Full Opinion

FILED OCTOBER 27, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE In the Matter of the Parenting and Support ) of: ) No. 41914-2-III ) A.J.D. ) ) ) KAREN KAY RYERS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) KARRIE S. ANDERSON, ) ) Appellant, ) ) RAY DUBAL, ) ) Defendant. ) COONEY, A.C.J. — Karen Ryers petitioned the superior court for an order adjudicating her as the de facto parent of her granddaughter, A.D., under the Uniform Parentage Act, chapter 26.26A RCW. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. On appeal, Ms. Ryers argues (1) sufficient facts were presented to establish standing, (2) the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof in dismissing the petition for lack of standing, and (3) the court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson conclusions of law. Although we agree the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof, we nevertheless affirm because the petition does not allege sufficient facts to establish standing. The absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law is immaterial because our review of the petition is de novo. BACKGROUND On June 13, 2025, Ms. Ryers filed a petition seeking to be adjudicated as the de facto parent of her then 14-year-old granddaughter, A.D. A.D.’s parents are Raymond Dubal and Karrie Anderson, Ms. Ryers’ daughter. In support of her petition, Ms. Ryers’ declared, in relevant part: 12. Residence for a significant period I lived with the child as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant period. (List the dates when you lived with the child and who else lived in the household.) The child lived with me for extended periods of time for the last two years. The child has lived with me for up to two and a half weeks at a time. The child has a bedroom in my home with her own cloths [sic] and belongings at my house. 13. Caretaking/Parenting Responsibilities I provide consistent caretaking for the child and undertook full and permanent parenting responsibilities without expectation of being paid. (Describe.) I have taken the child to school and picked her up from school. I have taken her to doctor appointments and therapy appointments. I have enrolled her in extra circular [sic] activities like Sea Cadets and 4 H. I have made medical decisions for her and communicated with her doctor, teachers, and therapists. 2 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson 14. Holding Out I held the child out as my child. (Describe when and how you have told others that you were the child’s parent or acted with others as the child’s parent.) I have been communicating with her teachers, doctors and therapists. I have taken her to and signed her up for Sea Cadets, 4H, and brought her to volunteer at VFM. I communicate with her medical insurance company Molina. I have made medical decisions for her and school decisions. 15. Bonded Relationship I have a bonded and dependent parental relationship with the child. (Describe.) We have a very strong emotional bond. She comes to me and confides in me, she trusts me and cries to me a lot. I am her safe place—per her Kitsap mental health counselor Barbara Mitchell. 16. Parent Fostered/Supported Relationship At least one of the child’s parents fostered or supported my relationship with the child. . . . My daughter Karrie was fostering and support [sic] our relationship for a period of time. But she has now cut me out of the child’s life abruptly. Ray Dubal, the child’s father: who Karrie will not allow to see the child, supports me taking care of the child. 17. Best Interest It is in the child’s best interest for our relationship to continue because: She relies on me for emotional support, leans on me and depends on me to take care of her. My daughter Karrie, is a hoarder, and drinks heavily. My granddaughter needs the support, love, and someone to trust in. She is happy at my residence. She has peace and quiet. She has told me she doesn’t know what she’d do without me. 3 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 8-9. Ms. Anderson filed a response in which she disputes the allegations in paragraphs 12 through 17 of Ms. Ryers’ petition. On September 16, 2025, Ms. Ryers filed a “Motion for Standing re De Facto Parentage” and asserted that she “has acted as a parent to [A.D.] for a substantial period of time and meets the statutory criteria for de facto parentage.” CP at 39 (capitalization omitted). The court thereafter ordered an expedited hearing “on the issue of whether [Ms. Ryers] has standing as a de facto parent.” CP at 102. The hearing took place over two days in early December. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed the petition without entering any findings of fact or conclusions of law, stating, “[Ms. Ryers] has not met the standard for the case to go forward by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).” CP at 175. The court also denied Ms. Anderson’s request for attorney fees. Ms. Ryers timely appeals. ANALYSIS Ms. Ryers contends the superior court erred in dismissing her petition because she satisfied the threshold showing required to establish standing and because the court applied the wrong burden of proof. Although we agree the court applied the wrong burden, Ms. Ryers did not allege facts sufficient to establish standing. We review de novo a trial court’s dismissal of a de facto parentage petition for lack of standing. In re Parentage of L.J.M., 15 Wn. App. 2d 588, 596-97, 476 P.3d 636 4 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson (2020). While our analysis may differ from the superior court’s analysis, we can affirm on any basis supported by the record. Mt. Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 344, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). Washington recognizes that a parent-child relationship may be established outside the traditional biological or adoptive context. See In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d 679, 683, 122 P.3d 161 (2005). The legislature has since codified de facto parentage, authorizing courts to adjudicate the establishment of parental rights. RCW 26.26A.440. The statutory factors for de facto parentage are: (a) The individual resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant period; (b) The individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; (c) The individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation; (d) The individual held out the child as the individual’s child; (e) The individual established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature; (f) Another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship required under (e) of this subsection; and (g) Continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is in the best interest of the child. RCW 26.26A.440(4). Establishing de facto parentage is a two-step process: (1) “to proceed to a full hearing, the petitioner must establish standing by alleging facts sufficient to justify 5 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson success on the merits,” and (2) “[i]f standing is satisfied, the petitioner must then prove the de facto parentage claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Parentage of L.T., 25 Wn. App. 2d 260, 266, 522 P.3d 1040 (2023); RCW 26.26A.440(3)(c), (4). To establish standing, the petitioner must file a verified pleading alleging specific facts that, if taken as true, would be legally sufficient to satisfy each statutory element. L.T., 25 Wn. App. 2d at 267. If the petitioner meets this threshold showing, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing on the merits where the court determines whether the petitioner has proved the factors contained in RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a)-(g) by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Ms. Ryers argues the trial court erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing on the merits without first determining whether she had standing and by applying the wrong burden of proof—requiring her to prove RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a)-(g) by a preponderance of the evidence at the standing stage. She further argues that she met her burden, even under a preponderance of the evidence standard. We agree the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof and erred by proceeding to a merits hearing without first making the threshold standing determination. Nevertheless, Ms. Ryers’ petition does not allege specific facts that, if taken as true, would be legally sufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a)-(g). Ms. Ryers first contends the trial court erred by requiring her to prove the seven elements of RCW 26.26A.440(4) by a preponderance of the evidence rather than 6 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson applying the framework enunciated in In re Parentage of J.D.W., 14 Wn. App. 2d 388, 417, 471 P.3d 228 (2020). 1 We agree the trial court improperly imposed a preponderance burden at the standing stage. We nevertheless reject Ms. Ryers’ reading of In re Parentage of J.D.W. and adhere to our holding in Walker v. Riley, 19 Wn. App. 2d 592, 498 P.3d 33 (2021). In Walker, we reiterated that to establish standing, a de facto parentage petition “must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate each of the seven statutory factors.” Walker, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 602. “If the petitioner’s allegations are legally insufficient to demonstrate standing, the petition shall be dismissed.” Id. Here, Ms. Ryers’ petition fails to allege specific facts that, if taken as true, would be legally sufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a)-(d). We therefore address the four statutory factors her petition fails to plead adequately. Under RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a), a petitioner must allege facts showing that the petitioner “resided with the child as a regular member of the child’s household for a significant period.” Ms. Ryers’ petition alleges only that A.D. stayed with her “for extended periods of time over the last two years,” “for up to two and a half weeks at a time,” and maintained a bedroom at Ms. Ryers’ home with clothing and other belongings. CP at 8. These generalized assertions—untethered to specific dates, the number of stays, 1 Whether (1) “a legal parent consented to and fostered a parent-child relationship between the petitioner and the child,” and (2) “the petitioner makes a threshold showing that he or she was a member of the child’s family unit and unequivocally parented the child.” J.D.W., 14 Wn. App. 2d at 409. 