Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus.
CourtWashington Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket104,579-4
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FILE
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
)
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT, ) No. 104579-4
INC. dba ANYTIME FITNESS, )
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) En Banc
)
WASHINGTON STATE )
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR )
AND INDUSTRIES, )
)
Petitioner. ) Filed: November 19, 2026
_______________________________)
GONZÁLEZ, J.—Under a Washington statute, state safety inspectors may
“enter a worksite at an entry point designated by the employer or, in the event no
entry point has been designated, at a reasonably recognizable entry point” to
request consent to inspect and investigate violations of workplace safety
regulations. RCW 49.17.070(3). We are asked whether, under this statute, state
safety inspectors were authorized to follow a customer into a key card accessible
fitness center’s front entrance, illuminated with an “open” sign, to request consent
to inspect and investigate claims that the fitness center was operating in violation
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
of a COVID-19 emergency workplace safety regulation. We hold that the
inspectors did not violate this statute.
We are also asked whether the inspectors’ entry violated the search and
seizure provisions of the federal constitution. We conclude that Bradshaw
Development Inc. has not demonstrated an expectation of privacy in the fitness
center’s front entrance area, which impliedly invited the public to enter to make
legitimate business inquiries, and the inspectors did no more than a reasonably
respectful person would have done. Accordingly, we hold the inspectors’ entry did
not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
While the protections of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
are often broader than the Fourth Amendment’s, an independent state constitutional
analysis has not been adequately presented in this case. Therefore, we do not reach
the state constitution under these facts. We reverse, vacate the trial court’s order
dismissing the inspectors’ citation, and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Proclamation by Governor Jay Inslee No. 20-25.4 (Wash. May 31, 2020)1
temporarily restricted certain business activities to fight the spread of COVID-19.
1
https://governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/20-25.4%20COVID-
19%20Safe%20Start.pdf[https://perma.cc/4HY6-S2CM]
2
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
See Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 722-28 (describing Washington’s phased reopening
plan). In support of that proclamation, the Department of Labor and Industries
(L&I) enacted an emergency workplace safety rule to prohibit employers from
allowing employees to perform work where business activity has been prohibited
by an emergency proclamation. Former WAC 296-800-14035 (Wash. St. Reg. 20-
12-017, effective May 26, 2020); see also CP at 31-32, 1144.
Wesley Bradshaw owns Bradshaw Development Inc., operating as Anytime
Fitness. Gyms and fitness centers were among the businesses that were
temporarily closed in Yakima County in June 2020. L&I received a complaint that
Anytime Fitness in Selah was open, and operating as usual, in violation of the
emergency proclamation. On June 15, 2020, L&I workplace safety inspectors
visited that Anytime Fitness location to determine if the business was violating the
emergency workplace safety rule.
On arrival, the L&I inspectors “saw a lit neon ‘open’ sign in the window of
the building but the doors opened only to individuals who had key cards.” CP at
32. This was the gym’s “only obvious entrance.” Id. at 28. The inspectors
unsuccessfully attempted to reach anyone at the gym by telephone at the posted
number. They entered the locked gym by safely following someone carrying a
3
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
gym bag.2 Inside, the L&I inspectors saw people exercising, sitting in an office,
and apparently assisting a customer with a new gym membership. The inspectors
asked an employee for consent to conduct an inspection of the facility.
The first person the inspectors spoke with declined to give consent and
asked them to wait where they were for the general manager. As they waited for
about 20 minutes, the inspectors “observed several people enter the building as
well as a chalkboard on which was written, ‘Welcome back.’” Id. at 32. The
inspectors left after the general manager arrived and said he did not consent to
them conducting an inspection.
Based on the inspectors’ report, L&I cited Bradshaw Development Inc. for
willfully violating former WAC 296-800-14035 and assessed a penalty of $9,639.
