In re P.S.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketCase No. 20251502-CA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
2026 UT App 175
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF P.S.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
J.S. AND H.S.,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20251502-CA
Filed November 19, 2026
Fifth District Juvenile Court, St. George Department
The Honorable Michael F. Leavitt
No. 1249126
Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellant
Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellee H.S.
Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellee J.S.
Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke,
Guardians ad Litem
JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred. JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS
concurred, with opinion.
TENNEY, Judge:
¶1 P.S. (Child) was removed from his home as a result of
ongoing problems that J.S. (Mother) and H.S. (Father) both had
with abusing illegal substances and engaging in domestic
violence. Following the removal, Mother and Father (collectively,
Parents) each made substantial progress toward overcoming their
In re P.S.
problems. But even so, the State filed a petition seeking to
terminate their parental rights.
¶2 The case went to trial. There, Child’s foster parents—who
were related to Mother—testified that they were unwilling to
accept a permanent guardianship, instead stating that they were
only willing to adopt Child. The juvenile court subsequently
issued a ruling stating that it would not terminate Parents’
parental rights. Instead, the court concluded that it was in the best
interest of Child to place him in a permanent guardianship, with
the principal reason being that this would allow Child to maintain
an ongoing relationship with Parents. In that same ruling, the
juvenile court offered Child’s foster parents the opportunity to
reconsider their prior position and agree to a permanent
guardianship. Before they made a definitive choice, the State and
the Guardian ad Litem (the GAL) each appealed the juvenile
court’s ruling.
¶3 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in all respects.
BACKGROUND
¶4 Mother and Father began a relationship in 2019, and they
were married in 2020. The two had a strained relationship over
the years, and of note, they each had “a significant history of
substance abuse and domestic violence with each other.” Between
2019 and 2022, they had three children together. During that same
period, each of those children was adjudicated as being abused
and neglected, and in proceedings that occurred in 2022 and 2023,
Mother and Father voluntarily relinquished their parental rights
to each of those children.
¶5 In addition to those three children, Mother had one child
from a previous relationship, while Father had seven other
children from other relationships. In 2008, five of Father’s children
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were adjudicated as being abused and neglected. None of these
children were in Parents’ custody at the time of Child’s birth.
¶6 In August 2023, Father physically abused Mother, and this
incident led to an aggravated assault conviction. At this point,
Mother and Father had separated, although they were still
married and maintaining something of an ongoing relationship.
They conceived Child in November 2023, and he was born in July
2024. Child is the subject of this appeal.
¶7 Father suspected that Mother had relapsed during her
pregnancy, but he took no steps at that time to seek custody of
Child. At the time of Child’s birth, Father was on house arrest, and
he received permission to attend the birth. Child lived with
Mother after he was born, and Father visited Child on a number
of occasions in the months after his birth. Between July 2024 and
February 2025, Father did not financially provide for Child’s care,
and he kept some distance between himself and Mother in an
effort to protect his fledgling sobriety.
¶8 In November 2024, Mother was involved in a domestic
violence incident with her mother. In February 2025, Mother
relapsed on drugs and was admitted to the behavioral medicine
unit at a local hospital after experiencing “an emotional
breakdown.” In response to Mother’s relapse and hospitalization,
the State filed a petition with the juvenile court alleging that Child
had been abused and neglected. The parties—meaning Parents,
the State, and the GAL—all later stipulated that Child had been
abused and neglected.
¶9 At some point after this stipulation, Mother entered a
residential treatment facility. After she did, the Division of Child
and Family Services (DCFS) informed Mother that it would no
longer be recommending reunification services. When Mother
was released from the residential treatment program a short time
later, she relapsed on drugs. The juvenile court soon issued an
order in which it stated that it would not offer reunification
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services to Parents, instead setting Child’s primary permanency
goal as guardianship with a concurrent goal of adoption. The
State then filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both
Mother and Father.
Parents’ Subsequent Progress in Recovery
¶10 The juvenile court later entered findings about the progress
Mother and Father made in the ensuing years, and neither the
State nor the GAL has challenged those findings on appeal.
¶11 With respect to Mother, the court found that her recovery
had effectively started when she entered the residential treatment
facility. At the time of trial, Mother had been in recovery for six
months, had obtained a job, was living in a “sober living house,”
and was following its rules. Mother was also in a relationship with
someone that she had met in recovery, and she was pregnant with
his child.
