Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 20, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 60619-4-II JACOB D. CROSS, Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and LAUREN E. CROSS, Appellant. GLASGOW, J.—Jacob and Lauren Cross separated in 2022 after 12 years of marriage. More than two years later, after a dissolution trial where Lauren represented herself and failed to appear for the last day of trial without any explanation, the trial court entered a parenting plan that imposed restrictions on Lauren’s residential time with the parties’ children under RCW 26.09.191. The trial court also awarded Lauren 70 percent of the community property and, on Jacob’s request, the trial court did not require Lauren to pay any child support. Lauren appeals the trial court’s final orders. Among other things, she argues that the trial court erred when it allowed her third attorney to withdraw shortly before trial; when it divided the parties’ property without the benefit of a valuation of Jacob’s 4.76 percent and 1.97 percent interests in two family businesses that were his separate property; and when it ruled that Lauren had an emotional problem that justified parenting limitations. We affirm the trial court. No. 60619-4-II FACTS I. BACKGROUND Jacob and Lauren Cross met in 2009. At the time, Jacob was working at Selden’s Interior Furnishings Inc. (“Selden’s”), a furniture store owned primarily by his uncle, Scott Selden. Lauren was working in marketing and insurance. Jacob and Lauren married and began living together in 2010. During their marriage, Jacob and Lauren had four children. Jacob eventually became the general manager for Selden’s. His salary was approximately $200,000 per year. During the marriage, family members gifted Jacob minority interests in two family companies: 1.97 percent of Selden’s and 4.76 percent of LLSS Selden LLC (“LLSS”). In 2013, Lauren started a photography business so that she could set her own schedule while caring for the children. For most of the marriage, Lauren served as primary caregiver for the children and operated her photography business part time. Lauren’s income from the photography business fluctuated. In 2021, Jacob and Lauren sold their home and moved into Jacob’s grandfather’s home. Jacob and Lauren then separated in November 2022. Jacob filed a petition for dissolution in December 2022. At the time, Jacob and Lauren’s four children ranged in age from 2-to-10 years old. Early in the litigation, Jacob moved for an immediate restraining order to limit Lauren’s residential time with the children, alleging she was abusing alcohol. He also alleged that Lauren had mental health problems that made it difficult for Lauren to “attend to the children’s needs.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 523. Jacob stopped pursuing alcohol-related restrictions after Lauren took court-ordered urinalysis tests, which showed no drugs or alcohol in her system. But Jacob 2 No. 60619-4-II continued to seek permanent limitations on Lauren’s residential time based on her alleged mental health problems. CP at 711. The trial court ordered Lauren to submit to a mental health evaluation with a licensed mental health professional and file the results. Lauren was evaluated by Dr. Brunette Dawson. Dr. Dawson diagnosed Lauren with “Disruption of Family by Separation, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood.” CP at 60. Dr. Dawson’s conclusions were based in part on communications with Dr. Molli M. Wilson, a therapist Lauren had seen periodically since childhood. Dr. Dawson recommended that Lauren continue mental health treatment but expressed optimism about Lauren’s prospects for “future adjustment” due to Lauren’s robust support network. CP at 54. During pretrial litigation, Lauren moved to require Jacob to pay for business valuations of Selden’s and LLSS. The trial court granted the motion and told the parties they would have to agree on a valuation professional. Although Lauren proposed a professional to complete the valuation, Jacob did not agree or disagree with her selection, nor did he propose an alternative. Jacob insisted he would comply with the court’s order, but he continued to allege that the valuation was not necessary and that he could not afford to pay for it. By the time the case proceeded to trial, no valuation had been performed. Before trial, the trial court granted three agreed continuances and Lauren retained three different attorneys, each of whom ultimately withdrew from representing her. The first two continuances were intended to allow more time for discovery. In anticipation of trial, Jacob filed an ER 904 notice seeking admission of several exhibits, and Lauren failed to respond. Then, the third continuance was granted shortly after Lauren retained her third attorney, to give him time to 3 No. 60619-4-II prepare for trial. As a result, trial did not occur until January 2025, more than two years after Jacob first filed for dissolution. Lauren’s third attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw shortly before the January 2025 trial date. Jacob opposed the withdrawal because he did not want trial to be continued again. Lauren did not object to the withdrawal. Lauren’s attorney then filed