Alexander Liam Lennon v. Tanya Marie Anderson

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION NOTICE DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. November 6, 2026 A party may file with the Supreme Court a Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62. Appeal No. 2026AP256 Cir. Ct. No. 2023FA836 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ALEXANDER LIAM LENNON, JOINT-PETITIONER-APPELLANT, V. TANYA MARIE ANDERSON, JOINT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County: STEPHANIE R. HILTON, Judge. Affirmed. ¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 In this divorce case, Alexander Liam Lennon, pro se, appeals an order of the circuit court finding him in contempt of court and 1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(h) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted.  No. 2026AP256 providing that jail time could be imposed as a remedial sanction. The contempt order followed Lennon’s failure to timely pay Tanya Marie Anderson’s attorney fees in this case, as required by an earlier circuit court order imposing sanctions for overtrial. The court entered the contempt order after Lennon failed to appear at a hearing presided over by a circuit court commissioner to address Lennon’s alleged contempt. In a separate order, the circuit court also rejected Lennon’s request for a de novo hearing regarding the contempt order. Lennon makes four arguments on appeal. ¶2 Lennon contends that the contempt order lacks adequate findings of his ability to pay the amount ordered as an overtrial sanction. I reject this argument because it was Lennon’s burden to prove that his failure to pay the ordered sanction was due to his inability to pay, and Lennon did not meet this burden when he failed to appear at the contempt hearing. ¶3 Lennon separately argues that the contempt order is void because it imposes confinement, even though it was not “issued by a judge” as required by WIS. STAT. § 785.07. I reject this argument, because the record reflects that the circuit court judge issued the contempt order, and Lennon fails to show that the manner in which the court issued the order was improper under the circumstances. ¶4 Lennon also contends that the contempt proceedings violated his procedural due process rights in the following ways: the contempt hearing was held after he was given defective service of notice for the hearing; he was effectively excluded from the contempt hearing when the circuit court denied his request to appear telephonically; the contempt order relied on findings of fact made at an unrecorded hearing; and Lennon’s request for de novo review of the 2  No. 2026AP256 contempt hearing was denied due to his absence from the hearing. I conclude that Lennon fails to establish that his due process rights were violated. ¶5 As another grounds for reversal of the contempt order, Lennon argues that the purge condition imposed is impossible for him to meet, rendering the sanction impermissibly punitive as opposed to remedial. I reject this argument because Lennon concedes the issue by failing to address Anderson’s arguments on the issue in his reply brief, and in any event Lennon fails to show that the circuit court clearly erred. ¶6 Accordingly, I affirm.2 BACKGROUND ¶7 Lennon and Alexander were married in 2021, and the circuit court entered a judgment of divorce dissolving the marriage in May 2024.3 ¶8 About one year later, Lennon, pro se, moved to vacate or alternatively to reopen the divorce judgment under WIS. STAT. § 806.07. Lennon made numerous other filings in support of this and other motions. This included an affidavit of indigency, which he filed in May 2025 for the purpose of obtaining 2 Lennon requests oral argument. I decline to exercise my discretion to grant this request. See WIS. STAT. § 752.31(3). Separately, Lennon moves this court to certify this appeal to our supreme court under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.61 based on what he contends is the novelty of the issue regarding WIS. STAT. § 785.07. This court declines Lennon’s motion to certify, because none of the issues raised in this appeal weigh in favor of certification. 3 The Hon. Frank D. Remington entered the judgment of divorce. The Hon. Stephanie R. Hilton issued the order sanctioning Lennon for overtrial, the order finding him in contempt, and the order denying Lennon’s request for a de novo hearing. 