Willie James Clements, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 2032-24-4 WILLIE JAMES CLEMENTS, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges O’Brien, Chaney and Callins Argued at Alexandria, Virginia Opinion Issued August 11, 2026 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge Kelsey Bulger, Deputy Appellate Counsel (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant. Nassir Aboreden, Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney (Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, Commonwealth’s Attorney; Abhimanyu Mehta, Deputy Commonwealth’s Attorney, on brief), for appellee. Amici Curiae: Electronic Frontier Foundation, American Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia (Matthew William Callahan; Andrew Gellis Crocker, on brief), for appellant. PUBLISHED OPINION BY JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS Perhaps it reduces to a matter about a smartphone. But in an era where the average American walks around with the “privacies of life” in their pocket, Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)), this case raises significant questions about the balance between public safety and the constitutional right to privacy, including the extent to which law enforcement may leverage the former against the latter. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” Id. “[T]he government’s unrestrained power to assemble data” from nothing more than the keystrokes a citizen makes on their smartphone charts new territory in the possibilities of law enforcement investigations. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). That these questions loom over the jurisprudential horizon is not, however, determinative of the controversy presented here. Willie James Clements, Jr., appeals his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident and aggravated malicious wounding. Arlington police officers obtained a reverse-keyword search warrant to compel Google to identify Clements’s Google account and, ultimately, Clements himself. Clements argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence from a keyword-search warrant and in failing to grant his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to causation. Moreover, Clements contends that, as an initial matter, the trial judge should have recused himself from the suppression hearing. We hold that the trial judge had no obligation to recuse himself after having signed the search warrant, that the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception allows admission of evidence from the search, and that the causation finding was not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND1 Around 2:20 a.m. on May 15, 2022, video footage outside an Arlington bar showed M.K. holding her phone and “stumbling” about after ordering a rideshare to take her home. M.K. later testified that it had “been a long day” and that she “had a couple drinks.” A vehicle matching the description of her rideshare arrived, but a dark SUV with no front tag pulled up behind it. 1 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court—here, the Commonwealth. Fary v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 331, 341 (2023) (en banc); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 53, 56 (2015). Further, we unseal facts found in the sealed record only to the extent we must discuss them. Brown v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Sixth Dist. Comm., 302 Va. 234, 240 n.2 (2023). And we refer to the survivor by initials to protect her privacy. Poole v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 357, 360 n.1 (2021). -2- Instead of getting into the rideshare,2 M.K. tried opening the rear door of the dark SUV and eventually got into the front passenger seat. As the SUV was driving around fifty miles per hour, an eyewitness traveling near the car saw “something [get] thrown out of the car.” When they slowed near the object, they realized it was a woman, and surveillance footage from the street confirmed a person had fallen from the moving car. The SUV never returned to the scene. When the police began searching for the SUV driver, they obtained M.K.’s cell phone location data, because they suspected her missing cell phone remained in the car after the suspect pushed her out. Historical cell-site location data led to a neighborhood in Maryland, where police found a “Black Chevrolet Traverse, [with] no front tag,” matching the description of the suspect’s vehicle. Police identified Clements as the suspect after finding the vehicle registered in his name. M.K. had been pushed out of the SUV only half a mile from her home, and M.K.’s cellphone data “indicate[d] that the phone traveled . . . past [her] residence” before crossing the intersection where the incident occurred. With no evidence indicating the suspect knew M.K. and based on her appearing “extremely intoxicated” in the bar surveillance footage, police reasoned that in order to drive past M.K.’s home, the suspect would have searched her address in a “navigation system” to get directions to her home. On this premise, the police secured a keyword-search warrant3 for any Google account that searched M.K.’s address in Google the night of the incident. Specifically, the warrant authorized the collection of any accounts that on 2 According to the rideshare records, M.K.’s ride was canceled, and no pickup occurred. 