¶12 With respect to Father, the court found that following the
August 2023 domestic violence incident, Father “remained in
recovery from substance abuse disorder,” stayed “active in the
recovery community,” and began “leading a group recovery
meeting each week.” Father also “developed a network of
assistance” that he had not previously had, “maintained a job at a
restaurant,” “reconnected with many of his older children,” and
maintained “stable housing.” Father rekindled a prior
relationship and began living with the mother of two of his older
children. Father also filed a petition to divorce Mother, although
the divorce had not yet been finalized as of the November 2025
ruling described below. But even so, at the time of that ruling,
Father had not completed certain domestic violence or anger
management courses that were available to him.
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Child’s Placement
¶13 In February 2025, Child was placed in a foster placement
with Mother’s brother and his wife (Relatives). Relatives have no
other children, and they are financially stable enough to care for
Child without assistance from Mother, Father, or the State.
Relatives expressed their desire to adopt Child, and at trial, they
testified that they would not accept a permanent guardianship
because they did “not trust Mother in her recovery” and wanted
“full autonomy in deciding whether Mother and Father should
have contact with [Child] at all.” Relatives had a “strained
relationship” with Mother, and they had no relationship with
Father.
¶14 In August 2025, Mother approached another couple who
knew Mother’s grandparents through church (Family Friends)
and asked them if they would be willing to serve as Child’s
permanent guardians. Family Friends had previously cared for
Child on several occasions and understood what’s involved in a
permanent guardianship. Like Relatives, Family Friends had no
relationship with Father. DCFS subsequently visited Family
Friends’ home and determined that “they would be a safe and
appropriate placement” for Child, and Family Friends said that
they were willing to be his permanent guardians.
Trial and Court Order
¶15 In October and November 2025, the juvenile court held a
three-day bench trial on the State’s petition to terminate Parents’
parental rights, and the testimony at trial established the facts set
forth above.
¶16 On November 25, 2025, the juvenile court issued a written
ruling. There, the court first set forth various factual findings
consistent with those recited above. The court then addressed the
question of whether there were grounds to terminate Parents’
parental rights. The court noted that Child had previously been
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adjudicated as abused and neglected, and the court detailed the
support for these determinations—namely, Mother’s relapse into
substance abuse, Father’s failure to protect Child from that
substance abuse, Child’s status as a sibling at risk based on the
removal of Parents’ other children, and the “long history of
substance abuse and domestic violence between” Mother and
Father. The court acknowledged that Parents had made
significant progress over the last several years, but it nevertheless
concluded that they had “not fully remedied the circumstances
that brought [Child] into [DCFS’s] custody.”
¶17 The court then addressed the issue of whether terminating
Parents’ parental rights was strictly necessary to promote Child’s
best interest. In setting forth the applicable law, the court
repeatedly emphasized that this analysis was to be undertaken
from Child’s “point of view.” The court observed that it
essentially had three options: “(1) return [Child] to a parent;
(2) place him in a permanent guardianship; or (3) terminate each
parent’s rights and make him available to be adopted.” The court
then provided detailed analyses of the pros and cons of each
option.
¶18 In doing so, the court first concluded that while Mother
and Father were both currently “doing well” and had been
making “steady progress” in dealing with their substance abuse
and domestic violence issues, it was still concerned by their
“long” histories with these issues, as well as by their failures to
complete certain steps toward full recovery. These steps included
the need for both of them to complete more “domestic violence
treatment,” “complete[] their divorce,” and “establish[] a robust
parenting plan that includes safe planning for either parent’s
relapse and avoiding conflict between them.” While again
recognizing that Parents had each made “laudable” progress, the
court concluded that it was not in Child’s best interest to “return
. . . to either parent” at that time.
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¶19 The court next addressed the possibility of a permanent
guardianship, and it concluded that such an arrangement was in
Child’s best interest. This was so, in the court’s view, because a
permanent guardianship would allow Child to be raised by a
responsible guardian while still maintaining a relationship with
Parents so long as “such a relationship [was] not harmful.” The
court reasoned that this would allow Child to maintain a
relationship with Parents if they “remain[ed] in recovery,” but
that this arrangement would also allow the guardian to “limit or
eliminate contact” if “either parent were to relapse.” Given
Parents’ ongoing progress and the benefits of maintaining an
ongoing relationship, the court thus concluded that it would not
be in Child’s best interest to terminate Parents’ parental rights but
that it was instead in Child’s best interest to be placed “in a
permanent guardianship with limited minimum parent time
available.”