3  No. 2026AP256 a waiver of fees and costs in the litigation. Lennon averred that he received multiple forms of means-tested public assistance and could not afford to pay court costs due to poverty. ¶9 Anderson moved the circuit court to dismiss Lennon’s WIS. STAT. § 806.07 motion. Anderson further requested that the court find that Lennon had engaged in overtrial and, on that basis, to impose sanctions. ¶10 The circuit court dismissed Lennon’s WIS. STAT. § 806.07 motion, finding that Lennon had engaged in overtrial.4 Based on this order, the court entered a judgment in Anderson’s favor against Lennon in the amount of Anderson’s attorney fees and costs that she incurred defending against the motion. Specifically, the court ordered that Lennon pay Anderson $12,990 by September 1, 2025. I refer to this as the “overtrial sanction” and to the order as “the sanctions order.”5 4 This court has explained the overtrial concept this way: Overtrial is a doctrine developed in family law cases that may be invoked when one party’s unreasonable approach to litigation causes the other party to incur extra and unnecessary fees. It may also involve abuse of judicial resources through the unnecessary over-utilization of those resources. A party’s approach to litigation is unreasonable if it results in unnecessary proceedings or unnecessarily protracted proceedings, together with attendant preparation time. A circuit court may sanction a party who has engaged in overtrial by ordering that party to pay the opposing party’s attorney fees. A sanction furthers two objectives, providing compensation to the overtrial victim for fees unnecessarily incurred, and deterring unnecessary use of judicial resources. Yu v. Zhang, 2001 WI App 267, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 913, 637 N.W.2d 754 (citations omitted). 5 Lennon challenges the sanctions order, among other rulings, in a separate appeal that is currently pending before this court, Lennon v. Lennon, No. 2025AP1427. 4  No. 2026AP256 ¶11 On September 22, Anderson moved the circuit court to find Lennon in contempt for failing to comply with the sanctions order. A hearing on this motion was scheduled to be heard on January 6, 2026, in front of a circuit court commissioner (“the contempt hearing”). ¶12 Several days before the hearing, on January 2, Lennon filed a motion in the circuit court to adjourn the hearing based on several grounds, including an objection that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him based on allegedly defective service. Anderson opposed Lennon’s motion to adjourn and filed several exhibits that she contended demonstrated that Lennon had adequate notice of the contempt hearing before the court commissioner. ¶13 The court commissioner held the contempt hearing, and Lennon failed to appear. ¶14 On January 8, the circuit court issued an order that the court signed electronically that day, and which had been electronically signed by the court commissioner on January 7. I refer to this order as “the contempt order.” ¶15 The contempt order contained the following findings regarding Lennon’s notice of, and attendance at, the contempt hearing: Lennon had actual notice of the hearing; he called the clerk of the circuit court requesting to appear at the hearing by telephone; and he “chose not to attend the hearing” in person. ¶16 The contempt order also reflected findings regarding Lennon’s ability to pay the amount required by the sanctions order. This included the findings that Lennon had recently retained private counsel in various court cases, and that he had posted cash bail in two matters totaling $5,500. The order further stated that Anderson’s motion for contempt was granted “[b]y default.” 5  No. 2026AP256 ¶17 The contempt order sentenced Lennon to 90 days of jail, without Huber privileges.6 As a purge condition, the circuit court stated that Lennon had until February 26, 2026, to pay Anderson $14,365, which was the combined total of the unpaid overtrial sanction and Anderson’s fees and costs for pursuing the motion for contempt. The contempt order further stated, regarding this purge condition: If [Lennon] does not pay, [Anderson] may submit a sworn statement describing the circumstances…. If [Lennon] does not submit a sworn detailed reply contesting whether he paid or describing any new circumstances showing an inability to pay, it is highly likely that a bench warrant and commitment will be issued. Any reply suggesting a newly found inability to pay must also include a description of any efforts to make partial payment. The contempt order stated that a judicial lien in the amount of $14,365 “shall be placed” on any proceeds that Lennon may receive in a separate civil case then pending in federal court.7 ¶18 Lennon filed in the circuit court what he styled as an “emergency motion” to vacate or stay enforcement of the contempt order. The circuit court construed this motion as a request for de novo review of the court commissioner’s rulings, which the circuit court denied. The court relied on a local rule of the circuit court in Dane County that limits de novo appeals to parties who were 6 “Huber release grants leave privileges to county jail prisoners for purposes such as employment.” See State v. Rector, 2023 WI 41, ¶49 n.22, 407 Wis. 2d 321, 990 N.W.2d 213 (citing WIS. STAT. § 303.08). 7 The parties completed the briefing for this appeal after the passing of the deadline that was set in the contempt order for Lennon to pay the contempt sanction. As best I can discern from the briefing in this appeal, Lennon has not paid the contempt sanction, but he also has not served any portion of the jail sentence. In any event, Anderson does not suggest that any issue in this appeal is moot, and no issue that I resolve turns on these details. 