Full Opinion

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 19, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON NOVEMBER 19, 2026 SUPREME COURT CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 104521-2 Respondent, En Banc v. Filed: November 19, 2026 WALTER SCOTT AMSDEN, Petitioner. WHITENER, J. – Walter Amsden was convicted by a jury of violating a no contact order. During sentencing, the State failed to prove the existence of Amsden’s prior convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, reversed his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The court also allowed the State to present additional evidence to prove the alleged prior convictions. We granted review “on the issue of whether the Court of Appeals decision remanding for resentencing to allow the State to present additional evidence of Amsden’s criminal history conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 U.S. 821[, 144 S. Ct. 1840, 219 L. Ed. 2d 451] (2024).” Ord. Granting Rev. (Dec. 4, 2025). Amsden argues that the remand violates Erlinger, because it requires the sentencing court to make impermissible findings of fact. Specifically, Amsden argues the sentencing court would need to make factual findings regarding (1) the washout of prior convictions, (2) whether prior convictions constitute domestic violence offenses, and (3) whether foreign convictions are factually comparable to Washington offenses. We hold that Erlinger applies to the Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW. However, Erlinger does not apply to washout determinations because washout determinations do not increase a defendant’s punishment or penalty. In addition, domestic violence designations do not violate Erlinger if the designations were pleaded and proved to a prior jury. We do not reach the issue of factual comparability. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Petitioner Walter Amsden was arrested and charged with felony violation of a court order, and the State alleged the crime was committed against an intimate partner. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3. Prior to trial, Amsden stipulated that he had two 2 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 prior convictions for violating a protection order with domestic violence findings. Id. at 45-48, 60, 65. To convict a defendant of felony violation of a court order, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) at the time of the offense there existed a no contact order, (2) the defendant knew of the order, (3) the defendant knowingly violated the order, (4) the defendant had been convicted of violating an order twice before, and (5) the offense occurred in Washington. Id. at 74; see also RCW 7.105.450(5). Following a jury trial, Amsden was found guilty of violating the no contact order, and the jury also returned a special verdict form that Amsden and the victim were intimate partners. CP at 82-83. At sentencing, the State submitted Amsden’s prior convictions, which included domestic violence designations and convictions from foreign jurisdictions.1 Id. at 94. The State argued that Amsden’s previous convictions put him at a +9 offender score, which, paired with the seriousness level of the offense, put his standard range at 60 to 60 months. Id. at 85. Amsden argued that an exceptional sentence below the standard range was warranted based on mitigating factors. Id. at 122-27. In addition, he disputed several of his prior 1 Amsden has several prior convictions in Tennessee and Idaho. CP at 94. 3 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 convictions, believing they had “washed out.” Id. at 129; Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Mar. 21, 2024) (VRP) at 178. The sentencing court denied Amsden’s request for an exceptional sentence. VRP at 192. The court accepted his criminal history presented by the State and determined his standard range sentence was 60 to 60 months. CP at 132. The court sentenced Amsden to 30 months’ confinement followed by 30 months in community custody. Id. at 134-35. Amsden timely appealed. State v. Amsden, No. 40309-2-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/403092_unp.pdf. On appeal, Amsden argued that (1) he was denied due process when the trial court refused to bifurcate a jury instruction on whether the State had proved two prior protection order violations, (2) he was prejudiced when the trial court refused to redact the term “domestic violence” from the State’s no-contact order exhibit and otherwise prohibit its use of the term during trial, and (3) insufficient evidence was presented to prove his criminal history for purposes of calculating the offender score. Id. at 1. The Court of Appeals found Amsden’s first two arguments unconvincing. Id. at 9-10, 13. In addition, the State conceded Amsden’s third argument concerning his 4 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 offender score and agreed that it did not prove the existence of all prior convictions. Id. at 14. Amsden then argued that on remand, the State could not provide additional evidence because it would violate Erlinger. Id. at 15. The Court of Appeals held that Erlinger was limited to the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), and that it did not apply to Amsden’s case. Amsden, slip op. at 14. The court affirmed Amsden’s conviction but reversed and remanded his case for resentencing. Id. at 17. Amsden then sought our review. Pet. for Rev. (Sep. 2, 2025). ISSUES I. Whether Erlinger v. United States is applicable to the Washington Sentencing Reform Act. II. Whether a jury must decide that a conviction has “washed out.” III. Whether a jury must decide that a prior conviction constitutes a domestic violence offense. