Kalanit Jaffa Lagbas, V. Mychael Blake Lagbas
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket87632-5
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
No. 87632-5-I
KALANIT LAGBAS,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
MYCHAEL LAGBAS,
Respondent.
COBURN, J. — As part of their dissolution, mother, Kalanit Lagbas-Parks, 1 and
father, Mychael Lagbas, entered into a CR 2A agreed parenting plan for their two
children. The plan provided that once the youngest child, S.L., reached school age, both
children would attend school where Mychael lived and the parties intended to live within
15 miles of the Renton city center and share residential time on a 50/50, alternating
weekly basis. After S.L. reached school age, the children began attending school on
Mercer Island where Mychael2 lived. But Kalanit remained living in Port Orchard,
resulting in the children commuting from Port Orchard to school on Mercer Island when
they lived with their mother. Kalanit moved to modify the parenting plan under RCW
26.09.260(1) and .260(2), asserting that the children’s long school commute compelled
1
Previously Kalanit Lagbas.
2
Because of the similarity of the parties’ current surnames, this opinion refers to the
parties by their first names for clarity.
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a major modification of the 50/50 residential schedule to make her the primary
residential parent.
Following a bench trial, the trial court modified the parenting plan to designate
Mychael as the primary residential parent. Kalanit appeals the modification orders,
arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the parenting plan, (2)
the court should have limited Mychael’s residential time under RCW 26.09.191, (3) the
court’s sua sponte vacation of a prior contempt finding against Mychael lacks
substantial evidence, and (4) the court abused its discretion in modifying child support.
We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Kalanit and Mychael married in 2014. Their daughter A.L. was born in 2015 and
their son S.L. was born in 2017. In 2019 Kalanit filed for dissolution. As part of the
finalized dissolution, the parties agreed to a parenting plan under CR 2A “in the best
interest of the children.” The parenting plan was entered as a final court order on
January 23, 2020. At that time, A.L. was four years old and S.L. was two years old.
Mychael lived in North Seattle and worked in Renton. Kalanit lived in North Seattle but
wanted to move to Port Orchard.
The parenting plan provided residential provisions based on two phases, with the
second phase beginning when S.L. started kindergarten in September 2023. The
parenting plan stated that, under the first phase, the “[c]hildren under school-age are
scheduled to live with Kalanit … except when they are scheduled to live with Mychael …
[f]rom 6:30 pm on Friday – 6:30 pm on Sunday every other weekend.” Regarding the
second phase, the parenting plan stated:
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The parties intent is to live within 15 miles traveled by road from the city
center of Renton when [S.L.] begins kindergarten (anticipated to be
September 2023), which aligns with when the residential schedule shifts to
a 50/50 shared schedule. The children shall attend school in the father’s
school district unless otherwise agreed upon. Prior to the transition to the
shared 50/50 schedule, both parties agree that the mother may relocate to
Port Orchard or any other location that is mutually agreed upon on a
temporary basis. … Any move prior to September 2023 is presumed to be
temporary with the intent to live within 15 miles from the city center of
Renton to allow the 50/50 shared residential schedule to being [sic] upon
[S.L.’s] entry into Kindergarten (anticipated to be September 2023).
The children are scheduled to live equally with both parents on an
alternating weekly schedule as follows:
From Monday when school lets out for the day (if no school, then
3:00 pm) to the following Monday when school lets out for the day
(if no school, then 3:00 pm).
…
The Summer Schedule is the same as the School Schedule once the
children are in Kindergarten or above except that each parent shall spend
2 weeks of uninterrupted vacation time with the children each summer ….
Additionally, the parenting plan provided that the parties would jointly make major
decisions, including decisions regarding health care and extracurricular activities. The
plan required the parent seeking to make a major decision to notify the other parent by
email, giving “[a]s much notice as possible … , but not less than 7 calendar days.” The
plan required the other parent to respond within seven days and stated that the other
parent “may, within the initial 72-hour period, request up to an additional 48 hours to
respond for good cause.” The parenting plan did not impose restrictions on either parent
under RCW 26.09.191. The accompanying child support order required Mychael to pay
monthly child support to Kalanit. The parties later entered into an agreed modified child
support order that did not require either party to pay child support.
