Full Opinion

2026 UT App 175 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF P.S., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. STATE OF UTAH, Appellant, v. J.S. AND H.S., Appellees. Opinion No. 20251502-CA Filed November 19, 2026 Fifth District Juvenile Court, St. George Department The Honorable Michael F. Leavitt No. 1249126 Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellant Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellee H.S. Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellee J.S. Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred. JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS concurred, with opinion. TENNEY, Judge: ¶1 P.S. (Child) was removed from his home as a result of ongoing problems that J.S. (Mother) and H.S. (Father) both had with abusing illegal substances and engaging in domestic violence. Following the removal, Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) each made substantial progress toward overcoming their In re P.S. problems. But even so, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate their parental rights. ¶2 The case went to trial. There, Child’s foster parents—who were related to Mother—testified that they were unwilling to accept a permanent guardianship, instead stating that they were only willing to adopt Child. The juvenile court subsequently issued a ruling stating that it would not terminate Parents’ parental rights. Instead, the court concluded that it was in the best interest of Child to place him in a permanent guardianship, with the principal reason being that this would allow Child to maintain an ongoing relationship with Parents. In that same ruling, the juvenile court offered Child’s foster parents the opportunity to reconsider their prior position and agree to a permanent guardianship. Before they made a definitive choice, the State and the Guardian ad Litem (the GAL) each appealed the juvenile court’s ruling. ¶3 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in all respects. BACKGROUND ¶4 Mother and Father began a relationship in 2019, and they were married in 2020. The two had a strained relationship over the years, and of note, they each had “a significant history of substance abuse and domestic violence with each other.” Between 2019 and 2022, they had three children together. During that same period, each of those children was adjudicated as being abused and neglected, and in proceedings that occurred in 2022 and 2023, Mother and Father voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to each of those children. ¶5 In addition to those three children, Mother had one child from a previous relationship, while Father had seven other children from other relationships. In 2008, five of Father’s children 20251502-CA 2 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. were adjudicated as being abused and neglected. None of these children were in Parents’ custody at the time of Child’s birth. ¶6 In August 2023, Father physically abused Mother, and this incident led to an aggravated assault conviction. At this point, Mother and Father had separated, although they were still married and maintaining something of an ongoing relationship. They conceived Child in November 2023, and he was born in July 2024. Child is the subject of this appeal. ¶7 Father suspected that Mother had relapsed during her pregnancy, but he took no steps at that time to seek custody of Child. At the time of Child’s birth, Father was on house arrest, and he received permission to attend the birth. Child lived with Mother after he was born, and Father visited Child on a number of occasions in the months after his birth. Between July 2024 and February 2025, Father did not financially provide for Child’s care, and he kept some distance between himself and Mother in an effort to protect his fledgling sobriety. ¶8 In November 2024, Mother was involved in a domestic violence incident with her mother. In February 2025, Mother relapsed on drugs and was admitted to the behavioral medicine unit at a local hospital after experiencing “an emotional breakdown.” In response to Mother’s relapse and hospitalization, the State filed a petition with the juvenile court alleging that Child had been abused and neglected. The parties—meaning Parents, the State, and the GAL—all later stipulated that Child had been abused and neglected. ¶9 At some point after this stipulation, Mother entered a residential treatment facility. After she did, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) informed Mother that it would no longer be recommending reunification services. When Mother was released from the residential treatment program a short time later, she relapsed on drugs. The juvenile court soon issued an order in which it stated that it would not offer reunification 20251502-CA 3 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. services to Parents, instead setting Child’s primary permanency goal as guardianship with a concurrent goal of adoption. The State then filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father. Parents’ Subsequent Progress in Recovery ¶10 The juvenile court later entered findings about the progress Mother and Father made in the ensuing years, and neither the State nor the GAL has challenged those findings on appeal. ¶11 With respect to Mother, the court found that her recovery had effectively started when she entered the residential