Linzie Colette Stovall v. Raekwon Deshawn Monterris Davis
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket60995-9
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
November 17, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Parenting and Support of:
J.D., No. 60995-9-II
A minor child,
LINZIE C. STOVALL,
Appellant,
and
RAEKWON D. DAVIS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent.
CRUSER, J.—Linzie Stovall appeals a parenting plan and child support order concerning
her son JD and his father, Raekwon Davis. Regarding the parenting plan, Stovall argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by ordering that Stovall and Davis jointly decide on JD’s non-
routine medical care and extracurricular activities, and by allowing Davis to exercise visits with
JD outside of Washington State before JD reaches school age. Regarding the child support order,
Stovall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Davis to pay $3,400 per month
in child support, by treating the parties’ memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreement as
binding and providing Stovall with damages for Davis’ breach of the agreement rather than
rescinding the agreement, and by allowing Davis, assuming he stays current with his child support
obligations, to list JD as a dependent on his taxes every other year. Davis did not file a response.
No. 60995-9-II
We reject Stovall’s challenges to the parenting plan, as well as her contention that the trial
court abused its discretion related to enforcement of the MOU. However, we hold that the trial
court abused its discretion in setting Davis’ child support obligation and in permitting Davis to list
JD as a dependent on his taxes in alternating years. Accordingly, we affirm the parenting plan but
reverse the child support order and remand to the trial court to reconsider Davis’ monthly support
obligation and to provide the full tax exemption to Stovall.
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
Stovall and Davis share a child, JD, who was born in September 2021. The two met when
they were in college. Davis is a football player who was drafted by the Miami Dolphins in 2020.
Stovall and Davis were living in Florida together when Stovall got pregnant but then broke up
during the seventh month of Stovall’s pregnancy. Stovall moved back to Washington before giving
birth to JD.
Davis played for the Dolphins for four seasons, with his pay increasing each season. He
earned $610,000 in his first season and $1.381 million in 2023. Davis then signed a two-year
contract with the Indianapolis Colts; he earned $7.5 million in the first year of his contract, and
the second year had not yet started at the time of trial. In July 2024, Davis bought a home in Texas
for about $1.5 million where he resided during the off season while playing for the Colts. Davis’
investments were valued at $322,062 and he had $3,088,736 in liquid assets at the time of trial.
Stovall is a surgical technician who makes about $3,000 per month before taxes. She and
JD live in Tacoma with Stovall’s mother, father, and sister.
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No. 60995-9-II
When JD was four months old, he was diagnosed with craniosynostosis, which prevented
his brain from growing on the right side of his head because the sutures in his skull were fused
together. There were two options for surgical interventions to address this condition; Stovall
discussed the options with Davis, and he did not “have an opinion” but rather agreed with Stovall’s
preferred course of action. 2 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 515-16.
When JD was five months old, Stovall started to seek state-mandated child support. Davis
filed a petition to establish parentage, then agreed to an order establishing parentage after genetic
testing confirmed that JD was his son.
In February 2024, Stovall petitioned for a parenting plan and child support. Stovall and
Davis signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on January 30, 2024, after meeting with a
mediator. The MOU required Davis to pay $30,000 in support arrearages and monthly child
support of $2,700. The agreement also required Davis to provide Stovall with his financial
documents and to “provide [Stovall] with his new NFL contract within one week of signing the
same.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 202.
Davis only paid $25,000 of the arrearages and did not pay the first monthly installment of
the $2,700 child support obligation. Davis made child support payments from March 2024 through
July 2024, then stopped paying. He did not share documentation of his 2023 income or tax return
with Stovall.
Before trial, Stovall and Davis conducted visits for Davis to see JD. Stovall flew with JD
to Florida to visit Davis in September 2023, February 2024, and June 2024. Stovall visited twice
in June 2024 because the first visit was cut short due to a conflict regarding whether JD and Stovall
would stay at Davis’ home or a hotel during the visit.
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Visits were supposed to happen in March and October 2024 as well, but they did not occur.
