In re B.J...

2026 UT App 144 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF B.J., C.J., AND S.W., PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. C.D., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee. Opinion No. 20250836-CA Filed September 24, 2026 First District Juvenile Court, Logan Department The Honorable Bryan Galloway Nos. 1210346, 1210347, 1210349 Alexandra Mareschal, Kirstin Norman, and Jason B. Richards, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred. TENNEY, Judge: ¶1 At the conclusion of a three-day trial, the juvenile court terminated C.D.’s (Mother) parental rights to three of her children. Mother now challenges that decision on three grounds. First, she argues that the court erred in finding that the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children prior to  In re B.J. terminating her parental rights. Second, she argues that the court erred in finding that DCFS’s efforts were compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA). Finally, she challenges the court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 Mother has six children, but only four of them are at issue in this appeal, and as explained below, this appeal ultimately concerns a ruling that terminated her parental rights to just three of them. The involved children are: B.J. (a boy who was born in 2011); C.J. (a boy who was born in 2014); H.J. (a girl who was born in 2017); and S.W. (a girl who was born in 2019). The biological father of B.J., C.J., and H.J. (Father) is also the legal father of S.W. because he was married to Mother at the time of S.W.’s birth. D.W. is the biological father of S.W. and was living with Mother and the children when the legal proceedings at issue in this appeal began. 1 The First Removal Proceeding ¶3 On April 18, 2022, the State filed a Verified Petition for Protective Supervision as to Mother, D.W., and the children. The 1. The four children we’ve just identified were involved in most of the proceedings at issue in this appeal, and for ease, we’ll generally use the term “the children” to refer to them collectively. As will be noted later in this opinion, however, H.J. was placed in a permanent custody and guardianship with her aunt midway through the process, so Mother’s parental rights to H.J. were not terminated and are not at issue in this appeal. In addition, we note that while the parental rights of both Father and D.W. were also eventually terminated, this appeal only concerns Mother’s parental rights. 20250836-CA 2 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. petition came in response to multiple referrals to DCFS. One referral alleged that H.J. was being neglected because her special needs for speech therapy were not being met and that she had been dropped off at preschool in clothes that were caked in dirt and with her underwear covered in dried feces. The same referral noted that H.J. had “a large bite mark on her left shoulder,” which H.J. reported had been caused by C.J. Another referral came after law enforcement had been called to Mother’s home in response to a domestic dispute between Mother and D.W. This referral from law enforcement included allegations that the home was a “deplorable mess” and “unfit for any human or animal to live in.” DCFS also received information that the children were not attending school and that when they did come to school, B.J. and C.J. smelled bad and were dirty. Additional information showed that C.J. had come to school with “a large bruise on his cheek.” ¶4 On May 3, 2022, while the petition was pending, Mother and D.W. were arrested and the children were removed and taken into state custody. Mother was charged with four counts of child endangerment, two counts of child abuse, possession or use of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia, while D.W. was charged with one count of child endangerment, one count of child abuse, possession or use of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Mother later pleaded guilty to certain charges in the criminal case. At the close of a shelter hearing, the children were placed in Father’s temporary custody, with DCFS providing both protective supervision services and reunification services to Mother and D.W. ¶5 The juvenile court issued an adjudication order on the petition in June 2022. There, the court found that D.W. had physically abused both H.J. and S.W. The court also determined that the children had been neglected by both Mother and D.W. In support of the neglect determination, the court entered factual findings detailing how Mother and D.W. had failed to obtain 20250836-CA 3 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. necessary services such as autism testing and speech therapy for H.J., had failed to obtain medical care for B.J., had allowed the children to have poor hygiene and miss school, and had allowed the children to live in “deplorable conditions.” The court also found that drug paraphernalia had been located in areas of the home that were accessible to the children. ¶6 On the same date the court entered this ruling, DCFS submitted a Child and Family Plan. The juvenile court accepted this plan and entered a finding that it “constituted reasonable efforts on the part of [DCFS] to accomplish the goal of reunification.” The Child and Family Plan directed Mother to complete a “mental health assessment” and enroll in a parenting course. It further provided