treatment facility. At the time of trial, Mother had been in recovery for six months, had obtained a job, was living in a “sober living house,” and was following its rules. Mother was also in a relationship with someone that she had met in recovery, and she was pregnant with his child. ¶12 With respect to Father, the court found that following the August 2023 domestic violence incident, Father “remained in recovery from substance abuse disorder,” stayed “active in the recovery community,” and began “leading a group recovery meeting each week.” Father also “developed a network of assistance” that he had not previously had, “maintained a job at a restaurant,” “reconnected with many of his older children,” and maintained “stable housing.” Father rekindled a prior relationship and began living with the mother of two of his older children. Father also filed a petition to divorce Mother, although the divorce had not yet been finalized as of the November 2025 ruling described below. But even so, at the time of that ruling, Father had not completed certain domestic violence or anger management courses that were available to him. 20251502-CA 4 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. Child’s Placement ¶13 In February 2025, Child was placed in a foster placement with Mother’s brother and his wife (Relatives). Relatives have no other children, and they are financially stable enough to care for Child without assistance from Mother, Father, or the State. Relatives expressed their desire to adopt Child, and at trial, they testified that they would not accept a permanent guardianship because they did “not trust Mother in her recovery” and wanted “full autonomy in deciding whether Mother and Father should have contact with [Child] at all.” Relatives had a “strained relationship” with Mother, and they had no relationship with Father. ¶14 In August 2025, Mother approached another couple who knew Mother’s grandparents through church (Family Friends) and asked them if they would be willing to serve as Child’s permanent guardians. Family Friends had previously cared for Child on several occasions and understood what’s involved in a permanent guardianship. Like Relatives, Family Friends had no relationship with Father. DCFS subsequently visited Family Friends’ home and determined that “they would be a safe and appropriate placement” for Child, and Family Friends said that they were willing to be his permanent guardians. Trial and Court Order ¶15 In October and November 2025, the juvenile court held a three-day bench trial on the State’s petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights, and the testimony at trial established the facts set forth above. ¶16 On November 25, 2025, the juvenile court issued a written ruling. There, the court first set forth various factual findings consistent with those recited above. The court then addressed the question of whether there were grounds to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The court noted that Child had previously been 20251502-CA 5 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. adjudicated as abused and neglected, and the court detailed the support for these determinations—namely, Mother’s relapse into substance abuse, Father’s failure to protect Child from that substance abuse, Child’s status as a sibling at risk based on the removal of Parents’ other children, and the “long history of substance abuse and domestic violence between” Mother and Father. The court acknowledged that Parents had made significant progress over the last several years, but it nevertheless concluded that they had “not fully remedied the circumstances that brought [Child] into [DCFS’s] custody.” ¶17 The court then addressed the issue of whether terminating Parents’ parental rights was strictly necessary to promote Child’s best interest. In setting forth the applicable law, the court repeatedly emphasized that this analysis was to be undertaken from Child’s “point of view.” The court observed that it essentially had three options: “(1) return [Child] to a parent; (2) place him in a permanent guardianship; or (3) terminate each parent’s rights and make him available to be adopted.” The court then provided detailed analyses of the pros and cons of each option. ¶18 In doing so, the court first concluded that while Mother and Father were both currently “doing well” and had been making “steady progress” in dealing with their substance abuse and domestic violence issues, it was still concerned by their “long” histories with these issues, as well as by their failures to complete certain steps toward full recovery. These steps included the need for both of them to complete more “domestic violence treatment,” “complete[] their divorce,” and “establish[] a robust parenting plan that includes safe planning for either parent’s relapse and avoiding conflict between them.” While again recognizing that Parents had each made “laudable” progress, the court concluded that it was not in Child’s best interest to “return . . . to either parent” at that time. 20251502-CA 6 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. ¶19 The court next addressed the possibility of a permanent guardianship, and it concluded that such an arrangement was in Child’s best interest. This was so, in the court’s view, because a permanent guardianship would allow Child to be raised by a responsible guardian while still maintaining