Davis testified that JD did not visit him in March because Stovall refused to schedule the visit with
him, while Stovall claimed the March visit did not happen because Davis did not reach out to
arrange a visit until she was back in school and unable to travel with JD. The visit in October did
not occur because Stovall asked Davis to agree to written terms regarding when Davis would return
JD and allow JD to communicate with Stovall during the visit, which Davis refused to sign.
II. TRIAL RECORD AND TESTIMONY
The superior court conducted a bench trial and heard testimony from Stovall, Davis, Davis’
NFL agent, and a forensic expert witness who testified regarding Davis’ earning potential. The
forensic expert testified that if Davis were cut from the Colts before the 2025 NFL season, the
minimum amount he would earn on a different team in the NFL would be $1.17 million. If, on the
other hand, Davis stayed with the Colts, the most he could earn with them was $6.49 million. The
expert noted that “there [was] talk in the press about [Davis] being cut” from the Colts. 3 VRP at
1031.
The expert witness also opined on Davis’ earning potential outside the NFL. The expert
estimated that Davis could earn $150,000 annually as a college coach or about $85,000 annually
as a real estate agent, a career path in which Davis had expressed interest.
Stovall testified that Davis broke down a door during an argument with his girlfriend while
she and JD were in his home. Stovall also testified that during a visit, he had grabbed Stovall,
pushed her into a wall, and strangled her. Davis denied that these events happened.
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Finally, the trial court was provided a series of text messages in which Davis expressed his
view that the MOU was no longer operative. Davis’ counsel, however, clarified in its closing
argument that the MOU was not void.
III. ORAL RULING AND FINAL ORDERS
The trial court issued its oral ruling, a final parenting plan, and a child support schedule.
The trial court found that there was no domestic violence between the parties. The trial court
awarded sole decision-making authority to Stovall except for “long-term” medical treatment
(because such decisions have “serious ramifications”) and extracurricular activities (because, as
the court stated, Stovall should not “get the impression that she can sign [JD] up for horseback
riding lessons that cost $1,000” and expect Davis to pay for them in their entirety). CP at 497; 6
VRP at 2517. The trial court additionally ordered the parties to work with a mediator if they
disagreed about how to proceed with JD’s long-term medical care or extracurriculars.
The parenting plan also included residential provisions. Stovall is the primary residential
parent, but Davis is entitled to visitation on three-day weekends, six weeks during the summertime,
every other Thanksgiving, and half of winter break every year. The order provided that prior to JD
entering kindergarten, Davis may exercise his holiday visitation “in or outside of Washington with
consideration of long-distance travel time.” CP at 513. The order further provided that once JD
reached school age, Davis is limited to exercising his visitation in Washington because “long-
distance travel time for [the] school year may interrupt school attendance and academic
performance.” Id. The trial court’s oral rulings reflect this determination as well. Id. at 499 (“it
would be wise for [Davis] to travel here during school days . . . . If you want quality time, you
come here.”).
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Davis was cut by the Colts after trial but before entry of a final child support order. In its
child support order, the trial court imputed Davis’ monthly income as $56,009.63 if he stayed in
the NFL and $9,439.83 if he did not. Davis’ salary was imputed based on the base salary for an
NFL veteran. If Davis left the NFL, that would warrant a petition for modification of the child
support order.
During closing argument, the trial court asked Stovall about its ability to modify what
Davis owed to Stovall as back support, given that the MOU was a binding agreement. Because
Davis had not paid the $30,000 that he was required to pay and had failed to pay some monthly
child support payments, Stovall asserted that the MOU was not binding and that the trial court
“should determine and set the full amount” of back support owed. 4 VRP at 1518. Stovall also
argued that the trial court was not required to hold the parties to the terms of the MOU if it found
the monetary award to Stovall insufficient. Stovall sought back support in the amount of $250,222
minus what Davis had paid already pursuant to the agreement. The trial court denied her requests.
The court determined that the MOU was an enforceable agreement and the remedy for breach of
the agreement was damages rather than recission and calculation of a new value for arrearages and
monthly support for the time prior to trial. The court further determined that equity did not require
revisiting the agreed upon amount of monthly child support as the amount was reasonable and was
already well in excess of the presumptive amount set forth in the Washington child support table.