¶20 The court then turned to the two apparent placement
options—Relatives or Family Friends. The court expressed its
preference for Relatives, given that they already “love[d]” Child,
had “bonded with him,” and were a “kinship placement.” But the
court observed that there were some “drawbacks” with
Relatives—namely, they had testified at trial that they were
unwilling “to be anything short of . . . adoptive parent[s],” they
had a strained relationship with Mother and had ongoing
concerns about her commitment to recovery and respect for
boundaries, and they had no relationship with Father. Addressing
Family Friends, the court observed that they were stable, were
willing to be permanent guardians, did “not have a strained
relationship with either parent,” and seemed willing to “facilitate
parent time” with Parents. But on the other hand, the court
observed that Family Friends had a “limited relationship” with
Child at that time and were “not a kinship placement.”
¶21 Given these conclusions, the court decided “to give
[Relatives] an opportunity to decide whether they would like to
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be” appointed as Child’s permanent guardians. The court
scheduled a hearing for several weeks out at which it would
appoint them as guardians if they agreed. It then said that if they
did not agree, it would appoint Family Friends as Child’s
guardians. Before that hearing was held, however, the State and
the GAL both appealed the juvenile court’s order, and the court
subsequently stayed that proceeding pending the outcome of this
appeal. 1
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶22 The State and the GAL have raised a large number of issues
on appeal. The GAL first raises several issues regarding the
juvenile court’s interpretation of certain provisions of the Utah
Juvenile Code. “Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that we review for correctness.” In re A.K., 2012
UT App 232, ¶ 11, 285 P.3d 772 (quotation simplified).
¶23 The remaining issues implicate various decisions made by
the juvenile court relating to its best interest analysis and its
decision that it is in Child’s best interest to be placed in a
permanent guardianship. “We review deferentially a lower
court’s best-interest determination” and “will overturn it only if”
the court “either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all
of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear
weight of the evidence.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 18, 520
P.3d 38 (quotation simplified).
1. We think it appropriate to acknowledge the juvenile court’s
thoughtful and thorough ruling in this case. The court issued
extensive factual findings as well as a lengthy and detailed ruling,
and it did so with care and sensitivity to all involved.
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ANALYSIS
¶24 “A court may terminate parental rights only after making
two necessary findings. First, the court must find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that at least one statutory ground for
termination exists. Second, the court must find that termination of
the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re J.P.,
2021 UT App 134, ¶ 13, 502 P.3d 1247 (quotation simplified); see
also Utah Code § 80-4-104(12). On the first step, the statutory
grounds for termination include, among others, abandonment,
neglect or abuse, parental unfitness or incompetence, failure of
parental adjustment, and voluntary relinquishment. Utah Code
§ 80-4-301(1). On the second step, the legislature has directed as
follows:
When determining whether termination of parental
rights is strictly necessary to promote the child’s
best interest, the court shall:
(a) undertake the analysis from the child’s point
of view;
(b) focus on finding the outcome that best
secures the child’s well-being;
(c) include, as applicable, the considerations
described in Sections 80-4-303 and 80-4-304; and
(d) explore whether other feasible options exist
that could address the specific problems or
issues facing the family, short of imposing the
ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s
rights.
Id. § 80-4-301(2).
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¶25 As discussed, the juvenile court concluded that while there
were grounds to terminate Parents’ parental rights—namely,
neglect and abuse—it was not in Child’s best interest to terminate
Parents’ rights. Instead, the court concluded that it was in Child’s
best interest to be placed in a permanent guardianship.
¶26 The State and the GAL have separately appealed, and we
address each issue in turn below. But before we do, we think it
appropriate to make something of a global comment that applies
to many of the issues.
¶27 In several recent decisions, our supreme court has stressed
the need for appellate courts to give deference to decisions made
by the juvenile courts in this area. The supreme court has held that
a “juvenile court’s termination decision should be afforded a high
degree of deference.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 7, 496 P.3d 58
(quotation simplified). And it has further held that an appellate
court
may reverse a juvenile court’s best interest
determination only if it is against the clear weight of
the evidence. Even if an appellate court views the
evidence differently and would make a different
determination, the juvenile court’s best interest
determination must stand unless it is against the
clear weight of the evidence.
