In re Marriage of Hauk

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON AUGUST 6, 2026 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON SARAH R. PENDLETON SUPREME COURT CLERK AUGUST 6, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) ) No. 104074-1 ARYNN KYLA HAUK, ) ) EN BANC Petitioner, ) ) and ) ) Filed: August 6, 2026 BRANDON JEFFREY WUESTHOFF, ) ) Respondent. ) ) ____________________________________) MELODY, J.—Cases involving the geographic relocation of a child’s residence following their parents’ dissolution are “intensely emotional.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). Relocation nearly always disrupts the prior expectations of the nonrelocating parent and, when the decision to relocate comes after a parenting plan is already in place, additionally requires modification of that plan. This appeal requires us to construe the “Child Relocation Act,” RCW 26.09.405-.560, and its rebuttable presumption in favor of the parent wishing to In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 relocate with the child. We hold that for purposes of determining whether the presumption applies, courts calculate residential time at the point when the notice of intent to relocate is served. In phased plans, this means the phase in place when the notice is served. The Court of Appeals held that future time—time that is anticipated by the parenting plan but not yet spent—should also be counted. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Daughter T.W. was born to mother, petitioner Arynn Hauk, and father, respondent Brandon Wuesthoff, who were married at the time. Hauk later filed to dissolve the marriage. Following a dissolution trial, the superior court entered a parenting plan that set the residential schedule for T.W., who was then two years old. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 427-38. The parenting plan provided a phased-in residential schedule—a schedule in which the child’s time with one parent increases over time. This residential schedule included four phases, with each phase giving Wuesthoff increasingly more time with T.W. CP at 429-30. During phase one, effective for the first three months of the parenting plan, Wuesthoff had four overnights with T.W. every two weeks. During phase two, effective until T.W. turned three, Wuesthoff had five overnights every two weeks. During phase three, effective from age three to the start of kindergarten, 2 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Wuesthoff had six overnights every two weeks. From kindergarten on, Wuesthoff was set to have half of all overnights with T.W., equally splitting residential time with Hauk. Nearly two years after the parenting plan was entered, Hauk filed with the court a “Notice of Intent to Move with Children (Relocation).” CP at 1-4. In the notice, Hauk proposed to move with T.W. to Virginia in order to live near her fiancé’s children from the fiancé’s previous marriage. Hawk also cited a lower cost of living and better job opportunities for Hauk and her fiancé in Virginia. At the time of Hauk’s notice, the parties were in the third phase of the parenting plan, so Wuesthoff had 6 out of every 14 overnights. 1 CP at 429-30. This was about a year and four months before the planned increase to a 50/50 residential schedule. Wuesthoff objected to relocation, and the matter was set for trial. In Hauk’s pretrial brief, she invoked the presumption in favor of relocation. Under RCW 26.09.520 and .525, there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of relocation unless the parents have “substantially equal residential time,” defined as 1 Although the record contains the date that Hauk filed the notice with the superior court, it does not reflect the date the notice was served on Wuesthoff. The Child Relocation Act does not require the parent proposing relocation to file the relocation notice in court, but it does require service on the other parent. RCW 26.09.430, .440. Then, the nonrelocating parent may object to relocation by filing and serving an objection within 30 days of the receipt of the relocation notice. RCW 26.09.480. No party here disputes that Wuesthoff was served or that his objection to relocation was timely. 3 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 each parent having at least 45 percent of the residential time with the child. Hauk claimed the presumption because under the current phase of the parenting plan, Hauk had 57 percent of the residential time as compared with Wuesthoff’s 43 percent. CP at 106, 214-15, 350. Wuesthoff disputed the application of the presumption, arguing that he had over 45 percent of residential time during the current phase of the plan when holidays were accounted for. See CP at 234-52. The parties went to trial on relocation. The superior court heard testimony from 11 witnesses, including an appointed guardian ad litem. At the end of trial, the trial court found that T.W. was “extremely well-bonded with both parents” and that “the parenting here seems to be quite exceptional, in terms of what [T.W.] gets from each of these parents.