a relationship with Parents so long as “such a relationship [was] not harmful.” The court reasoned that this would allow Child to maintain a relationship with Parents if they “remain[ed] in recovery,” but that this arrangement would also allow the guardian to “limit or eliminate contact” if “either parent were to relapse.” Given Parents’ ongoing progress and the benefits of maintaining an ongoing relationship, the court thus concluded that it would not be in Child’s best interest to terminate Parents’ parental rights but that it was instead in Child’s best interest to be placed “in a permanent guardianship with limited minimum parent time available.” ¶20 The court then turned to the two apparent placement options—Relatives or Family Friends. The court expressed its preference for Relatives, given that they already “love[d]” Child, had “bonded with him,” and were a “kinship placement.” But the court observed that there were some “drawbacks” with Relatives—namely, they had testified at trial that they were unwilling “to be anything short of . . . adoptive parent[s],” they had a strained relationship with Mother and had ongoing concerns about her commitment to recovery and respect for boundaries, and they had no relationship with Father. Addressing Family Friends, the court observed that they were stable, were willing to be permanent guardians, did “not have a strained relationship with either parent,” and seemed willing to “facilitate parent time” with Parents. But on the other hand, the court observed that Family Friends had a “limited relationship” with Child at that time and were “not a kinship placement.” ¶21 Given these conclusions, the court decided “to give [Relatives] an opportunity to decide whether they would like to 20251502-CA 7 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. be” appointed as Child’s permanent guardians. The court scheduled a hearing for several weeks out at which it would appoint them as guardians if they agreed. It then said that if they did not agree, it would appoint Family Friends as Child’s guardians. Before that hearing was held, however, the State and the GAL both appealed the juvenile court’s order, and the court subsequently stayed that proceeding pending the outcome of this appeal. 1 ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶22 The State and the GAL have raised a large number of issues on appeal. The GAL first raises several issues regarding the juvenile court’s interpretation of certain provisions of the Utah Juvenile Code. “Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness.” In re A.K., 2012 UT App 232, ¶ 11, 285 P.3d 772 (quotation simplified). ¶23 The remaining issues implicate various decisions made by the juvenile court relating to its best interest analysis and its decision that it is in Child’s best interest to be placed in a permanent guardianship. “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest determination” and “will overturn it only if” the court “either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 18, 520 P.3d 38 (quotation simplified). 1. We think it appropriate to acknowledge the juvenile court’s thoughtful and thorough ruling in this case. The court issued extensive factual findings as well as a lengthy and detailed ruling, and it did so with care and sensitivity to all involved. 20251502-CA 8 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. ANALYSIS ¶24 “A court may terminate parental rights only after making two necessary findings. First, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one statutory ground for termination exists. Second, the court must find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re J.P., 2021 UT App 134, ¶ 13, 502 P.3d 1247 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code § 80-4-104(12). On the first step, the statutory grounds for termination include, among others, abandonment, neglect or abuse, parental unfitness or incompetence, failure of parental adjustment, and voluntary relinquishment. Utah Code § 80-4-301(1). On the second step, the legislature has directed as follows: When determining whether termination of parental rights is strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest, the court shall: (a) undertake the analysis from the child’s point of view; (b) focus on finding the outcome that best secures the child’s well-being; (c) include, as applicable, the considerations described in Sections 80-4-303 and 80-4-304; and (d) explore whether other feasible options exist that could address the specific problems or issues facing the family, short of imposing the ultimate remedy of terminating the parent’s rights. Id. § 80-4-301(2). 20251502-CA 9 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. ¶25 As discussed, the juvenile court concluded that while there were grounds to terminate Parents’ parental rights—namely, neglect and abuse—it was not in Child’s best interest to terminate Parents’ rights. Instead, the court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest to be placed in a permanent guardianship. ¶26 The State and the GAL have separately appealed, and we address each issue in turn below. But before we do, we think it appropriate to make something of a global comment that applies to many of the issues. ¶27 In several recent decisions, our supreme court has stressed the need for appellate courts to give deference to decisions made by the juvenile courts in this area. The supreme court has held that a “juvenile court’s termination decision should be afforded a high degree of deference.