a motion to withdraw in response to Jacob’s objection, claiming he could not tell the trial court his reasons for withdrawing due to attorney-client privilege but that his continued representation of Lauren would cause him to violate several rules of professional conduct. The trial court approved the attorney’s withdrawal and denied Lauren’s request to delay trial again so she could find a fourth attorney. II. BENCH TRIAL AND DECISION Trial proceeded as scheduled in January 2025. Lauren represented herself, though the trial court allowed a friend to assist her with organizing her documents. The trial court informed Lauren that it was required to hold her to the same standards as an attorney when she was representing herself. On the day trial began, Lauren sought to have two witnesses appear remotely. The trial court denied this request because it was too late to arrange the necessary technology. Lauren also sought to exclude some of the ER 904 exhibits based on hearsay. The trial court denied this request, concluding that Lauren’s failure to object to Jacob’s ER 904 notice was dispositive. Jacob, Lauren, and Jacob’s uncle, Scott Selden, all testified at trial. Jacob and Scott testified about Jacob’s interests in Selden’s and LLSS, explaining to the trial court that Jacob’s minority shares provided limited monetary value. Jacob also testified about Lauren’s parenting, highlighting several occasions where she had failed to meet important obligations for the children, such as 4 No. 60619-4-II getting them to school or to medical appointments. Lauren disputed some of Jacob’s testimony. But she did not appear on the final day of trial to finish giving her testimony and she never explained her absence from trial. The trial court determined that Jacob’s interests in LLSS and Selden’s were his separate property. CP at 980 (Finding of Fact (FF) 10). Absent a valuation and based only on the testimony, the trial court also concluded that the interests in LLSS and Selden’s were of limited value and did not “really provide any sort of economic prospects.” 7 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 3016. And it found that Jacob had not violated the court order requiring him to pay for a business valuation. The trial court then distributed the community assets, which included the net proceeds from the sale of the family home; Lauren’s photography business; Jacob’s 401(k) from Selden’s; several bank accounts; a car; and a boat. It characterized its distribution as a 70/30 split in Lauren’s favor. The trial court determined that Lauren had a long-term emotional problem that interfered with her ability to parent under RCW 26.09.191. Accordingly, it limited Lauren’s residential time with the children during the school year, gave Jacob the right to make major decisions for the children, and ordered Lauren to continue mental health treatment and participate in parenting classes. The parenting plan did not include a mechanism for Lauren to increase her residential time. Although the trial court imputed income to Lauren and determined her child support obligation was $863 per month, at Jacob’s request, the court did not order her to pay any child support to him.1 Lauren appeals. 1 We provide more detailed facts relevant to each issue below. 5 No. 60619-4-II ANALYSIS I. ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL First, Lauren argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Lauren’s third attorney to withdraw and compounded its error by denying a continuance for Lauren to find another attorney. A. Relevant Facts Lauren was represented by three different attorneys during the litigation leading up to trial. Lauren retained her first attorney in December 2022, shortly after Jacob filed for dissolution. In March 2023, the attorney withdrew and Lauren retained her second attorney. The trial court then signed two agreed orders continuing trial over the next several months. The purpose of these continuances was to allow more time for discovery, including Lauren’s mental health evaluation and the valuation of Jacob’s business interests. Lauren’s second attorney withdrew in May 2024. Lauren retained her third attorney in July 2024, a week before trial was set to begin. The trial court signed a third agreed order to continue trial to January 14, 2025. In November 2024, Lauren moved for a fourth continuance on the basis that the ordered valuation of Jacob’s business interests had not been completed. Jacob opposed the motion, and the trial court denied the continuance. Lauren moved for reconsideration, which the trial court ultimately denied. On December 31, 2024, two weeks before the new trial date, Lauren’s third attorney filed a notice of intent to withdraw as counsel. The attorney listed his withdrawal date as January 10, which was 10 days from when he filed the notice of intent and 4 days before the start of trial. The notice stated that the withdrawal would become effective without further notice or action “unless an objection to the withdrawal is served upon the withdrawing attorney prior to” the withdrawal 6 No. 60619-4-II date of January 10. CP at 869. The notice also included a certificate of service, in which the attorney provided Lauren’s last known address and certified