Full Opinion

PRESENT: All the Justices CHEYENNE ROUNDTREE OPINION BY v. JUSTICE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III NOVEMBER 19, 2026 ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Record No. 250702 FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA After finding that Cheyenne Roundtree failed to substantially remedy the conditions that led to, and required the continuation of, her daughter’s placement in foster care, the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke terminated Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approved a foster care plan with the goal of adoption. On appeal, Roundtree contended that there was insufficient evidence for this finding and that the termination and foster care plan were not in the best interests of her daughter; the Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I. BACKGROUND 1 For the purposes of this review, we recite the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Roanoke City Department of Social Services (“RDSS”), the prevailing party below. See Patterson v. City of Danville, 301 Va. 181, 185 (2022). 1 “To the extent that we mention facts found only in the sealed record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding them relevant to our decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed record remains sealed.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 560 n.3 (2016). 1. Initial Proceedings Roundtree is the biological mother of M.U., 2 a nonverbal child born in December 2016 and diagnosed with autism. Both RDSS and Child Protective Services have been involved with Roundtree and M.U. for years. This included opening prevention cases in December 2019 and June 2020 after M.U. witnessed violent domestic disturbance incidents between Roundtree and her then-boyfriend. Those services were ongoing beginning in December 2019 until the incidents which culminated in these proceedings. The conflicts between Roundtree and her then-boyfriend, which led to RDSS’s involvement, continued to escalate and ultimately culminated on November 13, 2021, when police responded to another violent domestic disturbance and arrested both individuals. M.U. was, once again, present during the incident and subsequently taken by RDSS; two days later the Roanoke City Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (“JDR Court”) entered an Emergency Removal Order for M.U. that placed her in temporary custody with RDSS. M.U. was returned to Roundtree at an adjudicatory hearing on December 15, 2021, and additional services were put in place to help facilitate the return. M.U.’s return to Roundtree did not last long. After the JDR Court held the adjudicatory hearing, allegations arose that Roundtree had physically abused M.U. at a Walmart store on December 22, 2021. A report of the incident was submitted to RDSS on December 23; the JDR Court then held a preliminary removal hearing on January 5, 2022, finding that M.U. was subject to imminent threat based on “oral testimony about 2 incidents at Walmart since last hearing; Mother beating/hitting child in [a] restroom; customers complained.” Ultimately, full custody of 2 We use initials to protect the identity of the minor child. 2 M.U. was transferred to RDSS on February 22, 2022, and the JDR Court approved a foster care plan with the goal of returning M.U. home to Roundtree. The foster care plan contained certain conditions Roundtree needed to fulfill to facilitate M.U.’s return home. Among these conditions included demonstrating the capability to execute safe and effective parenting practices, maintaining contact with RDSS, regularly attending supervised visitations with M.U., attending individual counseling sessions to address mental health concerns, completing both a parenting class and a domestic violence program, completing a psychological and parental capacity evaluation, and securing safe and stable housing and employment. RDSS provided Roundtree with services for over one year, ultimately concluding that Roundtree had failed to appropriately fulfill the conditions set out in the foster care plan. Therefore, RDSS filed a Petition for Permanency Planning Hearing on April 25, 2023, requesting that the JDR Court approve a new foster care plan with the goal of adoption. Additionally, RDSS sought to terminate Roundtree’s parental rights under Code §§ 16.1-283(B), 16.1-283(C)(1), and 16.1-283(C)(2), or any combination thereof. On May 30, the JDR Court entered orders granting both requests, terminating Roundtree’s parental rights pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2) and approving the new foster care plan. 2. Circuit Court Trial Proceedings Roundtree appealed the termination of her parental rights and the approval of the new foster care plan to the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke; trial was held on May 24, 2024. Testimony was taken from multiple witnesses at trial; for the purposes of this appeal, we summarize the most relevant aspects of the testimony and trial proceedings below. 