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 7, 496 P.3d 58 (quotation simplified). And it has further held that an appellate court may reverse a juvenile court’s best interest determination only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. Even if an appellate court views the evidence differently and would make a different determination, the juvenile court’s best interest determination must stand unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 2025 UT 11, ¶ 4, 568 P.3d 1060. ¶28 Here, it seems to us that with respect to many of the issues, the State and the GAL are essentially asking us to reweigh decisions made by the juvenile court. And we can’t help but note some irony—in most appeals, it’s the parent who is appealing an adverse termination decision, and the State and the GAL routinely respond by asking the appellate courts to take a hands-off approach and defer to the decisions made below. But if such deference is warranted in those cases, then it would likewise be 20251502-CA 10 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. warranted in cases in which the decision below favored the parents. ¶29 With those observations in mind, we address the various issues advanced by the State and the GAL. For analytical reasons, we’ll address them in four groups. I. Legal Authority ¶30 Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b) sets forth the best interest portion of the termination test, and in 2024, the legislature made some amendments to that provision. As something of an overarching matter, the GAL first asserts that in light of these amendments, the juvenile court erred by not “consider[ing]” the “present statutory scheme,” as well as by relying on caselaw that predated those amendments. But these arguments are inadequately briefed. In its brief, the GAL doesn’t explain what the statutory changes even were, much less show that the juvenile court’s statutory analysis failed to account for them in any meaningful way. Nor does the GAL argue with any precision that any particular statutory change impacted any particular case or doctrine that was relied on by the juvenile court. Without such briefing, we have no basis for concluding that the court’s analysis was infirm or that the prior cases can no longer be relied on. We can and do reject this argument for this reason alone. See, e.g., Lavender v. FCOI Pres., LLC, 2025 UT App 47, ¶ 100, 569 P.3d 1037 (noting that a court “need not discuss the merits” of issues that are inadequately briefed (quotation simplified)), cert. denied, 570 P.3d 660 (Utah 2025). ¶31 In any event, we also note that this argument is at odds with our supreme court’s recent treatment of this very question. In In re D.S., the supreme court addressed this same statute and observed that the “current version of the law and the 2021 version of the law supplemented with binding caselaw are substantially similar.” 2025 UT 11, ¶ 11 n.4 (quotation simplified). In fact, the court said that the statute was changed “to codify two concepts 20251502-CA 11 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. from existing caselaw.” Id. This seems at odds with the GAL’s assertion that the 2024 changes somehow invalidated the prior caselaw or made it unreliable. For these reasons as well, the GAL has not persuaded us that the juvenile court’s ruling should be reversed. ¶32 In that same portion of its brief, the GAL also asserts that the juvenile court erred in relying on certain legal principles that, in its view, are no longer valid under more recent caselaw. The GAL identifies two such principles in particular. ¶33 First, in the portion of its ruling in which it set forth the applicable law, the juvenile court quoted In re B.T.B. for the proposition that a court should consider whether it “is absolutely essential to the child’s best interest that a parent’s rights be permanently severed.” 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 54, 436 P.3d 206, aff’d, 2020 UT 60, 472 P.3d 827. The GAL points out that our supreme court subsequently disavowed use of the “absolutely essential” language. See In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, ¶ 59 n.12. We take the point. But reading the juvenile court’s ruling as a whole, we note that this was an isolated and passing reference that was included in the legal background portion of the ruling. Turning to the court’s analysis, however, we see no place where the court relied on this phrase as a basis for any of its determinations. And elsewhere, the court repeatedly referred to the correct tests, supported those tests with controlling authority, and applied the tests to the facts before it. For these reasons, the GAL has not persuaded us that this single statement provides any basis for reversing the court’s decision. ¶34 Second, in its ruling, the juvenile court also referred to a “strong state policy” that favors a child being raised by the child’s natural parents. The GAL does not argue that the court could not consider this policy at all. Nor could it, because our legislature has expressly codified this policy in various places. See, e.g., id. § 80-4- 104(8)(a) (“It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision of the child’s parents.”); id. 20251502-CA 12 