under oath that he had “mailed a copy of this document to the . . . parties at their respective addresses of record.” CP at 870. On January 6, 2025, Jacob objected to the attorney’s withdrawal, arguing, among other things, that there was “not sufficient time between withdrawal and trial for [Lauren] to secure new counsel.” CP at 890. In a subsequent memorandum supporting his objection, Jacob stated that he was concerned that Lauren would use the withdrawal to secure another continuance. He also claimed there was no evidence that Lauren “had sufficient prior notice of the [attorney’s] intent to withdraw.” CP at 901. Lauren’s attorney then filed a motion to obtain court approval to withdraw on January 7. In the accompanying declaration, the attorney reiterated that he had “advised [Lauren] [he] was withdrawing as her attorney” and sent her his notice of intent to withdraw on the same day he filed the notice with the trial court. CP at 892. Lauren’s attorney asserted that telling the trial court his reasons for withdrawal would violate attorney-client privilege and prejudice Lauren. But he stated that his withdrawal was mandated by RPCs 1.16(a)(1) (“representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law”); RPC 1.16 (b)(2) (“client persists in a course of action . . . that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent”); RPC 1.16(b)(4) (“client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant”); RPC 1.16(b)(5) (“client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer”); RPC 1.16(b)(6) (“representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client”); and RPC 1.16(b)(7) (“other good cause”). See CP at 907. 7 No. 60619-4-II Also on January 7, Lauren’s attorney moved for an order shortening time to hear the motion for withdrawal, noting that his intended withdrawal date was January 10 and asking the trial court to resolve the issue before trial on January 14. The attorney purported to bring the motion to shorten time on Lauren’s behalf. He did not indicate whether Lauren had notice of the motion to shorten time. On the same day, the trial court signed an ex parte order shortening time, indicating it would decide the motion to withdraw on January 10. On January 10, the trial court granted the attorney’s motion to withdraw and stated that “withdrawal shall not be a basis for any further continuance.” CP at 913. It signed the order without a hearing and did not provide a rationale for its decision. On the same day, the trial court denied Lauren’s motion to reconsider its decision to deny her previously-requested continuance that she had sought to ensure time to complete the business valuation. On January 14, the day trial was set to begin, the trial court continued the case to January 21 due to a conflicting jury trial. Even so, the trial court addressed some issues at a brief hearing. Jacob noted that although the trial court had permitted Lauren’s third attorney to withdraw, he was standing outside in the hallway, had been with Lauren all that morning, and had “just delivered two binders of exhibits” to Lauren. 9 VRP at 4004. Jacob expressed confusion about the attorney’s role and stated that he understood that the attorney was “not representing [Lauren] because she [could not] pay him.” 9 VRP at 4004-05. To clarify the situation, Lauren told the trial court that the attorney had worked with her over the weekend to help her prepare for trial because they had not yet known whether the trial court had approved the withdrawal. Lauren then asked the trial court for more time so that she could retain another attorney before trial. The trial court denied Lauren’s request, stating that if it granted her “a week to get a 8 No. 60619-4-II new attorney,” it would “become a multi-month continuance while that attorney tries to come up to speed.” 9 VRP at 4006-07. Trial began on January 21, 2025, and Lauren represented herself. B. Trial Court’s Approval of Lauren’s Third Attorney’s Withdrawal On appeal, Lauren argues primarily that the trial court violated her due process rights when it allowed her third attorney to withdraw because she lacked sufficient notice of his intent to withdraw and was “deprived of [the] opportunity” to appear at a hearing and oppose the withdrawal. Opening Br. of Appellant at 45. Jacob responds that Lauren waived her right to challenge whether it was proper for the trial court to allow her third attorney to withdraw because she failed to object to the withdrawal below. 1. Withdrawal of an attorney in a civil case A privately retained attorney in a civil matter may withdraw from representation by following the procedures outlined in CR 71. The attorney must file a “Notice of Intent to Withdraw” with the trial court and serve it on all parties. CR 71(c)(1). The notice must “specify a date when the attorney intends to withdraw, which . . . shall be at least 10 days after the service of the Notice of Intent to Withdraw.” Id. The notice must also inform the parties “that the withdrawal shall be effective without order of court unless an objection to the withdrawal is served upon the withdrawing attorney prior to the date set forth in the notice.” Id. “Prior to service on other parties, the Notice of Intent to Withdraw shall be served on the persons represented by the withdrawing attorney or sent to them by certified mail, postage prepaid, to their last known mailing addresses. Proof of service or mailing shall be filed.” CR 71(c)(2). If neither party objects to the withdrawal, it will be effective on the date specified in the notice and no court order is necessary. CR 71(c)(3). 