Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 87632-5-I KALANIT LAGBAS, DIVISION ONE Appellant, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and MYCHAEL LAGBAS, Respondent. COBURN, J. — As part of their dissolution, mother, Kalanit Lagbas-Parks, 1 and father, Mychael Lagbas, entered into a CR 2A agreed parenting plan for their two children. The plan provided that once the youngest child, S.L., reached school age, both children would attend school where Mychael lived and the parties intended to live within 15 miles of the Renton city center and share residential time on a 50/50, alternating weekly basis. After S.L. reached school age, the children began attending school on Mercer Island where Mychael2 lived. But Kalanit remained living in Port Orchard, resulting in the children commuting from Port Orchard to school on Mercer Island when they lived with their mother. Kalanit moved to modify the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2), asserting that the children’s long school commute compelled 1 Previously Kalanit Lagbas. 2 Because of the similarity of the parties’ current surnames, this opinion refers to the parties by their first names for clarity. 87632-5-I/2 a major modification of the 50/50 residential schedule to make her the primary residential parent. Following a bench trial, the trial court modified the parenting plan to designate Mychael as the primary residential parent. Kalanit appeals the modification orders, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the parenting plan, (2) the court should have limited Mychael’s residential time under RCW 26.09.191, (3) the court’s sua sponte vacation of a prior contempt finding against Mychael lacks substantial evidence, and (4) the court abused its discretion in modifying child support. We disagree and affirm. FACTS Kalanit and Mychael married in 2014. Their daughter A.L. was born in 2015 and their son S.L. was born in 2017. In 2019 Kalanit filed for dissolution. As part of the finalized dissolution, the parties agreed to a parenting plan under CR 2A “in the best interest of the children.” The parenting plan was entered as a final court order on January 23, 2020. At that time, A.L. was four years old and S.L. was two years old. Mychael lived in North Seattle and worked in Renton. Kalanit lived in North Seattle but wanted to move to Port Orchard. The parenting plan provided residential provisions based on two phases, with the second phase beginning when S.L. started kindergarten in September 2023. The parenting plan stated that, under the first phase, the “[c]hildren under school-age are scheduled to live with Kalanit … except when they are scheduled to live with Mychael … [f]rom 6:30 pm on Friday – 6:30 pm on Sunday every other weekend.” Regarding the second phase, the parenting plan stated: 2 87632-5-I/3 The parties intent is to live within 15 miles traveled by road from the city center of Renton when [S.L.] begins kindergarten (anticipated to be September 2023), which aligns with when the residential schedule shifts to a 50/50 shared schedule. The children shall attend school in the father’s school district unless otherwise agreed upon. Prior to the transition to the shared 50/50 schedule, both parties agree that the mother may relocate to Port Orchard or any other location that is mutually agreed upon on a temporary basis. … Any move prior to September 2023 is presumed to be temporary with the intent to live within 15 miles from the city center of Renton to allow the 50/50 shared residential schedule to being [sic] upon [S.L.’s] entry into Kindergarten (anticipated to be September 2023). The children are scheduled to live equally with both parents on an alternating weekly schedule as follows: From Monday when school lets out for the day (if no school, then 3:00 pm) to the following Monday when school lets out for the day (if no school, then 3:00 pm). … The Summer Schedule is the same as the School Schedule once the children are in Kindergarten or above except that each parent shall spend 2 weeks of uninterrupted vacation time with the children each summer …. Additionally, the parenting plan provided that the parties would jointly make major decisions, including decisions regarding health care and extracurricular activities. The plan required the parent seeking to make a major decision to notify the other parent by email, giving “[a]s much notice as possible … , but not less than 7 calendar days.” The plan required the other parent to respond within seven days and stated that the other parent “may, within the initial 72-hour period, request up to an additional 48 hours to respond for good cause.” The parenting plan did not impose restrictions on either parent under RCW 26.09.191. The accompanying child support order required Mychael to pay monthly child support to Kalanit. The parties later entered into an agreed modified child support order that did not require either party to pay child support. 