In re D.S., 2025 UT 11, ¶ 4, 568 P.3d 1060.
¶28 Here, it seems to us that with respect to many of the issues,
the State and the GAL are essentially asking us to reweigh
decisions made by the juvenile court. And we can’t help but note
some irony—in most appeals, it’s the parent who is appealing an
adverse termination decision, and the State and the GAL routinely
respond by asking the appellate courts to take a hands-off
approach and defer to the decisions made below. But if such
deference is warranted in those cases, then it would likewise be
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warranted in cases in which the decision below favored the
parents.
¶29 With those observations in mind, we address the various
issues advanced by the State and the GAL. For analytical reasons,
we’ll address them in four groups.
I. Legal Authority
¶30 Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b) sets forth the best
interest portion of the termination test, and in 2024, the legislature
made some amendments to that provision. As something of an
overarching matter, the GAL first asserts that in light of these
amendments, the juvenile court erred by not “consider[ing]” the
“present statutory scheme,” as well as by relying on caselaw that
predated those amendments. But these arguments are
inadequately briefed. In its brief, the GAL doesn’t explain what
the statutory changes even were, much less show that the juvenile
court’s statutory analysis failed to account for them in any
meaningful way. Nor does the GAL argue with any precision that
any particular statutory change impacted any particular case or
doctrine that was relied on by the juvenile court. Without such
briefing, we have no basis for concluding that the court’s analysis
was infirm or that the prior cases can no longer be relied on. We
can and do reject this argument for this reason alone. See, e.g.,
Lavender v. FCOI Pres., LLC, 2025 UT App 47, ¶ 100, 569 P.3d 1037
(noting that a court “need not discuss the merits” of issues that
are inadequately briefed (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 570
P.3d 660 (Utah 2025).
¶31 In any event, we also note that this argument is at odds
with our supreme court’s recent treatment of this very question.
In In re D.S., the supreme court addressed this same statute and
observed that the “current version of the law and the 2021 version
of the law supplemented with binding caselaw are substantially
similar.” 2025 UT 11, ¶ 11 n.4 (quotation simplified). In fact, the
court said that the statute was changed “to codify two concepts
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from existing caselaw.” Id. This seems at odds with the GAL’s
assertion that the 2024 changes somehow invalidated the prior
caselaw or made it unreliable. For these reasons as well, the GAL
has not persuaded us that the juvenile court’s ruling should be
reversed.
¶32 In that same portion of its brief, the GAL also asserts that
the juvenile court erred in relying on certain legal principles that,
in its view, are no longer valid under more recent caselaw. The
GAL identifies two such principles in particular.
¶33 First, in the portion of its ruling in which it set forth the
applicable law, the juvenile court quoted In re B.T.B. for the
proposition that a court should consider whether it “is absolutely
essential to the child’s best interest that a parent’s rights be
permanently severed.” 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 54, 436 P.3d 206, aff’d,
2020 UT 60, 472 P.3d 827. The GAL points out that our supreme
court subsequently disavowed use of the “absolutely essential”
language. See In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 59 n.12. We take the point.
But reading the juvenile court’s ruling as a whole, we note that
this was an isolated and passing reference that was included in
the legal background portion of the ruling. Turning to the court’s
analysis, however, we see no place where the court relied on this
phrase as a basis for any of its determinations. And elsewhere, the
court repeatedly referred to the correct tests, supported those tests
with controlling authority, and applied the tests to the facts before
it. For these reasons, the GAL has not persuaded us that this single
statement provides any basis for reversing the court’s decision.
¶34 Second, in its ruling, the juvenile court also referred to a
“strong state policy” that favors a child being raised by the child’s
natural parents. The GAL does not argue that the court could not
consider this policy at all. Nor could it, because our legislature has
expressly codified this policy in various places. See, e.g., id. § 80-4-
104(8)(a) (“It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be
raised under the care and supervision of the child’s parents.”); id.