Stovall moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision to uphold the MOU, which the trial
court denied.
For the permanent child support order, Stovall requested child support of $12,231 per
month. Davis, on the other hand, requested that the child support be set at the standard calculation
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from the child support table, which would be $1,573 per month. Former RCW 26.19.020 (2018).
The trial court fixed the support amount at $3,400. By way of reasoning, the court indicated that
the amount that was agreed in the MOU ($2,700 per month) was not “quite enough under the
circumstances for the lifestyle that the child deserves,” but did not otherwise indicate how it arrived
at $3,400 beyond noting that the child had no special needs or “extra challenges” that would
warrant a larger deviation from the presumptive amount. CP at 486. The trial court orally stated
that Davis would pay a proportionate share of the costs associated with extracurricular activities
but did not include that statement in the written order. Davis was also ordered to pay all uncovered
medical expenses and out-of-pocket daycare expenses, as well as all travel expenses for visitation.
Finally, the trial court ordered that Stovall and Davis would alternate years claiming JD as
a dependent on their taxes so long as Davis is current on his child support obligations. The trial
court also awarded attorney fees to Stovall.
Stovall appeals.
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Stovall asserts that this court should treat Davis’ failure to file a
response brief as a concession to all of Stovall’s arguments. Stovall cites multiple cases in which
the appellate court concluded that the respondent conceded a point by failing to respond to it, but
Stovall does not cite any authority that holds an appellate court must rule in favor of the appellant
if the respondent does not file a brief. “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition,
the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent
search, has found none.” DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193
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No. 60995-9-II
(1962). We therefore reject Stovall’s request to treat all of her assertions as true and proceed with
an analysis of the issues on the merits.
I. PARENTING PLAN
Stovall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Stovall and Davis to
make joint decisions regarding JD’s long-term medical care and his extracurricular activities. She
also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Davis to exercise his visits with JD outside of
Washington.
The trial court has broad discretion in developing a parenting plan. In re Marriage of
Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). The trial court must exercise its discretion in the
best interest of the children. In re Parentage of J.H., 112 Wn. App. 486, 492-93, 49 P.3d 154
(2002). We review a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of its discretion. In re Marriage of Black,
188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
manifestly unreasonable, is based on untenable grounds or reasons, or reflects a misapplication of
the law. Id.; In re Committed Intimate Relationship of Muridan & Redl, 3 Wn. App. 2d 44, 54, 413
P.3d 1072 (2018).
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when issuing its parenting plan and
therefore affirm.
A. Joint Decision-Making
Pursuant to RCW 26.09.184(5)(a), a parenting plan “shall allocate decision-making
authority to one or both parties regarding the children’s education, health care, and religious
upbringing.” The trial court must award sole decision-making when “[o]ne parent is opposed to
mutual decision making, and such opposition is reasonable” based on the following criteria:
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No. 60995-9-II
(i) The existence of a limitation under RCW 26.09.191 or 26.09.192;
(ii) The history of participation of each parent in decision[-]making in [education,
health care, and religious upbringing];
(iii) Whether the parents have a demonstrated ability and desire to cooperate with
one another in decision making in [education, health care, and religious
upbringing]; and
(iv) The parents’ geographic proximity to one another, to the extent that it affects
their ability to make timely mutual decisions.
RCW 26.09.187(2)(b) and (c).1 “ ‘[W]hen evidence of those factors is before the court and its oral
opinion and written findings reflect consideration of the statutory elements, specific findings are
not required on each factor.’ ” In re Parenting & Support of C.T., 193 Wn. App. 427, 443, 378
P.3d 183 (2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Murray, 28 Wn. App. 187, 189, 622 P.2d 1288 (1981)).
Stovall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering joint decision-making
for major medical decisions and for extracurricular activities. She asserts that she should be
awarded sole decision-making because she opposed joint decision-making at the trial level and
such opposition was reasonable under the statutory criteria. Stovall further contends that Davis has
not been involved in parenting decisions, that the parents do not cooperate well, that Davis would
not honor his verbal agreements, and that the geographic distance between the parties is too great
to make joint decision-making practical.