3 87632-5-I/4 In June 2021 Kalanit purchased a house in Port Orchard with Dustin Parks, whom she married in 2021 or 2022. Mychael also remarried and moved to Mercer Island, where he purchased a house with his wife Kat Lagbas. Mychael’s house was located within 15 miles of the Renton city center as the parties intended under the second phase of the parenting plan. On May 12, 2023, Kalanit moved to modify the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2). Kalanit asserted that a substantial change required a major modification of the second phase of the residential schedule anticipated to start in September 2023. Instead of a 50/50 residential schedule, Kalanit proposed that the children continue to live with her during the week and live with Mychael every other weekend. In her attached declaration, Kalanit stated that she did not understand that the 15-mile radius under the parenting plan was “a rigid rule” and no longer believed that a move closer to Renton was in the children’s best interest. In part, she stated that “it takes about an hour and ten minutes [without traffic] to get to Mychael’s house,” and that it would be best for the children if the residential schedule remained the same. A trial court commissioner dismissed the petition for lack of adequate cause, finding that it was brought in bad faith. In October 2023 the children began attending school on Mercer Island and the parties began to share residential time on a 50/50, alternating weekly basis as provided under the second phase of the parenting plan. On October 20 Kalanit again requested a major modification of the parenting plan based on a substantial change under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2), asserting in part 4 87632-5-I/5 that the children’s school commute was detrimental to their wellbeing. Kalanit stated that she “cannot be forced to relocate” under the second phase of the parenting plan: I live in Kitsap County with my husband and his two children, and we cannot move to Renton, even if I could be ordered to do so. Therefore, the situation has changed significantly since the parenting plan was entered, and the provision requiring our children to commute back and forth to attend school in the father’s district is detrimental to the children. Therefore, I am proposing a new parenting plan and child support order to reflect a residential arrangement that I believe will be in the children’s best interest. Kalanit proposed that the children primarily live with her “except when they … live with Mychael … every other weekend.” She did not request restrictions under RCW 26.09.191. In her petition to modify the parenting plan, Kalanit requested a modification of the child support order to reflect her proposed residential schedule. Kalanit requested a temporary child support order requiring Mychael to pay child support. Mychael opposed Kalanit’s petition. On January 24, 2024, a trial court commissioner found there was adequate cause for modification. The commissioner stated: In this situation, there has been a substantial change in circumstances in the life of the child and both parents. The father has moved to Mercer Island and has remarried. The mother now intends to stay in Port Orchard on a permanent basis even though the parties agreed to a parenting plan that indicated they would be moving within 15 [miles] of Renton to make the week on week off schedule work. Since the week on/week off schedule was implemented, the mother has been driving the children from Port Orchard to the school in Mercer Island every day the children are with her. The mother cited the commute as part of the detrimental environment she sought to demonstrate. Based on the locations of the homes, the current week on week off schedule and the children’s enrollment and attendance in the Mercer Island schools, and significant conflict that [h]as arisen between the parents the current parenting plan is impractical and unworkable to follow. Adjusting the plan 5 87632-5-I/6 to account for the changes in circumstances is in the best interest of the children. The commissioner imposed a temporary parenting plan requiring the children to reside with Mychael during school weeks and to live with Kalanit during most weekends. The temporary plan required joint decision-making and that the parties engage in a dispute resolution process in the event of disagreements, “[u]ness there is an emergency.” The commissioner later appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate “[a]ll issues related to making a parenting plan for [the] children.” On February 9 Kalanit moved for a contempt hearing, arguing that Mychael violated both the parties’ agreed and temporary parenting plan by scheduling a primary care physician appointment for A.L. without Kalanit’s consent. Following a hearing, a commissioner entered an order on April 2, 2024, finding Mychael in contempt for intentionally violating the joint-decision making terms under the parties’ 2020 parenting plan and the temporary plan. The commissioner found that the appointment was not an emergency appointment and “an appointment could have been scheduled with [the children’s] primary care providers in Port Orchard.” Mychael moved for a superior court judge to revise the commissioner’s order, which the superior court denied. In its July 1, 2024, order, the court found that the response deadline under the parties’ parenting plan, which referred to both seven days and 72 hours, was ambiguous, and that Mychael’s “unilateral” decision-making regarding A.L.’s healthcare was intentional and completed in bad faith. The court found that Mychael’s conduct