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 24, 16. To determine whether to apply the presumption in favor of relocation, the court calculated residential time over the entire parenting plan until T.W. reached age 18. Because T.W. would spend 46.9 percent of overnights with Wuesthoff over the full life of the plan, the court concluded that T.W. spent substantially equal time with each parent. The court made no finding as to whether the 45 percent threshold 4 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 would have been met had the court calculated residential time at the current phase of the plan. The court then applied the statutory factors in the Child Relocation Act, RCW 26.09.520, and concluded that relocation was not in T.W.’s best interest. CP at 410- 17, 420. The court did find, however, that had there been a presumption in Hauk’s favor, Wuesthoff may not have overcome the presumption. CP at 421. Despite not prevailing at trial, Hauk informed the court that she still intended to move to Virginia. Accordingly, the trial court entered a modified parenting plan to reflect Hauk’s relocation. CP at 359-68. The new parenting plan provided that T.W. would spend school years with Wuesthoff in Washington and summers with Hauk in Virginia. This is the parenting plan currently in place. Hauk appealed the denial of her request to relocate, including the trial court’s decision to deny her the presumption in favor of relocation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split opinion. The majority affirmed the trial court’s refusal to apply the relocation presumption, determining that the parties shared substantially equal residential time based on a calculation over the full life of the parenting plan. In re Marriage of Hauk, 34 Wn. App. 2d 8, 15-19, 565 P.3d 660 (2025). Judge Veljacic dissented. Id. at 21. Judge Veljacic would have held that the 5 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 residential time calculation must include only time actually spent to date, and not any future time designated in the parenting plan but not yet spent. Id. at 21-22. We granted Hauk’s petition for review to resolve how trial courts should calculate residential time in phased parenting plans for purposes of determining whether the presumption in favor of relocation applies. ANALYSIS A. Washington’s Child Relocation Act In 2000, the legislature enacted the Child Relocation Act to specify the terms under which superior courts will “allow or not allow a person to relocate [a] child.” RCW 26.09.420. The final bill report acknowledged that relocation is often “heavily litigated” and that more robust procedures were needed “to determine relocation cases.” FINAL B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2884, at 1-2, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000). In establishing those procedures, the legislature intentionally departed from two of this court’s prior decisions regarding relocation. Specifically, the legislature supplanted this court’s rulings in Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, and In re Marriage of Pape, 139 Wn.2d 694, 989 P.2d 1120 (1999). See LAWS OF 2000, ch. 21, § 1 (“By this act, the legislature intends to supersede” Littlefield and Pape.). In Littlefield, this court questioned whether trial courts had authority to “prohibit a custodial parent from relocating without notice to the other 6 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 parent.” 133 Wn.2d at 49. And in Pape, we held that a primary residential parent seeking a court order permitting relocation “must demonstrate a bona fide reason for the relocation” because the court already considered the child’s best interests in establishing the primary residential placement, triggering a presumption that the “primary placement remain intact.” 139 Wn.2d at 696, 715-16. The Child Relocation Act replaced these rulings with a structured framework to guide parents and courts in relocation cases. Under the statute, any parent with at least 45 percent of the child’s residential time must serve notice to the other parent before moving. RCW 26.09.430, .525(2).2 If the relocation would alter the residential schedule, the relocating parent must also provide a proposed residential schedule that reflects how residential time would be allocated following the move. RCW 26.09.440(2)(b)(vi). If the nonrelocating party does not file an objection with the superior court within 30 days after being served with notice, then relocation of the child is permitted and the residential schedule is modified in accord with the relocating party’s proposal. RCW 26.09.500(1), (5). If the nonrelocating parent objects to relocation 2 The Child Relocation Act does not require a parent with less than 45 percent of residential time to provide notice of their intent to relocate. See RCW 26.09.410(2), .430, .525(2). Those parents must turn to the modification statute if they seek to alter the residential schedule as a result of their own move. See, e.g., RCW 26.09.260. 