3 “Reverse-keyword warrants operate differently than traditional warrants. With traditional warrants, investigators first identify a suspect or suspects, then obtain a warrant to search them or their property for evidence.” People v. Seymour, 536 P.3d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 2023). “However, reverse-keyword warrants start with a potentially incriminating piece of evidence—a search term like the address where the alleged [crime] occurred—then request a list of users implicated by that evidence.” Id. -3- May 15, 2022, from 2:15 a.m. to 3:15 a.m., searched M.K.’s address, or “any reasonable derivatives.” The warrant resulted in only one Google account that searched for her address at 2:22 a.m. on that date. After securing a second search warrant for the account’s information and the phone number associated with it, the police confirmed that the account was associated with Clements.4 In addition to M.K.’s address, Clements’s search history also included, “Arlington VA News, Police, Woman Jumps out of Vehicle,” and “Any suspect in Arlington VA News, Police, Woman Jumps out of Vehicle.” A grand jury indicted Clements for leaving the scene of an accident and aggravated malicious wounding. Prior to trial, Clements moved to suppress the evidence discovered through the keyword-search warrant, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy over what he searched. Clements also moved to recuse the trial judge from the case because he was the same judge who granted and signed the keyword-search warrant. In his motion, Clements compared the trial judge presiding over both proceedings to a “motion to reconsider,” noting that, unlike such a motion “where the court listens to an issue again with additional information,” his “motion to suppress brings into question the original ruling” and asks the court to “come to a different conclusion than [it] did previously.” The judge denied Clements’s motions, declining to recuse himself and finding probable cause supported the keyword-search warrant. Clements moved to strike at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and again at the close of all evidence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove causation, but the court denied both motions. The jury convicted Clements of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury to a person and aggravated malicious wounding. The trial court denied Clements’s motion to set aside the jury verdict. This appeal followed. 4 Because it was associated with his account as a “recovery email,” Clements’s sister’s email address was also identified in the search. However, the record does not indicate that the sister’s email account itself was searched. -4-  ANALYSIS Clements argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions. He contends that (1) the trial judge should have recused himself, (2) the trial court should have suppressed the evidence discovered from the keyword-search warrant, and (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to strike for causation. We disagree in toto for the reasons that follow. I. Recusal Clements argues that the trial judge should have recused himself from adjudicating the suppression motion since the trial judge issued the search warrant that yielded the evidence Clements sought to suppress. On this question of first impression, Clements is mistaken. We review the trial court’s recusal decisions for an abuse of discretion. Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 163 (2012). The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to consider proper factors, giving significant weight to improper factors, or committing a clear error of judgment. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 213 (2013). Put differently, we will reverse the trial court’s recusal decision only if no reasonable jurist could agree with the trial judge’s ruling. Commonwealth v. Holland, 304 Va. 34, 47 (2025). Clements bears the burden to prove the trial judge’s bias or prejudice and that it required recusal. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 267 Va. 226, 229 (2004). Due process requires recusal if the trial judge has “‘a direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest’ in the outcome of a case.” Welsh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 300, 314 (1992) (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)). Barring those palpably improper interests, we measure whether the trial judge should recuse by “whether he or she harbors ‘such bias or prejudice as would deny the defendant a fair trial.’” Id. at 315 (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 673 (1981)). In doing so, we are mindful that a judge should ordinarily recuse when a litigant may question the judge’s impartiality. See generally Va. Sup. Ct. R. pt. 6, § III, Canon 1. -5- But the Canons of Judicial Conduct do not control whether recusal is required. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28 (2006). “A purported violation of the Canons alone is not enough to mandate [recusal].” Jackson, 267 Va. at 229. Our Supreme Court has consistently held that a trial judge’s familiarity with a party and their legal issues through prior hearings “does not automatically” raise a question of bias. Deahl v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 224 Va. 664, 672-73 (1983) (quoting Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967)). Nor does a judge possessing—and even expressing—an opinion on the merits of a case, alone, render the judge biased or prejudiced. See Justus, 222 Va. at 673 (“We do not feel that a per se rule requiring a judge to recuse himself on retrial of a capital murder case is necessary to assure a fair trial.”); see also Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 376 (1946) (holding that “neither the forming nor the expression” of a factual conclusion disqualifies a judge in a subsequent proceeding); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1097 (1979) (“[A] judge is not disqualified to sit in a criminal case when, in the disposition of a matter arising out of the same facts, he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused.”). Moreover, a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not a basis for recusal. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 714 (1985).5 As our Supreme Court noted some time ago, if an adverse ruling “were the criterion of prejudice, no rulings could ever be made which a party opposes.” Id. Clements’s bald assertion that a trial judge cannot impartially review their own decisions is untethered from Virginia law. Virginia trial judges are regularly compelled to review their own decisions. Renewed motions to strike, motions to set aside a verdict, and motions for reconsideration—all part of regular pleading practice—each ask the same judge who originally 5 Superseded by statute on other grounds, 2021 Va. Acts Sp. Sess. I chs. 523, 540 (codified at Code § 19.2-271.6), as recognized in Shaw v. Commonwealth, 304 Va. 217 (2025). -6- ruled in the same proceeding to re-evaluate their decision based on new arguments or evidence. See, e.g., Williams v. Panter, 83 Va. App. 520, 548 (2025) (“A motion to reconsider ordinarily asks a court to reconsider a holding because, in the opinion of the movant, the holding was erroneous.” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores E., LP v. State Corp. Comm’n, 299 Va. 57, 76 (2020))). And at trial, judges review evidentiary objections taken under advisement or reasserted after being preliminarily overruled based on the development of evidence over the course of the case, notwithstanding a lawyer making substantially the same legal argument as at first blush. Here, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clements’s motion to recuse. The search warrant, issued by the judge in a prior proceeding, reflected only the information contained within the warrant application and affidavit, and did not imbue the judge with extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts. Nor does the record show actual bias against Clements or in favor of the Commonwealth or otherwise establish an objectively reasonable basis to question the trial judge’s impartiality. And a judge harbors no inherent bias by hearing a motion to suppress evidence seized under a warrant authorized by the same judge in a separate proceeding. We agree with the trial judge that it was “wholly proper” for him to preside over the subsequent suppression hearing. Confronted with information challenging the validity of his ruling in the ancillary warrant proceeding, the judge—like any judge so confronted—reevaluated the prior ruling. Such reevaluation of a probable cause determination occurred no differently than had the argument been presented before a different judge. And contrary to Clements’s framing, on a motion to suppress, the same or a different judge does not merely “look at the exact same facts, circumstances, and law, but come to a different conclusion.” Instead, the judge is presented with additional facts and circumstances (and, perhaps, law) to consider: those presented by the movant. That the additional information is considered by the same judge, alone, -7- is insufficient to demonstrate partiality. The trial judge appropriately distinguished search warrant hearings from suppression hearings, noting that the former are “determined ex parte,” whereas the latter feature an adversarial proceeding in which a judge may be “persuaded either way.” In so doing, the judge demonstrated his impartiality and lack of bias, and that he understood the appropriate standard governing the suppression hearing.6 Even if the trial judge’s suppression ruling was tainted by an appearance of bias, such appearance of bias must have “affected the outcome of the case” to justify reversal. Welsh, 14 Va. App. at 317. Clements fails to convince us that the alleged appearance of bias affected the outcome of his case, and thus we find his argument unavailing. II. Keyword-Search Warrant Next, Clements challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the keyword-search evidence. He argues that the keyword-search warrant constituted a general warrant barred under the United States and Virginia constitutions. And he avers that the warrant lacked particularity and was unsupported by probable cause. We disagree that the evidence should have been suppressed, holding that the good-faith exception applies to preclude exclusion. We review de novo the trial court’s denial of Clements’s motion to suppress. McArthur v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 352, 359 (2020). But in doing so, we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Id. 6 Clements argues that the trial judge’s characterization of his role at the suppression hearing as a “reconsideration” demonstrated his bias. Yet, as noted above, Clements introduced the comparison. Further, by affirming the trial court, we are not endorsing this characterization, but merely rejecting Clements’s contention that a trial judge cannot engage in any degree of reconsideration of a suppression ruling without compromising their ethical duty of impartiality. -8-  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution7 bars “unreasonable searches and seizures.” This prohibition includes proscribing general warrants. Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436, 463 (2023). General warrants are those warrants authorizing searches of “suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence.” Morton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 946, 952 (1993) (Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting Va. Const. art. I, § 10). Ordinarily, the exclusionary rule bars introduction of evidence seized in violation of the prohibition against general warrants. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). But since the exclusionary rule is meant to deter police misconduct, Adams v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 737, 746 (2006), we determine whether suppression is required on a case-by-case basis, Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 323, 330 (2009). See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 646, 653 (1996) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984))). Among the Fourth Amendment’s many exceptions, the good-faith exception prevents evidentiary suppression in certain circumstances. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-22. The exclusionary 7 Our Court has previously opined that “protections afforded under the Virginia Constitution are co-extensive with those in the United States Constitution.” Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 729, 739-40 (1996). But our Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that we are “absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection” than analogous provisions of the United States Constitution. Vlaming v. W. Point Sch. Bd., 302 Va. 504, 528 (2023) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)). Clements appears to capitalize on this acknowledgment, urging us to follow the lead of Colorado on the issue, whose Supreme Court concluded that its constitutional search and seizure provisions extended more protections than the federal ones. Seymour, 536 P.3d at 1272. Because we decide the question presented today on good-faith grounds, we do not opine on whether our search and seizure provisions are similarly more expansive than the federal ones. -9- rule’s deterrent effect loses its benefits when law enforcement officers act in objective good faith by conducting a search within the scope of a warrant obtained from a magistrate. Polston v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 500, 503 (1998). In those circumstances, we will not suppress evidence except: (1) Where the magistrate was misled by information in the affidavit which the affiant knew was false or should have known was false, (2) the issuing magistrate totally abandoned his judicial role, (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable or (4) where the warrant was so facially deficient that an executing officer could not reasonably have assumed it was valid. Colaw v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 806, 811 (2000) (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 462, 464 (1990)). Clements argues the latter two circumstances apply here to override the good-faith exception to suppression. For the former, a supporting affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” when it fails to assert “some nexus between the evidence sought and the place to be searched.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 605, 619 (2007). The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement demands more than a “bare bones” affidavit supported by conclusory allegations. Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 813. But if there is “some indicia of probable cause in the underlying affidavit, we will apply the good[-]faith exception.” Anzualda v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 764, 781 (2005). For the facial-deficiency argument, the good-faith exception offers no refuge for warrants that fail to “particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Here, the warrant’s supporting affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” such that suppression was necessary. Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 811 (quoting Atkins, 9 Va. App. at 464). As laid out in their 22-page affidavit, the investigating officers knew that M.K. did not know the suspect, and so the suspect would not have known her address. Since M.K. was - 10 - “extremely intoxicated,” police knew she likely would not have been able to provide the suspect with directions. As a result, the police could reasonably conclude that the suspect would have had to search M.K.’s address to have driven past her home. And absent evidence that M.K. used her own cellphone to provide navigation, the magistrate could reasonably infer that the suspect used a search application on their phone to navigate to M.K.’s home. See Gwinn v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 972, 975 (1993) (“A magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where incriminating evidence is likely to be found.”). Based on all these facts, the law enforcement officers could support a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime w[ould] be found” in the results from Google. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006). The fact that the officers could not have known whether Clements possessed a phone at all is of no moment since probable cause “does not demand any showing that” the probability of finding evidence of a crime would “be correct or more likely true than false.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 622 (2018) (quoting Evans v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 277, 287 (2015)). This probability only capitalized when the initial search of Google’s records returned only a single account. Neither was the warrant itself so “facially deficient” that an officer should have known it was not valid. The record reflects the officers’ reasonable efforts to legally obtain information regarding the suspect’s search history. Their detailed affidavit made plain the likelihood that they would discover evidence relating to their criminal investigation through this search. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (defining probable cause as the quantum of proof necessary to justify a person’s belief that “contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”). In the absence of controlling guidance on the validity of reverse-keyword searches and rather than shooting in the dark, the officers adapted the three-step warrant procedure discussed - 11 - by some Virginia circuit courts for geofencing8 warrants.9 Indeed, the officers had no controlling authority addressing the validity of these reverse keyword-search warrants or the procedures to be followed when executing them. This particular reverse-keyword search warrant is distinguishable from the geofencing warrant considered in Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___ (2026). There, law enforcement officers obtained a single warrant for data from Google, attempting to cut the judicial system out of the investigatory process thereafter. Id. at ___ (Jackson, J., concurring). They were allowed to access information beyond the scope of the geofence, and they were subject to no duty to narrow their search upon receiving anonymized data from Google. Id. at ___. That same lack of judicial oversight does not exist here. The law enforcement officers in this case narrowly tailored their search to the specific facts of the case and identified precise and limited information. And, importantly, they sought the court’s authorization at each step by obtaining a new warrant in light of the information received from Google in the first instance. This multi-step approach dispels the concerns expressed in Chatrie about supplying a Sovereign with unfettered “access [to] all of a cell-phone user’s movements” such that she would wield a “virtual panopticon with which to scrutinize [] citizens’ activities.” Id. at ___. 