that DCFS would arrange for in-home parenting instruction and make a referral for Mother’s mental health assessment. ¶7 In accordance with this plan, Mother completed a comprehensive mental health assessment in July 2022 with a psychotherapist (Psychotherapist). Psychotherapist diagnosed Mother with (1) dysthymic disorder, 2 (2) an unspecified anxiety disorder, (3) post-traumatic stress disorder, and (4) an unspecified personality disorder. Psychotherapist recommended continued therapy, including “cognitive behavioral interventions.” ¶8 The court held a review hearing in September 2022. At the close of that hearing, the court ruled that Mother could have overnight visits with the children, so long as D.W. was not present. The court also entered a finding that DCFS was making 2. Dysthymic disorder, which is now referred to as persistent depressive disorder, “is mild or moderate depression that doesn’t go away.” Persistent Depressive Disorder (PDD), Cleveland Clinic, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/9292-persistent-de pressive-disorder-pdd [https://perma.cc/NE4C-A2GC]. 20250836-CA 4 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. “reasonable efforts toward finalizing the permanency goal of reunification.” ¶9 In November 2022, DCFS submitted an updated Child and Family Plan that was similar to the first plan. This second plan noted that Mother and D.W. had completed mental health assessments pursuant to the first plan, and it incorporated the prior plan’s recommendation for “ongoing therapy” for Mother. Also in November 2022, Mother was sentenced on charges stemming from her May 3 arrest. Her jail sentence was suspended, and one of the requirements of her probation was that she “[c]omply [with] and follow DCFS recommendations.” It appears from the record that around this time, Mother moved out of the home she shared with D.W. and into Father’s home, which is where the children were staying. ¶10 Back in the protective supervision case, Mother and D.W. obtained a continuance for a hearing that had been scheduled for December, and they then failed to appear for a hearing that was scheduled for January 2023. In a DCFS progress report that was submitted around this time, DCFS observed that “the barriers preventing” the children from returning to Mother and D.W.’s home were “the lack of follow through by [Mother] and [D.W.] in completing their services and providing a safe home.” ¶11 After a review hearing that was held in February 2023, the court found that “very little of the services had been completed or complied with.” The court also found that Mother was “residing in the home” with Father and “having unsupervised access to the children.” The court further noted that DCFS had “re-assessed the risk and safety of the children,” that DCFS had concluded that the children were “at moderate risk and safe,” and that DCFS was recommending “that the case be closed.” ¶12 Accepting the recommendation of DCFS, the juvenile court closed the first removal proceeding. 20250836-CA 5 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. The Second Removal Proceeding ¶13 Between May and August 2023, law enforcement was called seven times with reports that the children had been observed unsupervised. On August 14, 2023, the State filed a Verified Petition for Custody and Substantiation, along with a Motion for Expedited Placement in Temporary Custody, based on the allegations of non-supervision as well as reports of the continued unsanitary nature of the home. ¶14 On August 21, 2023, Mother was arrested on an outstanding warrant for failing to appear in justice court on a traffic citation, and DCFS took custody of the children. ¶15 At an August 24, 2023, shelter hearing in the removal case, the court found that there was “a substantial danger to the physical health or safety of the children and [that] the children’s physical health or safety may not be protected without removing the children from the custody of the children’s parents.” The court based this finding on “the seven occurrences of a lack of supervision,” the “unsanitary conditions of the home,” and the “unavailability of the medications for [B.J.] and [C.J.] when the children were removed at the time of [Mother’s] arrest.” The court also found that reasonable efforts [had been] made to prevent the need for removal of the children from the children’s home, including a child protective services investigation for the past two months, during which time the parents[ 3 ] were notified on several occasions of the necessity of more diligent 3. Though not explicitly spelled out in the court’s order, insofar as Mother was living with Father at this point, it seems the reference to “parents” as well as others in the above paragraph were about Mother and Father (as opposed to Mother and D.W.). 