6  No. 2026AP256 present at the hearing underlying the ruling of the court commissioner for which the parties seek review. ¶19 Lennon appeals the contempt order. DISCUSSION ¶20 In this appeal, Lennon does not challenge the circuit court order imposing the sanction for overtrial, nor does he dispute that he failed to timely comply with the court order that he pay Anderson. I address each of his arguments in turn. Further below, I address Anderson’s motion to this court requesting costs and fees under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3) because Lennon’s appeal is frivolous. I. Present Ability to Pay ¶21 As noted, Lennon argues that the findings in the contempt order were not adequate to demonstrate that he had the ability to pay the overtrial sanction. Under pertinent legal standards that I now summarize, Lennon’s argument fails because it was his burden to prove his inability to pay, and he did not meet that burden when he failed to appear at the contempt hearing. ¶22 I review the circuit court’s decision to exercise its contempt powers for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See City of Wisconsin Dells v. Dells Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 539 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1995). The circuit court’s findings of fact are upheld on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2)). ¶23 “A person may be held in contempt of court if he or she has the ability, but refuses, to comply with a circuit court order.” Benn v. Benn, 230 7  No. 2026AP256 Wis. 2d 301, 309, 602 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1999); see also; WIS. STAT. § 785.02 (“A court of record may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt of court.”). Pertinent here, a party refusing to pay a sum ordered by the court to another party can be found to be in contempt of court if the party ordered to pay has the ability to do so and “the refusal to pay is willful and with intent to avoid payment.” Benn, 230 Wis. 2d at 309-10; WIS. STAT. § 785.01(1)(b) (“‘Contempt of court’ means intentional … [d]isobediance, resistance[,] or obstruction of the authority, process[,] or order of a court.”). ¶24 The circuit court here imposed a “remedial sanction,” which is one “imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.” WIS. STAT. § 785.01(3). Remedial sanctions may be sought by “[a] person aggrieved by a contempt of court … by filing a motion for that purpose in the proceeding to which the contempt is related.” See WIS. STAT. § 785.03(1)(a). ¶25 If the person seeking a sanction makes a “prima facie showing … of a violation of an order” of the court, then the “alleged contemnor[] bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that [his or her] conduct was not contemptuous.” Noack v. Noack, 149 Wis. 2d 567, 575, 439 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Rapids Educ. Ass’n, 70 Wis. 2d 292, 321, 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Balaam v. Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d 20, 30, 187 N.W.2d 867 (1971)). Thus, when there is a prima facie case that a party failed to pay a sum ordered by the court, that party bears the burden “to show that [the party] was not able to pay and that [the] refusal to pay represents something other than a willful and intentional avoidance of payment.” Id. (citing Balaam, 52 Wis. 2d at 29-30). ¶26 This court has explained that an alleged contemnor can fail to meet his or her burden to rebut a prima facie case for contempt in many ways: 8  No. 2026AP256 [The contemnor’s] evidence may be insufficient or uncompelling; or he [or she] may present no evidence at all. Where an alleged contemnor chooses not to present evidence on his [or her] own behalf, we find no reason in law or logic that the [circuit] court would be precluded from finding the underlying conduct was contemptuous and holding the alleged contemnor in contempt. Nothing in the contempt statutes or in the case law interpreting those statutes precludes such an action. Rather, it is well-settled that issues must be raised before the [circuit] court or they are deemed [forfeited]. Even issues of constitutional importance can be [forfeited] or abandoned. Id. (citations omitted).8 Thus, it was permissible for the circuit court to hold the alleged contemnor in Noack in contempt because he “was silent by virtue of his absence from [the] contempt hearing.” Id. at 575-76. ¶27 Because Lennon does not argue that Anderson failed to make a prima facie case of noncompliance through her contempt motion, Lennon had the burden to show that his noncompliance was due to his inability to pay and was not due to his “willful and intentional avoidance of payment.” See id. at 575. Here, as in Noack, Lennon “was silent by virtue of his absence” from the contempt hearing. See id. at 575-76. Thus, it was not an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court here to determine that Lennon was in contempt “[b]y default.” ¶28 Lennon argues to the contrary that the burden in a contempt matter cannot, in his words, “shift to a party [who was] excluded from the proceeding.” I reject this argument because I conclude that it is contrary to the settled law 8 Although this court in Noack v. Noack, 149 Wis. 2d 567, 575, 439 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1989), refers to the “waiver” of issues by failing to appear at a contempt hearing, I interpret Noack to have referred to what is more precisely called the “forfeiture” of issues. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶28-29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (noting that case law has at times been “imprecise” in use of “waiver” and “forfeiture,” but explaining that the latter is failure to make the timely assertion of a right, as opposed to an intentional relinquishment of that right). 9  No. 2026AP256 described above, and Lennon does not cite to legal authority suggesting that it is not settled law. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (court of appeals may decline to consider arguments not supported by legal authority). ¶29 Moreover, Lennon fails to direct my attention to evidence in the record to support the premise that he was “excluded from” the contempt hearing. As noted in the background above, the contempt order included the findings that Lennon called the clerk of the circuit court requesting leave to appear at the contempt hearing by telephone and that he “chose not to attend the hearing.” This implied that Lennon’s request to appear telephonically was rejected by the court commissioner, a fact that Lennon confirms on appeal. Also implied in the contempt order are findings by both the court commissioner and the circuit court that Lennon was not credible, or that he provided insufficient support, when he represented that he was not able to appear at the hearing in person. Lennon does not show that any of these explicit or implicit findings were clearly erroneous. See Country Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2021 WI 35, ¶19, 396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511 (under clear error standard, “‘the circuit court’s findings are to be sustained if they do not go against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence,’” even if the evidence “‘present[s] competing factual inferences’” (quoted source omitted)). ¶30 More generally, Lennon does not develop an argument, based on pertinent authority, that the court commissioner erred by denying Lennon’s request to appear telephonically. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. He notes that, under local rules, the court commissioner had the discretion to allow Lennon to appear by video call or telephone, and that the court commissioner denied Lennon’s request without entering a written order to that effect. Lennon does not 10  No. 2026AP256 cite, much less attempt to apply, any authority regarding the discretionary decision of a circuit court or court commissioner to allow parties to appear telephonically. See id. (declining to address as inadequately briefed arguments that did not consist of “developed themes reflecting any legal reasoning”).9 ¶31 Lennon repeatedly emphasizes that he filed a sworn affidavit of indigency in the circuit court in May 2025, so that it was part of the record by the time the circuit court found Lennon in contempt in January 2026. In the affidavit, Lennon averred that he had little in the way of cash assets and received means- tested public assistance. Lennon argues that the court erred by finding him in contempt without considering the affidavit as evidence of his ability to pay the overtrial sanction. However, Lennon fails to support the proposition that, even though he failed to appear at the hearing, the court commissioner and the circuit court were required to search the record for evidence in his favor, or required to credit as evidence various record references. See id. By failing to appear, Lennon did not present any argument based on the affidavit filed months earlier, nor did he make himself available as a fact witness for the court commissioner or Anderson to question him on the topic of his ability to pay. ¶32 In a related series of arguments, Lennon challenges the individual findings contained in the contempt order regarding Lennon’s ability to pay the overtrial sanction, and contends that the order did not explicitly find that he had been “shirking” from pursuing income-producing opportunities. These arguments 9 While not necessary to my conclusion on this issue, I observe that, as a general matter, it would appear to be a sensible approach for a court commissioner, depending on various dynamics in a particular case, to have a strong preference for the advantages of being able to interact with parties face-to-face when evaluating sensitive issues involving personal finances and allegedly contemptuous conduct. 