3 Medina Musa, a “team leader” at Walmart, testified about the incident at Walmart that the JDR Court judge had highlighted during the preliminary removal hearing. On December 22, 2021, Musa was working at the service desk when Roundtree approached her with M.U., asking for some help. Musa recalled that M.U. was being “very fussy.” After assisting Roundtree, Musa returned to work until other customers began shouting for the police because “somebody [was] hitting their child in the bathroom.” Musa entered the bathroom, saw two sets of feet on the floor in one of the closed stalls, and heard what she described as hitting noises, crying, and Roundtree repeatedly telling M.U. to calm down. However, Musa nevertheless clarified that she never actually saw Roundtree strike M.U. because the door to the stall was closed. Richard Campbell, a former foster care family services specialist with RDSS, testified about his experiences working with Roundtree and M.U. in 2022 and 2023. Campbell testified that Roundtree was “very involved,” “very active,” and would give M.U. “consistent attention” during supervised visitations. Campbell believed that M.U. had a “strong and durable bond with her mother.” However, Campbell also testified about incidents during supervised visitation that gave him pause. These incidents involved Roundtree’s insistence on engaging in parenting practices that, because of M.U.’s emotional volatility when overstimulated, would result in M.U. having outbursts. For example, M.U. had a fixation with food that caused her to eat excessively; Roundtree could not comprehend this and, despite Campbell urging her to limit the amount of food she routinely brought to each visitation, continued to bring excessive amounts of food. Because M.U. would eat “until she cannot physically eat anymore,” this was a concern, particularly because M.U. suffered from gastrointestinal issues. However, any efforts to remove uneaten food would inevitably trigger outbursts from M.U. that Roundtree seemed unable to address. Roundtree was also incapable of redirecting M.U.’s attention in light of this fixation on 4 food. For example, if a piece of food fell on the floor, Roundtree would discard it in the trash, only for M.U. to retrieve it. Roundtree insisted on trying (and failing) to teach M.U. not to eat it, instead of simply redirecting her attention by giving M.U. a new piece of food to fixate on. These attempts to prevent M.U. from eating the food were met with resistance, and ultimately further outbursts. Another “consistent form of stress” was Roundtree’s own fixation with “fixing” M.U.’s hair, which would overstimulate M.U. and “frequently provoke meltdowns, and screaming, and hitting, and yelling” by M.U. Roundtree took certain steps to address issues that Campbell raised during the visitations, but according to Campbell, Roundtree did not appear to fully comprehend the kind of parenting required for a nonverbal child with autism. Campbell commended Roundtree’s independent pursuit of assistive services but felt that Roundtree needed medication management for her own issues, which she refused. Dr. Klaire Mundy, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified as an expert witness about her evaluation of Roundtree’s psychological status, emotional stability, and parenting capacity. During the evaluation, Roundtree gave Dr. Mundy a detailed recounting of the circumstances in her life leading to this point, including traumatic relationships, bouts with homelessness, limited familial support, mental health issues, and inconsistent employment. Dr. Mundy testified that Roundtree suffered from anxiety that caused her to freeze up in difficult situations and engage in a pattern of blaming others for her circumstances. In Dr. Mundy’s expert opinion, Roundtree struggled with the ability to engage in emotional regulation or self-reflect on her problems. Dr. Mundy further testified that Roundtree had issues with problem-solving because of an inability to comprehend and internalize information. Specifically, Dr. Mundy described Roundtree’s difficulty as “cognitive stickiness,” which can result in a parent’s inability to keep their child safe at all times. She explained that Roundtree would benefit from medication management because 5 it would “help get the emotional system kind of under control while [Roundtree] can incorporate some of the tools” to appropriately parent M.U. Dr. Mundy ultimately concluded that Roundtree was incapable of appropriately parenting M.U. on her own and would “need some support to assist” with M.U. Whitney Caldwell, an RDSS employee, testified about her experiences working with Roundtree and M.U. Caldwell noted that while Roundtree had completed a domestic violence program, a parenting class, and psychological and parental capacity evaluations, Roundtree also missed several counseling appointments and had little to no contact with RDSS after her parental rights were terminated in the JDR Court on May 30, 2023. Caldwell was unaware of Roundtree’s living and working situation as of the trial, particularly because Roundtree had moved to New York to live with other members of her family shortly after her parental rights were terminated in the JDR Court. Caldwell reiterated many of the same issues raised by Campbell, namely that Roundtree was not receptive to advice about her parenting style, would get overwhelmed when parenting M.U., and needed to “[d]emonstrate an understanding of [M.U.’s] needs and an ability to have good judgment and make safe choices in regards to parenting [M.U.]” Caldwell testified that M.U. was currently thriving with a foster mother who had experience dealing with autistic children, and felt that after two years of foster care, adoption