The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals reinstated the citation after an industrial
appeals judge vacated the citation based on insufficient evidence. 3 See id. at 32-
34. The Board explained that the inspectors “had the right to enter the building for
2
To describe the inspectors’ entry, after recognizing the inspectors entered “in a safe manner,”
the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals used the colloquial term “tailgating,” using quotation
marks, without defining it. CP at 28. Based on the testimony, the term describes an inspector
“grabb[ing] the door and follow[ing]” a key card holder inside the locked gym. Id. at 1195. The
dissent effectively makes its own factual finding that the inspectors were acting in a sneaky
manner, suggesting their actions were contrary to policies established and enforced by Bradshaw,
but the Board did not find that to be the case, and the evidence is not sufficient to support that
conclusion. We are not the fact finder. We should constrain ourselves to making legal
judgments.
3
L&I had also cited Bradshaw for willfully violating the emergency workplace safety rule three
times in July 2020. The inspectors did not enter any of the Anytime Fitness locations in July.
The Board adopted the industrial appeals judge’s decision to vacate those three citations based on
insufficient evidence and the State did not cross-appeal. CP at 32-34.
4
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
the sole purpose of obtaining consent to inspect the premises” and properly relied
on their observations inside the gym while awaiting consent, along with the owner
Wesley Bradshaw’s refusal to answer questions, to find the violation willful. Id. at
27-29.
Bradshaw sought review in Yakima County Superior Court, which adopted
the Board’s findings of fact but vacated the citation on statutory and constitutional
grounds.4 That court agreed with the Board that RCW 49.17.070 allowed the L&I
inspectors to enter the gym for the purpose of obtaining consent but concluded any
observations inside the gym were inadmissible because, it concluded, “A business
that limits entry to keycard holders is not open to the public. Therefore, Anytime
Fitness had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the commercial premises.” CP
at 1297.
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds.
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 34 Wn. App. 2d 705, 571 P.3d 300
(2025). The Court of Appeals held that neither the statute nor the state and federal
constitutions allowed the inspectors to enter a commercial premises’ key card
accessible doors without permission through “tailgating”; therefore, any of their
4
If the Board’s findings were challenged, we would review them to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Potelco, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. &
Indus., 191 Wn. App. 9, 21, 361 P.3d 767 (2015). Here, in the absence of a proper challenge, the
Board’s factual findings are binding.
5
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
observations inside the gym were inadmissible. See id. at 721-24. The State
successfully sought our review. 5 Wn.3d 1042 (2026). The American Civil
Liberties Union of Washington Foundation (ACLU of WA) has filed an amicus
brief in support of Bradshaw.
ANALYSIS
1. ENTRY UNDER THE STATUTE
The Washington Legislature has enacted legislation “in order to assure,
insofar as may reasonably be possible, safe and healthful working conditions for
every [person] working in the state of Washington.” RCW 49.17.010. All workers
in Washington are entitled to safe workplaces and, for workers in some industries,
workplace safety is a fundamental right protected by our constitution. See id.;
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 35; Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 196 Wn.2d
506, 519-20, 475 P.3d 164 (2020). To implement these assurances and protect
these rights, our legislature enacted WISHA, 5 along with many other statutes, and
authorized L&I workplace safety inspectors to “enter a worksite at an entry point
designated by the employer or, in the event no entry point has been designated, at a
5
Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, chapter 49.17 RCW. WISHA requires
the State’s worker safety program to equal or exceed federal workplace safety standards. RCW
49.17.010.
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
reasonably recognizable entry point” to request consent to inspect and investigate
violations of workplace safety regulations. RCW 49.17.070.
Bradshaw contends RCW 49.17.070, read in light of its context and history,
prohibits L&I inspectors from entering a locked business by following a customer
inside and the L&I inspectors were required to get a warrant under RCW 49.17.075
to enter the gym. To determine whether the inspectors were statutorily authorized
to enter, we must look at the plain meaning of RCW 49.17.070, .075, and related
statutes. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d
4 (2002). We “must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include
them.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598
(2003); see also State v. Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 282, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008)
(courts “‘cannot press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion
even to avoid a constitutional question’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326
(2000))).
