Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Parenting of No. 88042-0-I K.B.P.G. DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION COBURN, J. — A.D.-C. filed a petition to determine K.B.P.G.’s parentage. In response, G.G.-A., the child’s mother, 1 under RCW 26.26A.465, alleged that K.B.P.G. was conceived as a result of sexual assault. The trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing. The court rejected A.D.-C.’s claim that a video taken of him in public by Mother’s sister should be excluded because it violated Washington’s privacy act. The court found Mother credible, and A.D.-C. not credible. The court concluded that A.D.-C. is not a legal parent of K.B.P.G. because the child was conceived as a result of A.D.-C. sexually assaulting Mother. A.D.-C. claims the court’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence, that the trial court’s findings of fact were inadequate, and that the court erred in admitting the video. We affirm. A.D.-C.’s claims are not only meritless, but also, as argued by Mother, frivolous; we award her appellate attorney fees. 1 Hereinafter referred to as “Mother.” 88042-0-I/2 Petition to Decide Parentage A.D.-C. filed a petition to determine K.B.P.G.’s parentage in June 2024. 2 Mother sought to preclude A.D.-C. from establishing parentage because K.B.P.G. was born as a result of A.D.-C. sexually assaulting her. Under the Uniform Parentage Act, chapter 26.26A RCW, if a superior court determines the sexual assault allegation to be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence after a fact-finding hearing, the court shall “[a]djudicate that [the person who committed the sexual assault] is not a parent of the child, has no right to residential time or decision-making responsibilities for the child, has no right to inheritance from the child, and has no right to notification of, or standing to object to, the adoption of the child.” 3 RCW 26.26A.030; RCW 26.26A.465(5), (6)(b), (7)(a). Fact-Finding Hearing Prior to the fact-finding hearing, Mother submitted affidavits setting forth facts supporting her allegations and A.D.-C. filed opposing affidavits. RCW 26.26A.465(5)(c). The parties agreed to submit all the declarations and submitted information into evidence. Both parties were represented by attorneys at the hearing and submitted exhibits, including photographs and videos. Both testified at the hearing but relied on witness support through submitted declarations and exhibits. Mother testified with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. A.D.-C. filed this petition identifying K.B.P.G.’s name as K.Y.G.A. We identify the child 2 as K.B.P.G., consistent with the trial court’s order and the child’s birth certificate. 3 The court may decline to enter one or more of these restrictions if the child’s parent who was the victim of the sexual assault consents in writing for the court to do so. RCW 26.6A.465(7)(a). 2 88042-0-I/3 A.D.-C. and Mother met and began dating in the fall of 2019. Mother had one child, K.G., before she met A.D.-C. Mother had a cleaning business and lived in an apartment in White Center when she first met A.D.-C.; Mother later bought a home in Burien. K.B.P.G. was born in April 2021. A.D.-C. is the biological father. 4 On May 12, 2023, Mother’s sister, F.G., 5 took a video of A.D.-C. outside Mother’s White Center apartment while he was in his pickup truck in the parking lot. A.D.-C. did not designate the video for appeal but does not dispute Aunt F.’s description of the video’s contents. As Aunt F. approaches A.D.-C. while videotaping him, A.D.-C. can be heard saying he did not give her permission to be recorded and Aunt F. responds that A.D.-C. is in a public area, not in the privacy of his home, so she did not care that he did not give her permission. A.D.-C. says the recording is illegal and he will report her before driving off. Around August 2023 Aunt F. petitioned for an anti-harassment protection order against A.D.-C. that was denied. The commissioner that presided over the related hearing observed that Aunt F. raised “reference to rape” that had “something to do with [Aunt F.’s] niece,” but that it was not clear to the court what was allegedly said, when, and to whom. The court observed that the submitted videos showing individuals speaking in Spanish indicates upset but that no interpretation was provided and neither party testified at the hearing. 4 Mother listed a man she was dating at the time on K.B.P.G.’s birth certificate as K.B.P.G.’s father but does not dispute that A.D.-C. is the biological father of K.B.P.G. Genetic testing results show a 99 percent or greater probability that A.D.-C. is the biological parent of K.B.P.G. 5 Hereinafter referred to as Aunt F., for readability purposes. 3 88042-0-I/4 On June 9, 2024, A.D.-C. called police who responded to an incident at his storage unit in Redmond. Mother was arrested and charged with assault in the fourth degree and for interfering with reporting domestic violence. Aside from these undisputed facts, the testimony from A.D.-C. and Mother about their relationship, including what occurred on June 9, greatly differed. We first summarize A.D.-C.’s and Mother’s testimony, and then, the discussion section of this opinion further addresses evidence relevant to issues A.D.