and termination of Roundtree’s parental rights were in M.U.’s best interests because Roundtree “has not demonstrated a compliance with services that need to be in place ongoing to show that she has the stability to care for her daughter.” Caldwell further noted that Roundtree does not have an “accurate or full understanding of [M.U.’s] diagnosis” because Roundtree, even after 18 months of services, believed that M.U. would eventually “fully” develop and no longer need services. To Caldwell, this demonstrated a lack of understanding about M.U.’s autism. Caldwell 6 ultimately concluded that adoption and termination of Roundtree’s parental rights were “the [safest] and the most appropriate option[s] for [M.U.] for her development and her overall well[-]being.” Sammi Rader, a CASA director at Children’s Trust who actively worked with Roundtree and M.U. between March and May 2023, testified about her own concerns with Roundtree’s inability to understand the nature of M.U.’s diagnosis and condition. Rader noted her concern because Roundtree said that she understood M.U. would need services until she “developed.” Rader ultimately recommended that M.U. stay in her current placement for adoption. After Rader’s testimony, Roundtree moved to strike RDSS’s petition to terminate her parental rights under Code §§ 16.1-283(B) and 16.1-283(C)(2); the circuit court denied the motion and Roundtree thereafter testified on her own behalf. Roundtree stated that after multiple incidents of domestic violence, she ended her relationship with her then-boyfriend; furthermore, she stated that she had not been with him since. Roundtree testified that she moved to New York in June 2023 to live with her family where she believed she benefitted from a stronger support system. Roundtree stated that she had been working as an administrative assistant for the New York State Education Department, that she had done regular telehealth counseling sessions, and that she had been looking at securing services for M.U. in New York. Roundtree stated that she had acquired a better understanding of the trauma M.U. suffered by being exposed to violent domestic abuse and that she did not believe that M.U.’s autism would “go away.” Roundtree also testified that she did not believe that she received helpful services from RDSS, particularly with regard to her parenting style, because her parenting coaches were not responsive to 7 Roundtree and what she asked for in terms of feedback. 3 Roundtree also reiterated that she would not take medication to manage her anxiety because of potential side effects, instead choosing to take multivitamins as stress relief. Regarding the Walmart incident, Roundtree testified that she and M.U. were in separate stalls while in the bathroom and stated that she never struck M.U., although she did concede that M.U. was overstimulated and crying. 4 At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court was not persuaded that RDSS had displayed that M.U. suffered abuse and neglect to the level necessary for termination of Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B). However, the circuit court also stated that considering M.U.’s age and condition, Roundtree was not adequately equipped to put M.U. in the best situation to succeed because she could not accurately assess and meet M.U.’s emotional and intellectual needs. Ultimately, the circuit court granted RDSS’s motion to terminate Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), and stated that an order would be drafted which summarized the findings and holdings. 3. Circuit Court Order On June 21, 2024, the circuit court entered the final order that ultimately terminated Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approved the new foster care plan, finding these to be in M.U.’s best interests. The circuit court stated that it was “not persuaded that [RDSS] adequately established that the neglect or abuse suffered by the child presented a 3 Although Roundtree testified that she did not receive helpful services from RDSS, she does not challenge the sufficiency of the services provided to her on appeal. See § 16.1-283(C)(2) (“notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health, or other rehabilitative agencies”) (emphasis added). 4 Roundtree acknowledged that M.U. was “stimulated as we arrived to Walmart” and that before the bathroom incident she “grabbed two associates to help me assist me because I knew my daughter was stimulated . . . I explained that my daughter is very upset and I can’t stay any longer.” 8 serious and substantial threat to her life, health and development, and therefore denies the termination of the parental rights of [Roundtree] pursuant to [Code §] 16.1-283(B).” However, the circuit court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Roundtree “was unwilling or unable to remedy substantially the conditions which led to and required the continuation of care for a period in excess of twelve months.” The circuit court also found that Roundtree “demonstrates no insight as to what to do to keep the child safe, is not adequately equipped to raise the child, and cannot meet the emotional and physical needs of the child.” Finally, the circuit court found that Roundtree’s testimony, where it conflicted with evidence presented by RDSS, was not credible. II. ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review When reviewing a circuit court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights, we presume that the circuit court thoroughly weighed all the evidence before it, properly considered all the statutory requirements, and made its decision based on the best interests of the child. See Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 200-01 (1977); Joyce v. Botetourt Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 699 (2022). Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court “will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Simms v. Alexandria Dep’t of Cmty. & Human Servs., 74 Va. App. 447, 470 (2022) (quoting Fauquier Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011)). As the factfinder, the circuit court “retains ‘broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 266 (2005) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328 (1990)). “A circuit court’s discretionary authority means it ‘has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range 9 and is not influenced by any mistake of law.’” Everett v. Tawes, 298 Va. 25, 40 (2019) (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352 (2011)). “In cases decided after an ore tenus hearing, we give the [trial] court’s findings the same ‘weight’ as a jury verdict.” Patterson, 301 Va. at 185. However, legal conclusions made by the circuit court are reviewed de novo. Schmuhl v. Clarke, 302 Va. 481, 495 (2023). 2. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) In assessing whether the circuit court properly terminated Roundtree’s parental rights and approved the new foster care plan, we begin with the text of the statute at issue: The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child placed in foster care as a result of court commitment . . . may be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that: . . . [t]he parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). When interpreting a statute, “we are bound by ‘[its] plain language . . . unless the terms are ambiguous or applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result.’” City of Charlottesville v. Payne, 299 Va. 515, 527 (2021) (quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227 (2006)). Looking at the plain language of the statute, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) ultimately requires a circuit court to make three distinct findings, by clear and convincing evidence, before terminating parental rights. See Joyce, 75 Va. App. at 701. First, the circuit court must find that the parent has failed to “remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement.” Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) (emphasis added). It is important to note that these are two separate 10 requirements. The statute’s use of the word “or” indicates that the conditions which led to a child’s placement in foster care may be different from those that require continuation of the child’s placement. Therefore, even if a parent substantially remedies the conditions which led to the placement, other existing or newly discovered conditions that require continuation of the placement could justify termination of parental rights if they are not remedied substantially. Additionally, these “conditions” which must be “remed[ied] substantially” are not singular, precipitating incidents that result in a child entering foster care. A “condition” in this context is something that underlies the entire nature of the parent-child relationship. See Condition, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 473 (1993) (“a circumstance that is essential to the appearance or occurrence of something else[;] prerequisite”). Second, the circuit court must find that the relevant “agencies” have made “reasonable and appropriate efforts” to help the parent remedy those conditions. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). And third, the circuit court must find that termination is in the child’s best interest, a task for which it has broad discretion. See Powell v. Knoepfler-Powell, 303 Va. 236, 249 (2024) (“[A] court retains ‘broad discretion in determining what promotes the [child’s] best interests’”) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 30 Va. App. 532, 538 (1999)). 3. Termination and Adoption Roundtree argues that the circuit court was plainly wrong in concluding that she “was unwilling or unable to remedy substantially the conditions which led to and required the continuation of care for a period in excess of twelve months.” She contends that there were two “conditions” which led to M.U. entering foster care: (1) the violent domestic disturbances between Roundtree and her then-boyfriend, and (2) the allegations of abuse at Walmart. According to Roundtree, both “conditions” were substantially remedied; she is no longer 11 together with her then-boyfriend, and the circuit court was not persuaded that the allegations of abuse at Walmart necessitated termination of Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B). Roundtree’s argument is unpersuasive. First, we note that dismissal of a petition to terminate parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) does not “wipe the slate clean” for a petition to terminate parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Second, we observe that Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires a parent to remedy the conditions that led to or required continuation of the child’s placement in foster care. Assuming that Roundtree is correct and that the violent domestic disturbances and allegations of abuse were the conditions that led to M.U.’s placement in foster care, and assuming further that these were substantially remedied, Roundtree still did not show how she remedied the underlying conditions that required M.U.’s continuation in foster care, which lasted for well over one year. Third, and most importantly, the record supports the circuit court’s finding that Roundtree “was unwilling or unable to remedy substantially the conditions which led to and required the continuation of care for a period in excess of twelve months.” 