Our legislature directs L&I inspectors, once they present their credentials to
the owner or other person with authority, to “enter without delay and at all
reasonable times” to investigate workplace safety “during regular working hours
and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner.” LAWS OF 1973, ch. 80, § 7, codified as RCW 49.17.070. Originally, both
7
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
state and federal law purported to allow inspectors to enter without a warrant or
exception to the warrant requirement. See 29 U.S.C § 657(a). Before our
legislature amended the state statute to add procedural protections, the United
States Supreme Court had held the federal law “is unconstitutional insofar as it
purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent.” Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978); see
also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943
(1967).
In 2006, our legislature made its intent clear:
The legislature intends that inspections performed under the
Washington industrial safety and health act ensure safe and healthful
working conditions for every person working in the state of
Washington. Inspections must follow the mandates of Article II,
section 35 of the state Constitution, and equal or exceed the
requirements prescribed by the occupational safety and health act of
1970 (Public Law 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590). The legislature also intends
that the inspections comply with the fourth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the state
Constitution.
LAWS OF 2006, ch. 31, § 1. 6 Our legislature made the workplace safety directive
subject to, among other things, a consent requirement. Id. § 2. Specifically, L&I
inspectors “entering any worksite located on private property” must enter “in a safe
6
Our legislature expressed the intent for RCW 49.17.070 to comport with state and federal
constitutional standards and also enacted a warrant procedure for L&I. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 31, §
1; see also id. § 3, codified as RCW 49.17.075. We address the state and federal constitutions
below.
8
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
manner . . . at an entry point designated by the employer” or, if none has been
designated, “at a reasonably recognizable entry point” to gain consent to inspect.
RCW 49.17.070(3). As the House testimony in support of the amendment
explained, “The notion is that the Department will go in at a place where most
people would enter the property.” H.B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2538, at 3, 59th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). Our legislature also specified that L&I may take
“action consistent with a recognized exception to the warrant requirements of the
federal and state Constitutions” and is not required to give “advance notice of an
inspection.” RCW 49.17.070(4)-(5).
Here, to gain consent as authorized by WISHA, the inspectors entered
through a key card accessible front door by safely following a key card holder
inside. The Board found this was the “only obvious entrance.” CP at 28. There
was no other entry point designated by the employer. The inspectors observed an
illuminated neon “open” sign and entered through the adjacent front door. The
statute does not specify an entry point has to be unlocked, and we would be adding
words to the statute to hold a key card accessible front door is an unreasonable
point of entry for inspectors seeking consent from a business owner while the
business is open. See RCW 49.17.070(3). Under these facts, the open gym’s front
door is a reasonably recognizable entry point. The inspectors’ entry did not violate
the statute.
9
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
Next, we address whether the inspectors’ entry violated Bradshaw’s
constitutional right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. If the inspectors’ entry did not violate Bradshaw’s right to privacy,
then the inspectors were justified in occupying the space where they sought
consent.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
“We review claims that constitutional rights were violated de novo.” State v.
Vanhollebeke, 190 Wn.2d 315, 321, 412 P.3d 1274 (2018). “The right to be free
from searches by government agents is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and
law, and it is enshrined in our state and national constitutions.” State v. Day, 161
Wn.2d 889, 893, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search occurs “[w]hen ‘the Government
obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or
effects.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495
(2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3, 132 S. Ct. 945, 181
L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012)). Further, a search occurs when (1) there is a subjective
manifestation of privacy in the area searched and (2) society recognizes that
privacy interest as reasonable. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct.
2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001) (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211,
106 S. Ct. 1809, 90 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1986)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
10
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). “What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in [their] own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
“The Fourth Amendment does not . . . prevent all investigations conducted
on private property.” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6; see, e.g., Patel v. City of Montclair,
798 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding the areas of a motel “open to the public
are not within the enumerated items in the Fourth Amendment; therefore, no search
occurs when police officers enter those areas”). A business owner retains no
privacy interest “in areas of its licensed premises that it actively invites the public
to enter.” Dodge City Saloon, Inc. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn.