11  No. 2026AP256 all fail for at least the following reasons. The contempt order did not need to rely on the challenged findings because it was Lennon’s burden to show an inability to pay, and he did not appear. Although the contempt order includes these findings, it also found him in contempt “[b]y default.” See Noack, 149 Wis. 2d at 575. Closely related, Lennon’s failure to appear and challenge the findings at a hearing at which Anderson could respond to Lennon’s evidence and argument forfeited his ability to challenge the findings in this appeal. See id.; State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (noting purposes of the “forfeiture rule” that include “giv[ing] both parties and the circuit court notice of the issue and a fair opportunity to address [an] objection”).10 Further, Lennon does not persuade me that the circuit court clearly erred in making any relevant factual finding or in how it weighed any particular piece of evidence on the topic of Lennon’s ability to pay the overtrial sanction. See State v. Below, 2011 WI App 64, ¶4, 333 Wis. 2d 690, 799 N.W.2d 95 (“the trier of fact is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and alone is charged with the duty of weighing the evidence”). ¶33 Lennon notes that the United States Supreme Court has concluded that right to due process includes the requirement that states either provide counsel for indigent parties subject to civil contempt proceedings or else provide the following “alternative procedural safeguards” related to the topic of an alleged contemnor’s ability to pay: 10 Because the forfeiture rule is a rule of judicial administration, an appellate court has the authority to disregard the rule and address the merits of an unpreserved issue. State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶27, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530. But given the nature of the forfeiture and the history of litigation in this case, this would not be an appropriate occasion to disregard the rule. 12  No. 2026AP256 (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information …; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for [the defendant] to respond to statements and questions about his [or her] financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447-48 (2011). He argues that none of these safeguards were provided here. ¶34 Before addressing Lennon’s procedural safeguards argument further, I explain why I am not persuaded by Anderson’s argument that the safeguards in Turner do not apply here. Anderson contends that Wisconsin law provides for appointed counsel for the representation of indigent parties who are subject to civil contempt proceedings. But in support she cites authority explaining that there is a constitutional right to counsel when a party’s “liberty is threatened in a remedial contempt action brought by the government.” See State v. Pultz, 206 Wis. 2d 112, 131, 556 N.W.2d 708 (1996) (emphasis added). This court has declined to recognize such a constitutional right in actions initiated by private parties. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, No. 2016AP530, ¶26, unpublished slip op. (Jul. 19, 2017) (declining to apply Pultz to case that “was not initiated by the state or an arm of the state”). Neither party identifies a statutory or regulatory right for someone in Lennon’s position to counsel. For these reasons, I assume without deciding that the “alternative procedural safeguards” described in Turner apply to the contempt proceedings here.11 11 For these same reasons, I reject Lennon’s brief argument that it was also error for the circuit court to issue the contempt order without advising him of the right to counsel under the rule stated in Pultz. 13  No. 2026AP256 ¶35 With this assumption in mind, I conclude that Lennon’s reliance on Turner fails because he forfeited any argument based on Turner by failing to appear at the contempt hearing. By failing to appear, Lennon eliminated an opportunity for the court commissioner to engage in a colloquy with the parties regarding topics relevant to the Turner safeguards. To cite only one example, the court commissioner had no chance to explore with Lennon whether he understood from Anderson’s motion that Lennon’s ability to pay the overtrial sanction was at issue.12 On a related point, Lennon’s motion to adjourn the contempt hearing suggested that he might need additional time to prepare a defense to the contempt, but he used vague terms to express this, and the court commissioner could not explore this concept with Lennon due to his absence from the hearing. Lennon does not persuade me that the procedural safeguards mentioned in Turner are not among the “issues of constitutional importance [that] can be [forfeited] or abandoned” by his failure to appear. See Noack, 149 Wis. 2d at 575. II. Issuance of Contempt Order by a Judge ¶36 Lennon argues that the contempt order should be reversed because it was not “issued” by the circuit court. Under WIS. STAT. § 785.07, “[a] contempt order imposing confinement shall be issued by a judge.” There is no