We disagree.
The record indicates that the trial court considered each of the statutory factors relevant to
Stovall and Davis. The trial court stated in its parenting plan that joint decision-making should be
limited to some degree because “the distance between the parents’ homes makes it hard to make
timely decisions together,” and stated in its oral ruling that the distance between Stovall and Davis
1
RCW 26.09.187 has been amended since the 2025 parenting plan. Because this amendment does
not affect our analysis, we cite the current version of the statute. LAWS OF 2025, ch. 166, § 4.
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No. 60995-9-II
prevented more decisions from being made jointly. CP at 510. The trial court clearly recognized
that there was some difficulty that would prevent full joint decision-making between the parties.
The court further noted that Stovall and Davis have disagreed about decisions related to
JD, specifically visitation, and ordered both parties to take a parenting course to learn better
communication skills. The trial testimony indicated, however, that Davis did not hinder the
decision-making process regarding JD’s skull surgery. And when discussing the necessity of Davis
communicating with Stovall when JD is with Davis, the trial court stated that Davis would need to
tell Stovall if an emergency occurred and stated, “That’s what you have done.” Id. at 499.
The trial court’s remarks reflect its consideration that full joint decision-making between
the parties was not feasible, but that some joint decision-making was nevertheless appropriate. We
cannot say that the limited joint decision-making ordered by the trial court is so unreasonable and
untenable as to be an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s oral remarks demonstrate that it fully
considered the parties’ past participation in decision-making and their difficulties in
communicating with one another. We refuse to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
when it has fulfilled its statutory requirements and the record supports the court’s decision, even
if reasonable minds could have reached a different result. We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering joint decision-making for major medical decisions and
extracurriculars.
B. Visits to Davis
Trial courts should create residential provisions that “encourage each parent to maintain a
loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent with the child’s developmental
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level and the family’s social and economic circumstances.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(a).2 When creating
a residential plan, the trial court must consider the following factors and give factor (i) the most
weight:
(i) The relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each
parent;
(ii) The agreements of the parties, provided they were entered into knowingly and
voluntarily;
(iii) Each parent’s past and potential for future performance of parenting functions
as defined in [ ]RCW 26.09.004(2), including whether a parent has taken greater
responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the
child;
(iv) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
(v) The child’s relationship with siblings and with other significant adults, as well
as the child’s involvement with his or her physical surroundings, school, or other
significant activities;
(vi) The wishes of the parents and the wishes of a child who is sufficiently mature
to express reasoned and independent preferences as to his or her residential
schedule; and
(vii) Each parent’s employment schedule, and shall make accommodations
consistent with those schedules.
Id. Additionally, the court “may order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence between
the households of the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time if such provision
is in the best interests of the child,” and may consider the geographic distance between the parents
in deciding whether such an arrangement would be appropriate. RCW 26.09.187(3)(b).
Stovall argues that the trial court erred by ordering that Davis could exercise his residential
time out of state over three-day weekends because such a schedule would be disruptive to JD’s
daily routine. The trial court’s final parenting plan states that up until JD begins kindergarten,
Davis may exercise his visitation “in or outside of Washington with consideration of long-distance
2
As with RCW 26.09.187(2), the 2025 amendments to RCW 26.09.187(3) do not affect our
analysis.
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No. 60995-9-II
travel time.” CP at 513. It its oral ruling, the trial court stated that Davis could only take JD out of
state “if it was convenient and he could get the child back without it being too burdensome on the
child” and someone were accompanying JD during his travel. Id. at 388. Once JD reaches school
age, Davis is limited to exercising his visitation in Washington because “long-distance travel time
for [the] school year may interrupt school attendance and academic performance.” Id. at 513. The
trial court’s oral rulings reflect this determination as well. Id. at 499 (“it would be wise for [Davis]
to travel here during school days . . . . If you want quality time, you come here.”).