App. 388, 398, 288 P.3d 343 (2012) (citing Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. at 315); accord
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1985)
(“Here, respondent did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of
the store where the public was invited to enter and to transact business.”). In
contrast, a business owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in nonpublic
areas of commercial premises, and this ordinarily requires a warrant (or a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent) before a state
actor may enter. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-700, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 96
11
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
L. Ed. 2d 601 (1987); see Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. at 315; see also, e.g., See, 387
U.S. at 545 (locked warehouse). 7
The protections of article I, section 7 of our state constitution are
“qualitatively different from,” and often broader than, those provided by the Fourth
Amendment. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 267, 868 P.2d 134
(1994). “[O]ur state constitution goes further” than the federal constitution “and
requires actual authority of law before the State may disturb the individual’s
private affairs.” Day, 161 Wn.2d at 893; see also State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571,
580, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (“Under Const. art. [I], § 7, the focus is whether the
‘private affairs’ of an individual have been unreasonably violated rather than
whether a person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable.”). In determining whether
there is a disturbance of private affairs, we examine “‘the nature and extent’ of the
intrusion ‘and the extent to which the information has been voluntarily exposed to
the public.’” State v. Evans, 5 Wn.3d 199, 210-11, 572 P.3d 1172 (2025) (quoting
State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 522, 192 P.3d 360 (2008)). “Interference with
the broad right to privacy can be legally authorized by statute or common law, but
7
In See, the United States Supreme Court held a person “may not be prosecuted for exercising
his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant” for a nonpublic space.
387 U.S. at 546. The Court did not hold that entering a locked door without consent violates a
reasonable expectation of privacy or is a trespassory search of a constitutionally protected area
enumerated within the text of the Fourth Amendment. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (recognizing “[t]he
Government’s physical intrusion on” an unenumerated area “is of no Fourth Amendment
significance”). Accordingly, contrary to the dissent’s assertions, See is not analogous.
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
only insofar as is reasonably necessary to further substantial governmental interests
that justify the intrusion.” State v. Chacon Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 292, 290 P.3d
983 (2012).
In the context of WISHA inspections of commercial businesses, the State
argues that our state “[c]onstitution’s protections are coextensive with those of the
Fourth Amendment.” Suppl. Br. of L&I at 18 (citing Centimark Corp. v. Dep’t of
Lab. & Indus., 129 Wn. App. 368, 375, 119 P.3d 865 (2005)). To show our state
constitution is more protective here, Bradshaw was required to “provide argument
and relevant authorities supporting the specific outcome they seek in light of ‘the
constitutional text, the historical treatment of the interest at stake as reflected in
relevant case law and statutes, and the current implications of recognizing or not
recognizing an interest.’” State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 881, 434 P.3d 58
(2019) (quoting State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 463, 158 P.3d 595 (2007)).
We decline to reach the issue of whether the state constitution’s privacy protections
for commercial business are different under these facts because Bradshaw did not
adequately present an independent state constitutional analysis.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a threshold question is whether Bradshaw
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front entrance area of Anytime
Fitness. Specifically, the party arguing that government agents searched a private
location “‘has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and
13
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
that the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one that society is willing to
accept.’” United States v. Perry, 548 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also State v. Evans, 159
Wn.2d 402, 409, 150 P.3d 105 (2007) (holding that the defendant, “[t]o establish
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy,” must “satisfy a twofold test: (1)
Did he ‘exhibit an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve
something as private?’ and (2) ‘[d]oes society recognize that expectation as
reasonable’” (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kealey, 80 Wn. App.
162, 168, 907 P.2d 319 (1995))). Here, Bradshaw has not carried its burden.
The State contends that Bradshaw has no expectation of privacy in the
common area of the gym that members of the public with key cards may access.
Bradshaw argues to the contrary, reasoning that “a locked key card exterior door is
an objective manifestation that the interior is not a space the general public may
enter at will.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 25.