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. § 80-4-104(12)(a) (“Wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and preserved . . . .”). Moreover, Utah Code section 80-4-301(2)(c) states that as part of the best interest analysis, a juvenile court “shall include, as applicable, the considerations described in Sections 80-4-303 and 80-4-304.” And sections 80-4- 303 and -304 both include broad language allowing a court to consider “any other factor” that the court considers to be “relevant.” See Utah Code § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7). The GAL does not point to any authority stating that a court cannot consider this policy as part of its consideration of “any other factor” that it deems relevant. ¶35 Instead, the GAL points to authority holding that this policy must remain subordinate to the ultimate question, which is whether termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re D.S., 2025 UT 11, ¶ 43 (stating that the “goal of preserving family life must be subordinate to and in service of the child’s best interest”). In light of this, the GAL claims that the juvenile court erred by giving too much weight to this policy. But we’ve reviewed the juvenile court’s ruling carefully, and in our view, the court consistently recognized that the ultimate question before it was indeed whether termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child’s best interest. To the extent the court discussed this policy, the court did so in a proper way. ¶36 For these reasons, the GAL has not persuaded us that the juvenile court’s ruling should be reversed based on an improper reliance on any authority. II. Issues Relating to Parents ¶37 The State and the GAL next raise several issues related to the juvenile court’s discussion of Parents. We address each in turn. 20251502-CA 13 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. A. Parents’ Progress ¶38 In slightly different forms, the State and the GAL both argue that the juvenile court improperly considered, as part of its best interest analysis, the progress that Parents had made toward overcoming their issues with illegal substances and domestic violence. The State argues that Parents’ “apparent success in treatment” was “irrelevant” because the best interest analysis must be conducted from the child’s point of view. As the State sees it, when the juvenile court considered the progress that Parents had made, the court was improperly conducting the analysis from Parents’ point of view, thereby inverting the analysis. For its part, the GAL argues that by discussing Parents’ progress, the court improperly inserted “settled matters from the permanency hearing into its best-interest analysis.” We disagree with these arguments. ¶39 Turning first to the State’s argument, as we’ve noted above, Utah Code section 80-4-301(2) states that as part of the best interest analysis, the juvenile court “shall . . . include, as applicable, the considerations described in Section[] 80-4-303.” Of note, section 80-4-303(1)(b) then specifically directs a juvenile court to consider, at the termination phase, “the effort the child’s parent or parents have made to adjust the parent’s or parents’ circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return the child to the child’s home after a reasonable length of time.” Given this statutory directive, it’s plain enough that a court can—and, indeed, must—consider a parent’s progress as part of the best interest analysis. ¶40 Moreover, we simply disagree with the State’s suggestion that doing so somehow inverts the child-focused nature of this analysis. Again, by statute, it’s true that the analysis must be conducted from the child’s point of view. See Utah Code § 80-4- 104(12)(b); id. § 80-4-301(1); id. § 80-4-301(2)(a); id. § 80-4-303(1)(a). But Utah Code section 80-4-303(1)(b) is consistent with that 20251502-CA 14 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. directive, simply suggesting that, from the child’s perspective, it may matter whether the child’s parents have made progress in overcoming the issues that led to the termination trial. And this makes sense. After all, if the parents have made progress and have overcome their issues, that may support the conclusion that it’s now in the child’s best interest for the court to not terminate the parental rights of that child’s natural parents; but if the issues remain ongoing, the opposite may be true. For these reasons, we’re not persuaded that the court did anything improper by considering Parents’ progress in this case. 2 ¶41 We also disagree with the GAL’s assertion that the juvenile court’s discussion of Parents’ progress was improper at this stage of the case. Again, section 80-4-303(1)(b) specifically directs a court to consider, at the termination phase, the “effort the child’s parent or parents have made to adjust the parent’s or parents’ circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return the child to the child’s home after a reasonable length of time.” Reviewing the ruling at issue, it’s clear enough that this is the manner in which the court considered Parents’ progress. There was nothing improper about it. B. Child’s Perspective ¶42 In one portion of its best interest analysis, the juvenile court opined that from “[Child’s] point of view, his first choice would 2. In addition to the language discussed above from section 80-4- 303(1)(b), we again note that Utah Code sections 80-4-303(1)(c) and 80-4-304(7) each contain language allowing a court to consider, at the termination phase, “any other factor” that the court considers to be “relevant.” The State has not pointed to any authority that would prevent a juvenile court from considering a parent’s progress under these provisions. And again, we think a court could do so even while conducting the analysis from the child’s perspective. 