-C. raises on appeal. A. Mother’s Testimony In sum, Mother said that she was a victim of multiple instances of sexual assault by A.D.-C. from about a month after they first started dating to an incident on June 9, 2024. Mother testified that over the course of their relationship she was too scared to not comply with A.D.-C.’s wishes or to report the sexual assaults to police because of threats from A.D.-C. On occasions, these threats included raping K.G., who was nine the first time A.D.-C. made the threat, and reporting Mother to immigration officials to have her deported. According to Mother, A.D.-C. warned her that if she called the police, he would tell them she stole from him, and on one occasion said he would kill her, he had a pistol, and would kidnap K.G. Mother also feared that the police would not believe her because she does not speak English. Mother denied living with A.D.-C. Mother admitted that A.D.-C. worked on her Burien house but denied A.D.-C.’s claims that he gave her thousands of dollars to buy that home and to contribute to her cleaning business. Mother explained that A.D.-C. would make false promises of giving Mother money to influence her. A.D.-C. gave 4 88042-0-I/5 Mother a small amount of money to set up a website for her business, but insisted Mother use his friend to do so and then controlled her online presence. Mother testified that A.D.-C. surveilled her by tracking the minivan he insisted she use, by driving by her home late at night, and by hiding in her bushes. Though she was too scared to report the sexual assaults to police, she told three other people about the assaults and threats, including Aunt F. Mother also submitted supporting declarations from those three people and a neighbor, screenshots of text messages from A.D.-C., a video her sister took of A.D.-C. outside Mother’s apartment, and photographs of Mother’s bruises she says were caused when A.D.-C. pinned her down to rape her. B. A.D.-C.’s Testimony In sum, A.D.-C. testified that he and Mother were in a romantic relationship, had consensual sex, and that the pregnancy was planned. He submitted a screenshot of what appears to depict video messaging on a cell phone where he claims Mother asked him to come over to have sex while nude. The image is undated. He also submitted affectionate text message exchanges between him and Mother, who testified that A.D.- C. made her send those text messages to him. A.D.-C. testified that he and Mother lived together from February 2020 to February 2021 in Mother’s White Center apartment, and that the reason he moved out was because Mother received a letter from the apartment office saying anyone who lived there had to be on the lease. In his declaration, A.D.-C. said he moved out because of some restrictions involving Mother’s receipt of benefits. He denied ever sexually assaulting Mother or making any threats. 5 88042-0-I/6 A.D.-C. claims he gave Mother $8,000 to $10,000 to start her cleaning business, and $23,000 to help her buy the Burien home, which is only in Mother’s name, he asserts, “due to her legal status.” A.D.-C. also claimed he gave Mother $1,200 a month when K.B.P.G. was born and increased his contribution to $2,000 a month when K.B.P.G. started daycare. A.D.-C. did not submit any documentation of any transfer of money from him to Mother. He testified that he would always try to give Mother a check of an electronic transfer of funds, but that Mother did not want any proof that he gave her money, demanding cash or she would not accept it. A.D.-C. explained that his relationship with Mother started falling apart in 2023 because Aunt F. interfered in their relationship. A.D.-C. testified that Aunt F. tried to get him to pay her at least $600 a month or $150 per week because she claimed responsibility for bringing Mother to the United States. After Aunt F. filed the “false” case against him, A.D.-C. took the minivan away from Mother but gave it back for K.B.P.G.’s benefit when Mother asked for it. A.D.-C. also increased his monthly financial help to Mother to $3,000 a month. It was after Aunt F. lost her petition for an anti-harassment order that she would manipulate Mother to stop seeing A.D.-C. by saying she would stop providing daycare for K.B.P.G. He explained that this was the reason Mother forbade A.D.-C. from taking pictures with K.B.P.G. or visiting her at the Burien house. Instead, A.D.-C. claimed that Mother would take K.B.P.G. to A.D.-C.’s place as long as he kept paying her $3,000 a month. After the June 9 storage unit incident, Mother stopped talking to A.D.-C. and he could no longer see K.B.P.G. 6 88042-0-I/7 C. Aunt F.’s video At the beginning of the fact-finding hearing, A.D.-C. objected to the admission of the May 12, 2023, video Aunt F. took of A.D.-C. A.D.-C. argued that it violated RCW 9.73.030 because A.D.-C. did not consent to the recording. The statute, which is under the Washington Privacy Act (WPA), chapter 9.73 RCW, prohibits the recording of private conversations without first obtaining consent of all the participants in the conversation. RCW 9.73.030(1)(b). Mother argued the WPA does not apply because the conversation took place in public and was not a private communication. A.D.