dispute that the court commissioner was not a “judge,” and Lennon contends that the court commissioner issued the order, not the circuit court. This is so, he argues, because the circuit court did not “exercise … independent judicial discretion” by “reviewing evidence, making findings, and determining the sanction.” This is 12 On September 22, 2025, along with her contempt motion, Anderson filed a sworn declaration that stated, “[u]pon information and belief, Alexander has the ability to pay but is refusing to do so.” 14  No. 2026AP256 required, the argument continues, because “issuing” an order is a “substantive judicial act” as opposed to a ministerial act. ¶37 Citing dictionary definitions as evidence of the plain meaning of the word “issue,” Anderson argues that issuing an order means “to put forth officially” or “to send out or distribute officially.” See Issue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (giving definitions for the verb “issue” as opposed to the noun); accord Issue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/issue.13 Lennon does not argue that the circuit court did not “issue” the contempt order under this standard—the order, as it appears in the record, bears the electronic signature of the circuit court. ¶38 The interpretation and application of a statute presents issues of law that I review de novo. See Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶29, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85. ¶39 I agree with Anderson’s supported argument that “issued,” as used in WIS. STAT. § 785.07, means that the judge sent out or distributed the order. In support of his contrary argument, Lennon relies on case law that is not applicable, as I now explain. ¶40 Lennon notes that our supreme court has stated that a circuit court order made in the judge’s “chambers is ineffective until notice thereof has been served upon the opposite party or his attorney.” Yanggen v. Wisconsin Mich. 13 Courts may consult apt definitions in dictionaries to attempt to discern the meaning of undefined statutory terms as part of a plain-language analysis. Kyllonen v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 2026 WI App 2, ¶16, 419 Wis. 2d 433, 30 N.W.3d 901. The word “issued” is not defined for purposes of WIS. STAT. ch. 785. See WIS. STAT. § 785.01. 15  No. 2026AP256 Power Co., 241 Wis. 27, 32, 4 N.W.2d 130 (1942). Lennon argues that this establishes that “issuing” an order requires more than signing and distributing an order, and that the court must make its order at a proceeding for which the parties have proper notice. One problem with Lennon’s argument is that the court made this statement in Yanggen in a context that is not present here—namely, in the context of orders granting motions to extend the deadline to seek a new trial after a verdict. See id. at 30-31. Even setting this problem aside, however, Yanggen has no solving power here because, at the broadest level, the reasoning in that opinion is based on the principle that the parties should be aware of judicial orders that affect their rights. See id. at 31-32. Here, Lennon provides no evidence that the circuit court took any action that prevented him from being aware of the contempt order or its contents. ¶41 Lennon also cites United States v. Hondras, 176 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2001), as persuasive authority. In Hondras, the district court discussed “two different mechanisms by which a warrant or summons may be issued at the start of a criminal case.” See id. at 858. Under one rule, a magistrate judge must sign the warrant or summons. See id. (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(c)). Under another rule, “the court” must issue a warrant or summons, and the warrant or summons “‘shall be signed by the clerk.’” See id. (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(b)). The district court rejected the argument that the latter rule was contrary to federal statutory law or the Fourth Amendment. See id. ¶42 Lennon asserts that Hondras demonstrates that forming the substantive justification for issuing a legal document (there, a warrant or summons; here, a judicial order) is part of the act of issuing. But Hondras undermines, rather than supports, Lennon’s argument. In the course of explaining its reasoning, the district court distinguished between, on the one hand, the 16  No. 2026AP256 substantive requirement that warrants can be issued only on probable cause, and, on the other hand, which judicial actor (magistrate or clerk) is permitted to “issue” a warrant in part by signing it. See id. at 858-59.14 The district court explained that under both rules for issuing warrants, a substantive determination of probable cause is required before the separate act of issuance is permitted. ¶43 Thus, to the extent that the logic Hondras is persuasive and applicable here, it supports the conclusion that the circuit court complied with WIS. STAT. § 785.07 by issuing the contempt order. The act of issuance required a substantive basis for