Like Bradshaw, the ACLU of WA would set the constitutional limit at a
business’s locked door. The ACLU of WA contends that the State’s argument is
contradicted by the leading treatise: “‘[A] club or other business that is operated
for a select clientele may not be public’” and “‘the actual practice as to admitting
persons into such facilities must be considered in making the determination of
whether there was in fact a justified expectation of privacy therein.’” Br. of
14
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 12-13 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(b)
(6th ed. 2020)); see also Asher v. City of Little Rock, 449 S.W.2d 933, 936-37 (Ark.
1970). The State responds that Bradshaw had no privacy interest because it flouted
the emergency proclamation and permitted customers and prospective customers to
enter. See L&I’s Resp. to Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 9.
The State grounds its argument in four cases that, it says, establish a
business has no reasonable expectation of privacy under these facts. Suppl. Br. of
L&I at 22. We disagree with the full range of the State’s argument but ultimately
agree with the State that no search occurred in this case. Bradshaw has not shown
that Anytime Fitness prohibited the public from entering the front entrance area to
make legitimate business inquiries, such as seeking to join the gym, which means
Bradshaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that location.
Before considering the State’s authority, we note that courts repeatedly have
considered whether there is an expectation of privacy in membership businesses
whose premises are locked and reserved for members and their guests. Perry, for
example, involved a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) hall with a locked door and
a buzzer. 548 F.3d at 692. The court found no objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy because Javarlo Perry did not present evidence that a members-only
policy “was strictly enforced in the past.” Id. To the contrary, the evidence of
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
record was that individuals, including police officers, were “admitted into the VFW
without incident, though they sometimes had to wait a few moments after pressing
the buzzer.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa. Super. 69, 72-73, 75-
76, 396 A.2d 649 (1978) (holding that “a locked front door activated by a buzzer
system” was insufficient to create an expectation of privacy in a membership club
that allowed undercover police officers to enter one time alone and another time by
joining a group of others seeking admittance).
The ACLU of WA brings to our attention a case involving a similar business
restriction made in response to COVID-19. See Br. of Amicus Curiae ACLU of
WA at 13 (citing Alexander Indus., LLC v. Town of Holly Ridge, 2022 WL 288178
(E.D. N.C. Jan. 31, 2022) (court order)). In that case, state actors obtained the
unauthorized key card of the former owner without the knowledge or consent of
the current owner and did a warrantless search of the premises. Alexander Indus.,
2022 WL 288178 at *2-4. The district court, in declining to dismiss a civil action
against the investigators, reasoned that “[d]rawing the line between what
commercial premises are protected and what are not hinges on what structures or
policies were in place to maintain privacy in the disputed space.” Id. at *3. At the
motion to dismiss stage, the court was required to accept the plaintiff’s allegations
as true. Because the gym was secured with a key card, the owner “reasonably
could have expected that only gym members with keycards would access it.” Id. at
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
*4 (citing Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed. 2d
1154 (1968)). Importantly, the plaintiff alleged that “the gym had a policy in place
of allowing only gym members onto the premises.” Id. (emphasis added). “That
members of the public belonging to the Gym regularly accessed it does not alter
the analysis, as it was equally well-established that access so limited does not
defeat an otherwise reasonable expectation in privacy.” Id. at *5 (citing Mancusi,
392 U.S. at 369). These principles are applicable, but a different societal
expectation applied here.
Bradshaw did not offer any evidence of a policy limiting admission into the
gym or that such a policy was consistently enforced. Even assuming that
Bradshaw’s decision to make the front entrance of its commercial gym key card
accessible is a subjective manifestation of privacy under the first prong of Kyllo,
Bradshaw did not provide facts sufficient to establish that expectation was
objectively reasonable under its second prong. 533 U.S. at 33. Rather, considering
the gym’s illuminated “open” sign, and the lack of evidence of any policy or
practice of excluding those who wished to enter for business purposes, Bradshaw
impliedly invited nonmembers with legitimate business inquiries inside.