9 No. 60619-4-II However, if any party objects before the designated withdrawal date, the attorney may not withdraw without an order from the trial court. CR 71(c)(4). “The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court” by the appealing party or “another party on the same side of the case.” RAP 2.5(a). A party may raise an issue on appeal despite failing to object below if it is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). The manifest constitutional error exception applies only if the appellant can show (1) that “‘the error is truly of a constitutional dimension’” and (2) that the error actually prejudiced them. State v. J.W.M., 1 Wn.3d 58, 90, 524 P.3d 596 (2023) (quoting State v. O’Hara 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009)). As to the first prong, “[w]e do not assume the alleged error is constitutional; instead, ‘[w]e look to the asserted claim and assess whether, if correct, it implicates a constitutional interest as compared to another form of . . . error.’” J.W.M., 1 Wn.3d at 90 (second alteration in original) (quoting O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98). 2. Analysis First, Lauren urges us to address the withdrawal issue on the merits despite her lack of objection below because “she was never afforded any independent opportunity to ‘object’ or ‘respond’ to [her third attorney’s] motion [to withdraw] because she was still represented by [him,] and dependent on him to lodge objections on her behalf, until the motion was granted.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 2-3 (emphasis in original). Essentially, Lauren asks us to hold that the waiver rule in RAP 2.5(a) does not apply to clients who fail to object to their attorney’s withdrawal. We disagree. CR 71 explicitly contemplates that the client must be served with the notice of intent to withdraw that informs the client that they must object if they oppose the withdrawal. CR 71(c)(1)- 10 No. 60619-4-II (2). Thus, although a client whose attorney is seeking to withdraw is still technically represented by that attorney, the disclosure requirement appears calculated to ensure that the client is aware that they must object to the withdrawal and cannot rely on the withdrawing attorney or the trial court to independently protect their interests. We therefore decline to hold that RAP 2.5(a) is inapplicable to attorney withdrawals. Additionally, the record contains evidence that Lauren’s third attorney complied with this requirement. In his notice of intent to withdraw, the attorney stated that the withdrawal would be effective “unless an objection to the withdrawal [was] [timely] served.” CP at 869. He certified under penalty of perjury that he had mailed a copy of the notice to the parties. And in the declaration accompanying his motion to withdraw, the attorney reiterated that he delivered his notice of intent to Lauren before filing it with the trial court. Lauren therefore cannot avoid waiver based on lack of notice or lack of opportunity to object. Lauren next argues that even if the waiver rule applies, we should review the trial court’s approval of the withdrawal because it was manifest constitutional error. Lauren claims that the application of CR 71 in this case violated her procedural due process rights because there was no hearing and the trial court provided no analysis of whether the rule’s requirements were met. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard “‘to guard against erroneous deprivation’ of a protected interest.” Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 193 Wn.2d 36, 44, 434 P.3d 999 (2019) (plurality opinion) (quoting Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006)). Lauren points to In re Dependency of A.G.2 to show how the “core 2 93 Wn. App. 268, 968 P.2d 424 (1998). 11 No. 60619-4-II principles of basic procedural due process [apply] in the context of” attorney withdrawal. Opening Br. of Appellant at 44. In A.G., a mother appealed the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights, arguing that the trial court violated her due process rights by “allow[ing] her [court-appointed] attorney to withdraw at the beginning of the termination hearing” even though the mother was not present at the hearing. 93 Wn. App. at 271. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights by default after “no one could locate” her for several months. Id. at 273-74. The mother had been adequately served notice of the impending hearing. Id. at 277-78. Division One rejected the mother’s due process claim because although “[p]arents have a right to counsel at dependency and termination hearings[,]” the mother’s counsel “could not effectively or ethically represent her” due to the mother’s “own inaction.” Id. at 278. In A.G., the mother had a right to counsel because she was facing a parental termination proceeding. 