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In June 2021 Kalanit purchased a house in Port Orchard with Dustin Parks,
whom she married in 2021 or 2022. Mychael also remarried and moved to Mercer
Island, where he purchased a house with his wife Kat Lagbas. Mychael’s house was
located within 15 miles of the Renton city center as the parties intended under the
second phase of the parenting plan.
On May 12, 2023, Kalanit moved to modify the parenting plan under RCW
26.09.260(1) and .260(2). Kalanit asserted that a substantial change required a major
modification of the second phase of the residential schedule anticipated to start in
September 2023. Instead of a 50/50 residential schedule, Kalanit proposed that the
children continue to live with her during the week and live with Mychael every other
weekend. In her attached declaration, Kalanit stated that she did not understand that
the 15-mile radius under the parenting plan was “a rigid rule” and no longer believed
that a move closer to Renton was in the children’s best interest. In part, she stated that
“it takes about an hour and ten minutes [without traffic] to get to Mychael’s house,” and
that it would be best for the children if the residential schedule remained the same. A
trial court commissioner dismissed the petition for lack of adequate cause, finding that it
was brought in bad faith.
In October 2023 the children began attending school on Mercer Island and the
parties began to share residential time on a 50/50, alternating weekly basis as provided
under the second phase of the parenting plan.
On October 20 Kalanit again requested a major modification of the parenting plan
based on a substantial change under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2), asserting in part
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that the children’s school commute was detrimental to their wellbeing. Kalanit stated
that she “cannot be forced to relocate” under the second phase of the parenting plan:
I live in Kitsap County with my husband and his two children, and we
cannot move to Renton, even if I could be ordered to do so. Therefore, the
situation has changed significantly since the parenting plan was entered,
and the provision requiring our children to commute back and forth to
attend school in the father’s district is detrimental to the children.
Therefore, I am proposing a new parenting plan and child support order to
reflect a residential arrangement that I believe will be in the children’s best
interest.
Kalanit proposed that the children primarily live with her “except when they … live with
Mychael … every other weekend.” She did not request restrictions under RCW
26.09.191.
In her petition to modify the parenting plan, Kalanit requested a modification of
the child support order to reflect her proposed residential schedule. Kalanit requested a
temporary child support order requiring Mychael to pay child support. Mychael opposed
Kalanit’s petition.
On January 24, 2024, a trial court commissioner found there was adequate
cause for modification. The commissioner stated:
In this situation, there has been a substantial change in circumstances in
the life of the child and both parents. The father has moved to Mercer
Island and has remarried. The mother now intends to stay in Port Orchard
on a permanent basis even though the parties agreed to a parenting plan
that indicated they would be moving within 15 [miles] of Renton to make
the week on week off schedule work.
Since the week on/week off schedule was implemented, the mother has
been driving the children from Port Orchard to the school in Mercer Island
every day the children are with her. The mother cited the commute as part
of the detrimental environment she sought to demonstrate. Based on the
locations of the homes, the current week on week off schedule and the
children’s enrollment and attendance in the Mercer Island schools, and
significant conflict that [h]as arisen between the parents the current
parenting plan is impractical and unworkable to follow. Adjusting the plan
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to account for the changes in circumstances is in the best interest of the
children.
The commissioner imposed a temporary parenting plan requiring the children to reside
with Mychael during school weeks and to live with Kalanit during most weekends. The
temporary plan required joint decision-making and that the parties engage in a dispute
resolution process in the event of disagreements, “[u]ness there is an emergency.” The
commissioner later appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate “[a]ll issues
related to making a parenting plan for [the] children.”
On February 9 Kalanit moved for a contempt hearing, arguing that Mychael
violated both the parties’ agreed and temporary parenting plan by scheduling a primary
care physician appointment for A.L. without Kalanit’s consent. Following a hearing, a
commissioner entered an order on April 2, 2024, finding Mychael in contempt for
intentionally violating the joint-decision making terms under the parties’ 2020 parenting
plan and the temporary plan. The commissioner found that the appointment was not an
emergency appointment and “an appointment could have been scheduled with [the
children’s] primary care providers in Port Orchard.” Mychael moved for a superior court
judge to revise the commissioner’s order, which the superior court denied. In its July 1,
2024, order, the court found that the response deadline under the parties’ parenting
plan, which referred to both seven days and 72 hours, was ambiguous, and that
Mychael’s “unilateral” decision-making regarding A.L.’s healthcare was intentional and
completed in bad faith. The court found that Mychael’s conduct violated the temporary
plan “and could have been avoided as it was not the result of an emergency.”