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review constitutional challenges de novo.” State v. Cubias, 155 Wn.2d 549, 552, 120 P.3d 929 (2005). 5 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 ANALYSIS I. Erlinger v. United States is applicable to the Washington Sentencing Reform Act Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), if a defendant has a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), they can face up to 10 years in prison. If the defendant also “has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense . . . committed on occasions different from one another,” the ACCA requires the sentence be a minimum of 15 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see also Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 826. In 2017, Paul Erlinger was charged in federal court and subsequently “pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g).” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 825-26. The government sought an increased sentence under the ACCA and relied on old convictions the defendant had for four burglaries that occurred over several days. Id. at 826-27. Erlinger objected and argued that the old burglaries had occurred during a single event and not on different occasions. Id. at 827. His request for a jury decision on the issue of whether the old burglaries occurred on separate occasions was denied, and Erlinger appealed. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed and held that a judge cannot 6 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 decide the factual question of whether “a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions.” Id. at 825. The Court concluded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution require a jury 2 to determine whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. Id. at 849. “The Sixth Amendment promises that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused’ has ‘the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.’” Id. at 830 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). “The Fifth Amendment further promises that the government may not deprive individuals of their liberty without ‘due process of law.’” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). “[T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments sought to ensure that a judge’s power to punish would ‘deriv[e] wholly’ from, and remain always ‘control[led]’ by, the jury and its verdict.” Id. at 831 (alterations in original) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004)). The Court reiterated that “‘[a] fact that increases’ a defendant’s exposure to punishment, whether by triggering a higher maximum or minimum sentence, must ‘be submitted to a jury’ and found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 833 (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 2 A jury represents a valid fact finder. This would include when a jury is waived and the court is the fact finder on guilty pleas. 7 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 570 U.S. 99, 111-13, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013)); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). “By requiring a unanimous jury to find every fact essential to an offender’s punishment, . . . [it] ensur[es] that the punishments courts issue are not the result of a judicial ‘inquisition’ but are premised on laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives and facts found by members of the community.” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 832 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 307). “Judges may not assume the jury’s factfinding function for themselves.” Id. at 834. In addition, the Court clarified that the Almendarez-Torres 3 exception allowing sentencing fact finding is extremely narrow. Id. at 838. “Under that exception, a judge may ‘do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was [previously] convicted of.’” Id. (quoting Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 511-12, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 195 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2016)). The Court did acknowledge that courts may need to access certain documents, “often called Shepard[4] documents, that include judicial records, plea agreements, and colloquies between a judge and the defendant.” Id. at 839. But the use of Shepard documents is “for the ‘limited function’ of determining 3 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998). 4 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 161 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2005). 8 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense.”5 Id. (quoting Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 186 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2013)). Whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions, the Court found, would require exploration of the means and manner in which the defendant committed the offenses. Id. at 839-40. In other words, facts as to the “time, location, character, and purpose” that could not be determined by Shepard documents. Id. at 840-41. “The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ‘contemplat[e] that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 840 (alteration in original) (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 269).6 In sum, the Supreme Court held that the only fact(s) a judge can find during sentencing are a defendant’s prior convictions and the related elements of those convictions. Id. at 838. Anything else must be determined by a jury. Erlinger is applicable here. The State argues that because the Supreme Court did not devote extensive time to state prosecutions, Erlinger does not represent a change to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 18. “We are 5 The Court also noted that Shepard documents may not be reliable because the defendant may not have felt the need to correct the judicial record. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 841-42. 6 The Court did note that often the question of whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions will be straightforward. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 842. But “[t]here is no efficiency exception to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 9 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal constitutional law.” State v. Vance, 168 Wn.2d 754, 762 n.7, 230 P.3d 1055 (2010). “The United States Supreme Court’s consideration of Sixth Amendment rights does apply to state cases.” State v. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d 468, 477, 325 P.3d 187 (2014). Although Erlinger deals with a federal statute, the rules discussed in Erlinger refine the application of the Sixth Amendment. “Apprendi and its progeny[’s] . . . change [to] federal case law requires us to revisit the issue of procedural due process.” State v. Wheeler, 145 Wn.2d 116, 121, 34 P.3d 799 (2001). Erlinger is an extension of Apprendi and its progeny, requiring the court to revisit procedural due process. II. In Washington, a “washed out” conviction does not increase a defendant’s punishment Erlinger applies only to facts that increase the defendant’s punishment. 602 U.S. at 834. The Almendarez-Torres exception applies only if the prior conviction is used in relation to the defendant’s punishment. Id. at 837-38. In Washington, the SRA was enacted “to make the criminal justice system accountable to the public by developing a system for the sentencing of felony offenders which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences.” RCW 9.94A.010. The goal “is to ensure that individuals who commit 10 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 similar crimes and have similar criminal histories receive equivalent sentences . . . without discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or to a defendant’s previous criminal record.” WASH. STATE CASELOAD FORECAST COUNCIL, 2025 WASHINGTON STATE ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 29 (SENTENCING GUIDELINES), https://cfc.wa.gov/sites/default/files/Publications/Adult_Sentencing_Manual_2025 _3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NEG-TN7H]; see also RCW 9.94A.340. “The SRA creates a grid of standard sentencing ranges calculated according to the crime’s seriousness level and the defendant’s offender score.” Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 472; see RCW 9.94A.510. The higher the offender score, the higher the standard sentence range. RCW 9.94A.510. There is a three-step process to determine an offender score: “(1) identify all prior convictions; (2) eliminate those that wash out;[7] (3) ‘count’ the prior convictions that remain in order to arrive at an offender score.” State v. Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d 169, 175, 240 P.3d 1158 (2010); RCW 9.94A.525. 8 Amsden challenges the second step and argues that determining when a conviction washes 7 A “washout” conviction is a prior conviction that is not included in the offender score. See State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 818, 239 P.3d 354 (2010). 8 Since the events of this case transpired, an amended version of RCW 9.94A.525 went into effect on January 1, 2026. See LAWS OF 2024, ch. 306, § 6. The relevant sections remain the same; therefore, we refer to the current statute. 11 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 out is a fact intensive inquiry that a jury must find. However, neither the State nor Amsden provides an analysis of when Erlinger attaches to RCW 9.94A.525. The Sentencing Guidelines provides guidance to judges on how to calculate an offender’s score. See generally SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Using the formula, the judge can determine the correct standard range. Id. at 256. Under the SRA, “[i]f the court is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has a criminal history, the court shall specify the convictions it has found to exist.” RCW 9.94A.500(1). The court then uses the statutory scheme that instructs “courts to ‘count’ the prior offenses by assigning different numerical values” when deciding how each of those convictions are scored. Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d at 175. Judges are advised that for sentencing purposes, a washed out conviction is not counted as criminal history. SENTENCING GUIDELINES at 59. There is no Erlinger concern when the court is merely determining which convictions exist. The first two steps in creating the offender score do not directly affect a defendant’s punishment. It is only the third step, when points are contributed to the prior offense, that a defendant’s punishment changes. See Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d at 175 (“Subsections (7) through (18) then provide specific rules regarding the actual calculation of offender scores, instructing courts to ‘count’ the prior offenses by assigning different numerical values to the prior offenses.”). The Sentencing 12 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 Guidelines’ scoring sheet does not have a section to consider washed out convictions because there is no corresponding point value assigned to washed out convictions. SENTENCING GUIDELINES at 256, 59. The purpose of the SRA is to structure judicial discretion, and in furtherance of that goal, the legislature determined that a washed out conviction should not be considered when calculating an offender score and the corresponding punishment. Erlinger applies to facts that “trigger[] a higher maximum or minimum sentence.” 