93 Wn. App. at 278. Here, there is no guaranteed right to counsel, In re Marriage of King, 162 Wn.2d 378, 386-87, 174 P.3d 659 (2007), so it is not clear that any constitutionally protected interest was threatened. Further, although Lauren insists that she “never had any lawful chance to present her objection to the trial court” and contrasts her case with A.G., partly on the grounds that the mother in that case “had full notice of a hearing date,” Lauren does not contend that she actually lacked notice of her third attorney’s intent to withdraw by January 10. Opening Br. of Appellant at 37, 44-45. Indeed, her due process challenge seems to be predicated on accepting, at least for the sake of argument, that “the procedure in this case appropriately complied with” CR 71. Id. at 45. Thus, we will not conclude that the trial court’s decision was unconstitutional or manifest error on this basis. 12 No. 60619-4-II Additionally, even if a protected interest was implicated, Lauren fails to explain how the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the record before deciding to allow the attorney’s withdrawal violated her due process rights. Due process does not always require a hearing when other procedures guarantee an opportunity to be heard. See Fields, 193 Wn.2d at 51. Under the procedures outlined in CR 71, Lauren had an opportunity to lodge her objections to her third attorney’s withdrawal in writing, as Jacob did. In sum, we hold that Lauren waived her challenge to the trial court’s approval of her third attorney’s withdrawal because she failed to object below. C. Denial of Continuance After Attorney Withdrawal Lauren next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a fourth continuance after allowing her third attorney to withdraw, ensuring she would have to represent herself at trial. Jacob counters that it was appropriate for the trial court to deny the continuance because the case had already been continued three times. He emphasizes that as a result, the litigation had been pending for over two years, leaving the outcome for the parties’ four children in limbo. We review the trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 670, 131 P.3d 305 (2006). “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based” on “‘clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable’” grounds. Id. at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Balandzich v. Demeroto, 10 Wn. App. 718, 721, 519 P.2d 994 (1974)). The Trummel court also concluded: In exercising its discretion, a court may properly consider the necessity of reasonably prompt disposition of the litigation; the needs of the moving party; the possible prejudice to the adverse party; the prior history of the litigation, including prior continuances granted the moving party; any conditions imposed in the 13 No. 60619-4-II continuances previously granted; and any other matters that have a material bearing. Id. at 670. An attorney’s withdrawal in a civil case “does not give the party an absolute right of continuance.” Jankelson v. Cisel, 3 Wn. App. 139, 141, 473 P.2d 202 (1970). A continuance is not required when an attorney withdraws “on the eve of trial” without explanation, because such a requirement would encourage any party seeking a continuance to “induce [their attorney] to file a notice of withdrawal.” Peterson v. Crockett, 158 Wash. 631, 636, 291 P. 721 (1930). But if an attorney withdraws due to “sudden illness” or is granted permission to withdraw by the court due to a finding of good cause, that may serve as a “compelling ground” for a continuance. Peterson, 158 Wash. at 636. This case had been ongoing for two years and the residential placement of Jacob and Lauren’s four children remained unsettled. The trial court had already granted three continuances and had recently denied a fourth continuance requested by Lauren. And Lauren’s two prior attorneys had withdrawn. Given the concern for establishing a permanent parenting plan for the children, as well as the fact that Lauren had already had three attorneys and there had been three prior continuances, it was not untenable or manifestly unreasonable to deny another continuance request. We therefore hold it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court, which had a long history with this litigation and with both parties, to decide that no further delay was warranted even if denying the continuance would force Lauren to proceed representing herself. 14 No. 60619-4-II II. PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION AND LACK OF BUSINESS VALUATION Lauren next argues that the trial court erred when it determined that Jacob’s interests in Selden’s and LLSS “‘do not provide any type of economic prospects’” without requiring a professional valuation of the businesses. Opening Br. of Appellant at 47 (quoting record). She argues that because these interests went unvalued, the ultimate distribution of assets was not equitable. Lauren also challenges several of the trial court’s Findings and Conclusions related to the property distribution. We reverse a trial court’s findings of fact only if they are unsupported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wn.2d 236, 246, P.2d 175 (1984). “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.” Hall, 103 Wn.2d at 246. We