A six-day modification trial began in November 2024. GAL Connor Lenz’s report
was admitted prior to trial. The report stated that the parties “acknowledge that a 50/50
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schedule is untenable and not in the best interests of the children.” The GAL determined
that given the 66-mile-distance between the parties’ residences, “[a]n equally shared
schedule is impractical and unrealistic” and “[t]here would likely be detriment to the
children in maintaining a week-on, week-off schedule during the school year due to the
distance.” The GAL further stated:
Overall, analysis of best interests yields a finding that there are
components of RCW 26.09.187 that favor each of the parents based on
different factors. Further, there are factors that don’t favor either parent to
a discernable degree …. When weighing each of the factors an
endorsement of a shared schedule that provides roughly equal time for
both is also reasonable, but since there was no relocation by the mother
as anticipated, an equally shared schedule is not a viable alternative.
Therefore, this GAL considered the children’s current status and the
adverse consequences of yet another shift in the children’s schedule,
school, and social connections, as well as the commitments and voluntary
agreements the parties have made.
Stating that avoiding disruption in the children’s routines and school was of “paramount
importance,” the GAL concluded that it would be most effective to maintain structure
and consistency for the children to remain in their current school and in Mychael’s
primary care, while ensuring ample time with Kalanit. The GAL recommended that the
children live with Kalanit during the summer, except for alternating weekends with
Mychael.
In his trial brief, Mychael asked the trial court to modify the parenting plan to
conform with the GAL’s residential schedule recommendations, deny Kalanit’s request
to modify the child support order, and award child support to him if the court adopted his
proposed parenting plan.
At trial, the court heard testimony regarding circumstances around the prior
contempt finding against Mychael for scheduling a primary care doctor appointment for
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A.L. Mychael testified that he, a physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor, made the
appointment out of concern because A.L. had been seen at urgent care for multiple
issues and the urgent care providers expressed concern about A.L.’s need for “follow up
with a primary care provider in the near future.” According to the GAL, it potentially
signaled a more urgent issue that A.L. was seen at urgent care three times in less than
three weeks, including for an ear infection, a bladder infection, respiratory issues,
nausea, and a rash from medication. Additionally, Mychael testified that the new primary
care doctor that he located for A.L. requested past medical records to get an idea of
A.L.’s medical history, but Kalanit refused to provide him with information about A.L.’s
last primary care provider. Based on his knowledge of professional training and the
situation, Mychael did not believe Kalanit’s response was reasonable.
On November 14 the trial court entered an order allowing responses to the
court’s sua sponte motion to reconsider the contempt order. The court subsequently
entered an order vacating the contempt finding. 3
On December 5 the trial court issued its final order and findings on Kalanit’s
petition to modify the parenting plan. The court approved a major change to the
parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2). The court found that the parties’
parenting plan:
(1) stated that the parents intended to reside within 15 miles of Renton city
center, (2) required the children to attend school in the school district
where [Mychael] lived, and (3) provided a 50/50 (week on / week off)
residential split. The school and residential provisions of the 2020
parenting plan were not conditioned in any way, i.e., although the
parenting plan did not by its terms require that the parents live within the
specified geographic area, the parenting plan was unambiguous in its
requirement that the children (1) attend school wherever [Mychael] lived
and (2) live with [Mychael] half the time once both were enrolled in school.
3
The order vacates the April 2, 2024, order, as revised by the July 1, 2024, order.
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The parties agreed (and the Court found) that arrangement to be in the
children’s best interest.
The trial court found that the commissioner’s entry of the temporary parenting
plan placing the children primarily with Mychael during the school year was necessitated
by Kalanit’s decision not to attempt to move within “the designated radius of 15 miles
from Renton city center.” The court found that Kalanit failed to prove her claim that it
was impossible for her to move within the agreed-upon area. The court determined that
the children’s current living situation was harmful to their physical, mental, or emotional
health and that a modification of the parenting plan would be better for the children to
prevent them from having a lengthy school commute. The court found “[i]t is in the
children’s best interest to place the children primarily in the father’s care during the
school year.”