A government inspector does not conduct a search simply by occupying a
space they were impliedly invited to enter. Importantly, Bradshaw did not take
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
steps to prevent unauthorized entry by outsiders. 8 Business owners are required to
take adequate measures to restrict the public from accessing private areas. The
lock on an open business’ front entrance manifests an intent to exclude trespassers,
but it does not manifest an intent to exclude members of the public with legitimate
business inquiries from entering the premises’ front entrance area. Here, the
inspectors entered to make an equivalent inquiry.
In an unchallenged finding of fact, the Board found, “For the sole purpose of
obtaining consent to conduct an inspection, the [inspectors] followed into the
facility a woman who was carrying a gym bag and opened the front door.” CP at
32. Nothing in that finding suggests the inspectors did anything in an underhanded
or improper fashion. During regular business hours, and absent evidence to the
contrary, a gym owner in Bradshaw’s position should reasonably expect a
8
For example, the record does not show Bradshaw had a “members only” sign at the entrance or
an enforced policy that forbids members from allowing nonmembers inside, or a screening
mechanism to prohibit nonmembers (or other categories of visitors) from entering.
Notably, L&I issues a compliance manual that includes nonbinding guidance and
procedures related to how to obtain consent, including when inspectors encounter a “no
trespassing” sign. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMPLIANCE MANUAL 3-1 to 3-3 (Feb. 17, 2025). This compliance manual
does not address the circumstances presented in this case; we accord it no weight and refer to it
to provide context only. See Seattle Bulk Shipping, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 25 Wn. App.
2d 762, 778, 524 P.3d 733 (2023) (“The compliance manual is not binding law. It is an internal
set of guidelines for the Department to follow.”); cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92,
97, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 191 L. Ed. 2d 186 (2015) (explaining that “the critical feature of interpretive
rules is that they are ‘issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the
statutes and rules which it administers’” (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,
99, 115 S. Ct. 1232, 131 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1995))).
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Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
prospective member, a hopeful vendor, or a person delivering a package, to safely
grab the door and follow a key card holder inside the front entrance area to make
an inquiry. The state inspectors had the same license. At the same time, we
disagree with the State that the constitution permits its inspectors to go beyond the
front entrance area and freely go wherever a member of the gym is entitled to
access. Bradshaw has a greater privacy interest in the areas of the gym where
workout equipment is used and its locker rooms because it is not customary for
nonmembers to occupy such spaces without express permission.
State actors have the same license to intrude as a “reasonably respectful
citizen.” State v. Seagull, 95 Wn.2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44 (1981); see also, e.g.,
State v. Ross, 141 Wn.2d 304, 314, 4 P.3d 130 (2000) (state actors entered an
impliedly open rear driveway at midnight “when no reasonably respectful citizen
would be welcome absent actual invitation or an emergency”). An unlawful search
occurs when a state actor exceeds the scope of their implicit license to enter.
Seagull, 95 Wn.2d at 903. For example, “a police officer not armed with a warrant
may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any
private citizen might do.’” Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 469, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011)). That “implicit license
typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer)
19
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
leave.” Id. In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court concluded it would not
be “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc.,
for a stranger to explore the curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.” Id. at 8
n.2.9
The inspectors, who entered with a limited purpose, did not exceed the
limited scope of the implicit license that Bradshaw granted to members of the
public who want to make legitimate business inquiries inside. Nothing in this
record makes us doubt that safely grabbing the door and following a key card
holder into the open gym was “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary,
typical, and nonalarming.” Id. There is no evidence that the person the inspectors
followed inside objected to their entry. No search occurred because the inspectors
were lawfully present where they observed Bradshaw’s employees working in
violation of the emergency workplace safety rule. Importantly, once inside, instead
of being asked to leave, the inspectors were told they could wait where they were,
which confirms the minimal privacy interest in the space the inspectors occupied
(near the front entrance). Finally, the inspectors left when they were told to.