20251502-CA 15 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. likely be to be raised by his natural parents if they can be safe.” Continuing, the court observed that “[a]lthough he is of insufficient age to express his desires, [Child] was raised for his first six months by Mother and had regular contact with Father, albeit only through Mother. He is attached to Mother and enjoys spending time with her.” Finishing the thought, the court observed that Child “also spends appropriate parent time with Father though their relationship is likely less bonded due to the lack of time [Child] has spent alone with Father in comparison to Mother.” ¶43 The State argues that this discussion was improper. It asserts that it was “speculative” and “more than questionably accurate,” and the State further asserts that the court put “more thoughts in Child’s head than could reasonably be expected at his age.” But we see no reversible error. ¶44 The controlling statutes repeatedly direct a juvenile court to conduct the best interest analysis “from the child’s point of view.” See id. § 80-4-104(12)(b); id. § 80-4-301(1); id. § 80-4- 301(2)(a). It seems to us that in these passages, this is precisely what the juvenile court was trying to do. And the State points to no authority that prohibits a juvenile court from considering or concluding that a child—even an infant—may want to have some relationship with the child’s natural parents in the future. ¶45 And in any event, we again note that the court had broad authority to consider “any other factor” that it thought relevant. See id. § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7). Even taking the court’s speculation about Child’s subjective wishes out of the equation, we have little difficulty concluding that the court could determine, as a generalized matter, that it would be in Child’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with Parents if, considering all the circumstances, it would be safe and otherwise appropriate to do so. While the court’s isolated musings about Child’s subjective desires may have been unusually phrased, the 20251502-CA 16 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. court’s actual analysis strikes us as being proper. We see no reversible error here. C. Harmfulness and the Parental Relationship ¶46 In one portion of its analysis, the juvenile court concluded that a permanent guardianship was in Child’s best interest, in part, because such an arrangement would allow Child to be raised by a responsible adult while still maintaining a relationship with Parents so long as “such a relationship [was] not harmful.” The State argues that this was improper. In its view, the best interest analysis does not permit a juvenile court to consider whether a child would be harmed by having an ongoing relationship with a parent. We disagree. ¶47 This discussion was part of the court’s best interest analysis. When a court engages in such an analysis, it should consider “the totality of the circumstances” from the child’s point of view and determine whether termination of parental rights is strictly necessary to promote that interest. Utah Code § 80-4- 104(12)(b). “The best-interest inquiry is wide-ranging and asks a court to weigh the entirety of the circumstances of a child’s situation, including the physical, intellectual, social, moral, and educational training and general welfare and happiness of the child.” In re J.J.W., 2022 UT App 116, ¶ 26, 520 P.3d 38 (quotation simplified). And again, as we’ve repeatedly noted, the statutes also broadly allow a court to consider “any other factor” that it thinks is relevant. See Utah Code § 80-4-303(1)(c); id. § 80-4-304(7). ¶48 The State points to no authority, and we’re aware of none, that prohibits a court from considering, as part of this wide- ranging inquiry, whether the child would be harmed by having an ongoing relationship with the parents. And in several past decisions, our appellate courts have implicitly approved of courts considering this very thing. In In re L.L.B., we considered the question of whether the child “had been harmed by the relationship” with his father. 2023 UT App 66, ¶ 24, 532 P.3d 592. 20251502-CA 17 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. In doing so, we never suggested that a court cannot legally consider this as part of the analysis. See id. And perhaps more significantly, in In re D.S., our supreme court discussed the alleged “harmfulness of the children’s relationship” with the parent in question. 