The trial court imposed a parenting plan designating Mychael as the parent with
whom the children are scheduled to reside most of the time. Specifically, the court
ordered that the children should live with Mychael during the school year, except for
every other weekend when they should live with Kalanit, and that the children should
live with Kalanit during the summer, except for every other weekend when they should
live with Mychael. The court also modified the decision-making provisions by ordering
that Mychael have sole decision-making authority regarding non-emergency and non-
major matters of health care, dental care, mental health care, orthodontia, and choice of
insurance and providers. The court did not impose restrictions on either parent under
RCW 26.09.191, finding that Kalanit did not prove that Mychael committed acts of
domestic violence.
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Additionally, the trial court modified the parties’ child support agreement based
on its major modification of the parenting plan, ordering that Kalanit pay child support to
Mychael as the primary residential parent. The court found that Kalanit’s net monthly
income was $6,739 and that Mychael’s net monthly income was $20,385. The court
determined that the standard calculation of child support, based on the parties’
combined monthly income that exceeded $12,000, was $590 for Kalanit. The court
determined that a downward deviation of Kalanit’s child support obligation was
warranted because the children “spend significant time with [Kalanit] who owes support”
and that a non-standard amount still provided her household sufficient money to meet
the children’s basic needs. Specifically noting that “the children will spend two months
during the summer with Kalanit,” the court subtracted two monthly payments from the
standard yearly calculation of $7080, reducing the annual amount to $5900.
Accordingly, the court ordered Kalanit to pay $492 in monthly child support.
Kalanit moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order modifying the
parenting plan and child support, which the court denied. The court stated as to its
modification of the parenting plan’s decision-making provisions:
The Court’s decision to vest the father with sole decision making as
to certain decisions was based primarily on the Court’s determination that
the mother had demonstrated an inability to cooperate with the father to
make decisions in those areas to the detriment of the children’s best
interest. … Specifically, (a) the father made reasonable requests (that the
children establish a doctor and extracurricular activities near the father’s
home given that he was the primary residential parent), (b) the mother
unreasonably withheld her consent, and (c) and the children suffered as a
result.
As to child support, the trial court stated:
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The Court deviated from the standard calculation given that the
mother will be the primary residential parent in the summer, but otherwise
did not find a reason for deviation.
…
The Court found that “Kalanit did not provide sufficient justification
to deduct business expenses from her gross income.” … [Kalanit’s] motion
cites pages from … her tax returns—as evidence of her business
expenses. The Court found line items on tax returns, which lack any
documentation justifying the deductions, insufficient evidence of
deductible business expenses.
Kalanit appeals.
DISCUSSION
Major Modification of Parenting Plan
Kalanit contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a major
modification of the parenting plan.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s authority to modify a parenting plan is strictly controlled by statute
under RCW 26.09.260. Once a trial court finds adequate cause to schedule a parenting
plan modification hearing under RCW 26.09.270, the trial court may then modify the
existing parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) if it finds that a substantial change has
occurred in the child’s circumstances and the modification is in and necessary for the
best interests of the child. Under RCW 26.09.260(2), the court may order a “major”
modification to the residential schedule that changes the residence the child is
scheduled to reside in the majority of the time if, among other grounds, the child’s
present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and the advantage of a change in the child’s environment outweighs the harm likely to
be caused by the change in environment. RCW 26.09.260(2)(c); see In re Marriage of
Snider, 6 Wn. App. 2d 310, 319, 430 P.3d 726 (2018). The “present environment” refers
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to the custodial environment named in the original parenting plan. George v. Helliar, 62
Wn. App. 378, 383, 814 P.2d 238 (1991).
Because changes in residential placements are generally viewed as highly
disruptive to children, “there is a strong presumption in favor of custodial continuity and
against modification.” In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239
(1993). “Nonetheless, trial courts are given broad discretion in matters dealing with the
welfare of children.” Id. We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to modify a parenting
plan absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283
P.3d 546 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly
unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or based on untenable reasons. In re
Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “A decision is
manifestly unreasonable if, based on the facts and applicable legal standard, it is
outside the range of acceptable choices.” In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App.
