Full Opinion

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON NOVEMBER 19, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON NOVEMBER 19, 2026 SUPREME COURT CLERK IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ) BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT, ) No. 104579-4 INC. dba ANYTIME FITNESS, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) WASHINGTON STATE ) DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ) AND INDUSTRIES, ) ) Petitioner. ) Filed: November 19, 2026 _______________________________) GONZÁLEZ, J.—Under a Washington statute, state safety inspectors may “enter a worksite at an entry point designated by the employer or, in the event no entry point has been designated, at a reasonably recognizable entry point” to request consent to inspect and investigate violations of workplace safety regulations. RCW 49.17.070(3). We are asked whether, under this statute, state safety inspectors were authorized to follow a customer into a key card accessible fitness center’s front entrance, illuminated with an “open” sign, to request consent to inspect and investigate claims that the fitness center was operating in violation Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 of a COVID-19 emergency workplace safety regulation. We hold that the inspectors did not violate this statute. We are also asked whether the inspectors’ entry violated the search and seizure provisions of the federal constitution. We conclude that Bradshaw Development Inc. has not demonstrated an expectation of privacy in the fitness center’s front entrance area, which impliedly invited the public to enter to make legitimate business inquiries, and the inspectors did no more than a reasonably respectful person would have done. Accordingly, we hold the inspectors’ entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While the protections of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution are often broader than the Fourth Amendment’s, an independent state constitutional analysis has not been adequately presented in this case. Therefore, we do not reach the state constitution under these facts. We reverse, vacate the trial court’s order dismissing the inspectors’ citation, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. BACKGROUND Proclamation by Governor Jay Inslee No. 20-25.4 (Wash. May 31, 2020)1 temporarily restricted certain business activities to fight the spread of COVID-19. 1 https://governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/20-25.4%20COVID- 19%20Safe%20Start.pdf[https://perma.cc/4HY6-S2CM] 2 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 See Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 722-28 (describing Washington’s phased reopening plan). In support of that proclamation, the Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) enacted an emergency workplace safety rule to prohibit employers from allowing employees to perform work where business activity has been prohibited by an emergency proclamation. Former WAC 296-800-14035 (Wash. St. Reg. 20- 12-017, effective May 26, 2020); see also CP at 31-32, 1144. Wesley Bradshaw owns Bradshaw Development Inc., operating as Anytime Fitness. Gyms and fitness centers were among the businesses that were temporarily closed in Yakima County in June 2020. L&I received a complaint that Anytime Fitness in Selah was open, and operating as usual, in violation of the emergency proclamation. On June 15, 2020, L&I workplace safety inspectors visited that Anytime Fitness location to determine if the business was violating the emergency workplace safety rule. On arrival, the L&I inspectors “saw a lit neon ‘open’ sign in the window of the building but the doors opened only to individuals who had key cards.” CP at 32. This was the gym’s “only obvious entrance.” Id. at 28. The inspectors unsuccessfully attempted to reach anyone at the gym by telephone at the posted number. They entered the locked gym by safely following someone carrying a 3 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 gym bag.2 Inside, the L&I inspectors saw people exercising, sitting in an office, and apparently assisting a customer with a new gym membership. The inspectors asked an employee for consent to conduct an inspection of the facility. The first person the inspectors spoke with declined to give consent and asked them to wait where they were for the general manager. As they waited for about 20 minutes, the inspectors “observed several people enter the building as well as a chalkboard on which was written, ‘Welcome back.’” Id. at 32. The inspectors left after the general manager arrived and said he did not consent to them conducting an inspection. Based on the inspectors’ report, L&I cited Bradshaw Development Inc. for willfully violating former WAC 296-800-14035 and assessed a penalty of $9,639. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals reinstated the citation after an industrial appeals judge vacated the citation based on insufficient evidence. 3 See id. at 32- 34. The Board explained that the inspectors “had the right to enter the building for 2 To describe the inspectors’ entry, after recognizing the inspectors entered “in a safe manner,” the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals used the colloquial term “tailgating,” using quotation marks, without defining it. CP at 28. Based on the testimony, the term describes an inspector “grabb[ing] the door and follow[ing]” a key card holder inside the locked gym. Id. at 1195. The dissent effectively makes its own factual finding that the inspectors were acting in a sneaky manner, suggesting their actions were contrary to policies established and enforced by Bradshaw, but the Board did not find that to be the case, and the evidence is not sufficient to support that conclusion. We are not the fact finder. We should constrain ourselves to making legal judgments. 