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§ 80-4-104(12)(a) (“Wherever possible, family life should be
strengthened and preserved . . . .”). Moreover, Utah Code section
80-4-301(2)(c) states that as part of the best interest analysis, a
juvenile court “shall include, as applicable, the considerations
described in Sections 80-4-303 and 80-4-304.” And sections 80-4-
303 and -304 both include broad language allowing a court to
consider “any other factor” that the court considers to be
“relevant.” See Utah Code § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7). The
GAL does not point to any authority stating that a court cannot
consider this policy as part of its consideration of “any other
factor” that it deems relevant.
¶35 Instead, the GAL points to authority holding that this
policy must remain subordinate to the ultimate question, which is
whether termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re D.S.,
2025 UT 11, ¶ 43 (stating that the “goal of preserving family life
must be subordinate to and in service of the child’s best interest”).
In light of this, the GAL claims that the juvenile court erred by
giving too much weight to this policy. But we’ve reviewed the
juvenile court’s ruling carefully, and in our view, the court
consistently recognized that the ultimate question before it was
indeed whether termination of Parents’ parental rights was in
Child’s best interest. To the extent the court discussed this policy,
the court did so in a proper way.
¶36 For these reasons, the GAL has not persuaded us that the
juvenile court’s ruling should be reversed based on an improper
reliance on any authority.
II. Issues Relating to Parents
¶37 The State and the GAL next raise several issues related to
the juvenile court’s discussion of Parents. We address each in
turn.
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A. Parents’ Progress
¶38 In slightly different forms, the State and the GAL both
argue that the juvenile court improperly considered, as part of its
best interest analysis, the progress that Parents had made toward
overcoming their issues with illegal substances and domestic
violence. The State argues that Parents’ “apparent success in
treatment” was “irrelevant” because the best interest analysis
must be conducted from the child’s point of view. As the State
sees it, when the juvenile court considered the progress that
Parents had made, the court was improperly conducting the
analysis from Parents’ point of view, thereby inverting the
analysis. For its part, the GAL argues that by discussing Parents’
progress, the court improperly inserted “settled matters from the
permanency hearing into its best-interest analysis.” We disagree
with these arguments.
¶39 Turning first to the State’s argument, as we’ve noted above,
Utah Code section 80-4-301(2) states that as part of the best
interest analysis, the juvenile court “shall . . . include, as
applicable, the considerations described in Section[] 80-4-303.” Of
note, section 80-4-303(1)(b) then specifically directs a juvenile
court to consider, at the termination phase, “the effort the child’s
parent or parents have made to adjust the parent’s or parents’
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best
interest to return the child to the child’s home after a reasonable
length of time.” Given this statutory directive, it’s plain enough
that a court can—and, indeed, must—consider a parent’s progress
as part of the best interest analysis.
¶40 Moreover, we simply disagree with the State’s suggestion
that doing so somehow inverts the child-focused nature of this
analysis. Again, by statute, it’s true that the analysis must be
conducted from the child’s point of view. See Utah Code § 80-4-
104(12)(b); id. § 80-4-301(1); id. § 80-4-301(2)(a); id. § 80-4-303(1)(a).
But Utah Code section 80-4-303(1)(b) is consistent with that
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directive, simply suggesting that, from the child’s perspective, it
may matter whether the child’s parents have made progress in
overcoming the issues that led to the termination trial. And this
makes sense. After all, if the parents have made progress and have
overcome their issues, that may support the conclusion that it’s
now in the child’s best interest for the court to not terminate the
parental rights of that child’s natural parents; but if the issues
remain ongoing, the opposite may be true. For these reasons,
we’re not persuaded that the court did anything improper by
considering Parents’ progress in this case. 2
¶41 We also disagree with the GAL’s assertion that the juvenile
court’s discussion of Parents’ progress was improper at this stage
of the case. Again, section 80-4-303(1)(b) specifically directs a
court to consider, at the termination phase, the “effort the child’s
parent or parents have made to adjust the parent’s or parents’
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best
interest to return the child to the child’s home after a reasonable
length of time.” Reviewing the ruling at issue, it’s clear enough
that this is the manner in which the court considered Parents’
progress. There was nothing improper about it.