When making a visitation plan, the trial court should consider the geographic distance
between the parties and whether short-term travel would be in the best interests of the child. RCW
26.09.187(3)(b). The trial court’s oral ruling and written parenting plan, detailed above,
demonstrates that the trial court considered JD’s welfare and the feasibility of interstate travel in
crafting the visitation provisions of the parenting plan. Again, we do not substitute our judgment
for the trial court’s where the trial court has fulfilled its statutory requirements and the record
supports the court’s decision, even if reasonable minds could have reached a different result. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Davis to exercise
visitation with JD outside of Washington.
II. CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
Stovall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that Davis pay $3,400
per month in child support because that amount is not commensurate with Davis’ resources and
standard of living. She also asserts that the trial court erred by upholding the parties’ MOU instead
of rescinding the agreement and recalculating back support based on Davis’ salary at the time of
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trial. Finally, she argues that the trial court erred by allowing Davis to claim JD as a dependent in
alternating years with Stovall.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in its monthly child support calculation
and its determination of tax exemptions, but not in its decision to uphold the MOU.
A. Monthly Child Support
The purpose of a child support schedule is to “[ensure] that child support orders are
adequate to meet a child’s basic needs and to provide additional child support commensurate with
the parents’ income, resources, and standard of living.” RCW 26.19.001. To determine the
presumptive amount of child support, the trial court must combine the incomes of both parents as
detailed in the statutory economic table. Former RCW 26.19.020; former RCW 26.19.065(3)
(2018). At the time that the trial court determined Davis’ support obligation, the maximum
combined monthly income listed on the economic table was $12,000 and the corresponding total
monthly support obligation for one child was $1,573. Former RCW 26.19.020. The trial court
allocates the monthly obligation “between the parents based on each parent’s share of the
combined monthly net income.” RCW 26.19.080(1).3 However, the trial court has the discretion
to exceed this monthly support amount “upon written findings of fact.” Former RCW 26.19.065(3).
The trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a child support ruling that deviates from the
standard calculation without supporting that ruling with written findings of fact. In re Marriage of
McCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 621, 152 P.3d 1013 (2007).
3
RCW 26.19.080 has been amended since the 2025 child support order. Because this amendment
does not affect our analysis, we cite the current version of the statute. LAWS OF 2025, ch. 272, § 3.
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No. 60995-9-II
“All income and resources of each parent’s household shall be disclosed and considered
by the court when the court determines the child support obligation of each parent.” RCW
26.19.071(1).4 Among the factors that trial courts may consider as reasons for deviation from the
standard calculation of child support are “[p]ossession of wealth, including but not limited to
savings, investments, real estate holdings and business interests, vehicles, boats, pensions, bank
accounts, insurance plans, or other assets.” RCW 26.19.075(1)(a)(vi).
We review a trial court’s determination of child support obligations for abuse of discretion.
State ex rel. J.V.G. v. Van Guilder, 137 Wn. App. 417, 423, 154 P.3d 243 (2007).
Stovall argues that the child support obligation was not supported by sufficient factual
findings because the trial court did not explain why $3,400 per month was sufficient to provide JD
with the lifestyle commensurate with his parents’ income, resources, and standard of living. She
argues that the record contains evidence that Davis has significant wealth and that the award of
$3,400 per month was insufficient given such wealth. We agree.
In the trial court’s oral ruling, it stated that child support should be “commensurate with
the parents’ income, resources, and standard of living.” CP at 474. In the trial court’s written
findings of fact, it stated that
[i]n consideration of the circumstances, reported case law, the persuasive effect of
unreported case KGS, the lifestyle that the child deserves, and the disparate of [sic]
income between the parents, the Court finds that it is proper for the father to pay a
child support transfer payment of $3,400 per month, plus all costs of travel,
uninsured medical/dental and daycare expenses relating to the care and nurturing
of the child.
4
RCW 26.19.071 has been amended since the 2025 child support order. Because this amendment
does not affect our analysis, we cite the current version of the statute. LAWS OF 2025, ch. 272, § 2.