3 L&I had also cited Bradshaw for willfully violating the emergency workplace safety rule three times in July 2020. The inspectors did not enter any of the Anytime Fitness locations in July. The Board adopted the industrial appeals judge’s decision to vacate those three citations based on insufficient evidence and the State did not cross-appeal. CP at 32-34. 4 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 the sole purpose of obtaining consent to inspect the premises” and properly relied on their observations inside the gym while awaiting consent, along with the owner Wesley Bradshaw’s refusal to answer questions, to find the violation willful. Id. at 27-29. Bradshaw sought review in Yakima County Superior Court, which adopted the Board’s findings of fact but vacated the citation on statutory and constitutional grounds.4 That court agreed with the Board that RCW 49.17.070 allowed the L&I inspectors to enter the gym for the purpose of obtaining consent but concluded any observations inside the gym were inadmissible because, it concluded, “A business that limits entry to keycard holders is not open to the public. Therefore, Anytime Fitness had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the commercial premises.” CP at 1297. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 34 Wn. App. 2d 705, 571 P.3d 300 (2025). The Court of Appeals held that neither the statute nor the state and federal constitutions allowed the inspectors to enter a commercial premises’ key card accessible doors without permission through “tailgating”; therefore, any of their 4 If the Board’s findings were challenged, we would review them to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Potelco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 191 Wn. App. 9, 21, 361 P.3d 767 (2015). Here, in the absence of a proper challenge, the Board’s factual findings are binding. 5 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 observations inside the gym were inadmissible. See id. at 721-24. The State successfully sought our review. 5 Wn.3d 1042 (2026). The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington Foundation (ACLU of WA) has filed an amicus brief in support of Bradshaw. ANALYSIS 1. ENTRY UNDER THE STATUTE The Washington Legislature has enacted legislation “in order to assure, insofar as may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful working conditions for every [person] working in the state of Washington.” RCW 49.17.010. All workers in Washington are entitled to safe workplaces and, for workers in some industries, workplace safety is a fundamental right protected by our constitution. See id.; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35; Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 196 Wn.2d 506, 519-20, 475 P.3d 164 (2020). To implement these assurances and protect these rights, our legislature enacted WISHA, 5 along with many other statutes, and authorized L&I workplace safety inspectors to “enter a worksite at an entry point designated by the employer or, in the event no entry point has been designated, at a 5 Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, chapter 49.17 RCW. WISHA requires the State’s worker safety program to equal or exceed federal workplace safety standards. RCW 49.17.010. 6 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 reasonably recognizable entry point” to request consent to inspect and investigate violations of workplace safety regulations. RCW 49.17.070. Bradshaw contends RCW 49.17.070, read in light of its context and history, prohibits L&I inspectors from entering a locked business by following a customer inside and the L&I inspectors were required to get a warrant under RCW 49.17.075 to enter the gym. To determine whether the inspectors were statutorily authorized to enter, we must look at the plain meaning of RCW 49.17.070, .075, and related statutes. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We “must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003); see also State v. Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 282, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008) (courts “‘cannot press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2000))). Our legislature directs L&I inspectors, once they present their credentials to the owner or other person with authority, to “enter without delay and at all reasonable times” to investigate workplace safety “during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.” LAWS OF 1973, ch. 80, § 7, codified as RCW 49.17.070. Originally, both 7 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 state and federal law purported to allow inspectors to enter without a warrant or exception to the warrant requirement. See 29 U.S.C § 657(a). Before our legislature amended the state statute to add procedural protections, the United States Supreme Court had held the federal law “is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978); see also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967). In 2006, our legislature made its intent clear: The legislature intends that inspections performed under the Washington industrial safety and health act ensure safe and healthful working conditions for every person working in the state of Washington. Inspections must follow the mandates of Article II, section 35 of the state Constitution, and equal or exceed the requirements prescribed by the occupational safety and health act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590). The legislature also intends that the inspections comply with the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the state Constitution. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 31, § 1. 6 Our legislature made the workplace safety directive subject to, among other things, a consent requirement. Id. § 2. Specifically, L&I inspectors “entering any worksite located on private property” must enter “in a safe 6 Our legislature expressed the intent for RCW 49.17.070 to comport with state and federal constitutional standards and also enacted a warrant procedure for L&I. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 31, § 1; see also id. § 3, codified as RCW 49.17.075. We address the state and federal constitutions below. 8 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 manner . . . at an entry point designated by the employer” or, if none has been designated, “at a reasonably recognizable entry point” to gain consent to inspect. RCW 49.17.070(3). As the House testimony in support of the amendment explained, “The notion is that the Department will go in at a place where most people would enter the property.” H.B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2538, at 3, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). Our legislature also specified that L&I may take “action consistent with a recognized exception to the warrant requirements of the federal and state Constitutions” and is not required to give “advance notice of an inspection.” RCW 49.17.070(4)-(5). Here, to gain consent as authorized by WISHA, the inspectors entered through a key card accessible front door by safely following a key card holder inside. The Board found this was the “only obvious entrance.” CP at 28. There was no other entry point designated by the employer. The inspectors observed an illuminated neon “open” sign and entered through the adjacent front door. The statute does not specify an entry point has to be unlocked, and we would be adding words to the statute to hold a key card accessible front door is an unreasonable point of entry for inspectors seeking consent from a business owner while the business is open. See RCW 49.17.070(3). Under these facts, the open gym’s front door is a reasonably recognizable entry point. The inspectors’ entry did not violate the statute. 9 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 Next, we address whether the inspectors’ entry violated Bradshaw’s constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the inspectors’ entry did not violate Bradshaw’s right to privacy, then the inspectors were justified in occupying the space where they sought consent. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY “We review claims that constitutional rights were violated de novo.” State v. Vanhollebeke, 190 Wn.2d 315, 321, 412 P.3d 1274 (2018). “The right to be free from searches by government agents is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and law, and it is enshrined in our state and national constitutions.” State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 893, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, a search occurs “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012)). Further, a search occurs when (1) there is a subjective manifestation of privacy in the area searched and (2) society recognizes that privacy interest as reasonable. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 10 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in [their] own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. “The Fourth Amendment does not . . . prevent all investigations conducted on private property.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6; see, e.g., Patel v. City of Montclair, 798 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding the areas of a motel “open to the public are not within the enumerated items in the Fourth Amendment; therefore, no search occurs when police officers enter those areas”). A business owner retains no privacy interest “in areas of its licensed premises that it actively invites the public to enter.” Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 398, 288 P.3d 343 (2012) (citing Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. at 315); accord Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1985) (“Here, respondent did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to enter and to transact business.”). In contrast, a business owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in nonpublic areas of commercial premises, and this ordinarily requires a warrant (or a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent) before a state actor may enter. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96 11 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987); see Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. at 315; see also, e.g., See, 387 U.S. at 545 (locked warehouse). 7 The protections of article I, section 7 of our state constitution are “qualitatively different from,” and often broader than, those provided by the Fourth Amendment. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267, 868 P.2d 134 (1994). “[O]ur state constitution goes further” than the federal constitution “and requires actual authority of law before the State may disturb the individual’s private affairs.” Day, 161 Wn.2d at 893; see also State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 580, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (“Under Const. art. [I], § 7, the focus is whether the ‘private affairs’ of an individual have been unreasonably violated rather than whether a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable.”). In determining whether there is a disturbance of private affairs, we examine “‘the nature and extent’ of the intrusion ‘and the extent to which the information has been voluntarily exposed to the public.’” State v. Evans, 5 Wn.3d 199, 210-11, 572 P.3d 1172 (2025) (quoting State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 522, 192 P.3d 360 (2008)). “Interference with the broad right to privacy can be legally authorized by statute or common law, but 7 In See, the United States Supreme Court held a person “may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant” for a nonpublic space. 387 U.S. at 546. The Court did not hold that entering a locked door without consent violates a reasonable expectation of privacy or is a trespassory search of a constitutionally protected area enumerated within the text of the Fourth Amendment. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (recognizing “[t]he Government’s physical intrusion on” an unenumerated area “is of no Fourth Amendment significance”). Accordingly, contrary to the dissent’s assertions, See is not analogous. 12 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 only insofar as is reasonably necessary to further substantial governmental interests that justify the intrusion.” State v. Chacon Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). In the context of WISHA inspections of commercial businesses, the State argues that our state “[c]onstitution’s protections are coextensive with those of the Fourth Amendment.” Suppl. Br. of L&I at 18 (citing Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005)). To show our state constitution is more protective here, Bradshaw was required to “provide argument and relevant authorities supporting the specific outcome they seek in light of ‘the constitutional text, the historical treatment of the interest at stake as reflected in relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest.’” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 881, 434 P.3d 58 (2019) (quoting State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 463, 158 P.3d 595 (2007)). We decline to reach the issue of whether the state constitution’s privacy protections for commercial business are different under these facts because Bradshaw did not adequately present an independent state constitutional analysis. Under the Fourth Amendment, a threshold question is whether Bradshaw had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front entrance area of Anytime Fitness. Specifically, the party arguing that government agents searched a private location “‘has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and 13 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 that the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one that society is willing to accept.’” United States v. Perry, 548 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also State v. Evans, 159 Wn.2d 402, 409, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (holding that the defendant, “[t]o establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy,” must “satisfy a twofold test: (1) Did he ‘exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve something as private?’ and (2) ‘[d]oes society recognize that expectation as reasonable’” (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App. 162, 168, 907 P.2d 319 (1995))). Here, Bradshaw has not carried its burden. The State contends that Bradshaw has no expectation of privacy in the common area of the gym that members of the public with key cards may access. Bradshaw argues to the contrary, reasoning that “a locked key card exterior door is an objective manifestation that the interior is not a space the general public may enter at will.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 25. Like Bradshaw, the ACLU of WA would set the constitutional limit at a business’s locked door. The ACLU of WA contends that the State’s argument is contradicted by the leading treatise: “‘[A] club or other business that is operated for a select clientele may not be public’” and “‘the actual practice as to admitting persons into such facilities must be considered in making the determination of whether there was in fact a justified expectation of privacy therein.’” Br. of 14 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 12-13 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(b) (6th ed. 2020)); see also Asher v. City of Little Rock, 449 S.W.2d 933, 936-37 (Ark. 1970). The State responds that Bradshaw had no privacy interest because it flouted the emergency proclamation and permitted customers and prospective customers to enter. See L&I’s Resp. to Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 9. The State grounds its argument in four cases that, it says, establish a business has no reasonable expectation of privacy under these facts. Suppl. Br. of L&I at 22. We disagree with the full range of the State’s argument but ultimately agree with the State that no search occurred in this case. Bradshaw has not shown that Anytime Fitness prohibited the public from entering the front entrance area to make legitimate business inquiries, such as seeking to join the gym, which means Bradshaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that location. Before considering the State’s authority, we note that courts repeatedly have considered whether there is an expectation of privacy in membership businesses whose premises are locked and reserved for members and their guests. Perry, for example, involved a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) hall with a locked door and a buzzer. 548 F.3d at 692. The court found no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because Javarlo Perry did not present evidence that a members-only policy “was strictly enforced in the past.” Id. To the contrary, the evidence of 15 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 record was that individuals, including police officers, were “admitted into the VFW without incident, though they sometimes had to wait a few moments after pressing the buzzer.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa. Super. 69, 72-73, 75- 76, 396 A.2d 649 (1978) (holding that “a locked front door activated by a buzzer system” was insufficient to create an expectation of privacy in a membership club that allowed undercover police officers to enter one time alone and another time by joining a group of others seeking admittance). The ACLU of WA brings to our attention a case involving a similar business restriction made in response to COVID-19. See Br. of Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 13 (citing Alexander Indus., LLC v. Town of Holly Ridge, 2022 WL 288178 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 31, 2022) (court order)). In that case, state actors obtained the unauthorized key card of the former owner without the knowledge or consent of the current owner and did a warrantless search of the premises. Alexander Indus., 2022 WL 288178 at *2-4. The district court, in declining to dismiss a civil action against the investigators, reasoned that “[d]rawing the line between what commercial premises are protected and what are not hinges on what structures or policies were in place to maintain privacy in the disputed space.” Id. at *3. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court was required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Because the gym was secured with a key card, the owner “reasonably could have expected that only gym members with keycards would access it.” Id. at 16 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 *4 (citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1154 (1968)). Importantly, the plaintiff alleged that “the gym had a policy in place of allowing only gym members onto the premises.” Id. (emphasis added). “That members of the public belonging to the Gym regularly accessed it does not alter the analysis, as it was equally well-established that access so limited does not defeat an otherwise reasonable expectation in privacy.” Id. at *5 (citing Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369). These principles are applicable, but a different societal expectation applied here. Bradshaw did not offer any evidence of a policy limiting admission into the gym or that such a policy was consistently enforced. Even assuming that Bradshaw’s decision to make the front entrance of its commercial gym key card accessible is a subjective manifestation of privacy under the first prong of Kyllo, Bradshaw did not provide facts sufficient to establish that expectation was objectively reasonable under its second prong. 533 U.S. at 33. Rather, considering the gym’s illuminated “open” sign, and the lack of evidence of any policy or practice of excluding those who wished to enter for business purposes, Bradshaw impliedly invited nonmembers with legitimate business inquiries inside. A government inspector does not conduct a search simply by occupying a space they were impliedly invited to enter. Importantly, Bradshaw did not take 17 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 steps to prevent unauthorized entry by outsiders. 8 Business owners are required to take adequate measures to restrict the public from accessing private areas. The lock on an open business’ front entrance manifests an intent to exclude trespassers, but it does not manifest an intent to exclude members of the public with legitimate business inquiries from entering the premises’ front entrance area. Here, the inspectors entered to make an equivalent inquiry. In an unchallenged finding of fact, the Board found, “For the sole purpose of obtaining consent to conduct an inspection, the [inspectors] followed into the facility a woman who was carrying a gym bag and opened the front door.” CP at 32. Nothing in that finding suggests the inspectors did anything in an underhanded or improper fashion. During regular business hours, and absent evidence to the contrary, a gym owner in Bradshaw’s position should reasonably expect a 8 For example, the record does not show Bradshaw had a “members only” sign at the entrance or an enforced policy that forbids members from allowing nonmembers inside, or a screening mechanism to prohibit nonmembers (or other categories of visitors) from entering. Notably, L&I issues a compliance manual that includes nonbinding guidance and procedures related to how to obtain consent, including when inspectors encounter a “no trespassing” sign. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH COMPLIANCE MANUAL 3-1 to 3-3 (Feb. 17, 2025). This compliance manual does not address the circumstances presented in this case; we accord it no weight and refer to it to provide context only. See Seattle Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 25 Wn. App. 2d 762, 778, 524 P.3d 733 (2023) (“The compliance manual is not binding law. It is an internal set of guidelines for the Department to follow.”); cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 191 L. Ed. 2d 186 (2015) (explaining that “the critical feature of interpretive rules is that they are ‘issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers’” (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99, 115 S. Ct. 1232, 131 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1995))). 18 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 prospective member, a hopeful vendor, or a person delivering a package, to safely grab the door and follow a key card holder inside the front entrance area to make an inquiry. The state inspectors had the same license. At the same time, we disagree with the State that the constitution permits its inspectors to go beyond the front entrance area and freely go wherever a member of the gym is entitled to access. Bradshaw has a greater privacy interest in the areas of the gym where workout equipment is used and its locker rooms because it is not customary for nonmembers to occupy such spaces without express permission. State actors have the same license to intrude as a “reasonably respectful citizen.” State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44 (1981); see also, e.g., State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 314, 4 P.3d 130 (2000) (state actors entered an impliedly open rear driveway at midnight “when no reasonably respectful citizen would be welcome absent actual invitation or an emergency”). An unlawful search occurs when a state actor exceeds the scope of their implicit license to enter. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 903. For example, “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011)). That “implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) 19 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 leave.” Id. In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court concluded it would not be “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc., for a stranger to explore the curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.” Id. at 8 n.2.9 The inspectors, who entered with a limited purpose, did not exceed the limited scope of the implicit license that Bradshaw granted to members of the public who want to make legitimate business inquiries inside. Nothing in this record makes us doubt that safely grabbing the door and following a key card holder into the open gym was “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, and nonalarming.” Id. There is no evidence that the person the inspectors followed inside objected to their entry. No search occurred because the inspectors were lawfully present where they observed Bradshaw’s employees working in violation of the emergency workplace safety rule. Importantly, once inside, instead of being asked to leave, the inspectors were told they could wait where they were, which confirms the minimal privacy interest in the space the inspectors occupied (near the front entrance). Finally, the inspectors left when they were told to. 9 In the context of an open business, making inquiries is what custom allows. Here, the inspectors were required to leave (and did) when it became clear they were not welcome. We do not mean to imply that an open business yields the same license to enter as the curtilage of a house. See Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312. 20 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 The ACLU of WA stresses that increasingly “pervasive federal government overreach” threatens privacy. See Br. of Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 1-2 (“In the past year, federal officers have invaded childcare centers, college buildings, apartments, and workplaces in search of suspected non-citizens.” (footnotes omitted)). The State says it shares ACLU of WA’s concerns “regarding federal overreach.” L&I’s Resp. to Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 1. We stress the narrowness of our holding and recognize structures, policies, and customs limit how far inside a gym or other business a member of the public with a legitimate business inquiry (and therefore a state actor) can reasonably enter under the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that “[w]e do not decide today whether a member of a private club, which employs a restrictive admissions policy that it strictly and consistently enforces, has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy therein.” Perry, 548 F.3d at 692. We also reiterate, “What is reasonable cannot be determined by a fixed formula. It must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 903 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963)). Under the Fourth Amendment, Bradshaw did not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front entrance area of its gym, and the inspectors therefore did not exceed the scope of their implicit license to enter the gym. 21 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 Everything the inspectors saw inside Bradshaw’s gym was admissible because they were justified in occupying its front entrance area to seek consent to conduct an inspection of the facility. We now turn to the cases the State cites in further support of its argument. First, the State relies on the holding in State v. Hastings that when “‘outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business’ . . . [b]usiness transactions with the public are not ‘private affairs’.” 119 Wn.2d 229, 232-33, 830 P.2d 658 (1992) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S. Ct. 424, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1966)). In that case, state actors employed a ruse to obtain an invitation into a home to buy drugs. Id. at 232-33. The State contends, “Tailgating to gain entry is constitutionally no different than a ruse.” Suppl. Br. of L&I at 27. Hastings offers weak support to the State. Here, the inspectors were not actively invited inside the gym for an illegal activity, were not undercover, and did not employ a ruse to elicit an invitation. While Bradshaw’s gym openly violated the emergency proclamation, it would stretch the holding of Hastings to apply it here. Nevertheless, the gym’s illuminated “open” sign, coupled with the lack of any sign or individual prohibiting entry by nonmembers impliedly invited the public to enter inside for legitimate business inquiries. Second, the State relies on the holding in State v. Carter that a privacy interest is abandoned when select members of the public are exposed to illegal 22 Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4 activity. 151 Wn.2d 118, 126-27, 85 P.3d 887 (2004). In that case, state actors inspected and seized an illegally modified gun that they were actively invited to handle in a class they attended off duty. Id. at 121, 124. Again, it would stretch the holding of Carter to apply it here. The inspectors were not expressly invited to enter the gym, were not off duty, and were not going to the gym on their own time. Third, the State relies on the holding in State v. Lakotiy that there is no privacy interest in the common area of a gated commercial storage facility. 151 Wn. App. 699, 713, 214 P.3d 181 (2009). In that case, an individual with an access code gave state actors permission to enter the facility. Id. at 704. The Court of Appeals held there is “no state or federal constitutionally protected privacy interest in the common area of a gated commercial storage facility,” particularly for an individual who is not renting a storage unit. Id. at 713. While the court did not reach the state actors’ actual authority to enter the common area, it is notable that the storage facility’s manager consented to the entry. Id. at 704. Lakotiy is distinguishable from this case because Lakotiy did not involve the facility owner’s privacy. Nevertheless, Lakotiy supports the cases discussed above that hold that a locked door, by itself, will not establish a protected privacy interest in at least some categories of commercial premises. Fourth, the State relie