Full Opinion

FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE BRONSON WESLEY EDWARD BARLOW, ) ) No. 41985-1-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ) PUBLISHED OPINION HEARING, ) ) Respondent. ) Staab, C.J. — RCW 74.20A.055(2) establishes a 60-day window for the Department of Social and Health Services to serve a notice and finding of financial responsibility on a support obligor and provides that the Department loses its right to reimbursement for payments made after the 60-day period if service is not timely made. The statute’s tolling proviso preserves the right to reimbursement when the Department exercises reasonable efforts to locate the obligor and is unable to do so. WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(d)(i) states that the Department does not lose its right to reimbursement for any period of time during which it is exercising reasonable efforts to locate the obligor. Bronson Barlow appeals an administrative order awarding the Department reimbursement for payments made after 60 days from the date services began until the date he was served notice. He argues that under the statute, the 60-day period is not tolled No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs unless the triggering events occur before the 60-day period expires. The Department disagrees and relies on the regulation, which does not expressly condition reimbursement protection on statutory tolling. We agree with Barlow. We hold that RCW 74.20A.055(2) determines whether the 60-day period is tolled. If the Department does not take the steps necessary to toll the 60-day period before it expires, the Department loses its right to reimbursement for payments made from day 61 until the date of service on the obligor. WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(d)(i) determines whether and to what extent a properly initiated tolling will continue. We read the regulation as protecting the Department’s right to reimbursement for any period after day 60 only if the statutory period was properly tolled and the Department continued exercising reasonable efforts to locate the obligor. Here, the evidence is undisputed that the Department made no efforts to locate Barlow until after the 60-day period expired. Thus, the 60-day period was not tolled and the Department lost its right to reimbursement for the period beginning on day 61 up to the day before Barlow was notified. The administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order of reimbursement to the contrary was in error and is reversed. Barlow raises two other issues in this appeal, challenging the support amount; on those issues, we affirm. 2 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs BACKGROUND Barlow is a noncustodial parent of his now 15-year-old child. The child’s physical custodian requested temporary assistance from the state, and the Department awarded a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) grant on September 11, 2023. The Department took no action to find Barlow until November 10, when it sent a letter to the post office seeking confirmation of a possible address for Barlow. After confirming the address for Barlow, the Department sent a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility (NFFR) via certified mail. The NFFR was returned by the post office, indicating “not here”; the Department resent it to a different, out-of-state address and the second mailing was returned unclaimed. The Department again sent the NFFR by certified mail, and Barlow was served on March 5. An ALJ conducted a hearing to determine whether and to what extent Barlow was required to pay child support. Barlow submitted earnings statements and tax forms. He testified, consistent with his statement of resources, that his income was $4,400 per month. Barlow also testified that five people live in his household: Barlow, his partner, their child in common, and his partner’s two children. The ALJ entered a final order on child support that incorporated child support worksheets using a whole family formula deviation. The ALJ considered the total circumstances and resources of both parents’ households, including the fact that Barlow 3 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs was required to support his other biological child. The ALJ granted Barlow a downward deviation from the standard calculation as reflected in the worksheets. The ALJ also considered the Department’s request for reimbursement. The ALJ found that the Department began exercising reasonable efforts to locate Barlow 61 days after the physical custodian began receiving services and concluded that the Department was entitled to reimbursement for support payments made from the date the physical custodian began receiving assistance until the date Barlow was served with notice. Barlow moved for reconsideration. He challenged the Department’s ability to collect past support under RCW 74.20A.055 because it did not begin its efforts to locate him until day 61. Barlow also asked the ALJ to reconsider its income determination and downward deviation. The ALJ denied Barlow’s request for reconsideration. Barlow filed a petition for review in superior court. Based on the parties’ agreement, the superior court certified the matter for direct review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. ANALYSIS 1. INTERPRETATION OF RCW 74.20A.055(2) AND WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(d)(i) Barlow contends the Department was not entitled to reimbursement for payments made between day 61 and the date he was served because the Department failed to take any steps to locate him until after the 60-day statutory period for services set forth in 4 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs RCW 74.20A.055(2) expired.1 While acknowledging that it did not begin efforts to locate Barlow until day 61, the Department argues that WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(d)(i) entitles it to reimbursement for any period during which it was exercising reasonable efforts to locate the obligor. When the Department begins providing public assistance to or for the benefit of a dependent child, Washington law automatically assigns to the state any rights to a support obligation from the support obligor. RCW 74.20A.030. The mechanics of this subrogation claim are governed by RCW 74.20A.055. This statute requires the