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No. 60995-9-II
Id. at 527 (second alteration in original). These written findings of fact do not indicate that the trial
court specifically considered Davis’ resources and standard of living when determining his child
support obligation. Under In re Marriage of Choate, 143 Wn. App. 235, 242, 177 P.3d 175 (2008),
trial courts must make a “consideration of the total circumstances of both households” in its
“written findings of fact to support any deviation.” And although the trial court is not required to
deviate from the standard calculation, the court must consider the factors when deciding whether
to deviate or not. Brandli v. Talley, 98 Wn. App. 521, 527 n.16, 991 P.2d 94 (1999). The simple
statement “in consideration of the circumstances,” does not reflect that the trial court accounted
for aspects of Davis’ wealth such as his “savings, investments, [and] real estate holdings.” RCW
26.19.075(1)(a)(vi).
The facts adduced at trial showed that Davis owned a home that he purchased for
approximately $1.5 million, that Davis’ investments were valued at $322,062, and that he had
$3,088,736 in liquid assets.
Because the trial court did not indicate that it considered these other sources of Davis’
wealth, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $3,400 per month in child
support.
Stovall additionally asks us to order the trial court, on remand, to include in the written
support order its ruling that Davis would be responsible for his proportionate share of the costs of
extracurricular activities. The trial court made this pronouncement in its oral ruling but failed to
include it in the written order. On remand, the trial court should include this provision in its written
child support order.
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B. The MOU
Stovall makes two arguments related to the MOU. First, Stovall argues that Davis’
repudiation of the MOU through a text message in which he expressed his view that the MOU was
no longer operative, coupled with his failure to pay $5,000 in arrearages and numerous monthly
support payments as required by the MOU, constituted a material breach of the agreement that
warranted rescission of the MOU rather than an award of damages for the amount owed on the
contract. Second, Stovall argues that in the alternative, the trial court should substitute a new child
support figure owed during the period covered by the MOU because the amount Stovall agreed to
was too low. This is so, Stovall contends, because “[l]ess than two months after the MOU was
signed, Davis signed a two-year, $14 million contract with the Colts—with $5 million payable
immediately as a signing bonus.” Br. of Appellant at 64. Stovall asserts that Davis failed to disclose
this contract within one week of signing it.
According to RCW 26.09.070(1),
The parties to a marriage or a domestic partnership, in order to promote the
amicable settlement of disputes attendant upon their separation . . . may enter into
a written separation contract providing for the maintenance of either of them, the
disposition of any property owned by both or either of them, the parenting plan and
support for their children and for the release of each other from all obligation except
that expressed in the contract.
Such a separation contract is binding on the court unless “it finds, after considering the economic
circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties on their own
motion or on request of the court, that the separation contract was unfair at the time of its
execution.” RCW 26.09.070(3). The trial court must review any child support provisions for
compliance with the economic table that details child support based on combined monthly income.
Id.; former RCW 26.19.020.
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A breach of a contract is considered material if it is so significant that it “ ‘substantially
defeats’ a primary function of an agreement.” 224 Westlake, LLC v. Engstrom Props., LLC, 169
Wn. App. 700, 724, 281 P.3d 693 (2012). A material breach “justifies recission of the contract.”
Park Ave. Condo. Owners Ass’n v. Buchan Devs., LLC, 117 Wn. App. 369, 383, 71 P.3d 692
(2003).
i. Rescission
Stovall argues that the trial court erred in not rescinding the MOU because Davis materially
breached the contract by repudiating it through a text message he sent prior to trial. We disagree.
According to Stovall, Davis repudiated the contract through a text message prior to trial,
in which he expressed his view that the MOU was no longer operative. However, Davis’ attorney
disputed Stovall’s assertion on the record that the agreement was void, thereby indicating Davis’
non-repudiation of the agreement. It was not abuse of discretion for the trial court to treat the
agreement as valid under these circumstances.
For the trial court to rescind a contract, the breach must be so significant that it
“ ‘substantially defeats’ ” the contract’s purpose. Id. (quoting 6A WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 302.03 (7th ed. 2022)). Stovall asserts that Davis failed to pay the total
amount owed in arrears, skipped the first installment of monthly support, stopped paying monthly
support after July 2024, did not provide his financial information to Stovall by the due date, and
did not disclose his contract with the Colts within one week of signing it. Although Davis breached
the contract, his breach was not so significant that it defeated the purpose of the contract.