violated the temporary plan “and could have been avoided as it was not the result of an emergency.” A six-day modification trial began in November 2024. GAL Connor Lenz’s report was admitted prior to trial. The report stated that the parties “acknowledge that a 50/50 6 87632-5-I/7 schedule is untenable and not in the best interests of the children.” The GAL determined that given the 66-mile-distance between the parties’ residences, “[a]n equally shared schedule is impractical and unrealistic” and “[t]here would likely be detriment to the children in maintaining a week-on, week-off schedule during the school year due to the distance.” The GAL further stated: Overall, analysis of best interests yields a finding that there are components of RCW 26.09.187 that favor each of the parents based on different factors. Further, there are factors that don’t favor either parent to a discernable degree …. When weighing each of the factors an endorsement of a shared schedule that provides roughly equal time for both is also reasonable, but since there was no relocation by the mother as anticipated, an equally shared schedule is not a viable alternative. Therefore, this GAL considered the children’s current status and the adverse consequences of yet another shift in the children’s schedule, school, and social connections, as well as the commitments and voluntary agreements the parties have made. Stating that avoiding disruption in the children’s routines and school was of “paramount importance,” the GAL concluded that it would be most effective to maintain structure and consistency for the children to remain in their current school and in Mychael’s primary care, while ensuring ample time with Kalanit. The GAL recommended that the children live with Kalanit during the summer, except for alternating weekends with Mychael. In his trial brief, Mychael asked the trial court to modify the parenting plan to conform with the GAL’s residential schedule recommendations, deny Kalanit’s request to modify the child support order, and award child support to him if the court adopted his proposed parenting plan. At trial, the court heard testimony regarding circumstances around the prior contempt finding against Mychael for scheduling a primary care doctor appointment for 7 87632-5-I/8 A.L. Mychael testified that he, a physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor, made the appointment out of concern because A.L. had been seen at urgent care for multiple issues and the urgent care providers expressed concern about A.L.’s need for “follow up with a primary care provider in the near future.” According to the GAL, it potentially signaled a more urgent issue that A.L. was seen at urgent care three times in less than three weeks, including for an ear infection, a bladder infection, respiratory issues, nausea, and a rash from medication. Additionally, Mychael testified that the new primary care doctor that he located for A.L. requested past medical records to get an idea of A.L.’s medical history, but Kalanit refused to provide him with information about A.L.’s last primary care provider. Based on his knowledge of professional training and the situation, Mychael did not believe Kalanit’s response was reasonable. On November 14 the trial court entered an order allowing responses to the court’s sua sponte motion to reconsider the contempt order. The court subsequently entered an order vacating the contempt finding. 3 On December 5 the trial court issued its final order and findings on Kalanit’s petition to modify the parenting plan. The court approved a major change to the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) and .260(2). The court found that the parties’ parenting plan: (1) stated that the parents intended to reside within 15 miles of Renton city center, (2) required the children to attend school in the school district where [Mychael] lived, and (3) provided a 50/50 (week on / week off) residential split. The school and residential provisions of the 2020 parenting plan were not conditioned in any way, i.e., although the parenting plan did not by its terms require that the parents live within the specified geographic area, the parenting plan was unambiguous in its requirement that the children (1) attend school wherever [Mychael] lived and (2) live with [Mychael] half the time once both were enrolled in school. 3 The order vacates the April 2, 2024, order, as revised by the July 1, 2024, order. 8 87632-5-I/9 The parties agreed (and the Court found) that arrangement to be in the children’s best interest. The trial court found that the commissioner’s entry of the temporary parenting plan placing the children primarily with Mychael during the school year was necessitated by Kalanit’s decision not to attempt to move within “the designated radius of 15 miles from Renton city center.” The court found that Kalanit failed to prove her claim that it was impossible for her to move within the agreed-upon area. The court determined that the children’s current living situation was harmful to their physical, mental, or emotional health and that a modification of the parenting plan would be better for the children to prevent them from having a lengthy school commute. The court found “[i]t is in the children’s best interest to place the children