8 “Geo-fencing is a process whereby, based on [GPS or] radio frequency identification, the location of an electronic device may be determined.” In re Geo-Fence and Cell Site Location Information Search Warrants, Record No. CM22000505-01, slip op. at 1 n.1 (Arlington Cir. Ct. July 28, 2022) (Fiore, J.) 9 See, e.g., In re Search of Information Stored at the Premises Controlled by Google, Record No. KM-2022-79, slip op. at 10-12 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2022) (Oblon, J.) (analyzing a three-step process for geofencing warrants but requiring police seek the approval of the circuit court before reviewing data received and unmasking particular cell phone numbers); In re Geo-Fence and Cell Site Location Information Search Warrants, slip op. at 6-10 (analyzing the same three-step process for geofencing warrants but deeming the proposed warrant overbroad). - 12 -  We recognize the gravity of this constitutional question, but we must emphasize that we express no view today on the constitutional validity of reverse-keyword search warrants.10 That question may ultimately warrant resolution in an appropriate case. Although the concurrence offers a thoughtful discussion of the issue, there is no dispute that the good-faith exception resolves this appeal without requiring us to reach the underlying constitutional question. Addressing the constitutional question under these circumstances would abandon our obligation to exercise judicial restraint by deciding cases “on the best and narrowest grounds” and thus avoiding the “unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue.” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (first quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4 (2010); and then quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203 (2002)); see also Siler v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons.”). This conclusion applies a fortiori to constitutional questions since “[n]o questions can be brought before a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve” constitutionality. See McKeithen v. City of Richmond, 302 Va. 422, 435 n.2 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833)). So, although jurists are entitled to voice any concern in a separate writing, principles of 10 We also recognize that the warrants in this case are supported by significantly more indicia of probable cause and are more narrowly tailored in scope than those in Chatrie. And as the U.S. Supreme Court has now clarified that law enforcement’s attempts to obtain detailed digital information from third-parties may constitute searches, we need not provide further guidance to law enforcement officers and magistrates on this point. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925. - 13 - judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance still operate to limit our discussions to the issues actually before the Court.11 III. Sufficiency Clements concludes his appeal by arguing that the evidence failed to prove that he caused M.K.’s injury. Again, we disagree. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463 (2017). The touchstone of our inquiry is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). Here, the jury’s finding that Clements caused M.K.’s injury is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Under Code § 18.2-51.2(A), the Commonwealth must prove that Clements “cause[d] bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill” M.K. by “shoot[ing], stab[bing], cut[ting] or wound[ing]” her. The jury heard testimony and viewed video evidence showing the driver of the vehicle pushing M.K. from the car, from which she fell headfirst onto the concrete. M.K. had injuries to the back of her head and scuffs on the sides of her shoes, consistent with Clements pushing her from the moving car. Taken together with evidence that Clements searched for M.K.’s address just prior to the incident, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Clements pushed M.K. out of the car, causing her injuries. 11 Because the constitutional question is unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal, we decline to substantively comment on or endorse the concurrence. Cf. Vlaming, 302 Va. at 584 n.44 (“[A] [concurring] opinion is generally not the best source of legal advice on how to comply with the majority opinion.” (quoting Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 230 (2023))). - 14 -  CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. - 15 - Chaney, J., concurring in judgment only. I concur in the judgment affirming Clements’s convictions and respectfully write separately. First, I write separately to clarify why the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clements’s motion to recuse. Although the majority expressly declines to endorse Clements’s characterization of the suppression hearing as a “reconsideration,” it nevertheless describes the judge as having “reevaluated” his earlier probable cause ruling. Maj. Op. at 7, 8 n.6. I would not frame the recusal issue in those terms. Using the term “reevaluated” risks implying that the suppression hearing afforded the issuing judge an opportunity to defend or reaffirm his prior warrant ruling. Instead, I would affirm the circuit court’s denial of recusal on the narrower ground that the issuing judge’s prior involvement was limited to a judicial probable-cause determination. This limited determination did not give the judge personal or extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts or create an objectively reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality. Second, I write separately to address an issue of first impression in Virginia—whether a reverse-keyword warrant12 directing Google to search its user-query records for unknown persons who searched a specific address during a specific time window satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements. Since reverse-keyword warrants present a recurring constitutional question in the digital-search context, it is important to address the merits. I would