Department to serve a notice and finding of financial responsibility on a support obligor within 60 days of the date the state assumes responsibility for supporting a dependent child. RCW 74.20A.055(2). If service is not accomplished during the 60-day window, the Department forfeits its right to reimbursement for payments made during the resulting gap period from day 61 until notice is actually provided to the support obligor. Id. However, the statute also provides that the entire 60- day period is tolled if the Department is making reasonable efforts to locate the support obligor and is unable to do so. Id. The exact language of the relevant subsection provides: 1 Barlow originally asserted that the Department was not entitled to reimbursement for the first 60 days, but at oral argument conceded that the forfeiture provision only applied to the period after 60 days and up to the date of service. See Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’g, No. 41985-1-III (Oct. 15, 2026), at 5 min., 40 sec. through 5 min., 47 sec. (on file with court). 5 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs The notice and finding of financial responsibility [NFFR)] shall be served . . . upon the person required to pay support within sixty days from the date the state assumes responsibility for the support of the dependent child or children on whose behalf support is sought. If the notice is not served within sixty days from such date, the department shall lose the right to reimbursement of payments made after the sixty-day period and before the date of notification: PROVIDED, That if the department exercises reasonable efforts to locate the person required to pay support and is unable to do so the entire sixty-day period is tolled until such time as the person can be located. RCW 74.20A.055(2) (emphasis added). Barlow argues that under the plain language of this statute, the triggering events for tolling must take place before the 60-day service period expires. This is a question of statutory interpretation, and our review is de novo. Darkenwald v. Emp. Sec. Dep’t, 183 Wn.2d 237, 244, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). When interpreting statutes or regulations, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Pres. Our Islands v. Shorelines Hr’gs Bd., 133 Wn. App. 503, 519, 137 P.3d 31 (2006). “[I]f the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). To determine a statute’s plain meaning, we consider “the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided for in the statute and related statutes.” In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 838-39, 215 P.3d 166 (2009). 6 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs Here, the statutory language is unambiguous. Service is due within 60 days; nonservice causes forfeiture of the right to reimbursement until service is made. Tolling is the exception and applies only if two events occur: reasonable efforts to locate the support obligor begin before expiration of the 60-day period and the obligor cannot be located. While the statute does not expressly state these two events must occur during the 60-day period in order for the period to toll, the language and structure of the tolling provision fairly implies as much. The verb “toll” is not ambiguous and has been interpreted consistently by our courts. Castro v. Stanwood Sch. Dist. No. 401, 151 Wn.2d 221, 86 P.3d 1166 (2004). The dictionary definition of “toll” is “to take away,” or “to remove the effect of” or “suspend.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/toll#legalDictionary (last visited Oct. 26, 2026). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “toll” as a verb meaning “(Of a time period, esp. a statutory one) to stop the running of; to abate <toll the limitations period>.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1797 (12th ed. 2024). By definition, tolling only stops the running of the period; it does not revive an expired period of time. If the Department takes no qualifying action during the 60-day period, its right to reimbursement for the gap period is lost. Efforts taken after 60 days cannot toll the 60-day period because the statute is self-executing and the right to reimbursement is lost if the period is not tolled. 7 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs Our interpretation is consistent with how the term “tolling” is used in other statutes that allow temporary suspension of filing deadlines. In Cortez-Kloehn v. Morrison, this court was asked to interpret the meaning of RCW 7.70.110, which tolls the three-year statute of limitations period of a medical malpractice claim for one year when a good faith request for mediation is made. 162 Wn. App. 166, 171, 252 P.3d 909 (2011). The court confirmed that while the triggering event could create a four-year period within which to file suit, the “statute does not create a[n independent] four year statute of limitations.” Id. “The three year period can be extended by this provision, but it will not revive a period that has already expired because there would be nothing to toll.” Id. By analogy, the court explained that a time out called during a basketball game will stop the clock but “[i]f the team waits until the game has ended, the time out is of no value because the game is over and the time out cannot bring the game back to life.” Id. at 171 n.2; see also Fox v. Groff, 16 Wn. App. 893, 559 P.2d 1376 (1977) (where defendants were not served with process until both the statute of limitations period and the 90-day tolling period set forth in RCW 4.16.170 had run, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations); Castro, 151 Wn.2d at 221 (the tolling provision of RCW 4.96.020(4) temporarily stops the statute of limitations period during the 60-day waiting period required when filing action against a government entity). 8 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs Interpreting the plain language of a statute requires that we consider context and the statute as a whole. Reading the tolling provision to apply even when efforts are not commenced until after the 60-day deadline would undermine the forfeiture provision in any case where the Department eventually begins searching, thereby rendering the forfeiture provision largely meaningless. Our interpretation must give effect to every word of a statute and avoid constructions that render provisions superfluous. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). The Department contends that the statute provides a 60-day grace period, during which it has an unconditional right to reimbursement. It further asserts that once the grace period expires, the regulation entitles the Department to reimbursement during any period in which it is exercising reasonable efforts to locate the obligor, regardless of when those efforts begin. We agree with the Department’s first position, but we disagree with the Department’s second position. The Department’s second argument—that it is entitled to reimbursement for any period during which it was exercising reasonable efforts—relies entirely on the language in the regulation. We thus consider whether the regulation supports the Department’s argument. We apply the same rules of statutory interpretation when interpreting regulations. Mader v. Health Care Auth., 149 Wn.2d 458, 472, 70 P.3d 931 (2003). The regulation cited by the Department addresses the same subject matter as RCW 74.20A.055(2) and sets out the rules applicable when the state is paying public assistance 9 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs to a dependent child’s custodian.2 WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(a) requires the Department to exercise reasonable efforts to locate the support obligor. Subsection (6)(b) restates the 60-day service requirement, and subsection (6)(c) restates the forfeiture consequences. Relevant here, subsection (6)(d) then provides that the Department does not lose the right to reimbursement of payments made “for any period of time” during which the Department exercised reasonable efforts to locate the support obligor. WAC 388-14A- 3350(6)(d)(i) (emphasis added). The regulation specifies no limitations on the word “any,” nor does it refer to tolling; on its face, the regulation does not expressly condition the reimbursement protections on tolling as set forth in the statute. 2 WAC 388-14A-3350: (6) When the state of Washington is paying public assistance to the CP and the children, or just the children, the following rules apply: (a) For support obligations owed for months on or after September 1, 1979, DCS must exercise reasonable efforts to locate the noncustodial parent (NCP); (b) DCS serves a notice and finding of financial responsibility within 60 days of the date the state assumes responsibility for the support of a dependent child on whose behalf support is sought; (c) If DCS does not serve the notice within 60 days, DCS loses the right to reimbursement of public assistance payments made after the 60th day and before the notice is served; (d) DCS does not lose the right to reimbursement of public assistance payments for any period of time: (i) During which DCS exercised reasonable efforts to locate the NCP; or (ii) For 60 days after the date on which DCS received an affidavit or acknowledgment of paternity or acknowledgment of parentage for the child for whom the state has assumed responsibility, and parentage has not been established. (Emphasis added.) 10 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs The Department argues that the plain language of the regulation does not include any prerequisite other than the exercise of reasonable efforts. However, we conclude that the Department’s interpretation of the regulation would create a right to reimbursement that is broader than, and inconsistent with, the tolling and forfeiture provisions in the statute. When reasonably possible, we interpret a regulation “ʻin a manner that is consistent with the underlying policy of the statute.’” Rios-Garcia v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 18 Wn. App. 2d 660, 670, 493 P.3d 143 (2021) (quoting Overlake Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health, 170 Wn.2d 43, 52, 239 P.3d 1095 (2010)). “An agency does not have the power to promulgate rules that amend or change legislative enactments, but it may ‘fill in the gaps’ in legislation where necessary to effectuate a general statutory scheme.” Pierce County v. State, 144 Wn. App. 783, 836, 185 P.3d 594 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green River Cmty. Coll. v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 95 Wn.2d 108, 112, 622 P.2d 826 (1980)). Conversely, a regulation that is inconsistent with the statute it implements is invalid. Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 195 Wn.2d 1, 9, 455 P.3d 1126 (2020). The Department’s interpretation of the regulation would conflict with the statute, thus rendering the regulation invalid. See Devine v. Dep't of Licensing, 126 Wn. App. 941, 955, 110 P.3d 237 (2005). The statute provides that the Department loses its right to reimbursement for payments made after 60 days if service is not completed within 60 11 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs days. This 60-day period for service can be tolled, but tolling assumes the triggering events occur before the 60-day period ends. Were we to read WAC 388-14A- 3350(6)(d)(i) as protecting the Department’s reimbursement right for any period when reasonable efforts are being exercised, regardless of when those efforts began, the regulation would render the tolling proviso meaningless and grant the Department reimbursement rights that were forfeited by the statute. Rather than interpret a regulation in a manner that creates a conflict, we seek to harmonize a regulation with its enabling statute. See Pres. Our Islands, 133 Wn. App. at 525. Here, we can harmonize the tolling provisions in RCW 74.20A.055(2) with the regulation by reading the regulation to protect the Department’s right to reimbursement for any period after 60 days only if the 60-day period has been tolled according to the statute and only when the Department is exercising reasonable efforts to locate the obligor. Under this reading, the regulation does not create an independent basis for protecting the Department’s reimbursement rights outside the statutory framework. Instead, the regulation clarifies and elaborates on the statutory tolling mechanism. If the 60-day period is tolled because the Department is exercising reasonable efforts and cannot locate the obligor, the tolling continues until the obligor is found, so long as the Department continues to exercise those reasonable efforts. Under our interpretation, the regulation fills a gap in