343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001). A decision is based on untenable grounds if the record
does not support the findings of fact and is based on untenable reasons if the court
applies the incorrect legal standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the
proper legal standard. Id.
A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence. In
re Marriage of Hansen, 81 Wn. App. 494, 498, 914 P.2d 799 (1996). Substantial
evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person that the
asserted premise is true. In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d
832 (2022). The party challenging the trial court’s findings has the burden of showing
that substantial evidence does not exist. In re Marriage of Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. 1, 9,
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57 P.3d 1166 (2002). We do not reweigh evidence, even if conflicting, or judge witness
credibility. In re Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). “So long
as substantial evidence supports the finding, it does not matter that other evidence may
contradict it.” Burrill v. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court.
DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 48. A trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact are verities
on appeal. In re Marriage of Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. 861, 865, 815 P.2d 843 (1991).
We review de novo whether the trial court’s conclusions of law flow from its findings. In
re Marriage of Raskob, 183 Wn. App. 503, 510, 334 P.3d 30 (2014).
B. Trial Court’s Consideration of Agreed Parenting Plan
Kalanit argues that the trial court erred by relying on the parties’ agreed parenting
plan in its determination as to whether a major modification of the parenting plan was in
the best interests of the children. Particularly, Kalanit argues that the parenting plan
impermissibly waived the presumption of relocation under RCW 26.09.520 and that her
agreement was not knowing and voluntary under RCW 26.09.187(2)(a)(ii).
These arguments are meritless. Kalanit did not move for relocation, but for
modification of the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260. 4 The terms of the parties’
agreed parenting plan are not subject to review in this appeal of the trial court’s
modification of that plan. A petition to modify the parenting plan does not bring up the
original parenting plan for de novo review. George, 62 Wn. App. at 385. “Once a court
enters a parenting plan and neither party appeals it, the plan can be modified only
4
Kalanit also fails to acknowledge that the rebuttable presumption under RCW
26.09.520 of the Child Relocation Act does not apply to a 50/50 parenting plan, which was in
effect at the time she moved to modify the parenting plan. Bergerson v. Zurbano, 6 Wn. App. 2d
912, 914-15, 917-18, 920-21, 432 P.3d 850 (2018).
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pursuant to RCW 26.09.260.” Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at 350. In a modification inquiry,
the trial court’s focus is on the child’s present environment under the parenting plan and
whether the existing residential plan is detrimental to their well-being and a change in
that residential schedule is in the child’s best interest. RCW 26.09.260(1), (2)(c); see
George, 62 Wn. App. at 383-85. Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that,
based on the parenting plan, the parties agreed that it was in the children’s best interest
to attend school wherever Mychael lived and to live with Mychael “half the time once
both [children] were enrolled in school.” The trial court did not err in considering the
terms of the parties’ established parenting plan in its determination as to whether a
major modification of that plan was in the children’s best interest.
Additionally, Kalanit challenges the trial court’s finding that she did not establish
that she could not move within the agreed radius under the parenting plan. She claims
that the trial court improperly placed the burden on her to prove that it was not possible
for her to move within 15 miles of the Renton city center.
Kalanit’s argument is unpersuasive. Kalanit based her petition to modify the
parenting plan on the premise that she could not move to Renton even if she was
“ordered to do so.” Stemming from her assertion that she could not reside anywhere
other than Port Orchard, Kalanit submitted that the children’s commute to school on
Mercer Island had become detrimental and proposed as a solution that the children
primarily reside with her. As the moving party, it was Kalanit’s burden to establish the
circumstances warranting her requested modification of the children’s residential
schedule and that such modification was in the children’s best interest. See Schroeder,
106 Wn. App. at 350 (“[I]t is the moving party’s burden to prove a modification is
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appropriate.”). Any modification of a parenting plan requires an independent inquiry by
the trial court. In re Marriage of Coy, 160 Wn. App. 797, 804, 248 P.3d 1101 (2011). It
was not error for the trial court to consider whether the record supported the
circumstances as Kalanit described them in her petition, or if her petition was prompted
by a situation of her own making. See In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381,
388, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018) (“‘[A] trial court has broad discretion to structure a parenting
plan, guided by the provisions of the applicable statutes.’”) (quoting In re Marriage of
McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 563, 359 P.3d 811 (2015)); Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at
350-51 (stating that though parental involvement remains a secondary concern to the
primary concern of the best interests of the child, parenting plan violations remain a
factor that can justify modification under RCW 26.09.260); see also In re Marriage of
Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 708-09, 715-16, 789 P.2d 807 (1990) (concluding that
modification of parenting plan was proper where parents’ high-conflict relationship
created an unworkable joint custody situation that put the child’s well-being at risk).