5 As the Court of Appeals has noted, “subsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 271. There is no question that the violent domestic disturbances and allegations of abuse at Walmart were precipitating incidents which resulted in M.U.’s removal from Roundtree and placement in foster care. However, the 5 We recognize that “[a]bsent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not required to give findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500 n.8 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)). Here, the record is more than sufficient to support the circuit court’s findings. 12 record also demonstrates that these were not the underlying conditions at issue; and it shows, furthermore, that Roundtree failed to make necessary, reasonable changes to address the problems that arose throughout her dealings with RDSS. M.U.’s autism, combined with her inability to verbally communicate and her emotional volatility when overstimulated, routinely led to outbursts and necessitated an increased level of attention and care, both in preventing outbursts and responding to them. Therefore, M.U.’s diagnosis, plus Roundtree’s inability to learn and apply the tools necessary to respond to M.U.’s diagnosis, are the conditions that truly underlie the precipitating incidents at issue and ultimately led to M.U.’s placement in foster care. These manifested throughout the period of time associated with RDSS’s involvement, whether it be the incident at Walmart or observations of Roundtree’s behavior during supervised visitation. Despite Roundtree’s deep affection for M.U., and M.U.’s attachment to Roundtree, the circuit court found that “Roundtree demonstrates no insight as to what to do to keep the child safe, is not adequately equipped to raise the child, and cannot meet the emotional and physical needs of the child.” The evidence of Roundtree’s own underlying issues plainly supports this finding. As highlighted in Dr. Mundy’s testimony, Roundtree’s anxiety and pattern of blaming others prevented her from learning and applying important parenting techniques and tools. Additionally, Roundtree’s refusal to engage in medication management, which could help with emotional regulation, further justifies the finding that she was “unwilling or unable” to substantially remedy the underlying conditions at issue. 13 Testimony from both Caldwell and Rader also demonstrated that Roundtree believed M.U. might outgrow her autism. 6 Again, M.U.’s autism, combined with her emotional volatility when overstimulated, was a primary force that led to, and required continuation of, M.U.’s placement in foster care. Roundtree’s inability to fully understand and appreciate M.U.’s diagnosis only exacerbated M.U.’s outbursts and emotional volatility, requiring her to remain in foster care. And the record shows that Roundtree never made reasonable changes to her own behavior as suggested by RDSS staff. Whether it was her inability to appropriately calm M.U. down at Walmart, inability to redirect M.U.’s attention with food, or inability to keep from overstimulating M.U. by “fixing” her hair, Roundtree never gained the tools necessary to properly parent a child with M.U.’s diagnosis. The record also demonstrates that M.U. was thriving in foster care and showed significant progress after being provided with additional services. M.U. was placed with a foster mother who worked with other autistic children, and M.U. was beginning to experience stability in her life. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that it was in M.U.’s best interests to both terminate Roundtree’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and ultimately approve the new foster care plan with the goal of adoption. III. CONCLUSION This case presents an unfortunate situation where a mother who has affection for her child was ill-equipped to parent that child and was unable to develop the tools to do so. However, the circuit court properly applied the law to the facts of this case and reached a 6 Although Roundtree testified that she does not believe M.U.’s “condition would just go away as she got older,” the circuit court credited the testimony of RDSS’s witnesses and found that “Roundtree’s testimony, where it conflicts with [RDSS], is not credible.” “We give deference to the fact finder who, having seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their credibility and weighs their testimony.” Elliott v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 462 (2009). 14 conclusion rightly within the broad discretion granted to it. Finding no error in the judgment of the circuit court, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. 15