20250836-CA 6 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. supervision, of the need to maintain a more sanitary living environment, and of the need to communicate with one another regarding the care of the children. The court further found that DCFS had “provided cleaning supplies, trash bags, and groceries,” and it also found that DCFS had “attempted to arrange a meeting” with Mother and Father “to make a firm plan regarding care of the children, but the parents failed to cooperate with this effort.” The court ordered the children’s removal from the home, and the children were placed in various foster homes or with relatives. ¶16 The court later issued an adjudication order, wherein it made a finding that during a home visit in July 2023, Mother had told DCFS that she was “currently receiving mental health therapy.” The court also made a legal determination that “the children were neglected due to the faults or habits” of Mother, Father, and D.W. This determination was supported by factual findings detailing multiple instances of lack of appropriate supervision of H.J. and S.W., evidence of substance abuse by the adults in the home, concerns about C.J.’s mental health not being attended to, physical abuse of B.J. by Father, and, again, the deplorable conditions inside the home. ¶17 In October 2023, the court held a dispositional hearing where it addressed the terms of a newly proposed Child and Family Plan and concluded that this plan constituted “reasonable efforts on the part of [DCFS] to accomplish the goal of reunification.” This Child and Family Plan included requirements similar to the prior plans (including a requirement that Mother “follow[] the recommendations from her Mental Health Assessment”), and it also required a co-parenting course for Mother and Father as well as a stepparenting course for Mother’s and Father’s new partners. A DCFS progress report from late December 2023 indicated that Mother and her new partner 20250836-CA 7 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. attended the required course and “seemed to benefit from having participated in the class.” The same report indicated that Mother had met with a therapist one time and that they were scheduled to meet weekly. ¶18 At a review hearing in January 2024, the court ordered DCFS to expand Mother’s parent-time “up to and including [a] trial home placement.” A DCFS progress report from March 2024 indicated that Mother had “been consistent with her attendance in therapy,” and Mother’s therapist reported that she “actively participated in sessions.” At a review hearing later that month, the court entered a finding that B.J., C.J., and H.J. had begun trial home placements and that S.W. would be starting one soon as well. At this same hearing, DCFS raised and addressed ongoing concerns with school attendance, as well as with “appropriate supervision of” S.W., and Mother’s counsel presented photographs of the home’s current condition and discussed Mother’s attempts to address DCFS’s concerns. At the close of the hearing, the court found that DCFS was making “reasonable efforts” toward reunification. ¶19 On April 17, 2024, H.J. and S.W. were found wandering unsupervised near a busy intersection. Five days later, DCFS ended the trial home placements of C.J., H.J., and S.W. and returned those children to foster homes. Immediately after these removals, Mother’s counsel filed a Discovery Request seeking all of the documents that DCFS had relied on when deciding to remove the children. ¶20 On April 29, 2024, Mother’s probation officer filed an affidavit in support of a motion for an order to show cause in her criminal case. There, the probation officer alleged that Mother had lied to her children, DCFS, her attorney, and a social worker about being pregnant and delivering a stillborn child. The probation officer alleged that Mother had used an internet photograph of a stillborn child in support of this lie. And the probation officer 20250836-CA 8 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. further alleged that Mother had perpetuated this lie in an attempt to be “freed from jail to attend” the alleged child’s funeral. As a result of this motion for an order to show cause, Mother’s probation was revoked and restarted in early May 2024, and she was ordered to serve 30 days in jail. ¶21 In late May 2024, a DCFS progress report indicated that Mother’s therapist said she had met with Mother three times in March but that Mother then “no showed 3 times before going into the jail.” At the conclusion of this progress report, DCFS requested “that the court include in its order a finding that reasonable efforts were made to finalize” the “service plan” and “permanency goal” for the children. Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a document captioned “Memorandum Opposing [DCFS’s] Reasonable Efforts Finding.” In this document, Mother alleged that DCFS had failed to follow its procedures in its response to the April 17 non-supervision incident as well as in the subsequent removal of the youngest children, and she further alleged that DCFS had failed to comply with prior discovery requests. This document said nothing, however, about Mother needing any additional services. ¶22 On May 30, 2024, the court ordered B.J. to return to a trial home placement with Mother. 4 The court also ordered DCFS to conduct weekly home visits. ¶23 In July 2024, the court held a pretrial conference before a permanency hearing, and during this conference DCFS outlined its plan for bringing each of the children home on a trial placement over the next 30 days. A DCFS progress report from this time indicated that DCFS had “not received an update on [Mother’s] continued therapy attendance.” At the conclusion of the progress 4. The record indicates that B.J. had been removed from Mother’s custody at some point after the April 17, 2024, incident, but the circumstances of that removal are unclear. 