-C. did not dispute the location of the interaction and instead reiterated that he did not give consent. The court, which viewed the video, observed that the location “appears to be on a street,” while noting that Mother described it as a parking lot. The court concluded that “[i]t is certainly out in the public realm” and did not find that the interaction captured on video was a private communication. The court denied A.D.-C.’s motion to exclude the video because RCW 9.73.030 only applies to private communication. D. Trial Court’s Findings Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court issued its written ruling. The court considered Mother’s sexual assault allegation, any response, supporting or opposing declarations or other evidence, and any testimony or argument. The court found, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that A.D.-C. committed sexual assault against Mother that was nonconsensual sexual penetration resulting in pregnancy, and the child was born within 320 days after the sexual assault. The court entered specific findings of fact to support its determination: 7 88042-0-I/8 The child was conceived as a result of [A.D.-C.’s] nonconsensual sexual penetration of [Mother] on or about June 23, 2020, which is approximately 287 days prior to the child being born. [Mother’s] declarations and testimony were credible regarding multiple sexual assaults over the course of her involvement with [A.D.-C.] There was corroboration as it related to her testimony: she told at least three close family members about ongoing nonconsensual sexual contact and threats by [A.D.-C.] at or near the time it was happening; [Mother] provided photos of bruising on her arms that were taken on June 24, 2020 after the nonconsensual sexual contact; [K.G.] was witness to a night where she heard her mother crying in her bedroom while inside her bedroom with [A.D.-C.] The daughter called [Aunt F.] for help that same night in the very early morning hours. [Mother’s] demeanor and emotional state at the fact-finding hearing also was credible. [A.D.-C.’s] testimony was not credible. There were several examples where his explanations did not make sense and were not credible (i.e., why he was outside [Mother’s] home during early morning hours sitting in his truck or driving by her house on multiple occasions, his explanation of the GPS monitoring of [Mother’s] vehicle, his explanation why he said [Mother] did not want him living near her, the explanation of the video of him putting the key in the door, and his sudden (not in any prior declarations) explanation that the bruises on [Mother’s] arms were “hickeys” when they were very clearly bruises on the back of both of her arms at her triceps). The Court considered the demeanor of the parties in addition to the content of their testimony. The Court observed that [A.D.-C.’s] body language would change when it seemed he was not telling the truth. For example, when asked about the GPS on the car or neighbor’s declaration regarding him being outside [Mother’s] house multiple times over a period of time in the early morning hours, he was fidgety and broke eye contact with the Court when trying to (not credibly) explain his actions. This behavior was noted multiple times during his testimony and was not due to being nervous as there were many times that he made strong eye contact with the Court. [A.D.-C.] denied any nonconsensual sexual contact with [Mother]. The Court did not find him credible. [Mother’s] demeanor was appropriate in the context of her testimony. Her testimony regarding being fearful of [A.D.-C.] due to his threats was credible given her lack of sophistication and her very limited English proficiency. Her explanations that she did not think anyone would believe 8 88042-0-I/9 her, and that she believed [A.D.-C.] threats against her older daughter were credible. 6 The court concluded under RCW 26.26A.465, that A.D.-C. was not a legal parent of K.B.P.G. and entered a final parentage order declaring the same. A.D.-C. appeals. DISCUSSION Video Admissibility Despite not designating the May 12, 2023, video for this court’s review, A.D.-C. challenges the trial court’s admission of such video, which he maintains violated the WPA. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Matter of Dependency of R.D., 27 Wn. App. 2d 219, 227, 532 P.3d 201 (2023) (citing In re Welfare of M.R., 200 Wn.2d 363, 376, 518 P.3d 214 (2022)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if a judge’s decision was ‘manifestly unreasonable,’ meaning no reasonable person would reach the same conclusion, or if it ‘rests on untenable grounds,’ meaning it relied on facts not supported by the record or on an incorrect legal standard.” M.R., 200 Wn.2d at 376 (quoting State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467, 473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets a statute or rule. Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 462, 285 P.3d 873 (2012). RCW 9.73.030(1)(b) states (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any: … 6 A couple of times, it is apparent from context that the trial court’s order inadvertently referred to A.D.-C. as Mother and vice versa. 