Kalanit argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
that she did not prove that it was impossible for her to move within the agreed-upon
radius. But she does not point to any evidence that controverts the trial court’s
explanatory findings, including that evidence at trial neither established that Kalanit
searched for homes to buy or rent nor that it was financially futile for her to search for
homes to buy or rent given her family income. In its findings, the trial court listed
municipalities within the agreed-upon radius and noted that Kalanit “presented no
evidence about the median home price or homes available to buy or rent within the
huge area [within the radius].” The trial court further found that Kalanit presented market
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data that the median home price in Renton in 2024 was between $700,000 and
$800,000, which was less than the combined value of her and her husband’s two
homes in Port Orchard. Because Kalanit does not challenge these findings, they are
verities on appeal. See Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. at 865. Kalanit attempts to explain in
her opening brief the circumstances that led to her permanent relocation to Port
Orchard. But we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. Kalanit
fails to show that the trial court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. See
Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. at 9.
C. Modification of Residential Schedule
Kalanit contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
mandatory statutory factors in determining that a modification of the residential schedule
was in the children’s best interest. Her argument is premised on the assertion that a trial
court must consider the factors described in RCW 26.09.187(3) when modifying a 50/50
residential or “joint custody” schedule.
We turn first to the statutes at issue. We review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo and interpret statutes primarily to give effect to the legislature’s
intent. PeaceHealth St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 196 Wn.2d 1, 7, 468
P.3d 1056 (2020). “We derive legislative intent solely from the plain language of the
statute, considering the text of the provision, the context of the statute, related
provisions, amendments, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. at 7-8.
RCW 26.09.187 provides criteria that a trial court must consider in establishing,
not modifying, an initial permanent plan. RCW 26.09.187(3) provides factors that a trial
court must consider in making residential provisions “[w]here the limitations of RCW
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26.09.191 or 26.09.192 are not dispositive.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). A trial court must
consider the factors in fashioning an initial permanent plan to encourage the parent’s
“loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent with the child’s
developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances.” RCW
26.09.187(3)(a).
In the context of a modification proceeding, a permanent parenting plan is
already in place, and a trial court must follow the procedures and apply the relevant
factors under the statutory framework of RCW 26.09.260. In re Marriage of Shryock, 76
Wn. App. 848, 852, 888 P.2d 750 (1995) (citing Stern, 57 Wn. App. at 711). Under RCW
26.09.260(1), a trial court may modify an existing parenting plan only if the court finds
that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the
nonmoving party and the modification is in the best interest of the child and necessary
to serve the child’s best interests. For major modifications such as the modification
ordered in the instant case, RCW 26.09.260(2) provides exclusive criteria under which a
trial court may order a change to a previously established residential schedule. These
conditions include, under RCW 26.09.260(2)(c), if the court finds that “the child’s
present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the
advantage of a change to the child.”
RCW 26.09.260 does not refer to RCW 26.09.187. Observing the different
contexts in which these distinct statutory frameworks apply, our state Supreme Court
has held that:
[a] trial court making an initial placement of the child considers many
factors that impact the child’s life in order to determine the best interests of
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the child. See RCW 26.09.187(3). A trial court hearing a modification
action, on the other hand, presumes the best interests of the child require
the primary placement remain intact. RCW 26.09.260(1).