the finding of contempt and imposition of a remedial sanction, yet the act of issuance was separate from that substantive basis.15 ¶44 Further, to the extent that WIS. STAT. § 785.07 requires the circuit court to independently review the record as it relates to the contempt proceedings before issuing an order imposing confinement, Lennon provides no basis for me to conclude that the circuit court did not do so here. He emphasizes that the final contempt order differs in some respects from the order that was drafted and proposed to the court commissioner by Anderson’s counsel. The contempt order, signed first by the court commissioner and then the circuit court, clarified that: Lennon is not entitled to Huber release, added procedural clarifications to the 14 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court in Hondras, states that “[i]ssuing a warrant is not synonymous with signing a warrant.” United States v. Hondras, 296 F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit made this point to explain how a district court could “issue” a warrant even when the court directs a clerk to sign it, instead of the judge signing. See id. at 602-03. This reasoning only reinforces the concept that the act of issuing a warrant is different from the act of deciding that issuance is appropriate. See id. 15 One of the opinions that Lennon cites is a concurrence in an unpublished Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinion from 1989, and therefore I ignore this citation. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a)-(b) (unpublished cases may not be cited as persuasive authority if they were not issued on or after July 1, 2009). 17  No. 2026AP256 purge condition, and specified the amount of the judicial lien. Contrary to Lennon’s assertions on this topic, none of these changes demonstrate that the circuit court failed to independently consider the written submissions of the parties, Lennon’s failure to appear to contest Anderson’s arguments, and the broader record of the case in order to determine the appropriate sanctions and purge conditions in exercises of the court’s own discretion. ¶45 Lennon notes that the changes to the proposed order were made without a recorded hearing. But, as explained above, this was a result of Lennon’s own failure to appear at the hearing: there was nothing to record regarding the uncontested requests by Anderson. On a related point, I reject as unsupported Lennon’s assertion that the circuit court, under the circumstances here, was required to take additional evidence or allow for additional argument before determining that the findings in the contempt order supported the sanction, the purge condition, and the lien to be imposed. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. ¶46 If Lennon means to argue that the circuit court should have recognized—either from the face of the contempt order as it appeared to the circuit court after it had been signed by the court commissioner, or from some other part of the record—that some aspect of the order was defective or inappropriate, he fails to develop a supported argument to that effect that I do not reject elsewhere in this opinion. III. Due Process ¶47 In addition to Lennon’s argument based on Turner, he contends that the issuance of the contempt order violates several of his procedural due process rights. Whether Lennon’s due process rights were satisfied presents an issue that 18  No. 2026AP256 this court reviews de novo. See City of S. Milwaukee v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, ¶13, 347 Wis. 2d 334, 830 N.W.2d 710. A. Service of Notice ¶48 Lennon argues that the contempt order should be vacated because the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lennon during the contempt hearing, because Anderson failed to timely provide personal service to Lennon of notice of the contempt hearing. Under WIS. STAT. § 785.03(1)(a), the circuit court, “after notice and hearing, may impose a remedial sanction authorized” by WIS. STAT. ch. 785. Lennon further argues that here the circuit court erred in relying on the finding of the court commissioner—that Lennon had actual notice of the contempt hearing—to support the circuit court’s conclusion that the court had personal jurisdiction over Lennon. ¶49 Anderson argues that, regardless of the timing of her personally serving Lennon with notice of the contempt hearing, the circuit court properly found that it had jurisdiction based on a finding that Lennon had actual notice of the hearing. In support of this argument, Anderson cites our supreme court’s decision in Joint School District, 70 Wis. 2d 292. I agree with Anderson that Joint School District is dispositive based on the findings in the contempt order, which Lennon fails to show are clearly erroneous. ¶50 In Joint School District, our supreme court stated that “formal notice of the charge” that a party is in contempt of court, specifically in the form of “personal service” of an order to show cause, “is not always required.” Id. at 317; see also De