7 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson their frequency, or the total time A.D. supposedly lived at the home—do not plausibly allege that A.D. resided with Ms. Ryers as a regular member of her household for a significant period, as the statute requires. At most, the petition describes intermittent visits over an unknown two-year span, which is insufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(a). Under RCW 26.26A.440(4)(b), a petition must also allege facts sufficient to show the petitioner “engaged in consistent caretaking of the child.” Ms. Ryers’ petition asserts that she transported A.D. to and from school, took her to medical appointments, enrolled her in extracurricular activities, made medical decisions, and communicated with A.D.’s medical providers and teachers. These are generalized and conclusionory assertions. The petition does not allege when these activities occurred, how often they occurred, in what manner they occurred, or over what period of time they occurred—facts necessary to show consistent caretaking rather than occasional assistance. Ms. Ryers therefore fails to allege specific facts sufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(b). Under RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c), a petition must allege facts showing that the petitioner “undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a parent of the child.” Ms. Ryers’ petition asserts that she communicated with A.D.’s medical providers and teachers, enrolled A.D. in extracurricular activities, and made medical and educational decisions for her. The petition provides no facts indicating when or how often these actions occurred, or whether Ms. Ryers assumed full and permanent responsibilities as 8 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson opposed to intermittent assistance. Absent any allegations demonstrating the scope, duration, and permanence of her assumed role, the petition fails to plead facts sufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(c). Under RCW 26.26A.440(4)(d), a petition must allege facts sufficient to show the petitioner “held out the child as the [petitioner]’s child.” In Walker, we explained, [H]olding a child out as one’s own is to assert a status as a parent or parent- like as opposed to a caretaker. Whereas a person who holds themselves out as a parent will make major decisions for a child, such as education, extracurricular activities, religion, health care, and residence, a caretaker will not. Holding a child out as one’s own does not require a petitioner to lie and claim a biological connection to the child. Instead, it requires that one holds themself out as a person responsible for parenting the child. 19 Wn. App. 2d at 604-05. Here, Ms. Ryers’ petition alleges, without dates or any indication of frequency or duration, that she enrolled A.D. in extracurricular activities and made educational and medical decisions for her. These generalized assertions do not concretely demonstrate that Ms. Ryers held herself out as the person responsible for parenting A.D., as opposed to providing intermittent caretaking assistance. Ms. Ryers therefore fails to allege specific facts sufficient to satisfy RCW 26.26A.440(4)(d). 2 Ms. Ryers’ verified petition does not allege specific facts that, if taken as true, would be legally sufficient to satisfy the seven elements under RCW 26.26A.440(a)-(g). 2 Because there are insufficient facts alleged to satisfy factors (a) through (d), we need not determine whether Ms. Ryers alleged facts sufficient to satisfy (e), (f), and (g). 9 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson She therefore failed to establish standing, and dismissal was required. See Walker, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 602. Ms. Ryers also contends the trial court erred by failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, and she requests we remand for findings to be entered on each RCW 26.26A.440(4) factor. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the trial court considered that basis or relied on it. State v. Gomez Cervantes, 169 Wn. App. 428, 433, 282 P.3d 98 (2012). Because our review is de novo, any findings and conclusions would not affect our analysis. Remand for entry of findings and conclusions is therefore unnecessary. Lastly, Ms. Anderson requests attorney fees on appeal. She contends RCW 26.26A.510 gives the court discretion to award fees. Alternatively, she contends Ms. Ryers’ appeal is frivolous and seeks fees under RAP 18.9(a). We deny her request. RAP 18.9(a) authorizes an award of attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. Kinney v. Cook, 150 Wn. App. 187, 195, 208 P.3d 1 (2009). “‘An appeal is frivolous, if considering the entire record, the court is convinced that the appeal presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds can differ and that it is so devoid of merit that there is no possibility of reversal.’” Id. (quoting Lutz Tile, Inc. v. Krech, 136 Wn. App. 899, 906, 151 P.3d 219 (2007)). RCW 26.26A.510(2) provides that “the court may assess filing fees, reasonable attorneys’ fees, fees for genetic testing, other costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses” incurred under the de facto parentage statute. 10 No. 41914-2-III Ryers v. Anderson Here, the appeal raised debatable issues regarding the procedure and burden applicable to de facto parenting petitions. It is therefore not frivolous. Exercising our discretion, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal. Affirmed. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. Cooney, A.C.J. WE CONCUR: Murphy, J. Hill, J. 11