9 88042-0-I/10 (b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation. At the hearing, the trial court found that the video did not violate RCW 9.73.030 because it was not a private conversation since it occurred in the public realm. A.D.-C. does not dispute the court’s finding that the video captured a conversation that occurred in the public realm. He does not dispute where the recorded conversation took place. Instead, A.D.-C., citing State v. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d 666, 672, 57 P.3d 255 (2002), claims that the court was “required” to but failed to consider the fact A.D.-C objected to the recording before determining whether the conversation was “private.” Townsend does not so hold. 147 Wn.2d at 673. In fact, our Supreme Court explained: We must first determine if the communications between Townsend and the fictitious child, Amber, fall under the act as private communications recorded by a device. If we answer those questions in the affirmative, we must then determine if the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that Townsend consented to the recording of his private communications. Townsend, 147 Wn.2d at 673 (emphasis added). A.D.-C. next asserts generally that “a charged, personal confrontation between family members about deeply private matters—the nature of a romantic relationship, allegations of misconduct, the welfare of a child—has a qualitatively different character” and that “Washington courts have recognized that the content and nature of a communication bear on the privacy analysis.” For support, A.D.-C. cites State v. Clark, 129 Wn.2d 211, 225, 916 P.2d 384 (1996). Aside from the fact that the captured conversation in the subject video did not at all touch upon deeply private matters, Clark affirmed convictions for drug dealing that were captured via audio recordings through an informant. Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 215. The court explained 10 88042-0-I/11 We find the conversations here were not private because they were routine sales conversations on public streets between the defendants and a stranger who happened to be an undercover police informant. Twelve of the sixteen conversations also took place in front of a third party, or while the defendant was standing in the public thoroughfare within sight and hearing of any passerby. Because the conversations were not private, RCW 9.73 does not apply and the defendants’ convictions are affirmed. Clark, 129 Wn.2d at 215. Our State Supreme Court gave the term “private” under RCW 9.73 its ordinary and usual meaning, including “belonging to one’s self … secret … intended only for the persons involved (a conversation) … holding a confidential relationship to something … a secret message: a private communication … secretly: not open or in public.” Id. at 224-25 (citing Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep’t, 119 Wn.2d 178, 189-90, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992)). A.D.-C.’s arguments lack any merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video. Substantial Evidence Next, A.D.-C. argues that the trial court erred in finding that K.B.P.G. was born as a result of sexual assault by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. A.D.-C. does not specifically assign error to any of the trial court’s findings. And despite acknowledging that an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or assess credibility, A.D.-C. argues that “[a] finding based entirely on one witness’s testimony—when that testimony is contradicted by the witness’s own documented conduct—cannot, as a matter of law, be ‘highly probable.’” To support this contention, A.D.-C. argues that Mother’s sexual assault testimony is uncorroborated and highlights disputed facts. In essence, A.D.-C. asks this court to reweigh the evidence all while acknowledging that “[t]his Court 11 88042-0-I/12 recognizes that victims of sexual assault may delay reporting, may maintain contact with their assailant, and may exhibit behaviors that seem inconsistent with victimhood.” A.D.- C. asserts that “[t]hese dynamics are real and this brief does not minimize them,” while arguing that “[t]he complete absence of any corroboration over five years—combined with extensive affirmative evidence of a consensual relationship—places this case outside what the heightened standard permits.” We reject the notion that sexual assault cannot occur between two people who have previously been in a consensual relationship or that corroboration of the sexual assault is required for it to be highly probable. In fact, this court has held that, even under the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, corroboration is not required in incest cases or other sex offenses because “such offenses are rarely[,] if ever[,] committed under circumstances permitting knowledge and observation by persons other than the accused and the complaining witness, and not all such offenses are otherwise capable of corroboration.” State v. Chenoweth, 188 Wn. App. 521, 537, 354 P.3d 13 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Galbreath, 69 Wn.2d 664, 670, 419 P.2d 800 (1966)). Nonetheless, it was Mother’s burden to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the ultimate fact at issue