B. Child’s Perspective
¶42 In one portion of its best interest analysis, the juvenile court
opined that from “[Child’s] point of view, his first choice would
2. In addition to the language discussed above from section 80-4-
303(1)(b), we again note that Utah Code sections 80-4-303(1)(c)
and 80-4-304(7) each contain language allowing a court to
consider, at the termination phase, “any other factor” that the
court considers to be “relevant.” The State has not pointed to any
authority that would prevent a juvenile court from considering a
parent’s progress under these provisions. And again, we think a
court could do so even while conducting the analysis from the
child’s perspective.
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likely be to be raised by his natural parents if they can be safe.”
Continuing, the court observed that “[a]lthough he is of
insufficient age to express his desires, [Child] was raised for his
first six months by Mother and had regular contact with Father,
albeit only through Mother. He is attached to Mother and enjoys
spending time with her.” Finishing the thought, the court
observed that Child “also spends appropriate parent time with
Father though their relationship is likely less bonded due to the
lack of time [Child] has spent alone with Father in comparison to
Mother.”
¶43 The State argues that this discussion was improper. It
asserts that it was “speculative” and “more than questionably
accurate,” and the State further asserts that the court put “more
thoughts in Child’s head than could reasonably be expected at his
age.” But we see no reversible error.
¶44 The controlling statutes repeatedly direct a juvenile court
to conduct the best interest analysis “from the child’s point of
view.” See id. § 80-4-104(12)(b); id. § 80-4-301(1); id. § 80-4-
301(2)(a). It seems to us that in these passages, this is precisely
what the juvenile court was trying to do. And the State points to
no authority that prohibits a juvenile court from considering or
concluding that a child—even an infant—may want to have some
relationship with the child’s natural parents in the future.
¶45 And in any event, we again note that the court had broad
authority to consider “any other factor” that it thought relevant.
See id. § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7). Even taking the court’s
speculation about Child’s subjective wishes out of the equation,
we have little difficulty concluding that the court could
determine, as a generalized matter, that it would be in Child’s best
interest to have an ongoing relationship with Parents if,
considering all the circumstances, it would be safe and otherwise
appropriate to do so. While the court’s isolated musings about
Child’s subjective desires may have been unusually phrased, the
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court’s actual analysis strikes us as being proper. We see no
reversible error here.
C. Harmfulness and the Parental Relationship
¶46 In one portion of its analysis, the juvenile court concluded
that a permanent guardianship was in Child’s best interest, in
part, because such an arrangement would allow Child to be raised
by a responsible adult while still maintaining a relationship with
Parents so long as “such a relationship [was] not harmful.” The
State argues that this was improper. In its view, the best interest
analysis does not permit a juvenile court to consider whether a
child would be harmed by having an ongoing relationship with a
parent. We disagree.
¶47 This discussion was part of the court’s best interest
analysis. When a court engages in such an analysis, it should
consider “the totality of the circumstances” from the child’s point
of view and determine whether termination of parental rights is
strictly necessary to promote that interest. Utah Code § 80-4-
104(12)(b). “The best-interest inquiry is wide-ranging and asks a
court to weigh the entirety of the circumstances of a child’s
situation, including the physical, intellectual, social, moral, and
educational training and general welfare and happiness of the
child.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 26, 520 P.3d 38 (quotation
simplified). And again, as we’ve repeatedly noted, the statutes
also broadly allow a court to consider “any other factor” that it
thinks is relevant. See Utah Code § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7).
¶48 The State points to no authority, and we’re aware of none,
that prohibits a court from considering, as part of this wide-
ranging inquiry, whether the child would be harmed by having
an ongoing relationship with the parents. And in several past
decisions, our appellate courts have implicitly approved of courts
considering this very thing. In In re L.L.B., we considered the
question of whether the child “had been harmed by the
relationship” with his father. 2023 UT App 66, ¶ 24, 532 P.3d 592.
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In re P.S.
In doing so, we never suggested that a court cannot legally
consider this as part of the analysis. See id. And perhaps more
significantly, in In re D.S., our supreme court discussed the
alleged “harmfulness of the children’s relationship” with the
parent in question. 2025 UT 11, ¶ 55. Indeed, that case was before
the supreme court on certiorari review, and in its discussion of the
“harmfulness” question, the supreme court faulted this court for
“downplay[ing] the juvenile court’s findings about how difficult
visits were for the children.” Id.