primarily in the father’s care during the school year.” The trial court imposed a parenting plan designating Mychael as the parent with whom the children are scheduled to reside most of the time. Specifically, the court ordered that the children should live with Mychael during the school year, except for every other weekend when they should live with Kalanit, and that the children should live with Kalanit during the summer, except for every other weekend when they should live with Mychael. The court also modified the decision-making provisions by ordering that Mychael have sole decision-making authority regarding non-emergency and non- major matters of health care, dental care, mental health care, orthodontia, and choice of insurance and providers. The court did not impose restrictions on either parent under RCW 26.09.191, finding that Kalanit did not prove that Mychael committed acts of domestic violence. 9 87632-5-I/10 Additionally, the trial court modified the parties’ child support agreement based on its major modification of the parenting plan, ordering that Kalanit pay child support to Mychael as the primary residential parent. The court found that Kalanit’s net monthly income was $6,739 and that Mychael’s net monthly income was $20,385. The court determined that the standard calculation of child support, based on the parties’ combined monthly income that exceeded $12,000, was $590 for Kalanit. The court determined that a downward deviation of Kalanit’s child support obligation was warranted because the children “spend significant time with [Kalanit] who owes support” and that a non-standard amount still provided her household sufficient money to meet the children’s basic needs. Specifically noting that “the children will spend two months during the summer with Kalanit,” the court subtracted two monthly payments from the standard yearly calculation of $7080, reducing the annual amount to $5900. Accordingly, the court ordered Kalanit to pay $492 in monthly child support. Kalanit moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order modifying the parenting plan and child support, which the court denied. The court stated as to its modification of the parenting plan’s decision-making provisions: The Court’s decision to vest the father with sole decision making as to certain decisions was based primarily on the Court’s determination that the mother had demonstrated an inability to cooperate with the father to make decisions in those areas to the detriment of the children’s best interest. … Specifically, (a) the father made reasonable requests (that the children establish a doctor and extracurricular activities near the father’s home given that he was the primary residential parent), (b) the mother unreasonably withheld her consent, and (c) and the children suffered as a result. As to child support, the trial court stated: 10 87632-5-I/11 The Court deviated from the standard calculation given that the mother will be the primary residential parent in the summer, but otherwise did not find a reason for deviation. … The Court found that “Kalanit did not provide sufficient justification to deduct business expenses from her gross income.” … [Kalanit’s] motion cites pages from … her tax returns—as evidence of her business expenses. The Court found line items on tax returns, which lack any documentation justifying the deductions, insufficient evidence of deductible business expenses. Kalanit appeals. DISCUSSION Major Modification of Parenting Plan Kalanit contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a major modification of the parenting plan. A. Standard of Review A trial court’s authority to modify a parenting plan is strictly controlled by statute under RCW 26.09.260. Once a trial court finds adequate cause to schedule a parenting plan modification hearing under RCW 26.09.270, the trial court may then modify the existing parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(1) if it finds that a substantial change has occurred in the child’s circumstances and the modification is in and necessary for the best interests of the child. Under RCW 26.09.260(2), the court may order a “major” modification to the residential schedule that changes the residence the child is scheduled to reside in the majority of the time if, among other grounds, the child’s present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the advantage of a change in the child’s environment outweighs the harm likely to be caused by the change in environment. RCW 26.09.260(2)(c); see In re Marriage of Snider, 6 Wn. App. 2d 310, 319, 430 P.3d 726 (2018). The “present environment” refers 11 87632-5-I/12 to the custodial environment named in the original parenting plan. George v. Helliar, 62 Wn. App. 378, 383, 814 P.2d 238 (1991). Because changes in residential placements are generally viewed as highly disruptive to children, “there is a strong presumption in favor of custodial continuity and against modification.” In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). “Nonetheless, trial courts are given broad discretion in matters dealing with the welfare of children.” Id. We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to modify a parenting plan absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or based on untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “A decision is manifestly unreasonable if, based on the facts and applicable legal standard, it is outside the range of acceptable choices.” In re Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001). A decision is based on untenable grounds if the record does not support the findings of fact and is based on untenable reasons if the court applies the incorrect legal standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the proper legal standard. Id. A trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed on appeal for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Hansen, 81 Wn. App. 494, 498, 914 P.2d 799 (1996). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person that the asserted premise is true. In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022). The party challenging the trial court’s findings has the burden of showing that substantial evidence does not exist. In re Marriage of Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. 1, 9, 12 87632-5-I/13 57 P.3d 1166 (2002). We do not reweigh evidence, even if conflicting, or judge witness credibility. In re Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). “So long as substantial evidence supports the finding, it does not matter that other evidence may contradict it.” Burrill v. Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 868, 56 P.3d 993 (2002). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court. DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 48. A trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. 861, 865, 815 P.2d 843 (1991). We review de novo whether the trial court’s conclusions of law flow from its findings. In re Marriage of Raskob, 183 Wn. App. 503, 510, 334 P.3d 30 (2014). B. Trial Court’s Consideration of Agreed Parenting Plan Kalanit argues that the trial court erred by relying on the parties’ agreed parenting plan in its determination as to whether a major modification of the parenting plan was in the best interests of the children. Particularly, Kalanit argues that the parenting plan impermissibly waived the presumption of relocation under RCW 26.09.520 and that her agreement was not knowing and voluntary under RCW 26.09.187(2)(a)(ii). These arguments are meritless. Kalanit did not move for relocation, but for modification of the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260. 4 The terms of the parties’ agreed parenting plan are not subject to review in this appeal of the trial court’s modification of that plan. A petition to modify the parenting plan does not bring up the original parenting plan for de novo review. George, 62 Wn. App. at 385. “Once a court enters a parenting plan and neither party appeals it, the plan can be modified only 4 Kalanit also fails to acknowledge that the rebuttable presumption under RCW 26.09.520 of the Child Relocation Act does not apply to a 50/50 parenting plan, which was in effect at the time she moved to modify the parenting plan. Bergerson v. Zurbano, 6 Wn. App. 2d 912, 914-15, 917-18, 920-21, 432 P.3d 850 (2018). 13 87632-5-I/14 pursuant to RCW 26.09.260.” Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at 350. In a modification inquiry, the trial court’s focus is on the child’s present environment under the parenting plan and whether the existing residential plan is detrimental to their well-being and a change in that residential schedule is in the child’s best interest. RCW 26.09.260(1), (2)(c); see George, 62 Wn. App. at 383-85. Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that, based on the parenting plan, the parties agreed that it was in the children’s best interest to attend school wherever Mychael lived and to live with Mychael “half the time once both [children] were enrolled in school.” The trial court did not err in considering the terms of the parties’ established parenting plan in its determination as to whether a major modification of that plan was in the children’s best interest. Additionally, Kalanit challenges the trial court’s finding that she did not establish that she could not move within the agreed radius under the parenting plan. She claims that the trial court improperly placed the burden on her to prove that it was not possible for her to move within 15 miles of the Renton city center. Kalanit’s argument is unpersuasive. Kalanit based her petition to modify the parenting plan on the premise that she could not move to Renton even if she was “ordered to do so.” Stemming from her assertion that she could not reside anywhere other than Port Orchard, Kalanit submitted that the children’s commute to school on Mercer Island had become detrimental and proposed as a solution that the children primarily reside with her. As the moving party, it was Kalanit’s burden to establish the circumstances warranting her requested modification of the children’s residential schedule and that such modification was in the children’s best interest. See Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at 350 (“[I]t is the moving party’s burden to prove a modification is 14 87632-5-I/15 appropriate.”). Any modification of a parenting plan requires an independent inquiry by the trial court. In re Marriage of Coy, 160 Wn. App. 797, 804, 248 P.3d 1101 (2011). It was not error for the trial court