20250836-CA 9 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. report, DCFS recommended that the court “terminate jurisdiction and release all parties from the case.” ¶24 That same month, Mother’s counsel arranged for Mother to complete a psychological evaluation with a retained clinical psychologist (Psychologist). Psychologist determined that Mother “presented with symptoms of borderline personality disorder.” Although this evaluation was performed in July, its results were not provided to DCFS or the juvenile court until after the second removal proceeding had closed. Mother also began seeing a new therapist and participated in a total of ten sessions with this therapist between July 2024 and January 2025. These sessions focused on “emotional regulation, distress tolerance, and trauma.” ¶25 On August 15, 2024, the juvenile court returned custody of B.J., C.J., and S.W. to Mother pursuant to the plan DCFS had presented at the July 2024 permanency hearing. The court granted a permanent custody and guardianship of H.J. to her aunt, with whom she had been placed sometime after the second removal, and it granted this permanent custody and guardianship pursuant to a stipulation from the parties. The court’s order stated that it was basing its rulings on a DCFS court report and “the oral representations and recommendations of the parties,” and it concluded that it was in the best interests of the children “to be released from the custody and legal guardianship” of DCFS. The court did not make a finding that DCFS had provided reasonable efforts at reunification, nor did it comment on Mother’s memorandum opposing a finding of reasonable efforts. Upon issuing this order, the court closed the second removal proceeding. The Third Removal Proceeding ¶26 On September 6, 2024, Mother was again arrested and incarcerated, necessitating another removal of B.J., C.J., and S.W. 20250836-CA 10 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. from the home. 5 Mother’s arrest was a result of an alleged probation violation relating to S.W. being left unsupervised in the parking lot of the apartment complex where the family was living. In an affidavit in support of a motion for an order to show cause that was filed in the criminal case, Mother’s probation officer detailed the allegation involving S.W., and the probation officer further alleged that there were poor living conditions in the home. ¶27 At a shelter hearing on September 17, 2024, the juvenile court found that there was “serious danger to the physical health or safety of the children” and that the “danger to the health or safety of the children result[ed] from” the “incarceration of [Mother].” 6 The court found that S.W. had been in “serious danger due to being unsupervised.” The court also found that DCFS had “provided extensive services to the family over the past two and one-half years, and that these efforts constitute[d] ‘reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.’” And the court concluded that there were “no services available that would prevent the need for continued removal, in light of the parents’ current unavailability” due to incarceration. The children were separately placed with foster families at this point. ¶28 On November 1, 2024, Mother was released from jail, but on November 11, she was again arrested, this time for retail theft and violating the terms of her probation. An adjudication hearing was held on November 13, 2024. At the close of that hearing, the court determined that the children were neglected, and the court issued detailed findings in support of that determination. On 5. From this point forward, and unless context suggests otherwise, references to “the children” should be understood as referring to the three children who were still involved in the ongoing events and legal proceedings (B.J., C.J., and S.W.). 6 . Father was already incarcerated for domestic violence and alcohol-related offenses at the time of the third removal. 20250836-CA 11 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. November 20, Mother admitted to the probation violation allegations in her criminal case and was sentenced to 364 days in jail. She asked to be screened for mental health court, but that request was denied. DCFS’s Motion for No Reunification Services ¶29 On October 8, 2024, DCFS filed a Motion for Dispositional Order of No Reunification Services. DCFS argued that Utah Code section 80-3-406(5) provides a presumption against reunification if a minor has been “removed from the minor’s home on at least two previous occasions and reunification services were offered or provided to the family at those times.” DCFS asserted that the “children ha[d] been removed on three separate occasions,” that “reunification services [had been] offered or provided to each of the parents at that time,” and that the “parents ha[d] failed to respond to those services.” DCFS accordingly requested that it not be required to provide additional reunification services to Mother, Father, or D.W. and that the permanency goal for the children be set as adoption. ¶30 On December 4, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing on DCFS’s motion. Psychologist testified at that hearing and explained that he had diagnosed Mother with borderline personality disorder. He testified that this disorder causes “marked impulsivity” and “increase[s] one’s focus on and devotion to one’s immediate needs, often at the sacrifice of long- term goals and accomplishments.” He said that persons with this disorder