602 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added and omitted). Under the SRA, washout convictions operate to remove convictions from a defendant’s criminal history. In essence, it lowers the defendant’s offender score, which can lower the standard sentencing range. Therefore, although Erlinger does apply to our SRA sentencing scheme, it does not apply to washout determinations. III. Where a domestic violence designation may increase a defendant’s punishment, it must be found by a jury A sentencing court may “‘determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was [previously] convicted of.’” Id. at 838 (quoting Mathis, 579 U.S. at 511-12). In State v. Abdi-Issa, the court noted: Designating a crime as one of domestic violence “‘does not itself alter the elements of the underlying offense[,] rather, it signals [to] the court 13 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 that the law is to be equitably and vigorously enforced.’” Further, a domestic violence designation itself does not increase a defendant’s punishment. 199 Wn.2d 163, 170, 504 P.3d 223 (2022) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Goodman, 108 Wn. App. 355, 359, 30 P.3d 516 (2001) (quoting State v. O.P., 103 Wn. App. 889, 892, 13 P.3d 1111 (2000))). Amsden argues that because domestic violence is not an element, it is improper for a court to determine domestic violence applied to a prior conviction.9 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 26. Specifically, he argues that any application of a prior domestic violence designation violates Erlinger. “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it— must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002). “[A] fact other than proof of a prior conviction that increases the minimum penalty authorized by law must be treated as an element, not a sentencing factor, for Sixth Amendment purposes.” State v. Allen, 192 Wn.2d 526, 539, 431 P.3d 117 (2018). “If the present conviction is for a felony domestic violence offense where domestic violence . . . was pleaded and proven, . . 9 Amsden misrepresents Abdi-Issa: “[T]his Court has said a domestic violence designation is not an ‘element’ of the crime.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 26. The court said it does not alter the underlying offense’s elements. This is true for aggravating factors as well. The base offense’s elements remain the same. 14 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 . [c]ount two points for each adult prior conviction where domestic violence . . . was pleaded and proven after August 1, 2011.” RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a). Here, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that domestic violence applied to Amsden’s current offense. Although not treated as an element of the underlying offense, the domestic violence designation does increase Amsden’s authorized punishment and must be treated as an element for Sixth Amendment purposes. When considering past convictions, the court considers the law in effect at the time of conviction. See In re Pers. Restraint of Canha, 189 Wn.2d 359, 372, 402 P.3d 266 (2017). In Washington, prior to August 1, 2011, a domestic violence designation could be made by a judge and had no effect on punishment. See Patricia Sully, Comment, Taking It Seriously: Repairing Domestic Violence Sentencing in Washington State, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 963, 980 (2011);10 see also Abdi-Issa, 199 Wn.2d at 169 n.2. After August 1, 2011, the legislature linked domestic violence designations with increasing an offender score. See RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a).11 Today, to conform with Blakely the domestic violence designator must be pleaded and proved to a jury. See Sully, supra, at 977.12 10 This law review article provides a detailed history of domestic violence statutes in Washington. 11 The current version of RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a) was added to the SRA on June 10, 2010, but the text makes August 1, 2011, the start date for an increase in the offender score. 12 Domestic violence is “pleaded and proven,” pursuant to RCW 9.94A.525(21), when (1) a valid charging instrument affirmatively alleges a domestic relationship (i.e., that the offense was committed between family or household 15 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 Abdi-Issa is inapposite, and Amsden’s reliance on the court’s discussion of domestic violence is limited to his challenge. Abdi-Issa did not deal with domestic violence in relation to RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a). Abdi-Issa’s discussion on whether domestic violence is an element, as quoted above, relies on cited cases 13 that predate the SRA amendment of RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a). 