North Branch Fire District v. Ferrazza
CourtVermont Superior Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket26-cv-520
StatusUnknown
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Full Opinion
Vermont Superior Cou
Filed
Windham
STATE OF VERMONT
CIVIL DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT Docket No. 26-CV-520
WINDHAM UNIT
NORTH BRANCH FIRE DISTRICT #1,
Plaintiff
vs.
THOMAS FERRAZZA,
Defendant and Third Party Plainti
ff
vs.
L. ,
STEVEN MONTELLO, JONATHAN PRIAL
and KENNETH WESTBY,
Third Party Defendants Strike
Decision: Defendant's Motion to
of
t #1 (hereinafter "North Branch") asserts two causes
Plaintiff North Branch Fire Distric Defendant Thomas
ma licio us pro secu tion and abuse of process, in this suit against
Mr.
action,
ks on for exp ens es incurred in two prior lawsuits
Ferrazza. North Bra nch see com pen sati Motion to
in defending this suit, has filed special
a
Ferrazza brought against it. Mr. Fer razz a,
of 12 V.S.A. § 1041, Vermont's ant
i-SLAPP (Strategic
as a viol atio n
Stri ke the complai nt on the Motion to Strike
Pub lic atio n) stat ute. Oral argument was heard
Lawsuit Against Particip
Valente and Defendant was
202 6. Pla inti ff was rep rese nted by Attorney James A.
on July 20, that the Motion to Strike
rne y Lan ce C. Sha der , who confirmed at the hearing
represented by Atto cludes as follows.
to both cau ses of action asserted. The court now con
applies
this case
a y of alle gati ons in North Branchs Complaint in
The following facts are sum mar
Vermont. It is
ity in West Dover,
North Branch Fire District #1 is municipal ent
a
in
g a was tew ater treatment system serving properties
and mainta inin
responsible for operating mittee elected by property own
ers within its
a Pru den tial Com
West Dover. It is managed by
district.
1 and is a
t of Wes t Dov er, has had a home in the District since 200
Mr. Ferrazza, a resi den
ractions with
t and for its mu nici pal services. He had contentious inte
member of the Dis tric pay s
ded to be connected to
in 200 1-2 005 con cern ing a property he developed that nee
the Commit tee but was elected in
was tew ater em. He ran twice for a seat on the Committee and lost, In
the syst
for 9 udi ng bein g its Chair from 2019 to 2021.
2012 and was on the Com mit tee yea rs, incl
the Committee. In
his bid for reel ecti on. Sinc e then he has made claims against
2021 he lost in Ferrazza v.
the Com mit tee and lost . He sued to challenge the election
2023 he ran for a seat on The suit was dismissed by the tria
l
tric t 23- CV- 243 8. (Fe rra zza I).
North Branch Fire Dis #1,
court.
1
Mr. Ferrazza filed a second suit in 2024 alleging illegal and improper acts on the part of
the Committee and seeking declaratory judgment and other remedies, including the appointment
of a receiver. Ferrazza v. North Branch Fire District #1, 24-CV-2110. (Ferrazza IJ). The trial
court dismissed the case based on a ruling that he lacked standing to bring such an action
because he had not shown harm to himself personally. A three justice panel of the Vermont
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. North Branch Fire District #,1, 25-AP-008 (Entry Order),
July 11, 2025.
In this lawsuit, North Branch seeks recovery for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process. It claims that as a result of these two cases, it incurred monetary damages, including
but
not limited to attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike
Vermont's anti-SLAPP statute is intended to provide protection against "lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom
to petition government for the redress of grievances." 2005, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.), § 1(1).
The statute broadly protects:
(1) any written or oral statement made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(2) any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement concerning an issue of public interest made in a
public forum or a place open to the public; or
(4) any other statement or conduct concerning a public issue or an issue of public
interest which furthers the exercise of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech or the constitutional right to petition the government for redress
of
grievances.
12 V.S.A. § 1041(i).
The statute authorizes a defendant who has been sued due to, or in anticipation of, the
exercise of those rights (freedom of speech and freedom to petition government for the redress of
grievances) "in connection with a public issue," to file a special motion to strike the lawsuit
at
the outset of the case. 12 V.S.A. § 1041(a).
If a motion to strike is filed and the defendant shows that one of the forms of protected
statement is at issue, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that:
(A) the defendant's exercise of his or her right to freedom of speech and to
petition was devoid of any reasonable factua] support and any arguable basis in
law; and
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(B) the defendant's acts caused actual injury to the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff cannot make such a showing, the court grants the motion
12 V.S.A. § 1041(e)(1).
and the defendant is entitled to attorney fees and costs. /d. § 1041(f)(1). If the motion was
frivolous, the plaintiff is entitled to fees and costs. /d.