address findings of fact and conclusions of law as what they are regardless of how they are labeled. Nguyen v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn. App. 155, 163, 317 P.3d 518 (2014). If an appellant’s challenge to a factual finding is unsupported by argument, we consider the finding a verity on appeal. See Wallace v. Kuehner, 111 Wn. App. 809, 817, 46 P.3d 823 (2002). A. Relevant Facts In 2016, during Jacob and Lauren’s marriage, Jacob’s mother and grandfather gifted Jacob a combined 4.76 percent of Class A ownership interests in LLSS, a limited liability company Jacob’s grandfather had created that owned real property Selden’s rented for its furniture store. In 2018, a family member gifted Jacob a 1.97 percent interest in Selden’s. In November 2023, while the dissolution litigation was ongoing, Jacob signed a promissory note to pay back $53,725 drawn from LLSS. Around the same time, Lauren sought to have Jacob’s interests in LLSS and Selden’s valued. In November 2023, while represented by her second 15 No. 60619-4-II attorney, Lauren moved for an order requiring Jacob to pay the costs of a business valuation. She identified a specific preferred valuator. The trial court granted the motion, ordering Jacob to “pay the costs for a business valuation/s by an agreed-upon business valuator,” with the cost capped at $7,500. CP at 759. The trial court stated that Lauren had chosen an acceptable valuator, and if Jacob did not agree to retain them, the parties would “need to work out who’s going to do the evaluation.” 3 VRP at 1031. In February 2024, the trial court signed an agreed order continuing trial for a second time and stated that the continuance was necessary “so that discovery can be completed, including the business valuations which were ordered by the” trial court. CP at 772. The record does not reflect any further efforts by Lauren to secure a valuation until Lauren’s third attorney appeared as her counsel in July 2024. At that time, Lauren’s third attorney and Jacob’s attorney exchanged emails in which Jacob’s attorney acknowledged that “the court ordered [Jacob] to advance $7,500 towards the business valuation” but claimed Jacob did not have the funds to pay for it. CP at 853. After further email exchanges, Jacob’s attorney sent a short message summarizing their position as follows: (i) [Lauren] wants the business valuation, [Jacob] does not believe it is necessary. (ii) [Jacob] was ordered to pay $7,500 towards such and he will; (iii) The court commissioner ordered that the expert is agreed upon. However, this does not mean it will be a joint valuation. CP at 852. Jacob’s attorney did not further clarify what she meant by “joint valuation.” It does not appear Lauren’s attorney ever responded to this last email. In November 2024, about a month and a half before trial was set to begin, Lauren moved for a continuance for more time to complete the valuation. At the same time, she moved separately for the trial court to order Jacob to cooperate and agree to a valuator. The trial court denied the 16 No. 60619-4-II continuance and does not appear to have ruled on the motion to order Jacob to cooperate. No valuation was completed before trial. Jacob and Scott Selden testified at trial about Jacob’s ownership interests and the state of LLSS and Selden’s. Jacob testified that family members had gifted him the ownership interests during his marriage. He testified that he had no decision-making authority in the operations of Selden’s or LLSS based on his minority ownership stake. Jacob testified that he did not expect to receive “any monetary benefit from [his] ownership interest[s]” because they were “not liquid” and because in the furniture industry, “big payout[s]” are unlikely unless the business is bought out. 4 VRP at 1593. Jacob testified that Lauren’s third attorney had reached out to his attorney in July 2024 and characterized the email as a “representation that [Lauren] would follow up with names and availability as well as [her preferred valuator’s] interest and availability.” 4 VRP at 1592. He stated that he received no follow-up and that it was Lauren’s “choice not to pursue a formal business valuation.” 4 VRP at 1595. Scott testified that the only financial payment Jacob received from Selden’s or LLSS was his salary from Selden’s. Scott told the trial court that Selden’s and LLSS did not distribute dividends but that if they had a successful year they sometimes offered profit sharing among the employees. Scott further testified that to the extent LLSS’s minority interest holders had tax obligations based on their ownership, LLSS would cover those expenses. Scott testified that in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Selden’s was “losing money at a dramatic rate.” 5 VRP at 2058. He stated that he did not expect Jacob would ever receive money directly based on his minority interest in Selden’s. Scott also testified that LLSS was 17 No. 60619-4-II roughly six million dollars in debt, and that Jacob would not receive any “real monetary benefit” for his minority interests in LLSS until that debt was paid. 5 VRP at 2062. Scott estimated that debt would be paid off in “18 to 20 years.” 