was ‘highly probable.’” Matter of R.V., 22 Wn. App. 2d 300, 314, 511 P.3d 148 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). We review a trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence in light of the “highly probable” test when clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is required. Sego, 82 Wn.2d at 739. “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded rational person of the truth of 12 88042-0-I/13 the declared premise.” In re Welfare of A.B., 181 Wn. App. 45, 59, 323 P.3d 1062 (2014). “Evidence that is sufficient under a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof is not necessarily sufficient under the higher burden of proof of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” R.V., 22 Wn. App. 2d at 314 (citing Sego, 82 Wn.2d at 739). “Appellate courts do not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations, but we may review the entire record to determine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence.” R.V., 22 Wn. App. 2d at 314. To the extent A.D.-C. suggests that the trial court made its determination “based entirely on one witness’s testimony” that is not supported in the record. The trial court considered both Mother’s testimony, A.D.-C.’s testimony, declarations of witnesses, and submitted information. A.D.-C. also claims that “[t]he court’s order rests heavily on demeanor.” The record does support that the court considered the parties’ demeanor but that demeanor was considered “in addition to the content of their testimony.” (Emphasis added.) In reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court’s findings touched upon Mother’s claim of multiple sexual assaults, allegations of A.D.-C. surveilling Mother, A.D.-C.’s explanation as to why Mother did not want him to live near her, and Mother’s limited English proficiency. It is evident from the record that the trial court did not base its findings entirely on one witness’s testimony. A. Multiple sexual assaults Mother testified to multiple instances of A.D.-C. sexually assaulting her and threatening herself and her children. She submitted declarations from three others. Two 13 88042-0-I/14 of them, Aunt F. and E.M., 7 confirmed that Mother reported to them that A.D.-C. raped her. The third declaration was from Mother’s nephew, G.G., confirming that Mother was worried because A.D.-C. had threated to kill her and take her children away, and also threatened to call immigration officials. In its findings, the court talked about evidence that related to two particular instances of sexual assault. One incident involved K.G. and the other included photographs of bruising on Mother. The incident that involved K.G. was the second time A.D.-C. raped Mother, which occurred at Mother’s apartment. According to Mother, A.D.-C. called asking if Mother was hungry, which she answered no. He then said he was already at her apartment and had food. When she opened the door to get the food, he pushed the door open. When Mother told him to leave, he pulled her upstairs to the bedroom and threatened to rape K.G. if she did not comply. He pushed her down on the bed, pulled off her clothes and proceeded to sexually assault Mother multiple times in her bedroom throughout the night. Mother did not resist because she thought A.D.-C. would rape K.G., who was in her own room “very close” to Mother’s bedroom. But at some point, Mother cried and yelled for A.D.-C. to leave, which she believed woke up K.G. Around three in the morning, K.G., crying, knocked on Mother’s bedroom door. A.D.-C. told K.G. to go away and that him and Mother were “playing.” Thereafter, A.D.-C. overheard K.G. calling Aunt F. A.D.-C. told Mother to make sure K.G. was not calling the police. A.D.-C. also threatened that if Mother called the police, he would kill her because he had a pistol, 7 In reply to Mother’s response brief, A.D.-C. notes in passing that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that E.M. was a family member. A.D.-C. is correct in that E.M. only identified himself as knowing Mother since January 2010. However, A.D.-C. did not assign error to this finding and Mother never testified that E.M. was a family member. We view the trial court’s order identifying E.M. as a family member as an inadvertent mistake that is not material. 14 88042-0-I/15 and once she was dead, he would kidnap K.G. A.D.-C. took Mother’s phone away from her and hid it under the bed, where she did not find it until the next day. Aunt F. recalled that K.G. had called her around three in the morning crying. K.G. said that Mother was crying in a room with A.D.-C. but would not answer the door and K.G. was scared. According to Aunt F., K.G. then said that Mother had come out of the room and said everything was okay. A.D.-C. admitted during the hearing that K.G. had called Aunt F. at three in the morning but provided a different explanation. He testified that he was living with Mother and K.G., who was used to being with Mother all the time. Around that time, three in the morning, A.D.-C., Mother, and K.G. were watching television together. Though Mother had explained to K.G. that when Mother gets a new boyfriend, those two come together and K.G. needed to sleep in her own room, A.D.