7 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 or the revised residential schedule, the superior court sets the matter for a fact- finding hearing. See RCW 26.09.480(1). At the hearing, the parent proposing relocation is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that relocation is permitted. RCW 26.09.520. The presumption may be rebutted by the nonrelocating parent if they show that “the detrimental effect of the relocation outweighs the benefit of the change to the child and the relocating person.” Id. And the presumption falls away altogether if the parents share substantially equal residential time. RCW 26.09.525(1)(a). In calculating residential time, courts must base their calculation on the terms of the parenting plan “unless: (i) There has been an ongoing pattern of substantial deviation from the residential schedule; (ii) both parents have agreed to the deviation; and (iii) the deviation is not based on circumstances that are beyond either parent’s ability to control.” RCW 26.09.525(2). After determining whether the presumption in favor of relocation applies, the court considers 11 unweighted factors to determine whether relocation is in the best interests of the child. RCW 26.09.520, .525(1)(b). Put another way, whether or not the presumption applies, the court always proceeds to apply the 11 statutory factors.3 3 The legislature clarified this in 2019 following a Court of Appeals opinion holding that the Child Relocation Act did not apply “when the child’s residential time is designated equal or substantially equal.” In re Marriage of Worthley, 198 Wn. App. 419, 424, 393 P.3d 859 (2017). The legislature confirmed that it does. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 79, § 1. 8 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 When applying the statutory factors, the trial court must consider each factor and enter specific findings or articulate its application of each. In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 893-897, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). B. Measuring Residential Time for Phased-In Parenting Plans This case requires us to interpret RCW 26.09.525(2) and determine the point at which to measure residential time under a parenting plan with a phased-in residential schedule. Hauk argues that residential time is measured at the phase of the plan in place when a parent serves notice of their intent to relocate. Wuesthoff contends, and the Court of Appeals held, that time is measured viewing the parenting plan as a whole and without restriction to the current phase. See Hauk, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 18. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Wilcox, 3 Wn.3d 507, 517, 553 P.3d 614 (2024) (citing In re Marriage of Zandi, 187 Wn.2d 921, 926, 391 P.3d 429 (2017)). If the meaning of the statute is plain from its text and context, we must give effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379, 390, 402 P.3d 831 (2017). “If, after this inquiry, the statute remains ambiguous or unclear, it is appropriate to resort to canons of construction and legislative history.” Id. A statute is ambiguous if it is “‘susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.’” 9 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Five Corners Fam. Farmers v. State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 305, 268 P.3d 892 (2011) (quoting Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)). The Child Relocation Act does not specify the point at which to calculate residential time for a phased-in parenting plan, and the statute is therefore ambiguous. The statutory text and context, though, is the place to start and favors Hauk. The statute defining “substantially equal residential time,” RCW 26.09.525(2), primarily utilizes verbs in the present tense and present perfect tense— verb tenses that concentrate on the family’s current circumstances. The statute defines “substantially equal residential time” in terms of which parent “has substantially equal residential time,” how residential time “is spent,” whether there “has been an ongoing pattern” of deviation from the parenting plan, and whether “parents have agreed” to such deviation. RCW 26.09.525 (emphasis added). These verb tenses provide strong evidence of legislative intent. See State v. A.M.W., 5 Wn.3d 147, 169, 574 P.3d 101 (2025) (“The use of present-tense forms of the verb ‘pose’ . . . reinforces the time-bounded nature of the court’s factual inquiry.”); Wrigley v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 195 Wn.2d 65, 73-77, 455 P.3d 1138 (2020) (evaluating verb tense to determine whether statute captured possible “future” conduct or only “past or current conduct”). 10 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 The statute next door, RCW 26.09.520, also situates the relocation inquiry in the present. For example, in laying out the rights and duties of the relocating and objecting parents, the statute speaks of the “person proposing to relocate” and the “person entitled to object.” Id. (emphasis added). And the best-interest factors likewise speak to the present or the past. See RCW 26.09.520(9) (weighing “whether it is feasible and desirable for the other party to relocate also” (emphasis added)). The only factor that uses a future-focused verb evaluates whether disrupting contact with the relocating parent “would be more detrimental” than disrupting contact with the objecting parent. See RCW 26.09.520(3) (emphasis added). But even this factor invites analysis of future harm based solely on the current strength of the parent- child relationships. Nothing in the language of RCW 26.09.520 or 26.09.525 directs trial courts to consider the parties’ future or anticipated conduct. This interpretation comports with our conclusion in the dependency context, where we were similarly asked to determine the proper point in time to measure a child’s best interest. In Wrigley, this court considered whether a prediction of future harmful conduct by a parent qualifies as a report of child abuse requiring an investigation. 