5 VRP at 2063. Scott testified that a valuation had been done on LLSS in 2017. Scott told the trial court that no valuation had been done on Selden’s “in recent years” but that it would be feasible to determine a “book value” for the company based on “the inventory, . . . debt[,] and customer deposits.” 5 VRP at 2068. The trial court ruled that the interests in Selden’s and LLSS were Jacob’s separate property and that they had “limited” value. 7 VRP at 3015. The trial court assigned the shares to Jacob in the asset distribution. The trial court then distributed the community property. The community property consisted of the net proceeds from the sale of Jacob and Lauren’s family home; Jacob’s 401(k) from Selden’s; Lauren’s photography business; a car; a boat; two personal checking accounts; a savings account; and a business checking account associated with the photography business. Relying on a spreadsheet Jacob had submitted that valued most of the community assets, the trial court concluded that there was “$383,865 in net community assets.” 7 VRP at 3021. The trial court distributed to Lauren the majority of the proceeds from the home sale; the majority of the 401(k); the car; the photography business; one of the personal checking accounts; and the business checking account. It assigned the remaining community property to Jacob. The trial court found that this distribution constituted 70/30 split in Lauren’s favor. 18 No. 60619-4-II The trial court imputed a monthly net income of $4,008 to Lauren, which resulted in a child support obligation of $853.31 per month. However, at Jacob’s request, the trial court ordered that Lauren would pay no child support. B. 70/30 Distribution of Community Assets First, Lauren challenges the trial court’s finding that its distribution of the community assets resulted in a 70 percent to 30 percent split in Lauren’s favor. Lauren claims this finding was erroneous because the trial court did not “identif[y] the value of the . . . assets” before parceling them out to confirm that Lauren was receiving a 70 percent share. Opening Br. of Appellant at 28. She argues that the only asset the trial court specifically valued was “the net proceeds from the sale of the family home, at $202,500.” Id. Based on the record, the trial court determined there was “$383,865 in net community assets,” and it arrived at that value based on a spreadsheet submitted by Jacob that valued most of the parties’ assets. 7 VRP at 3021. Jacob’s spreadsheet listed the net value of the family home sale at $202,500; his Selden’s 401(k) at $140,928; a credit union savings account at $35,128; the parties’ car at $18,769; and the parties’ boat, which was subject to a lien, at -$14,460. The sum of these values amounted to the $382,865 figure used by the trial court. See Ex. 54. Of these assets, the trial court distributed to Lauren $120,350 from the Selden’s 401(k); $114,533 from the sale of the family home; and the car worth $18,769. These assets added up to a value of $253,652, or approximately 66% of the assets the trial court valued—a figure similar to the 70 percent in the trial court’s finding. Moreover, Lauren was not assigned any community debt, while Jacob retained the community debt on the boat. 19 No. 60619-4-II The pool of community property also included three bank accounts that were not valued in Jacob’s spreadsheet: a business checking account for Lauren’s photography business (#9774) and two personal checking accounts (#7286 and #7965). The trial court distributed one of the personal checking accounts to Jacob (#7286) and the other two accounts to Lauren. See CP at 1014. The difference between the balance of Jacob’s checking account and the balance of Lauren’s checking accounts is minimal compared to the assets the trial court valued above and therefore these accounts do not meaningfully affect the distribution. Finally, the trial court distributed Lauren’s photography business to Lauren. We cannot find any valuation of this business in the record. But Lauren makes no argument that the business had negative value, so we can assume it did not decrease the value of her award. Considering the entire context of the property and debt distribution overall, we hold that the trial court’s finding here was supported by substantial evidence. C. Failure to Require Business Valuation We turn next to Lauren’s argument that it was error for the trial court to not require a business valuation and to distribute the assets with the assumption that Jacob’s minority interests in Selden’s and LLSS were of limited value. Relatedly, Lauren challenges the trial court’s finding that Jacob “did not violate the Court order regarding the business valuation.” CP at 986 (FF 22.2); Opening Br. of Appellant at 51. We review a trial court’s valuation of shares for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390, 403, 948 P.2d 1338 (1997). We have recognized that “[i]t is difficult to value the shares of a closely held corporation; the task calls for the careful weighing of relevant facts and the ultimate exercise of reasoned judgment.” Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. at 402. “‘A 20 No. 60619-4-II dissolution court cannot decree a fair allocation of assets and debts without the court gaining thorough knowledge of the parties’ property and l