often “remain[] in high-risk relationships” and engage in “compulsive lying.” Psychologist further testified that the “science would tell us that if people are willing to engage in appropriate interventions for the treatment of . . . borderline personality [disorder],” the “prognosis can be promising.” He testified that treatment for this disorder is “usually . . . intensive,” involving treatment sessions “multiple times in a week for a minimum of one year,” that it “typically moves to one session a 20250836-CA 12 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. week for about another year” and that it then involves ongoing sessions that are a little less frequent for “another two to three years following that.” ¶31 Psychologist observed that “dialectical behavioral therapy” (DBT) is “the gold standard” for treating an individual with borderline personality disorder. He explained that “DBT is one of the veins in the umbrella of” cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)” 7 and that CBT “runs through the whole of DBT.” At one point, Psychologist suggested that if a clinician “didn’t have specific training in understanding the symptoms and presentation of borderline personality [disorder], they may engage in good faith efforts that are less successful and potentially even problematic.” But Psychologist also testified that “the science is very clear that when a person chooses to participate and does so reasonably effectively, there’s an expectation of growth,” regardless of the type of treatment the person is receiving. He thus observed that while there is a “much better expectation of faster and longer sustained benefit from DBT than . . . from other treatment paradigms . . . , again, some treatment is generally better than no treatment.” Psychologist further testified that “if a person chooses not to participate” in any treatment, “the prognosis is usually” that “the symptoms become significantly increased or at minimum maintain in their stability over time and also across contexts.” And he also testified that, given Mother’s history of “sporadic treatment interventions,” her “prognosis would be in the poor range.” 7 . Cognitive behavioral therapy is a “form of psychological treatment” that “involves efforts to change thinking patterns” and “efforts to change behavioral patterns.” What is Cognitive Behavioral Therapy?, Am. Psych. Ass’n, https://www.apa.org/ptsd- guideline/patients-and-families/cognitive-behavioral [https://per ma.cc/894K-79JJ]. 20250836-CA 13 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. ¶32 Mother testified at the hearing. When asked “what would be different this time” if the court ordered reunification services, Mother testified that she would be “[t]aking her mental health seriously.” She testified that because she “know[s] [she] ha[s] this diagnosis now,” she could “work towards getting better and not having this hinder [her].” Mother testified that she planned to address her mental health by “doing DBT” with her therapist, but she noted that she hadn’t “had time to do DBT” yet because of her incarceration. ¶33 In closing arguments, Mother’s counsel argued that Mother’s past challenges were “not necessarily due to a lack of effort, but to a lack of the right people and the right tools to actually guide her,” and counsel further argued that “the evidence from [Psychologist] shows that.” Mother’s counsel noted that there had recently been “a modicum of improvement and glimmer of progress,” and counsel asserted that there could now “be greater improvement with the correct treatment.” ¶34 At the close of this hearing, the court ruled from the bench. The court stated that it wished it had supervised Mother’s case more carefully during past proceedings, and it acknowledged that she had made some “change[s].” But it then observed that Mother had not “responded to treatment in the past very well,” noting that she “picked up a few things here and there that made things better for a period of time, but not to the point [that] the children were appropriately being cared for.” The court accordingly concluded that Mother had not rebutted the statutory presumption against providing reunification services and ordered that no further reunification services would be offered. The court then set adoption as the primary permanency goal. ¶35 In early January 2025, the State filed a Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. On February 4, 2025, Mother was arrested for another probation violation (this time for forging a 20250836-CA 14 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. doctor’s note), and after pleading guilty to one count of forgery, she was sentenced on April 2 to 180 days in jail. The Termination Trial ¶36 In June 2025, the court held a three-day trial on the State’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Before trial, Mother filed a trial brief in which she argued that “[a]t its core, the [c]ourt [was] asked to determine whether [DCFS] made reasonable efforts to reunify [Mother] with her children, and whether the failure to do so—particularly in light of her documented disabilities—render[ed] the termination of her parental rights legally and constitutionally impermissible.” In this brief, Mother expressed her view that the trial would “center on” several issues related to the ADA. ¶37 Mother’s testimony. At trial, Mother testified that she has “borderline personality disorder,” which