195 Wn.2d at 69-71. To answer that question, we looked to the verb tenses in surrounding statutory provisions that evaluated whether “‘a child has suffered abuse or neglect,’” whether abusive instances “‘have occurred,’” and 11 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 whether a child “‘is deprived’” of nurture, health, or safety. Id. at 73 (some emphasis added) (quoting former RCW 26.44.030(1)(a) (2009)), 75 (emphasis added) (quoting former RCW 26.44.010 (1999)). We concluded that these verb tenses “indicate that the legislature intended the reports to be based on existing conduct, not on future speculation.” Id. at 73-75. Here, too, whether there “has been an ongoing pattern” of deviation from the residential schedule, whether the “parents have agreed” to such deviation, and how time “is spent” use the same verb tenses as in Wrigley—directing the inquiry to existing conduct rather than to speculation about the future. See RCW 26.09.525 (emphasis added). Hauk’s interpretation is also more consistent with one of the Child Relocation Act’s animating purposes: to supersede Pape and “shift[] the analysis away from only the best interests of the child to an analysis that focuses on both the child and the relocating person.” In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 887, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). Underlying that shift is the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of their child—including when making the decision to relocate. Id. at 895. With phased-in plans, measuring residential time according to the entire plan would void the relocation presumption much of the time, a result inconsistent with the legislature’s purpose in enacting it. See, e.g., Nelson v. P.S.C., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 227, 236, 535 P.3d 418 (2023) (“‘Statutes should be interpreted to further, not frustrate, 12 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 their intended purpose.’” (quoting Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 99, 864 P.2d 937 (1994))); In re Adoption of T.A.W., 186 Wn.2d 828, 840, 383 P.3d 492 (2016) (“If the statute at issue . . . incorporates a relevant statement of purpose, our reading of the statute should be consistent with that purpose.”). The dissent argues that looking to the entire plan is more consistent with legislative intent because the legislature “does not” intend to make relocation easier “for ‘substantially equal residential time parenting plans.’” Dissent at 20. While correct, that merely begs the question presented by this appeal: how to measure whether a plan accords substantially equal residential time in the first place. To answer, we must understand the work that the rebuttable presumption accomplishes, which is to accord additional weight to the judgment of the parent who cares for the child more than 55 percent of the time. That parental judgment is necessarily dependent on the child’s current age, developmental stage, needs, and relationships; after all, children grow and change. “[G]enerally, a parent who cares for the child a majority of the time should be better able to care for the child in that moment because they should know the very specific needs and routines of the child.” Hauk, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 23 (Veljacic, J., dissenting). Measuring residential time at the phase of the plan when relocation is proposed gives appropriate weight to the judgment of the parent who currently provides the most care to the child. 13 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Next is the problem that Wuesthoff’s construction poses for phased plans with contingent phases—as pointed out by amici Northwest Justice Project, Sexual Violence Law Center, and King County Bar Association Domestic Violence Legal Advocacy Project. These are plans where increases in residential time are contingent on a parent meeting certain requirements, such as successful evaluation and treatment for domestic violence, substance abuse, or mental health conditions. Amicus Curiae Br. of NW Just. Project et al. at 8. Another common condition is the successful completion of supervised visits, which may be necessary when there is a history of parental abuse, abandonment, or neglect. RCW 26.09.191(4). At the time of a trial on relocation, a superior court cannot know whether as- yet-unmet conditions will ever be satisfied. The result is that if, as Wuesthoff proposes, trial courts calculate residential time based on the entire life of the plan, they may end up including time from phases that will never be achieved. In response, Wuesthoff correctly points out that there are no conditions