to consider whether the record supported the circumstances as Kalanit described them in her petition, or if her petition was prompted by a situation of her own making. See In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 388, 409 P.3d 1184 (2018) (“‘[A] trial court has broad discretion to structure a parenting plan, guided by the provisions of the applicable statutes.’”) (quoting In re Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 563, 359 P.3d 811 (2015)); Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at 350-51 (stating that though parental involvement remains a secondary concern to the primary concern of the best interests of the child, parenting plan violations remain a factor that can justify modification under RCW 26.09.260); see also In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 708-09, 715-16, 789 P.2d 807 (1990) (concluding that modification of parenting plan was proper where parents’ high-conflict relationship created an unworkable joint custody situation that put the child’s well-being at risk). Kalanit argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that she did not prove that it was impossible for her to move within the agreed-upon radius. But she does not point to any evidence that controverts the trial court’s explanatory findings, including that evidence at trial neither established that Kalanit searched for homes to buy or rent nor that it was financially futile for her to search for homes to buy or rent given her family income. In its findings, the trial court listed municipalities within the agreed-upon radius and noted that Kalanit “presented no evidence about the median home price or homes available to buy or rent within the huge area [within the radius].” The trial court further found that Kalanit presented market 15 87632-5-I/16 data that the median home price in Renton in 2024 was between $700,000 and $800,000, which was less than the combined value of her and her husband’s two homes in Port Orchard. Because Kalanit does not challenge these findings, they are verities on appeal. See Vander Veen, 62 Wn. App. at 865. Kalanit attempts to explain in her opening brief the circumstances that led to her permanent relocation to Port Orchard. But we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. Kalanit fails to show that the trial court’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. See Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. at 9. C. Modification of Residential Schedule Kalanit contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider mandatory statutory factors in determining that a modification of the residential schedule was in the children’s best interest. Her argument is premised on the assertion that a trial court must consider the factors described in RCW 26.09.187(3) when modifying a 50/50 residential or “joint custody” schedule. We turn first to the statutes at issue. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo and interpret statutes primarily to give effect to the legislature’s intent. PeaceHealth St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 196 Wn.2d 1, 7, 468 P.3d 1056 (2020). “We derive legislative intent solely from the plain language of the statute, considering the text of the provision, the context of the statute, related provisions, amendments, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. at 7-8. RCW 26.09.187 provides criteria that a trial court must consider in establishing, not modifying, an initial permanent plan. RCW 26.09.187(3) provides factors that a trial court must consider in making residential provisions “[w]here the limitations of RCW 16 87632-5-I/17 26.09.191 or 26.09.192 are not dispositive.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). A trial court must consider the factors in fashioning an initial permanent plan to encourage the parent’s “loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic circumstances.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). In the context of a modification proceeding, a permanent parenting plan is already in place, and a trial court must follow the procedures and apply the relevant factors under the statutory framework of RCW 26.09.260. In re Marriage of Shryock, 76 Wn. App. 848, 852, 888 P.2d 750 (1995) (citing Stern, 57 Wn. App. at 711). Under RCW 26.09.260(1), a trial court may modify an existing parenting plan only if the court finds that a substantial change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the nonmoving party and the modification is in the best interest of the child and necessary to serve the child’s best interests. For major modifications such as the modification ordered in the instant case, RCW 26.09.260(2) provides exclusive criteria under which a trial court may order a change to a previously established residential schedule. These conditions include, under RCW 26.09.260(2)(c), if the court finds that “the child’s present environment is detrimental to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.” RCW 26.09.260 does not refer to RCW 26.09.187. Observing the different contexts in which these distinct statutory frameworks apply, our state Supreme Court has held that: [a] trial court making an initial placement of the child considers many factors that impact the child’s life in order to determine the best interests of 17 87632-5-I/18 the child. See RCW 26.09.187(3). A trial court hearing a modification action, on the other hand, presumes the best interests of the child require the primary placement remain intact. RCW 26.09.260(1). In re Marriage of Pape, 139 Wn.2d 694, 715, 989 P.2d 1120 (1999). 