conclude that the reverse-keyword warrant was constitutionally defective because the affidavit did not establish the nexus required to search Google’s records specifically, 12 A “reverse-keyword warrant” is also referred to as a “reverse-keyword search warrant,” “keyword search warrant,” or “reverse search warrant.” For consistency, this separate opinion uses “reverse-keyword” warrant throughout. - 16 - and the warrant authorized a reverse search of unknown users’ query data without particularized probable cause as to any identified person, account, device, or IP address. A Fourth Amendment violation, however, does not necessarily require suppression. On this record, the officers sought and obtained judicial authorization in 2022, before any controlling authority had addressed reverse-keyword warrants, and the affidavit—though constitutionally insufficient—was not so lacking in factual content that their reliance was objectively unreasonable. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment only. I. RECUSAL The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clements’s motion to recuse. Although the majority disclaims endorsing Clements’s characterization of the suppression hearing as a “reconsideration,” it continues to describe the judge as having “reevaluated” his prior ruling. Maj. Op. at 7. I would not rely on that framing or an analogy to a motion for reconsideration. The relevant question is not whether a judge may revisit a prior legal ruling in the abstract, but whether this judge’s prior involvement created actual bias, personal or extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts, or an objectively reasonable basis to question impartiality. On this record, it did not. The judge’s prior role in issuing the warrant did not, standing alone, give him personal or extrajudicial knowledge of the disputed facts. Rather, his prior involvement reflected judicial knowledge obtained from reviewing the warrant application and affidavit. The judge expressly grounded his ruling on the distinction between “personal knowledge” and “judicial knowledge.” R. 849. He explained that, unlike a judge who issues a wiretap order—who must recuse because the intercepted communication is filed with the court and may become a source of personal knowledge, see Code § 19.2-68—a judge who issues an ordinary search warrant “is only making a legal determination,” and is “not testing th[e] facts.” - 17 - R. 873-74. The record also reflects that the judge had multiple warrant applications before him and signed some while declining others, including a related geofence warrant he refused to sign. R. 848. A judge who grants one application and denies another exercises the judgment of a neutral magistrate; that role does not constitute grounds for recusal. I do not, however, rest on the broader suggestion that recusal can never be required simply because the General Assembly has mandated it for wiretap issuing judges but not for those who issue ordinary search warrants. Our Supreme Court has held that recusal may be warranted even in the absence of a statutory command. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 30 (2006). On the narrower point, on this record, the judge’s purely legal warrant determination did not provide the personal or extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts that recusal requires. Nor does this record show actual bias, favoritism toward the Commonwealth, or an objectively reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality. At the recusal hearing, the judge described the warrant’s search term as “extremely narrow in its focus.” R. 869. However, under established Virginia law, neither forming nor expressing an opinion on an issue in a prior proceeding disqualifies a judge from ruling on that matter later. See Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 376 (1946); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 1098 (1979). An initial remark made while explaining why recusal was unnecessary does not establish the bias or extrajudicial knowledge that would mandate recusal. Although the judge described the motion as asking the court “basically to reconsider its prior legal determination,” the record shows that he understood the distinction between the ex parte warrant proceeding and the later suppression hearing. R. 869. The judge’s reference to “reconsideration” is best understood as a response to Clements’s suggestion that a judge may never revisit a prior ruling, not as a description of the governing suppression standard. The judge - 18 - invoked the routine practice of reconsidering rulings to explain why he was not categorically disqualified from hearing the motion. He also recognized that the suppression hearing differed from the ex parte warrant proceeding because it allowed him to “be persuaded either way.” R. 851-52, 870-71. The judge further explained that the warrant proceeding had been ex parte, while the suppression hearing allowed the court to consider additional adversarial briefing and argument. R. 870-71. In ruling on the suppression motion, the court did not merely reaffirm its earlier probable-cause determination. It considered the parties’ arguments, applied the suppression standard and legal framework, and ruled against the Commonwealth in part by concluding that Clements had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Google search data. R. 497. Thus, I would not adopt any broad rule suggesting that suppression hearings are properly understood as reconsideration of earlier warrant decisions. Nor would I suggest that a judge’s prior issuance of a warrant is categorically irrelevant to a later recusal motion. The narrower point is sufficient. This judge’s limited prior judicial involvement did not create personal or extrajudicial knowledge of disputed facts or otherwise require recusal. I, therefore, concur in the judgment affirming the denial of Clements’s recusal motion. II. FOURTH AMENDMENT GOVERNING FRAMEWORK The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. “The ‘basic purpose of this Amendment,’ . . . ‘is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 52