on the planned increases to his residential time. He then proposes that in cases involving conditional phases conditional time could be omitted from the court’s calculation of residential time. Resp’t’s Answer to Amicus Curiae Br. of NW Just. Project et al. at 3-7. Put differently, Wuesthoff proposes that his “whole plan” construction apply only to unconditionally phased plans, with time in conditional plans counted only up 14 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 to the phase actually achieved. The dissent appears to sign on to this approach, such that the statutory term “substantially equal residential time” can mean one thing for unconditional plans but something different for conditional ones. See dissent at 14- 15, 21. We decline to adopt this construction because nothing in the statute distinguishes between conditional and unconditional plans, and we see no basis to differentiate between the two. See Porter v. Kirkendoll, 194 Wn.2d 194, 212, 449 P.3d 627 (2019) (statutory interpretation must “ʻeffectuate a consistent statutory scheme that maintains the integrity of the respective statute’” (quoting Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wn.2d 173, 184, 142 P.3d 162 (2006))). The legislature chose to treat all types of parenting plans together in the Child Relocation Act, and we decline to parse them into subtypes with distinct rules. We next consider the parties’ policy arguments, as both sides warn of the risk of gamesmanship. Wuesthoff argues that measuring residential time based on the current phase of the plan will incentivize a parent who currently has the majority of the residential time, but whose time is set to decrease in a future phase, to rush to relocate before the next phase takes effect. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 30-31. Hauk argues that measuring time based on anticipatory time not yet spent will allow a parent currently assigned the minority of the residential time to exert appreciable 15 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 control over the custodial parent and make it harder for that parent to move and self- determine the next chapter of their life. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 22-23. We conclude that neither risk of gamesmanship outweighs the other. The legislature is aware of the risks of gamesmanship and implemented safeguards to check them within the Child Relocation Act. One guardrail is the relocation standard itself, which requires the court to consider “[t]he reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation and the good faith of each of the parties in requesting or opposing the relocation.” RCW 26.09.520(5). A second is the provision permitting courts to sanction a party “if it finds that a proposal to relocate the child or an objection to an intended relocation” was made “to harass a person, to interfere in bad faith with the relationship between the child and another person entitled to residential time or visitation with the child, or to unnecessarily delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” RCW 26.09.550. These provisions equip courts to respond to bad- faith behavior by litigants without requiring us to adjust our interpretation of the statute. And far from producing the assertedly “absurd” results the dissent forecasts, these guardrails head them off at the pass.4 Dissent at 12. 4 The dissent labels gamesmanship “irrelevant” while also offering one-sided examples of alleged gamesmanship that all involve the relocating parent. Dissent at 11-12. But gamesmanship is, regrettably, a two-way street. Just as possible are scenarios where a parent seeks more residential time in the parenting plan than they want or intend to use, knowing that it may prevent the other parent from moving (and moving on). In any event, all the facts in the dissent’s 16 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Finally, Wuesthoff makes his strongest point: that measuring residential time based on the current plan phase would disrupt the expectations of the nonrelocating parent and harm parents who, like Wuesthoff, have strong and loving bonds with their children. The facts here present a compelling backdrop for that argument, given the trial court’s finding that both parents provided “exceptional” parenting, VRP at 16, and the guardian ad litem’s conclusion at trial that T.W. was a “well-adjusted, happy, and bright child,” loved by both parents. CP at 280. We have repeatedly acknowledged—and do so again now—that relocation can be deeply painful and may fundamentally alter a family. See, e.g., Pape, 139 Wn.2d at 715 (“We are aware of and are sympathetic to the difficulties faced by parents whose children move, with the other parent, some distance away.”); Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47 (relocation cases are “highly litigated” precisely because they are “intensely emotional”). But the legislature was aware of this and still chose the rebuttable presumption in favor of relocation.5 Wuesthoff’s argument to the proposed scenarios would be available to—and no doubt considered by—the trial court. Only if the trial court ignored RCW 26.09.520(5) and any facts evidencing gameplay would the best- interest standard produce absurd results. 