¶49 For these reasons, we conclude that a juvenile court may
consider whether a continuing relationship with a parent would
be harmful to a child as part of the best interest inquiry. The
juvenile court did not err by doing so here.
III. Issues Relating to Relatives
¶50 The State and the GAL next raise several issues relating to
the juvenile court’s consideration of Relatives as a potential
placement for either adoption or a permanent guardianship.
A. Kinship Placement
¶51 Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b) states:
In determining whether termination is in the best
interest of the child, and in finding, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that termination of
parental rights, from the child’s point of view, is
strictly necessary to promote the child’s best
interest, the juvenile court shall consider, among
other relevant factors, whether:
...
(ii) pursuant to Section 80-3-302, the efforts to
place the child with a relative who has, or is
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In re P.S.
willing to come forward to care for the child,
were given due weight.
¶52 Given that Relatives were, well, relatives, the State first
argues that the juvenile court erred by not “fully recognizing” this
statutory preference for kinship placement. We disagree.
¶53 In the ruling, the juvenile court repeatedly did take into
account the fact that Relatives were kin. The court observed that
“[k]eeping [Child] with [Relatives] would meet [Child’s] needs
well.” In support of that baseline belief, the court specifically
pointed out that Child’s foster father is Mother’s brother and is
therefore “a kinship placement.” The court also considered the
possibility that Relatives’ familial relationship with Mother might
increase the likelihood that Child would be able to maintain
relationships with his siblings. And in considering the possibility
that Child might instead be placed with Family Friends, the court
further recognized that Family Friends “are not a kinship
placement and have no relationship with the other families with
whom [Child’s] siblings have been placed.”
¶54 But even so, the court did not ultimately regard Relatives’
kinship status as conclusive. Instead, as discussed throughout this
opinion, the court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest to
have an ongoing relationship with Parents, so it fashioned an
order that was designed to effectuate that. Of note, the court’s
order still gave Relatives first priority in terms of being an option
to serve as Child’s permanent guardians.
¶55 In its brief, the State does not argue that the kinship
preference is inviolate or that it is per se conclusive. Nor could it.
Instead, as noted, Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b)(ii) requires a
juvenile court to give “due weight” to efforts to place a child with
relatives, but it never says that a court can’t choose another
placement based on the particular facts before it. And again, the
court in this case did consider Relatives’ relationship to Mother,
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but it ultimately concluded that other considerations outweighed
that.
¶56 In light of this, the State’s argument with respect to this
issue strikes us as a paradigmatic example of the State’s overall
approach to this appeal, wherein it simply wants us to reweigh
decisions made by the juvenile court. But we see no basis for
doing so. For these reasons, we believe the district court gave
“due weight” to Relatives’ status as kin, and we see no reversible
error on this front.
B. Coercion
¶57 As discussed, Relatives stated at trial that they were
unwilling to consider anything short of adoption. But in its ruling,
the juvenile court concluded that a permanent guardianship was
in Child’s best interest. And because it thought Relatives would
be the best option for such an arrangement, it chose to give
Relatives the chance to reconsider their prior position and agree
to serve as Child’s permanent guardians.
¶58 The State argues that this decision was improper. In its
view, the court was somehow attempting to “coerce” Relatives
into “accepting an unwanted” permanent guardianship. As the
State sees it, by giving Relatives the choice “of either losing Child
or accepting a life-long association with his unfit Parents,” the
juvenile court “turned the ‘alternative to termination’ analysis on
its head.” And the State further asserts that “[s]uch coercion is
manifestly in the Parents’ best interests, but not at all in Child’s.”
¶59 We see nothing improper about what the court did. Given
the progress that Parents had made toward addressing their
various issues, the court had some basis for concluding that it was
indeed in Child’s best interest to be able to have an ongoing
relationship with them. And for the reasons expressed elsewhere
in this opinion, we think it was appropriate for the court to
conclude that, so long as it remained safe and feasible, it would be
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In re P.S.
in Child’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with them,
and for the court to further conclude that a permanent
guardianship would be the best vehicle for accomplishing that.
Given this, the remaining question was simply who would be able
to best serve in that role. For the reasons we’ve already
articulated, the court preferred Relatives, but they had expressed
an unwillingness to agree to act as permanent guardians. And
since Family Friends were a viable (albeit less preferred) option,
the court chose to give Relatives a chance to reconsider before
placing Child in Family F