Whether the statute applies to protect the subject matter of Mr. Ferrazza's lawsuits
The initial issue for analysis is whether the allegations in Mr. Ferrazza's lawsuits qualify
as "concerning an issue of public interest" (§ 1041(i)(3)).! See Felis v. Downs Rachlin Martin
PLLC, 2015 VT 129, 4 35, 200 Vt. 465 (holding that "the statute requires all actions to be 'in
connection with a public issue").
Following are the descriptions by North Branch of Mr. Ferrazza's allegations against it in
each lawsuit.
Ferrazza I, 23-CV-2438
North Branch describes this as a lawsuit filed by Mr. Ferrazza to challenge the results of
the Prudential Committee election in June 2023, which Mr. Ferrazza lost. (Complaint, § 40.)
North Branch alleges that Mr. Ferrazza claimed that the election results should be thrown out
because "the 'staggering' of terms for members of the Prudential Committee, which was
modified due to COVID-19 related vacancies when Defendant had been Chair, was illegal." Jd.
at 4 42. North Branch alleges that there were no legal grounds for an overturn of the election and
that Mr. Ferrazza knew this, and that his only purpose was to damage North Branch. The suit was
dismissed. North Branch claims that the suit was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted."
Ferrazza IT, 24-CV-220
North Branch describes this second suit as one in which Mr. Ferrazza alleges that it had
acted illegally and improperly with a purpose to damage Plaintiff. (Complaint, § 47-48.) Mr.
Ferrazza claimed in the suit that the North Branch Prudential Committee
e Had improperly moved funds loaned by the State into its general account in
violation of state statute
e Had improperly billed property owners other than himself
'
The allegations in the two lawsuits were made in pleadings filed in court and therefore qualify as the type of
statement subject to protection as they were made in a judicial proceeding (12 V.S.A. § 1041(i)(1). As to the element
of "whether the defendant's acts caused actual injury to the plaintiff' (12 V.S.A. § 1041(e)(1)), Mr. Ferrazza
acknowledges that his lawsuits caused North Branch to spend money on attorney fees and litigation expenses and
does not contest this element.
2
Mr. Ferrazza claimed in his Complaint in Ferrazza I/ that it was dismissed because it became moot because of
compliance by North Branch. (Complaint, Exhibit A, page 4, footnote 1.) This court has reviewed the ruling
dismissing the case. It was dismissed because administrative remedies had not been exhausted and therefore the
court lacked jurisdiction. It was dismissed without prejudice. Ferrazza /, 24-CV-2438, Decision on Motion,
December 2, 2024.
3
Had improperly staggered the terms of its members
Had held abatement board meetings without its Clerk "in violation of the law"
Had failed to provide sufficient detail in abatement decisions
Had improperly appointed an interim treasurer in violation of state law
Had failed to administer the oath of office to the Clerk in violation of state law
Had made illegal use of executive session in 2011 and 2023, and
Had not elected a moderator for its annual meeting in violation of the law
North Branch also alleges that Mr. Ferrazza knew that he had no standing to seek relief.
North Branch filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the trial court for lack of
standing for the reason that Mr. Ferrazza had not alleged individual personal injury. The decision
was affirmed by a three-justice panel of the Vermont Supreme Court in an Entry Order.
The question for analysis is whether the allegations in each case concern a matter of
public interest.
Fire Districts are established under 20 V.S.A. Chapter 171 to address fire, water, and
sewer issues within the district. Powers and obligations are set forth in subchapters 1 and 3. In
addition, "North Branch Fire District No. 1 shall have all the powers granted to fire districts and
municipal corporations by the Constitution and laws of this State and this chapter, together with
all the implied powers necessary to carry into execution all the powers therein granted." 24 App.
V.S.A. ¢. 309 § 2.
Prudential Committees are the governing bodies of fire districts and members of the
Committee are elected by the voters. They are the equivalent of a selectboard or city council for
J
the governance of their district. 24 V.S.A. 2485. Thus Committee members have obligations to
the constituents in their district under Chapter I, Article 6 of the Vermont Constitution: "That all
power being originally inherent in and consequently derived from the people, therefore all
officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants; and at all
times, in a legal way, accountable to them."