5 The legislature added the presumption in 2000, the year after Pape. The dissent suggests, without explanation, that the legislature’s further refinement of the presumption through RCW 26.09.525 somehow affects the fact that Pape was superseded. Dissent at 19 n.4. But the legislature could not have stated more clearly its intent to displace Pape. The 2019 amendment only affirmed that the Child Relocation Act applies to parents with substantially equal residential time. 17 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 contrary relies heavily on Pape and its holding that stability and the status quo are in the best interest of the child. See 139 Wn.2d at 717 (stating a “strong presumption that custodial continuity is in the child’s best interest”). The dissent does the same. See dissent at 16 (emphasizing that the Parenting Act of 1987 “promotes permanent parenting plans”). The problem is that the Child Relocation Act intentionally superseded Pape and repeatedly acknowledged that relocation will often result in a “revised schedule of residential time” and a new “parenting plan.” RCW 26.09.440(2)(b)(vi). See also RCW 26.09.530 (anticipating “modifications to the parenting plan” as a result of relocation). Wuesthoff and the dissent would have us gloss over that history, but it evidences the legislature’s intent that the Child Relocation Act—and not statutes applicable to other types of modifications—control the inquiry. In line with that intent, we hold that residential time for purposes of phased plans is calculated at the phase of the plan in place when the relocating parent serves notice of their intent to relocate, and not on time in future phases of the plan that have not yet taken effect. C. Remand Is Required To Determine Whether the Presumption in Favor of Relocation Applies On this record, we lack the facts necessary to determine whether the rebuttable presumption in favor of relocation applies. We do not know the date Hauk served the notice of intent to relocate, a date necessary to compute residential time. And the 18 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 trial court made no factual finding as to whether, based on a present-time calculation, Wuesthoff would have met the 45 percent threshold for substantially equal residential time. This is significant because he expressly argued that when holiday time in the current phase of the parenting plan was properly counted, he crossed the 45 percent threshold. See CP at 234-35, 251-52, 465-66. And even if the presumption applies, it is, of course, rebuttable. RCW 26.09.520. We therefore remand for the trial court to make further factual findings and determine whether the presumption in favor of relocation applies. If it does, given the passage of time during this appeal, the trial court should conduct a new fact-finding hearing to consider evidence as to T.W.’s best interest based on current circumstances. See In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 198, 634 P.2d 498 (1981) (remanding for reconsideration of a custody order and providing that “[i]n order to insure that their best interests are served, the trial court should look into the present circumstances of the children and their parents”). CONCLUSION We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 19 In re Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Melody, J. WE CONCUR: Madsen, J.P.T. 20 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Whitener, J., dissenting No. 104074-1 WHITENER, J. (dissenting)–– In Washington, a relocating parent does not enjoy a presumption in favor of relocation if they have “substantially equal residential time,” meaning at least 45 percent of the child’s time is spent with the nonrelocating parent. RCW 26.09.525. In this case, where parents have adopted an automatic graduated parenting plan, we must decide whether courts should calculate “substantially equal residential time” based on the entire parenting plan or only one phase of the parenting plan. Id. The majority finds that the statute supports a finding that courts should consider only the ratio of residential time in the present phase of the parenting plan at the time notice of relocation is served. Majority at 2. I disagree. “In making a determination of a modification [of a parenting plan] pursuant to relocation of the child, the court shall first determine whether to permit or restrain the relocation of the child using the procedures and standards provided in RCW 26.09.405 through 26.09.560.” RCW 26.09.260(6). RCW 26.09.410(2) defines “relocate” as “a change in principal residence . . . in cases where parents have substantially equal residential time as defined by RCW 26.09.525.” Notice must be provided to the nonrelocating parent, and it must include “[a] proposal in the form of a proposed parenting plan for a revised schedule of residential time or visitation 1 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Whitener, J., dissenting with the child.” RCW 26.09.440(2)(b)(vi). Unlike other types of parenting plans, in a substantially equal residential time parenting plan, there is no rebuttable presumption that the intended relocation of the child will be permitted. RCW 26.09.525(1)(a). In calculating whether parents have “substantially equal residential time” under a given parenting plan, the court must “base its determination on the amount of time designated in the court order.” RCW 26.09.525(2)(b) (emphasis added). A “court order” is a “temporary or permanent parenting plan, custody order, visitation order, or other order governing the residence of a child under this title.” RCW 26.09.410(1). To determine a modification of the court order based on the proposed relocation, “the court shall make a determination in the best interests of the child.” RCW 26.09.525(1)(b). 