2025 UT 11, ¶ 55. Indeed, that case was before the supreme court on certiorari review, and in its discussion of the “harmfulness” question, the supreme court faulted this court for “downplay[ing] the juvenile court’s findings about how difficult visits were for the children.” Id. ¶49 For these reasons, we conclude that a juvenile court may consider whether a continuing relationship with a parent would be harmful to a child as part of the best interest inquiry. The juvenile court did not err by doing so here. III. Issues Relating to Relatives ¶50 The State and the GAL next raise several issues relating to the juvenile court’s consideration of Relatives as a potential placement for either adoption or a permanent guardianship. A. Kinship Placement ¶51 Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b) states: In determining whether termination is in the best interest of the child, and in finding, based on the totality of the circumstances, that termination of parental rights, from the child’s point of view, is strictly necessary to promote the child’s best interest, the juvenile court shall consider, among other relevant factors, whether: ... (ii) pursuant to Section 80-3-302, the efforts to place the child with a relative who has, or is 20251502-CA 18 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. willing to come forward to care for the child, were given due weight. ¶52 Given that Relatives were, well, relatives, the State first argues that the juvenile court erred by not “fully recognizing” this statutory preference for kinship placement. We disagree. ¶53 In the ruling, the juvenile court repeatedly did take into account the fact that Relatives were kin. The court observed that “[k]eeping [Child] with [Relatives] would meet [Child’s] needs well.” In support of that baseline belief, the court specifically pointed out that Child’s foster father is Mother’s brother and is therefore “a kinship placement.” The court also considered the possibility that Relatives’ familial relationship with Mother might increase the likelihood that Child would be able to maintain relationships with his siblings. And in considering the possibility that Child might instead be placed with Family Friends, the court further recognized that Family Friends “are not a kinship placement and have no relationship with the other families with whom [Child’s] siblings have been placed.” ¶54 But even so, the court did not ultimately regard Relatives’ kinship status as conclusive. Instead, as discussed throughout this opinion, the court concluded that it was in Child’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with Parents, so it fashioned an order that was designed to effectuate that. Of note, the court’s order still gave Relatives first priority in terms of being an option to serve as Child’s permanent guardians. ¶55 In its brief, the State does not argue that the kinship preference is inviolate or that it is per se conclusive. Nor could it. Instead, as noted, Utah Code section 80-4-104(12)(b)(ii) requires a juvenile court to give “due weight” to efforts to place a child with relatives, but it never says that a court can’t choose another placement based on the particular facts before it. And again, the court in this case did consider Relatives’ relationship to Mother, 20251502-CA 19 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. but it ultimately concluded that other considerations outweighed that. ¶56 In light of this, the State’s argument with respect to this issue strikes us as a paradigmatic example of the State’s overall approach to this appeal, wherein it simply wants us to reweigh decisions made by the juvenile court. But we see no basis for doing so. For these reasons, we believe the district court gave “due weight” to Relatives’ status as kin, and we see no reversible error on this front. B. Coercion ¶57 As discussed, Relatives stated at trial that they were unwilling to consider anything short of adoption. But in its ruling, the juvenile court concluded that a permanent guardianship was in Child’s best interest. And because it thought Relatives would be the best option for such an arrangement, it chose to give Relatives the chance to reconsider their prior position and agree to serve as Child’s permanent guardians. ¶58 The State argues that this decision was improper. In its view, the court was somehow attempting to “coerce” Relatives into “accepting an unwanted” permanent guardianship. As the State sees it, by giving Relatives the choice “of either losing Child or accepting a life-long association with his unfit Parents,” the juvenile court “turned the ‘alternative to termination’ analysis on its head.” And the State further asserts that “[s]uch coercion is manifestly in the Parents’ best interests, but not at all in Child’s.” ¶59 We see nothing improper about what the court did. Given the progress that Parents had made toward addressing their various issues, the court had some basis for concluding that it was indeed in Child’s best interest to be able to have an ongoing relationship with them. And for the reasons expressed elsewhere in this opinion, we think it was appropriate for the court to conclude that, so long as it remained safe and feasible, it would be 20251502-CA 20 2026 UT App 175 In re P.S. in Child’s best interest to have an ongoing relationship with them, and for the court to further conclude that a permanent guardianship would be the best vehicle for accomplishing that. Given this, the remaining question was simply who would be able to best serve in that role. For the reasons we’ve already articulated, the court preferred Relatives, but they had expressed an unwillingness to agree to act as permanent guardians. And since Family Friends were a viable (albeit less preferred) option, the court chose to give Relatives a chance to reconsider before placing Child in Family F