-C. thought that K.G. was crying because she was not used to that and called Aunt F. to say Mother was in the other room. The incident documented by photographs of bruises on Mother occurred on June 23, 2020, around one p.m., and is the incident that the court found resulted in the conception of K.B.P.G. According to Mother, following the previous sexual assault, A.D.- C. said he was sorry for what happened, that it would never happen again, and that he wanted to get back together. Mother did not believe him. A.D.-C. started stalking Mother, driving by multiple times over a period of weeks, sometimes hiding in bushes to watch her. On June 23, 2020, Mother came home, looked around and did not see A.D.- C.’s truck, but when she unlocked her door, he rushed up and pushed her into her apartment. A.D.-C. then pulled Mother by the arm and pushed her down onto the couch. 15 88042-0-I/16 A.D.-C. told Mother he was going to have sex with her but first wanted to check her vagina to see if there was sperm from any other men. Mother started to resist and said no as A.D.-C. grabbed her by her upper arms to force her down. He forcefully took her pants and underwear off and put his two fingers in her vagina to check for sperm. He then penetrated her with his penis until he climaxed. The next day, Mother took photos of the bruises on her arms caused by A.D.-C. grabbing her. Mother submitted the photographs of the bruises to the court. A.D.-C. denied raping Mother. He submitted a declaration prior to the hearing in response to the photographs of the bruises submitted by Mother with her declaration. In that declaration, he did not dispute that the photographs “may” be of Mother’s arm, but he did dispute that he caused the bruises. During the fact-finding hearing, A.D.-C. was asked about the photographs of the bruises Mother said he caused. A.D.-C. said the marks were hickeys, not bruises, and that he and Mother gave each other hickeys on their bodies. The trial court specifically noted in its findings that A.D.-C. made no such explanation in his prior declarations and that the marks depicted in the photographs were clearly bruises on the back of both Mother’s arms. The record establishes that the trial court did not rest its finding that K.P.B.G. was conceived as a result of nonconsensual sexual penetration on “general credibility preference” based on a “single encounter on or about June 23, 2020,” as suggested by A.D.-C. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. B. Surveilling Mother Mother testified that A.D.-C. surveilled her by driving by her home multiple times, hiding in the bushes, and tracking the minivan. 16 88042-0-I/17 Mother’s neighbor B.B., who moved to Burien in February 2023, submitted a declaration describing how he and neighbors noticed a white truck, documenting the make and license number, parking on the street and turning its lights off regularly. The driver would “prowl the street towards [Mother’s] house with a flashlight” and “hid[e] in the bushes when a car would pass by, in order to not be seen.” When they confronted the driver, he gave what turned out to be a false name and explained he was there to visit his daughter in Mother’s house. B.B. said this was “unnerving since he would only come around at 1:00-2:00 am.” B.B. took photographs of the vehicle and driver and showed them to Mother who confirmed that the driver was A.D.-C. A.D.-C. testified that he came around the Burien house with Mother’s consent and that Mother asked him to wait a block or two away from the house so that Aunt F. would not see him coming around. The day Aunt F. took the video of A.D.-C., he claimed Mother consented to have him over and that the reason he did not go into the apartment was because of Aunt F.’s presence and threat that she would not watch K.B.P.G. anymore if Mother allowed A.D.-C. to come over. A.D.-C. admitted B.B. approached him and asked for a business card and asked why he was there but denied ever ducking into bushes whenever a car went by. A.D.-C. said he thought he went by Mother’s house between one and two in the morning one time and admitted it was not with Mother’s consent, but that this was after he was not able to see K.B.P.G. A.D.-C. admitted to tracking the minivan but explained that the vehicle “came with a GPS” and that Mother knew it as they were worried about K.P.B.G. He admitted calling Mother to ask who was driving the minivan when it traveled to Tacoma and back to Kent and Renton when Mother was working. When Mother said Aunt F. drove the 17 88042-0-I/18 minivan, A.D.-C. told her not to let Aunt F. drive it because it was only for K.B.P.G.’s transportation. The record supports that the trial court did not just rely on Mother’s testimony claiming that A.D.-C. surveilled her. The court considered Mother’s neighbor’s declaration about A.D.-C. being outside Mother’s house multiple times in the early morning. The court also considered A.D.-C.’s own denials and admissions about his interactions with the neighbor, and explanation for the GPS monitoring of Mother’s vehicle. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. C. Living separately Mother denied that A.D.-C. ever lived with her but did stay once for about two weeks when he was sick. Mother submitted a screenshot of a text message she testified was from A.D.