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ii. Back Child Support Calculation
Stovall argues that the trial court was obligated “to set support in accordance with the child-
support schedule regardless of the parties’ private agreement.” Br. of Appellant at 61-62. We
disagree.
The trial court acknowledged that a contract between the parties related to child support
must comply with the child support schedule found in RCW 26.19.020. However, the trial court
determined that the $2,700 the parties agreed to in the MOU was reasonable and exceeded the
highest amount set out in the child support schedule. The court was not required to retroactively
substitute its own judgment for that of Stovall and Davis’ by holding that Davis owed more money
than the agreement stated. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by treating the
MOU agreement as valid and requiring Davis to pay the amount the parties agreed to under that
contract.
Finally, Stovall argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for reconsideration
of its decision regarding back support. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err by
declining to change the amount of back support owed based on the MOU, we also hold that the
trial court did not err by denying Stovall’s request for reconsideration.
C. Claiming JD as a Dependent
i. Legal Principles
In Washington, the ability to claim a child as a dependent for federal tax income
exemptions is considered a form of child support. In re Marriage of Peterson, 80 Wn. App. 148,
156, 906 P.2d 1009 (1995). The custodial parent is usually entitled to the dependency exemption
under the federal tax code. In re Marriage of Peacock, 54 Wn. App. 12, 14, 771 P.2d 767 (1989).
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The trial court “may divide the exemptions between the parties, alternate the exemptions between
the parties, or both.” RCW 26.19.100. The trial court should “allocate exemptions to the party who
will benefit most from them.” Peterson, 80 Wn. App at 156.
ii. Application
Stovall argues that the trial court abused its discretion by alternating tax exemptions
annually between Stovall and Davis because its decision “lacked any basis in findings, the statutory
factors, or the record,” and because the tax exemption would benefit JD more if it went to Stovall,
who is the primary residential parent and has fewer financial resources than Davis. Br. of Appellant
at 67. We agree.
The final child support order states that Davis may claim JD as a dependent for odd years
and Stovall may claim JD for even years. In a declaration to the court in anticipation of the creation
of a final child support order, Stovall objected to this plan. At the final hearing for presentation of
a child support order, the trial court mentioned that objection, stating that “[s]plitting tax
deductions was a mistake on [the court’s] part, if you will, or maybe not equitable.” 6 VRP at
2508. Yet the court refused to reconsider.
There are no written or oral findings that explain why the trial court made its decision
regarding the tax exemption. Given the difference in financial resources between the parties,
Stovall would clearly benefit more than Davis from the exemption. We therefore conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion by allowing Davis to claim JD as a dependent in alternating years
with Stovall.
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No. 60995-9-II
ATTORNEY FEES
Stovall also requests attorney fees on appeal, arguing that she is entitled to fees because
she has presented “meritorious arguments” to this court and Davis has more financial resources
than she does. Br. of Appellant at 71.
The award of attorney fees in dissolution proceedings is governed by RCW 26.09.140,
which states that “the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the
other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition to statutory costs.” In deciding
whether to award fees, we weigh the financial resources of the parties and the “arguable merit of
the issues raised on appeal.” In re Marriage of Leslie & Verhey, 90 Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d
330 (1998).
Given the difference in resources between Stovall and Davis, evidenced by the record, and
the fact that Stovall raised successful claims on appeal, we award attorney fees to Stovall in an
amount to be determined by a commissioner of this court.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding limited joint
decision-making to Davis and allowing out-of-state visits with Davis. Neither did the trial court
abuse its discretion in treating the parties’ MOU as binding. We conclude, however, that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding $3,400 per month in child support and by providing Davis
with the opportunity to claim JD as a dependent in alternating years. Accordingly, we affirm the
parenting plan but reverse the child support order and remand this matter for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We further instruct the trial court on remand to include in its written
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child support order that Davis is to pay his proportionate share of extracurricular activity costs.
Finally, we award attorney fees on appeal to Stovall.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
CRUSER, J.
We concur:
PRICE, A.C.