9
In the context of an open business, making inquiries is what custom allows. Here, the
inspectors were required to leave (and did) when it became clear they were not welcome. We do
not mean to imply that an open business yields the same license to enter as the curtilage of a
house. See Ross, 141 Wn.2d at 312.
20
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
The ACLU of WA stresses that increasingly “pervasive federal government
overreach” threatens privacy. See Br. of Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 1-2 (“In
the past year, federal officers have invaded childcare centers, college buildings,
apartments, and workplaces in search of suspected non-citizens.” (footnotes
omitted)). The State says it shares ACLU of WA’s concerns “regarding federal
overreach.” L&I’s Resp. to Amicus Curiae ACLU of WA at 1. We stress the
narrowness of our holding and recognize structures, policies, and customs limit
how far inside a gym or other business a member of the public with a legitimate
business inquiry (and therefore a state actor) can reasonably enter under the Fourth
Amendment. We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit that “[w]e do not decide today whether a member of a private club, which
employs a restrictive admissions policy that it strictly and consistently enforces,
has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy therein.” Perry, 548 F.3d at
692. We also reiterate, “What is reasonable cannot be determined by a fixed
formula. It must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Seagull,
95 Wn.2d at 903 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L.
Ed. 2d 726 (1963)).
Under the Fourth Amendment, Bradshaw did not demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the front entrance area of its gym, and the inspectors
therefore did not exceed the scope of their implicit license to enter the gym.
21
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
Everything the inspectors saw inside Bradshaw’s gym was admissible because they
were justified in occupying its front entrance area to seek consent to conduct an
inspection of the facility.
We now turn to the cases the State cites in further support of its argument.
First, the State relies on the holding in State v. Hastings that when “‘outsiders are
invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business’ . . . [b]usiness transactions
with the public are not ‘private affairs’.” 119 Wn.2d 229, 232-33, 830 P.2d 658
(1992) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S. Ct. 424, 17 L. Ed.
2d 312 (1966)). In that case, state actors employed a ruse to obtain an invitation
into a home to buy drugs. Id. at 232-33. The State contends, “Tailgating to gain
entry is constitutionally no different than a ruse.” Suppl. Br. of L&I at 27.
Hastings offers weak support to the State. Here, the inspectors were not actively
invited inside the gym for an illegal activity, were not undercover, and did not
employ a ruse to elicit an invitation. While Bradshaw’s gym openly violated the
emergency proclamation, it would stretch the holding of Hastings to apply it here.
Nevertheless, the gym’s illuminated “open” sign, coupled with the lack of any sign
or individual prohibiting entry by nonmembers impliedly invited the public to enter
inside for legitimate business inquiries.
Second, the State relies on the holding in State v. Carter that a privacy
interest is abandoned when select members of the public are exposed to illegal
22
Bradshaw Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. 104579-4
activity. 151 Wn.2d 118, 126-27, 85 P.3d 887 (2004). In that case, state actors
inspected and seized an illegally modified gun that they were actively invited to
handle in a class they attended off duty. Id. at 121, 124. Again, it would stretch
the holding of Carter to apply it here. The inspectors were not expressly invited to
enter the gym, were not off duty, and were not going to the gym on their own time.
Third, the State relies on the holding in State v. Lakotiy that there is no
privacy interest in the common area of a gated commercial storage facility. 151
Wn. App. 699, 713, 214 P.3d 181 (2009). In that case, an individual with an access
code gave state actors permission to enter the facility. Id. at 704. The Court of
Appeals held there is “no state or federal constitutionally protected privacy interest
in the common area of a gated commercial storage facility,” particularly for an
individual who is not renting a storage unit. Id. at 713. While the court did not
reach the state actors’ actual authority to enter the common area, it is notable that
the storage facility’s manager consented to the entry. Id. at 704. Lakotiy is
distinguishable from this case because Lakotiy did not involve the facility owner’s
privacy. Nevertheless, Lakotiy supports the cases discussed above that hold that a
locked door, by itself, will not establish a protected privacy interest in at least some
categories of commercial premises.
Fourth, the State relie