Total strangers to the district would not be able to file suit to hold members of the
Prudential Committee accountable for these responsibilities, but members of the District, who
pay fees for the services provided and are the ones authorized to vote on District matters, have an
interest in the proper functioning of the Prudential Committee in its roles of conducting
elections, conducting public meetings, and handling public funds, among other responsibilities.
J
In Soares v. Barnet Fire District #2, 217 VT 49, 15 (2022), the Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court ruling granting declaratory judgment relief to Mr. Soares--like Mr.
Ferrazza, a voter in the prudential district--who successfully sued the Prudential Committee for
failure to observe the requirements of the Open Meeting Law. While the Court also affirmed the
trial court ruling that the Prudential Committee action taken in violation of the Open Meeting
Law, a bond vote, was subsequently validated by properly following separate legal requirements
for validation of an action initially undertaken improperly, it did not reverse the declaratory
judgment ruling in favor of Mr. Soares on the Open Meeting violation.
4
Mr. Ferrazza's challenge in Ferrazza I was a claim that the election of Prudential
Committee members was invalid. This is the type of claim that affects the public interest
significantly, and members of a public body affected by such action are entitled to bring actions
under Rule 75. Petition of Fairchild, 159 Vt. (1992)(Mandamus relief under Rule 75 granted in
citizen suit to require Town to comply with non-discretionary duty to enforce zoning
regulations.)
The allegations in Ferrazza I] include mishandling of district funds in violation of 24
V.S.A. 1 2804(a), improper billing in violation of 32 V.S.A. § 5136, adjustments to statutorily
required terms of office in violation of 20 V.S.A. q 2485, failure to document reasons for
abatement decisions in violation of 24 V.S.A. § 1535(c), improper appointment of a treasurer in
violation of 17 V.S.A. § 2647, illegal use of executive sessions in violation of 1 V.S.A. 1 313(a),
J
and failure to appoint a moderator in violation of 17 V.S.A. 2646(1). These are all matters of
public interest as they affect the proper functioning of the Prudential Committee as a public
governmental body with statutorily defined responsibility for conducting itself in conformance
with legal requirements.
For purposes of the Motion to Strike, it is not a matter of whether Mr. Ferrazza prevailed
on his claims in those suits, but whether the issues he raised were matters of public interest
deserving of the protection provided by the anti-SLAPP law.
The court concludes that the claims made by Mr. Ferrazza in both suits were matters of
public interest.
Whether the allegations in the lawsuits were "devoid of any reasonable factual support and any
arguable basis in law."
Once a defendant has shown that the protections of the statute apply because the
statements at issue affect matters of public interest, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the statements (in this case, the complaints in the lawsuits) are "devoid of any reasonable factual
support and any arguable basis in law." 12 V.S.A. § 1041(e)(1).? Plaintiff had the opportunity
to
submit affidavits to meet its burden on factual issues pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1041(e)(2), but has
not done so. The analysis is thus made on the basis of the pleadings, motion, and oral argument.
North Branch alleges that Ferrazza I was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As to proof of
facts, North Branch has not argued, much less shown, that Mr. Ferrazza's factual allegations
were false. The dismissal was on legal, not factual grounds, and was dismissed without
prejudice. The fact that a party loses a case on a legal procedural ruling does not automatically
mean that there was no arguable basis in law. Moreover, many legal rulings have to be made
when there are precedents and/or policy arguments on both sides. It is up to North Branch to
make the showing that there was no arguable basis in both fact and law for the claim in Ferrazza
J, and it has not done so.
3
As noted in Footnote 1, Mr. Ferrazza does not dispute that North Branch incurred expenses in opposing his
lawsuits and thus is not claiming that Plaintiff cannot prove actual injury, the second element on which a piaintiff
bears a burden of proof once the applicability of the anti-SLAPP law is shown.
5
With respect to Ferrazza I/, again no factual findings were ever made in the case and
North Branch has made no showing that there was no basis for factual allegations. North Branch
alleges in its Complaint in this case that "Any objectively reasonable person would have known
that Defendant's claims lacked factual and legal support and were made by Defendant without
standing." Complaint, § 49.* The ruling in Soares shows that that is not the case, as Mr. Soares'
standing to challenge the Prudential Committee's failure to observe Open Meeting requirements
in connection with a bond vote was recognized and resulted in a declaratory judgment favorable
to Mr. Soares. One of the claims made by Mr. Ferrazza in Ferrazza I] as a member of the
prudential district was illegal use of executive session, which is similar to the claim in Soares.