she regarded as a “disability.” When asked what DCFS could have “done differently to help” her, Mother testified that she “wish[ed] [she] would have known that [she] had” borderline personality disorder “before” because “going into counseling with the right tools and knowing would have been a little bit different.” Mother further testified that no one had explained to her that “if [she] had a disability, [DCFS] would be required to provide reasonable accommodations to help [her] access or participate in the services” and that no one had given her information about the ADA. She testified that she felt overwhelmed and “unable to fully participate in meetings or services.” ¶38 DCFS testimony. The State called Mother’s DCFS caseworker (Caseworker) and a DCFS supervisor (Supervisor) to testify. Caseworker testified that in the course of his employment with DCFS, he had not “received training on” the ADA. When asked why DCFS had recommended that the second removal proceeding be closed in 2024, Caseworker responded that DCFS 20250836-CA 15 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. “had offered all the services that [it] could” and that it had “worked with [Mother] to the best [it] could to get her to fulfill those services.” Caseworker testified that Mother “made the assurance that she was going to continue the mental health services for her and the children” and that she “wanted DCFS out of her life also.” Caseworker testified that to his knowledge, Mother did not receive any DBT during his time working with her. ¶39 During cross-examination, Mother’s counsel confronted Caseworker about assessments he had conducted using the Utah Family and Child Endangerment Tool (UFACET), and counsel suggested that during the first two removal proceedings, despite flagging multiple “areas that called for immediate attention,” DCFS had failed to establish appropriate requirements for Mother. Caseworker admitted that portions of the Child and Family Plans (which, as noted, had built on each other through the subsequent removal proceedings) should have been removed because there was no evidence that Mother needed those particular types of interventions, 8 and he further admitted that some of DCFS’s arguments to the juvenile court had been based on Mother not being compliant with what now seemed to be those unnecessary interventions. He also admitted that DCFS policy had not been followed in certain respects during the April 2024 removal because DCFS did not complete a risk assessment 8 . For example, Caseworker testified that although neither Mother’s UFACET assessment nor mental health assessments supported a substance use requirement, DCFS imposed substance use requirements on Mother anyway. Caseworker also testified that domestic violence and anger management requirements carried over from the Child and Family Plans in the first removal proceeding to the Child and Family Plans in the second removal proceeding but that those requirements “should have been removed.” 20250836-CA 16 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. before removing the children from Mother’s custody. During this same questioning, Mother’s counsel suggested that “the children were not to be considered candidates for serious risk of removal” under DCFS policy because the children were on a trial home placement with Mother at the time of the April 2024 removal. Caseworker admitted that he had not watched existing surveillance footage of the non-supervision incident that led to the April 2024 removal. ¶40 For her part, Supervisor admitted that she was not aware of a guidance memorandum that had been issued by the federal government in August 2015 about how to handle parents with disabilities in removal or termination cases, and she testified that DCFS had not instituted systematic employee training sessions on the ADA until the week before this trial. Supervisor also testified that pursuant to “DCFS policy,” a UFACET assessment “is supposed to be completed prior to” a proceeding being closed, and Mother’s counsel suggested that at least one UFACET assessment was completed after the closure of a proceeding. ¶41 Psychotherapist’s testimony. As noted, Psychotherapist evaluated Mother in July 2022, and he testified at trial as well. He expressed his view that Psychologist’s subsequent diagnosis of Mother having borderline personality disorder was not contrary to his own earlier diagnoses. He also testified that DBT is a category of CBT. He agreed that in “the recommendations that [he] made, [he] didn’t say DBT,” but he observed that they were “essentially the same kind of recommendations that one would think about when recommending DBT.” He testified that he did not “make a borderline [personality disorder] diagnosis, and [he] didn’t recommend DBT, but [he] essentially did recommend DBT strategies.” ¶42 Psychologist’s testimony. Psychologist testified about his conclusion that Mother “presented with symptoms of borderline 20250836-CA 17 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. personality disorder.” He testified that he did not believe his diagnosis “and recommendations [were] divergent from” Psychotherapist’s. He also agreed that the “underpinnings of DBT share much in common with CBT.” He testified that DBT is “commonly identified” as the “gold standard for treatment of borderline personality disorder” and that CBT would not “administer the same level of clinical success