-C. offering to bribe her to give him a key, which she said she did not respond to. The text read, “I have $5,000.00 in cash. Do you want them? You give me a key to the apartment and I start staying with you every night.” When asked about the text message, A.D.-C. said, She used to ask me money all the time. I gave her money, and then she didn’t let me see [K.B.P.G.] And then I said, If I am welcome to come anytime, well, give me the key and so I can come by. And it’s why I said, Well, if you need money and you ask me to come anytime, well, I should have a key. And she asked me a key from my home and I didn’t give her one. To support his claim that he and Mother lived together in the White Center apartment, A.D.-C. submitted a video of him inserting a key in a door. He claimed that he had a key when he lived there and gave it back when he moved out. Mother denied ever giving A.D.-C. a key but noticed a key missing one day after A.D.-C. had been at her apartment. 18 88042-0-I/19 The trial court directly asked A.D.-C. about the video he submitted of him inserting a key into a door: 8 Q. All right. That video that was uploaded as an exhibit with you with the key, when was that filmed? A. It was on 2020, the key when pretty much the first time [Mother] gave me the key to try if the key was working. And then the key was working, the same key we use for every single door. The same key was for the storage, and that storage, we took everything and cleared and organized all the cleaning supplies. Q. So where is that video taken? A. In White Center, in her apartment. Q. And why did you film that? A. To send it to [Mother] and to tell her that the key was working. Q. So at the end of the video, there’s nobody opening a door or even turning the key. It just stops with you putting the key in. So does that show that the key was working? A. Yes. I opened the storage then and I cleaned the storage. I attached the video that I have everything outside to organize the cleaning stuff. Q. So is that the storage door or the front door? A. It was for both doors. The same key was for both doors. Q. But in the video, which door? A. Front door, the main door. The court also followed up on A.D.-C.’s testimony that Mother did not want him to live close by, which is why he found an apartment in Redmond. When the court asked why Mother did not want to have him live close by, A.D.-C. answered: Because most of her house cleaning are in Kirkland, Redmond, and she will want me to – she will like to have a place nearby that area to meet for lunch or – plus, because [Aunt F.] didn’t want us to meet someplace around Burien, around her house. So she didn’t want me to be pretty much close by, so that’s the reason. The record supports that the trial court did not just determine A.D.-C.’s lack of credibility based on his demeanor, but also on the substance of his testimony explaining why Mother did not want to live near him and his explanation of the video of him putting a key in the door. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. 8 A.D.-C. did not designate this video in this appeal. 19 88042-0-I/20 D. Mother’s limited English proficiency A.D.-C. takes issue with the trial court finding that Mother had limited English proficiency. The record supports the court’s finding that she had limited English proficiency. Mother submitted an order denying her 2024 petition for a domestic violence protection order against A.D.-C. because the petition did not contain allegations that could support issuing any type of protection order. Mother explained that she had an interpreter in the courtroom but did not have an interpreter to assist with the petition and so she did not know she had to list details in the petition. Language issues also appeared in the June 9 storage unit incident. In A.D.-C.’s declaration in response to Mother’s sexual assault allegation, he notified the court that he was the victim in pending criminal matters that stemmed from Mother assaulting him in the June 9 storage unit incident. Mother responded by submitting a copy of the police report from the incident. Mother testified that she agreed to meet A.D.-C. at his storage unit because he threatened to kidnap her children. While there, Mother claimed that A.D.-C. tried to rape her on a mattress on the floor of the storage unit. Mother resisted because K.B.P.G. was nearby and watching. Mother claims A.D.-C. pressed on her chest into the mattress and tried to choke her. Mother said she did not tell police what had happened because she did not know English and did not know how to explain it. She said at the jail there was an interpreter and she told the interpreter that she felt pressure and pain in her chest and that A.D.-C. tried to rape her. When asked why the report said there were no marks on her neck, Mother explained she got out of the encounter fast. The record suggests Mother demonstrated what she did while testifying at the hearing when she said, “I went like this and I got myself out.” 20 88042-0-I/21 An investigating police officer wrote in the police report that Mother “made comments about having chest pain” at the jail and that “[t]his conversation was made through an interpreter at t