1 All parenting plans, including “substantially equal 1 The factors are (1) The relative strength, nature, quality, extent of involvement, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life; (2) Prior agreements of the parties; (3) Whether disrupting the contact between the child and the person seeking relocation would be more detrimental to the child than disrupting contact between the child and the person objecting to the relocation; (4) Whether either parent or a person entitled to residential time with the child is subject to limitations under RCW 26.09.191 or 26.09.192; (5) The reasons of each person for seeking or opposing the relocation and the good faith of each of the parties in requesting or opposing the relocation; (6) The age, developmental stage, and needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation or its prevention will have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child; (7) The quality of life, resources, and opportunities available to the child and to the relocating party in the current and proposed geographic locations; (8) The availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child’s relationship with and access to the other parent; 2 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Whitener, J., dissenting residential time” plans, share the same overriding purpose of serving “the best interests of the child.” RCW 26.09.002. “The best interests of the child are served by a parenting arrangement that best maintains a child’s emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care.” Id. Furthermore, “the best interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents ….” Id. RCW 26.09.525 is ambiguous on whether a parent should enjoy a presumption in favor of relocation when the parents will have substantially equal residential time over the course of the entire parenting plan but do not have substantially equal time at the time notice of relocation is served. But the greater statutory context suggests an intent to consider parenting plans with a forward- looking lens. The best interest of a child is captured in the entire parenting plan, which is a forward-looking court order. See RCW 26.09.184(1)(g) (“[t]o otherwise protect the best interests of the child consistent with RCW 26.09.002”). The parenting plan (1) takes into consideration the child’s changing needs over the child’s (9) The alternatives to relocation and whether it is feasible and desirable for the other party to relocate also; (10) The financial impact and logistics of the relocation or its prevention; and (11) For a temporary order, the amount of time before a final decision can be made at trial. RCW 26.09.520. 3 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Whitener, J., dissenting adolescent lifetime, (2) must account for future dispute resolution, and (3) allocates decision-making authority for education, health care, and religious upbringing. See RCW 26.09.184(1)(c), (4), (5)(a). The parenting plan also includes the child’s residential schedule, in other words, where the child will reside in the future. RCW 26.09.184(6). In this case, the court ordered parenting plan referenced by RCW 26.09.525(2) is a forward-looking document. The entire order matters, not just one piece of it. Therefore, I would hold that courts calculate residential time for an automatic graduated parenting plan based on the entire parenting plan. Accordingly, I would affirm. I. RCW 26.09.525 is ambiguous as to the correct method of calculating “substantially equal residential time” a. Statutory interpretation and ambiguity The majority and I agree that RCW 26.09.525 is ambiguous with respect to calculating residential time in graduated parenting plans. Majority at 10. We disagree, however, on how to interpret the statute. This court interprets statutes de novo. Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007). In statutory interpretation, we first determine whether the “meaning of statutory language is plain 4 In the Matter of the Marriage of Hauk and Wuesthoff, No. 104074-1 Whitener, J., dissenting on its face.” State v. McNeal, 156 Wn. App. 340, 352 n.18, 231 P.3d 1266 (2010). If it is, “we must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. To determine the plain meaning, “we consider the entire statute in which the provision is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions in the same act that disclose legislative intent.” City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 158 Wn.2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006). If a “statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 1