for borderline personality disorder treatment as DBT” would. ¶43 Psychologist testified that he would classify Mother as moderate to severe in terms of how impacted she was by her borderline personality disorder. He testified that borderline personality disorder is a highly stigmatized disorder, and he agreed that there is a risk that individuals who have borderline personality disorder and are struggling with parenting abilities might be blamed for their lack of willingness to try, as opposed to recognizing that their failures are attributable to the disorder. ¶44 Testimony from Mother’s therapist. The therapist who had treated Mother during ten sessions between July 2024 and January 2025 testified. He explained that he had some familiarity with DBT and had incorporated aspects of DBT into those sessions, including “mindfulness practice,” “breathing exercises,” “progressive muscle relaxation,” and “activities that would bring about more positive emotions to counteract the negative ones.” He testified that in those sessions, she was improving in her emotional regulation before their work was interrupted due to Mother’s incarceration. He further testified that he had tried to get Mother into the DBT treatment program at his clinic but that this effort was unsuccessful because the program was already full. ¶45 B.J.’s testimony. B.J. was fourteen years old at the time of trial. As noted, B.J. had been removed from Mother’s home in September 2024 and had been living with foster parents. B.J. testified that his mental health was better than it was when he 20250836-CA 18 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. lived with Mother. Speaking of his foster placement, B.J. said that “[i]t actually feels like a home.” He testified that he didn’t “feel left out all the time” and that he didn’t “feel like” he was “not loved.” When asked if he felt like his siblings would be “safe and healthy” if they went back to Mother’s care, B.J. responded, “No, not at all.” When asked what he thought would be best for him long-term, B.J. responded, “Not going home” and “staying in the placement” that he was in. Speaking of his siblings, he said he thought it would be best if they stayed in their current placements as well, observing that those placements were “great for them” and that they were “doing a lot better.” ¶46 Testimony from the children’s therapists. The therapists who were treating B.J. and C.J. also testified. B.J.’s therapist testified that “stability is probably [B.J.’s] greatest need, to feel safe and stable so that he can move on.” She testified that something that “provide[s] him the most stable environment going forward, and not a back-and-forth type of a situation” would be “in his best interest.” ¶47 C.J.’s therapist testified that his greatest concern for C.J. was “[o]ngoing stability and consistency.” He testified that C.J. was aware that he may be adopted and had not “shared any concern about that.” He also testified that C.J. “like[d] interacting with [Mother]” and loved her “deeply.” ¶48 Testimony from foster parents. One foster parent for each of the children testified. B.J.’s foster mother testified that she had acted in that capacity since September 2024 and that she hoped to adopt him. She testified that DCFS had not explained to her the differences between a permanent custody and guardianship as opposed to an adoption, but she said that “[p]ermanent guardianship never really crossed [her] mind[]” because “[a]dopting” B.J. “was something that [she] wanted to do to make him permanently part of [her] family.” She testified that B.J. had minimal contact with Mother because he didn’t “want to talk to 20250836-CA 19 2026 UT App 144  In re B.J. her.” She testified that she would “do whatever” she could “to make sure” that B.J. could “still talk to and see his siblings” and that she would be supportive if B.J. chose to maintain a relationship with Mother. ¶49 C.J.’s foster father testified that C.J. was initially placed with him temporarily in April 2024, and then continuously beginning in September 2024. He testified that he understood the differences between adoption and permanent guardianship and that he preferred adoption because Mother had “lied and been very manipulat[ive] when given control over situations,” so he did not “trust her to make the decisions,” and he further testified that he did not think that a permanent custody and guardianship “would be in C.J.’s best interest.” He testified that DCFS had spoken with him about the differences between a permanent custody and guardianship versus adoption. He testified that he would support C.J.’s continued communication with Mother post-adoption. ¶50 S.W.’s foster mother testified that S.W. had been with her since January 2025. She testified that she preferred adoption over a permanent custody and guardianship, and she said that she supported S.W. maintaining a relationship with her siblings and with Mother. She testified that DCFS “briefly” discussed with her the differences between a permanent custody and guardianship versus adoption. ¶51 Testimony from Mother’s expert. Mother presented expert testimony from a licensed clinical social worker (Expert), who said that she had prepared for trial “[t]hrough a review of [the] records and documentation” from Mother’s proceedings. Expert testified that DCFS had provided Mother with “inconsistent services” and also identified what she regarded as a s