the statute. The statute provides the trigger for tolling the 60-day period but does not expressly address how long 12 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs the tolling continues or what conditions must be maintained to preserve it. The regulation answers that question by providing that tolling continues throughout any period during which the Department exercises reasonable efforts to locate the support obligor. Read together, the Department preserves its right to reimbursement when it begins exercising reasonable efforts within the first 60 days, as required by statute, and continues to exercise reasonable efforts, as provided by regulation. Here, it is undisputed that the Department did not begin efforts to locate Barlow until after the 60-day period expired. Thus, under RCW 74.20A.055(2), the 60-day period was not tolled, and the Department lost its right to reimbursement for payments made from day 61 until the date that Barlow was served with the notice. Because the 60- day period was not tolled, and the right to reimbursement after 60 days was lost, the protections afforded by WAC 388-14A-3350(6)(d)(i) do not apply. We conclude that the ALJ erred in ordering Barlow to reimburse the Department for support “payments made after the sixty-day period and before the date of notification,” in this case from November 10 until March 4. RCW 74.20A.055(2). The Department remains entitled to reimbursement for the first 60 days after the physical custodian began receiving support and for the period after Barlow was notified of his financial obligation, including the day of service.3 3 Barlow challenges the ALJ’s finding that the Department’s efforts to locate him were reasonable. This issue is moot in light of our decision, and we decline to address it. 13 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs 2. INCOME DETERMINATION Barlow argues the ALJ erred by finding that his gross income was $4,400 per month because Barlow’s income varies and the ALJ did not meaningfully analyze the documents in evidence to calculate an average. The Department maintains that the income finding is supported by substantial evidence including Barlow’s testimony. We agree with the Department. “We review administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence.” Darkenwald, 183 Wn.2d at 244; see RCW 34.05.570(3). “Substantial evidence” is a “quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person.” Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Barlow’s gross income was $4,400 per month. At the hearing, Barlow testified, consistent with his statement of resources, that his income was $4,400.00 per month. Barlow also submitted a tax form showing his adjusted gross income in 2023 was $52,414.00—on average, $4,367.83 per month. Finally, Barlow provided pay stubs that showed earnings of $1,957.09 and $2,336.90 during two recent 14-day pay periods—on average, $4,651.82 per month. This evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational fact finder that Barlow’s gross income was $4,400.00 per month. 14 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs 3. SUPPORT DEVIATIONS Barlow contends the ALJ erred by failing to consider the full financial impact of his household, which includes his significant other, their child in common, and her two additional children. The Department maintains Barlow is not entitled to a downward deviation for his partner and her two additional children because he does not owe them a legal duty of support. We agree with the Department. A court may deviate from the standard calculation when either or both parents owe a duty of support to children from other relationships. RCW 26.19.075(1)(e). Such deviation “shall be based on consideration of the total circumstances of both households.” RCW 26.19.075(1)(e)(iv). “All income and resources of the parties before the court . . . and other adults in the households shall be disclosed and considered.” RCW 26.19.075(2). “When reasons exist for deviation, the court shall exercise discretion in considering the extent to which the factors would affect the support obligation.” RCW 26.19.075(4). “The court shall enter findings that specify reasons for any deviation or any denial of a party’s request for any deviation from the standard calculation made by the court.” RCW 26.19.075(3). Here, the ALJ deviated from the standard calculation after considering the total circumstances of Barlow’s household and finding that Barlow owed a legal duty of support to his other biological child. It did not make a finding that Barlow owed a legal duty of support to his partner or her two additional children—nor does Barlow claim he 15 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs owes such a duty. Nevertheless, the ALJ indeed considered that Barlow’s household also included his significant other and two additional children when determining the deviation. It further noted that Barlow’s household received state food assistance and all of the children in the household received state Medicaid. The ALJ also made findings regarding the other noncustodial parent’s income and circumstances. After considering the totality of the circumstances and available resources in both parents’ households, the ALJ applied a whole family formula deviation as reflected in the worksheets. Accordingly, the record indicates the ALJ properly considered the total circumstances of the households when determining the deviation. It made the necessary findings and those findings are supported by the record. To the extent Barlow contends he is entitled to a deviation for additional household members that are not his biological children, he does not establish that he owes a legal duty of support. CONCLUSION We conclude that the Department lost its right to seek reimbursement from Barlow during the gap period, November 10 through March 4, because the Department failed to demonstrate that prior to the expiration of the 60-day period it made reasonable efforts to locate Barlow and could not locate him. Otherwise, we affirm the ALJ’s income finding and whole family formula deviation. 16 No. 41985-1-III Barlow v. Office of Admin. Hr’gs We reverse and remand for the ALJ to adjust the reimbursement award. _________________________________ Staab, C.J. WE CONCUR: _________________________________ Hill, J. _________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J. 17