In re Marriage of Pape, 139 Wn.2d 694, 715, 989 P.2d 1120 (1999). 5 The policy goals
set forth under chapter 26.09 RCW recognize the importance of maintaining “the
existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child” and that an existing parenting
arrangement should only be changed by a court “to the extent [it is] necessitated by the
changed relationship of the parents or as required to protect the child from physical,
mental, or emotional harm.” RCW 26.09.002. As referenced above, “[t]he language of
RCW 26.09.260, consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, establishes a
strong presumption against modification and in favor of continuity.” In re Marriage of
Cardwell, 16 Wn. App. 2d 90, 96, 479 P.3d 1188 (2021) (citing In re Marriage of
Maclaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d 751, 770, 440 P.3d 1055 (2019); McDole, 122 Wn.2d at 610).
A trial court’s backtracking to the drawing board under RCW 26.09.187 contradicts the
policy goals under chapter 26.09 RCW to prioritize children’s stability and continuity. 6
5
In its recent decision about the application of the rebuttable presumption for relocation
under RCW 26.09.520 of the Child Relocation Act, the Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Hauk
emphasized the superseding effect of the Child Relocation Act on its previous holding in Pape
that “a primary residential parent seeking a court order permitting relocation ‘must demonstrate
a bona fide reason for the relocation’ because the court already considered the child’s best
interests in establishing the primary residential placement, triggering a presumption that the
‘primary placement remain intact.’” No. 104074-1, slip op. at 6-7 (Wash. Aug. 6, 2026),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1040741.pdf (citing and quoting Pape, 139 Wn.2d at
696, 715-16); see Hauk, slip op. at 12, 17-18 (citing Pape, 139 Wn.2d at 715, 717).
Nevertheless, the mandated framework under the Child Relocation Act in a relocation
proceeding does not detract from the Pape court’s recognition of the preference for maintaining
the status quo in a modification proceeding under RCW 26.09.260(1), which is the relevant
statute in the instant case.
6
This court has concluded in many unpublished opinions that RCW 26.09.187 factors do
not apply to a trial court’s decision to modify an existing parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260.
See, e.g., Darnell, No. 84216-1-I, slip op. at 9 (“[I]n modification proceedings, the court does not
‘start from scratch’ and reconsider the factors in
RCW 26.09.187. Instead, the court must follow the procedures and factors set out in RCW
26.09.260.”); In re Marriage of Turner, No. 84402-4-I, slip op. at 10, 13-14 (Wash. Ct. App. July
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Kalanit relies on the Court of Appeals’ opinion in In re Marriage of Murphy, 48
Wn. App. 196, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987), for the proposition that a trial court must look to
RCW 26.09.187(3) factors in determining whether a proposed modification is in the best
interests of the child when a joint custody arrangement is no longer workable.
In Murphy, the court considered the trial court’s modification of an established
parenting plan under which the parties had joint custody with the physical residence of
the child alternating every week between them. Id. at 197. After the joint custody
arrangement was established, the mother remarried and moved to Oregon with the
child. Id. The mother subsequently moved for modification and was granted sole
custody of the child. Id. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court used the wrong
statutory standard in modifying the parenting plan by considering factors for an initial
custody award under former RCW 26.09.190 (1973). Id. at 197-200; see LAWS OF 1987,
ch. 460, § 61 (repealing RCW 26.09.190); compare LAWS OF 1973, ch. 157, § 19
(factors under RCW 26.09.190) with LAWS OF 1987, ch. 460, § 9 (factors under RCW
26.09.187(3)).
The Murphy court, noting that the mother’s attorney withdrew and the mother had
not filed a response brief, held that the father did not show that the trial court abused its
discretion by using RCW 26.09.190 factors to guide its analysis of whether a change
17, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/844024.pdf (holding that RCW
26.09.187 factors for “when a court is fashioning an initial parenting plan” are distinct from the
process under RCW 26.09.260 “for when a court is considering a petition for modification” and
collecting additional unpublished opinions); In re Parenting & Supp. of B.E.C., No. 60498-1-II,
slip op. at 14 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2025) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2060498-1-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf
(“This case involves the initial permanent placement decision governed by RCW 26.09.187(3). It
does not involve a modification of custody placement, which would be governed by RCW
26.09.260.”). We cite these unpublished opinions, consistent with GR 14.1(c), as necessary for
a reasoned decision.
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from joint custody to sole custody was in the child’s best inte