199 Wn.2d at 170. Prior to the amendment, a domestic violence designation did not have to be proved to a jury and did not increase a defendant’s offender score. Id. at 169 n.2. The addition of RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a), Apprendi’s progeny, and this court’s understanding of elements discussed in Allen in effect overruled previous case law on the domestic violence designator. In addition, Erlinger concerned a sentencing court going beyond the prior conviction to make determinations not previously found by a jury. A prior domestic violence designation through special verdict is an accusation confirmed by neighbors, see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477, or, in other words, an element a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt. A judge does not have to determine the means or manner of past offenses to find domestic violence. To determine whether a previous members or intimate partners) and (2) that fact was unanimously found, e.g. through a special verdict form, by a valid fact finder: a unanimous jury, the court if a jury is waived, or a valid plea or stipulation. 13 Goodman, 108 Wn. App. at 359; O.P., 103 Wn. App. at 892; State v. Spencer, 128 Wn. App. 132, 144, 114 P.3d 1222 (2005). 16 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 conviction constituted domestic violence, a sentencing court could refer to the previous judgment to see whether a jury found that domestic violence was present in the commission of the crime. To determine if multiple offenses occurred on separate occasions, a court would need to find facts never decided by a jury. “[A]t all times the ‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant had to be ‘confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [his] equals and neighbours.’” Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 831 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477). “The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ‘contemplat[e] that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 840 (alteration in original) (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 269). “[A] judge may not use information in Shepard documents to decide ‘what the defendant ... actually d[id],’ or the ‘means’ or ‘manner’ in which he committed his offense in order to increase the punishment to which he might be exposed.” Id. at 839-40 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Mathis, 579 U.S. at 510-11). Whether multiple offenses occurred on separate occasions is different from determining prior domestic violence. In Washington, before RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a) was implemented, it is likely that a domestic violence designation on a defendant’s conviction would not have 17 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 been found by a jury. See, e.g., State v. Hagler, 150 Wn. App. 196, 198, 208 P.3d 32 (2009) (“It is neither necessary nor advisable to inform the jury that charges have been designated as domestic violence crimes under chapter 10.99 RCW.”). In those cases, the judge would be finding a domestic violence designation based on other facts found by a jury. This judicial fact finding violates Erlinger. See, e.g., In re Beito, 167 Wn.2d 497, 504, 220 P.3d 489 (2009) (“Although Beito did stipulate to the facts that led the trial court to this finding, it was an additional finding that was needed to connect the murder with the rape (i.e., an unstipulated fact not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), a finding which is controlled by Blakely.”). 14 A current sentencing judge would not be able to rely on this previous judicial finding of fact. Similarly, whether a foreign jurisdiction’s domestic violence designation can be applied depends on whether the foreign jurisdiction requires a jury or allows a judge to determine the domestic violence designation. In order to comply with Erlinger, the Washington sentencing court must determine whether in that foreign jurisdiction a jury found, or the defendant pleaded to, the domestic violence designator. 14 This circumstance does not appear to apply to Amsden. The criminal history previously presented by the State shows all Washington domestic violence offenses occurring after August 1, 2011. CP at 86. The State will still need to establish these prior convictions and domestic violence designations on remand. 18 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 A domestic violence designator can affect a defendant’s offender score, which can increase a defendant’s sentence. Here, a jury does not have to determine whether Amsden’s prior convictions constitute a domestic violence offense, as long as such a determination was made by the prior jury or fact finder. Therefore, Amsden has failed to show that RCW 9.94A.525(21)(a) violates Erlinger in his case. Finally, Amsden argues that factual comparability of a foreign conviction violates Erlinger because it requires the sentencing court to go beyond the prior convictions and the related elements of those convictions. The State concedes that it will not seek to include Amsden’s prior foreign convictions in his offender score,15 making the issue moot. AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase II, LLC, 3 Wn.3d 80, 86, 546 P.3d 385 (2024). CONCLUSION The Court of Appeals’ decision remanding for resentencing to allow the State to present additional evidence of Amsden’s criminal history does not conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger.16 Accordingly, we affirm. 15 Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 (May 21, 2026), at 22 min., 05 sec. to 22 min., 22 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-state- supreme-court-2026051049/ 16 Because Amsden has failed to establish that his resentencing will violate Erlinger, we do not address his argument, raised for the first time in his supplemental brief, that a court on remand may not empanel a sentencing jury. 19 State v. Amsden, No. 104521-2 ______________________________ WE CONCUR. Melody, J. Angelis, J. 20