As to whether North Branch has shown no arguable basis in law for Mr. Ferrazza to have
standing, the issue of standing in suits brought by taxpayers against public bodies is frequently
litigated and the result can hinge on specific facts as well as close questions of law.° The mere
fact that a citizen lawsuit was dismissed on the issue of standing is insufficient to meet the
plaintiff's burden to prove that the suit was "devoid of any reasonable factual support and any
arguable basis in law." In this case, North Branch has not shown that there are no facts that
could have supported standing for Mr. Ferrazza.
At oral argument, North Branch urged the court to conclude that because Mr. Ferrazza's
suits did not survive motions to dismiss, that automatically signified that there was no arguable
basis in law for the lawsuits. That is not the standard. A case may be dismissed for a variety of
reasons but that does not necessarily mean that the claim asserted lacked a basis in statutory or
common law.® It is up to North Branch in this case to prove that there was no arguable basis in
law for the claims Mr. Ferrazza made in his two lawsuits. Proof is not made by reliance on the
fact of a dismissal ruling.
The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect citizens from being fearful that if they
bring a claim against the government for redress of grievances on the exercise of public duties
and wind up losing, they will face retribution such as liability for the government's legal fees.
4
North Branch also alleges in its Complaint that Mr. Ferrazza "knew he had no standing to seek relief" (/d. at { 53)
and "knew he lacked standing" (/d. at q 54).
E.g.. Open Meeting Law standing: Severson v. City of Burlington, 2019 VT41 (standing denied because
5
allegations were of injuries that were only speculative), Blum v Friedman, 172 Vt. 622 (2001) (taxpayer alleged
sufficient injury based on inability to hear negotiations for town contracts that would affect taxpayer's fees and
cured
charges); Soares v. Barnet Fire District #2, supra (the harm in the Open Meeting violation was subsequently
under a statutory validation process but taxpayer had nonetheless obtained declaratory relief).
Waste of Public Funds standing: Baird v. City of Burlington, 2016 VT 6 (standing denied due to no showing of either
direct pecuniary loss or improper waste of municipal assets); Cent. Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Springfield,
135 Vt. 436 (1977)(taxpayer action appropriate to test allegation of improper waste of municipal assets), Schievella
v. Dep t of Taxes, 171 Vt.591 (2000)no standing for non-constitutional challenge to tax provision where no alleged
impact on plaintiff's property taxes);
Improper conduct of Election standing: See 17 V.S.A. § 2603 (a): "The result of an election for any office, other
than
for the General Assembly, or public question may be contested by any legal voter entitled to vote on the office or
public question to be contested."
6
Plaintiff cites Dudley v. City of Burlington, 25-CV-4318, Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and to Strike,
March 17, 2026, page 10, in arguing that a dismissal automatically indicates 'no arguable basis in law.' The ruling in
that case, which involved facts and circumstances very different from those in this case, is not persuasive authority.
Moreover, the standard is the one set forth in the anti-SLAPP law.
6
Where the governmental body can meet its burden of proof of lack of any legitimacy of the suit,
such liability is available under the law and may be warranted. However, once the initial
prerequisites of an anti-SLAPP case are shown, the governmental body has the burden to prove
both lack of reasonable factual support and lack of arguable basis in law. Plaintiff has failed to
meet that burden in this case as to both fact and law. Moreover, the declaratory ruling obtained
by the taxpayer plaintiff in Soares and not disturbed by the Vermont Supreme Court undermines
Plaintiff's argument that 'anyone would know' that c member of a prudential district would not
a
have standing to sue the Prudential Committee for alleged violations of its statutory duties.
The court concludes that the claims made in both Ferrazza I and Ferrazza II affect
matters of significant public interest. They are the types of claims that represent the importance
of protecting the freedom of citizens to seek redress from their government. The anti-SLAPP
statute is designed to provide protection against "lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the rights of citizens to seek redress from their government." 2005, No. 134 (Adj.
Sess.), § 1(1).The prerequisites have been found that shift the burden to Plaintiff to prove lack of
both factual and legal support, and North Branch has not shown that the complaints in Ferrazzas
land II were devoid of any reasonable factual support and any arguable basis in iaw.
ORDER
The Motion to Strike is granted and the Complaint is dismissed.
Defendant's counsel represented at oral argument that if Defendant prevailed on this
Motion to Strike, his Third Party Claim against three individuals would be dismissed. Therefore,
the Complaint against the Third Party Defendants filed January 27, 2026 is dismissed.
As a consequence of the dismissal of the Third Party Complaint, Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss filed March 2, 2026 is moot.
Any motion for legal fees shall be filed within 14 days.
Lucho
Mang
Superior Judge (Ret.), Specially Assigned
August 24, 2026
7