5 The policy goals set forth under chapter 26.09 RCW recognize the importance of maintaining “the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child” and that an existing parenting arrangement should only be changed by a court “to the extent [it is] necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm.” RCW 26.09.002. As referenced above, “[t]he language of RCW 26.09.260, consistent with the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, establishes a strong presumption against modification and in favor of continuity.” In re Marriage of Cardwell, 16 Wn. App. 2d 90, 96, 479 P.3d 1188 (2021) (citing In re Marriage of Maclaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d 751, 770, 440 P.3d 1055 (2019); McDole, 122 Wn.2d at 610). A trial court’s backtracking to the drawing board under RCW 26.09.187 contradicts the policy goals under chapter 26.09 RCW to prioritize children’s stability and continuity. 6 5 In its recent decision about the application of the rebuttable presumption for relocation under RCW 26.09.520 of the Child Relocation Act, the Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Hauk emphasized the superseding effect of the Child Relocation Act on its previous holding in Pape that “a primary residential parent seeking a court order permitting relocation ‘must demonstrate a bona fide reason for the relocation’ because the court already considered the child’s best interests in establishing the primary residential placement, triggering a presumption that the ‘primary placement remain intact.’” No. 104074-1, slip op. at 6-7 (Wash. Aug. 6, 2026), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1040741.pdf (citing and quoting Pape, 139 Wn.2d at 696, 715-16); see Hauk, slip op. at 12, 17-18 (citing Pape, 139 Wn.2d at 715, 717). Nevertheless, the mandated framework under the Child Relocation Act in a relocation proceeding does not detract from the Pape court’s recognition of the preference for maintaining the status quo in a modification proceeding under RCW 26.09.260(1), which is the relevant statute in the instant case. 6 This court has concluded in many unpublished opinions that RCW 26.09.187 factors do not apply to a trial court’s decision to modify an existing parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260. See, e.g., Darnell, No. 84216-1-I, slip op. at 9 (“[I]n modification proceedings, the court does not ‘start from scratch’ and reconsider the factors in RCW 26.09.187. Instead, the court must follow the procedures and factors set out in RCW 26.09.260.”); In re Marriage of Turner, No. 84402-4-I, slip op. at 10, 13-14 (Wash. Ct. App. July 18 87632-5-I/19 Kalanit relies on the Court of Appeals’ opinion in In re Marriage of Murphy, 48 Wn. App. 196, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987), for the proposition that a trial court must look to RCW 26.09.187(3) factors in determining whether a proposed modification is in the best interests of the child when a joint custody arrangement is no longer workable. In Murphy, the court considered the trial court’s modification of an established parenting plan under which the parties had joint custody with the physical residence of the child alternating every week between them. Id. at 197. After the joint custody arrangement was established, the mother remarried and moved to Oregon with the child. Id. The mother subsequently moved for modification and was granted sole custody of the child. Id. The father appealed, arguing that the trial court used the wrong statutory standard in modifying the parenting plan by considering factors for an initial custody award under former RCW 26.09.190 (1973). Id. at 197-200; see LAWS OF 1987, ch. 460, § 61 (repealing RCW 26.09.190); compare LAWS OF 1973, ch. 157, § 19 (factors under RCW 26.09.190) with LAWS OF 1987, ch. 460, § 9 (factors under RCW 26.09.187(3)). The Murphy court, noting that the mother’s attorney withdrew and the mother had not filed a response brief, held that the father did not show that the trial court abused its discretion by using RCW 26.09.190 factors to guide its analysis of whether a change 17, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/844024.pdf (holding that RCW 26.09.187 factors for “when a court is fashioning an initial parenting plan” are distinct from the process under RCW 26.09.260 “for when a court is considering a petition for modification” and collecting additional unpublished opinions); In re Parenting & Supp. of B.E.C., No. 60498-1-II, slip op. at 14 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2060498-1-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf (“This case involves the initial permanent placement decision governed by RCW 26.09.187(3). It does not involve a modification of custody placement, which would be governed by RCW 26.09.260.”). We cite these unpublished opinions, consistent with GR 14.1(c), as necessary for a reasoned decision. 19 87632-5-I/20 from joint custody to sole custody was in the child’s best inte