Jenson v. Jenson

2026 UT App 158 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS KENNETH L. JENSON AND JULIE G. JENSON, Appellants, v. CARON L. JENSON, Appellee. Opinion No. 20251237-CA Filed October 22, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence No. 250901626 Troy L. Booher, Caroline A. Olsen, Rahgan N. Jensen, Clint R. Hansen, and Jeffrey D. Enquist, Attorneys for Appellants Jeffery J. McKenna, Ron Hill, and Preston S. Mathews, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. LUTHY, Judge: ¶1 Caron L. Jenson created a revocable living trust and named herself as trustee. She later resigned, and her son Kenneth (Ken 1) L. Jenson became trustee. A few months later, Caron amended the trust to state that it was irrevocable. Disagreements later arose when Caron requested that she be paid trust principal—under a trust provision requiring the trustee to pay the settlor principal upon the settlor’s written request—and Ken refused. 1. Because the parties share a surname, we use their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.  Jenson v. Jenson ¶2 Caron sued Ken, both personally and in his role as trustee, as well as Ken’s wife, Julie G. Jenson, 2 requesting (among other things) a declaration that upon Caron’s written request, Ken was required to transfer the trust’s assets to Caron. Caron subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment on that declaratory judgment claim. The district court determined that Caron’s request for a transfer of all the trust’s assets exposed a latent ambiguity between the trust’s irrevocability provision and its provision allowing the settlor to request payment of the trust’s assets. The court expressed its view that “there is no conflict between the concept of irrevocability and permitting the [settlor] to request transfers of assets from the trust,” but it then concluded that Caron’s request that “all assets of the trust be transferred” would essentially have the effect of terminating the trust, an outcome that would be at odds with irrevocability. Having determined that there was an ambiguity in the trust, the court concluded that the question of whether Ken was required to comply with Caron’s request to be paid all of the trust’s assets could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment, and it denied Caron’s motion. The court suggested, however, that the ambiguity might be avoided if Caron requested less than all of the trust’s assets. Caron promptly did just that. When Ken then refused Caron’s request for a transfer of less than all of the trust’s assets, Caron filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, this time requesting a declaration that Ken was required to transfer the specifically requested assets. The court granted this motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the requested assets. ¶3 Ken and Julie requested leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the court’s summary judgment ruling, and we granted 2. Caron also named Ken and Julie’s company—Jenson Land & Livestock, LLC—as a defendant. The company is not a party to this appeal, and we do not further address it or the claims against it. 20251237-CA 2 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson that request. 3 We now conclude that notwithstanding the trust’s language of irrevocability, Caron holds an unrestricted withdrawal power. On this basis, we affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment, and we remand this matter to the district court for such proceedings as may now be appropriate.4 BACKGROUND 5 The Creation of the Trust ¶4 Caron and her late husband, Clifford, had four sons: James, Bruce, Ken, and Rob, who is also now deceased. Clifford passed away in 2009. Shortly thereafter, Caron created The Caron L. Jenson Trust (the Trust). Ken asserts that Caron created the Trust to protect her assets from her other sons, “who tended to get into legal trouble and frequently demanded financial support from Caron.” Caron, on the other hand, alleges that Ken unduly 3. Although Julie is a party to this appeal, we refer to the appellants’ arguments on appeal as Ken’s because Caron brought her declaratory judgment claim only against Ken and because the district court’s summary judgment ruling is directed only toward him. 4. Caron filed a motion under rule 23C(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requesting that we “designate this appeal for expedited review . . . and render [our] decision at the earliest practicable date following . . . oral argument.” We hereby grant that motion, having expedited our review and prepared this opinion for issuance on the earliest practicable date. 5. “In reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and recite the facts accordingly.” Crosbie v. 750 West Owners Ass’n, 2026 UT App 9, n.1, 586 P.3d 10 (cleaned up). 20251237-CA 3 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson influenced her into signing the Trust and bequeathing much of the estate to him. ¶5 The Trust was initially established as a revocable trust, with Caron as the settlor and trustee. Its assets originally included “approximately 216 acres of farmland near Nephi, Utah, and associated water shares, as well as brokerage accounts worth approximately $345,000.” The specific terms of the Trust were memorialized in a trust instrument (the Trust Agreement). The Relevant Provisions of the Trust Agreement ¶6 Article Three of the Trust Agreement is titled “Revocation and Amendment.” It originally gave the settlor “during his/her life, . . . the right, exercisable at any time and from time to time, to revoke [the] Trust.” It further stated that the settlor could “alter or amend [the] Trust at any time and from time to time by written instrument signed by [the settlor] and delivered to the [t]rustee,” except that “the duties and liabilities” of the trustee could not “be increased without his/her consent.” ¶7 The first sentence of the second paragraph of Article Four of the Trust Agreement is at the heart of this appeal. That article is titled “Payment of Principal and Income,” and it provides as follows, with our emphasis: The [t]rustee shall manage and invest the [t]rust [e]state and shall collect the income thereof, and shall, upon request of the [settlor], pay to the [settlor] during his/her life all or a portion of the net income of the [t]rust [e]state. In the event that the [settlor] does not request payment of the net income of the Trust, then the [t]rustee may accumulate such income and add it to the principal of the [t]rust [e]state. The [t]rustee shall further pay principal, to the [settlor] upon written request. The [settlor] requests the 20251237-CA 4 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson [t]rustee to abide by the Personal Property Bequest Exhibit attached to th[e] Trust Agreement . . . . In the event the [settlor] becomes disabled the [t]rustee, in his/her sole and absolute discretion, shall distribute the principal and net income of the Trust in such amounts as shall be necessary for the education, health, maintenance and support of the [settlor], and any other person deemed by the [t]rustee to be dependent on the [settlor]. The [t]rustee shall provide as much of the principal and income of the Trust as the [t]rustee, in his/her sole and absolute discretion, deems advisable for the payment of any of the [settlor’s] valid obligations as confirmed by the [t]rustee. The [t]rustee shall provide as much of the principal and income of the Trust as the [t]rustee deems advisable for the payment of insurance premiums on policies owned by the [settlor], either directly or beneficially, or by the Trust. ¶8 Article Six of the Trust Agreement is titled “Trustee Powers.” Among other things, it grants the trustee power “to do all acts in the management of the [t]rust [e]state as if [the trustee] were the absolute owner thereof.” Article Six also provides: Unless specifically limited, all discretion conferred upon the [t]rustee shall be absolute, and his/her exercise conclusive on all persons interested in any [t]rusts hereunder. The enumeration of certain powers of the [t]rustee herein shall not be construed as a limitation upon the [t]rustee’s powers, it being intended that the [t]rustee shall have all the rights, powers and privileges that an absolute owner of the property would have. 20251237-CA 5 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson ¶9 Article Ten of the Trust Agreement includes a spendthrift provision, which states, “The interest of the [b]eneficiaries in the principal and/or income of the Trust shall not be subject to the claim or claims of their creditors or others, not to legal process, and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated or encumbered.” Caron’s Resignation as Trustee and Her Amendment of the Trust Agreement ¶10 In early 2010, Caron resigned as trustee. Under the terms of the Trust, Ken became the successor trustee. Several months later, Caron amended the Trust Agreement. The amendment modified Article Three of the Trust Agreement to contain only the following provision: “The Trust is irrevocable and cannot be amended.” We refer to the irrevocability language of the amendment as “the Irrevocability Provision.” 6 The amendment also stated, “All of the other paragraphs as written in the . . . Trust Agreement . . . shall remain in full force and effect.” The Lawsuit ¶11 In February and March 2024, Caron sent written requests to Ken to transfer all of the assets of the Trust to her. Ken refused to comply. ¶12 In September 2024, Caron sued. In an amended complaint, Caron alleged causes of action against Ken for breach of fiduciary duty and exploitation of a vulnerable adult and against Ken and Julie for undue influence, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and conversion. She also sought an accounting, the removal of Ken as trustee, and a declaration “that the terms of the Trust 6. We do not analyze or express an opinion regarding the interplay between the amendment’s statement that the Trust Agreement “cannot be amended” and other provisions of the Trust Agreement. 20251237-CA 6 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson require[d] Ken to transfer the principal assets of the Trust” to her, given her repeated written requests for such a transfer. ¶13 Shortly after filing her amended complaint, Caron filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the district court to enter a judgment “declaring that Ken [was] required to transfer any or all [t]rust assets to Caron forthwith in accordance with her written request.” She argued that the requested transfer was required by the provision in Article Four of the Trust Agreement that states, “The [t]rustee shall further pay principal, to the [settlor] upon written request” (the Payment Provision). The court interpreted Caron’s motion as posing the “narrow[]” question of “whether Ken [was] required to transfer ALL of the trust assets to Caron.” ¶14 In addressing this question, the court identified our supreme court’s opinion in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, as relevant authority. Dahl involved a trust that contained both a provision stating that the trust was “irrevocable” and a provision stating that the settlor “reserve[d] any power whatsoever to alter or amend any of the terms or provisions” of the trust. Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis omitted). The supreme court held that notwithstanding the trust’s irrevocability provision, the trust was “revocable under Utah law” where the settlor had “reserved an unrestricted power to amend any and all provisions of the [t]rust.” Id. ¶ 32. The district court here acknowledged the holding in Dahl but concluded that because Caron—the settlor in this case—“did not reserve the power to alter or modify the [T]rust” and, instead, reserved only “the power to request the transfer of [trust] assets,” the holding in Dahl did not control. In other words, the district court was of the view that the power “to request the transfer of [trust] assets” is “not akin” to the power “to alter or modify [a] trust” and, thus, that the power to request the transfer of trust assets “does not do damage to the concept of irrevocability.” ¶15 Having determined that there was “no conflict between the concept of irrevocability and permitting the [settlor] to request transfers of assets from the [T]rust,” the court turned to the 20251237-CA 7 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson question of whether Caron’s “particular requested transfer of all trust assets [was] a permissible transfer under the Trust Agreement.” The court noted Ken’s argument that “transferring, and thus draining the [T]rust of, all assets . . . would effectively terminate the [T]rust and eviscerate the material purpose of the [T]rust” and that “an irrevocable trust can only be terminated through the procedures set forth in” Utah Code section 75B-2-411. It also acknowledged Caron’s contrary argument that her reservation of “a broad right to demand transfer of assets” gave her—notwithstanding the Irrevocability Provision—“an unfettered right to have all trust assets transferred to her.” The court concluded that these arguments “constitute[d] two reasonable interpretations of the Trust Agreement” and, thus, that Caron’s request for all of the trust assets had exposed “a latent ambiguity” in the Trust. See generally Equine Holdings LLC v. Auburn Woods LLC, 2021 UT App 14, ¶¶ 26–27, 482 P.3d 880 (explaining that where each party to a written instrument proffers an interpretation that “can be considered reasonable, the language is necessarily ambiguous”). The court ruled that this ambiguity could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment and would, instead, have to be “resolved by the fact- finder, based upon a review of all relevant extrinsic evidence” of Caron’s intent when creating and amending the Trust. On this basis, the court denied Caron’s motion for partial summary judgment. It stated, however, that its ruling was “a narrow one” that did “not affect whether [Ken would be] obligated to transfer assets to Caron . . . if she were to request something less than all of the trust assets.” ¶16 Caron then did just that: she made two written requests for Ken to transfer nearly half of the Trust’s assets to her— specifically, real property ultimately identified as “the Fairground property” plus forty-two shares of irrigation company stock. Ken refused to make that transfer, and Caron filed a second motion for partial summary judgment. This time she requested a declaration that Ken was “required to convey to her [the Fairground property] and the [forty-two] water shares.” The district court granted this motion, determining that the Payment Provision 20251237-CA 8 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson unambiguously required this transfer where the request was for less than all of the Trust’s assets. The court ordered Ken to complete the transfer within ten days. ¶17 Ken and Julie petitioned for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, and we granted the petition. We also granted their request for a stay of the district court’s order to transfer the requested assets. ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶18 Ken asserts that the district court erroneously ruled that the Trust Agreement required him to transfer the Fairground property and forty-two irrigation company shares to Caron on her written request. “We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions . . . .” Heslop v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5, ¶ 20, 390 P.3d 314 (cleaned up). We also review “a [district] court’s interpretation of a trust instrument . . . for correctness.” Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 21, 285 P.3d 815 (cleaned up). ANALYSIS ¶19 “We employ familiar principles of contract interpretation when construing trust instruments.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 29, 459 P.3d 276. In accordance with those principles, “we begin our analysis with the language of the trust agreement to ascertain the intent of the settlor.” Id. (cleaned up). “Because we presume that the settlor knew and intended the legal effect of the language used, we give the words used in the trust agreement their ordinary and usual meaning.” Id. “We consider each trust provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 815 (cleaned up). ¶20 Where conflicting provisions of a trust cannot be reconciled or harmonized, we ordinarily declare the instrument 20251237-CA 9 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson ambiguous and direct that the ambiguity be resolved through factual findings based on extrinsic evidence of the settlor’s intent. See Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, ¶ 19 n.8, 121 P.3d 57 (“[I]f the court cannot . . . harmoniz[e] ambiguous or conflicting terms, as a matter of law, then the court may properly conclude there is an ambiguity and then resort to extrinsic evidence.”); Hull, 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 27 (“When a court determines that a trust is ambiguous, it may consider extrinsic evidence in light of the trust language to determine the settlor’s intent.”). However, in some circumstances, the law has established rules that dictate how conflicting provisions of a written instrument are to be resolved without resort to extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993) (“[I]f an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed in favor of coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage.”); Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 1977) (“[W]here there is a printed form of contract, and other words are inserted, in writing or otherwise, it is to be assumed the latter take precedence over the printed matter.”). This case presents one of those circumstances. ¶21 As we have already observed, Dahl involved a trust that contained both a provision stating that the trust was “irrevocable” and a provision stating that the settlor “reserve[d] any power whatsoever to alter or amend any of the terms or provisions” of the trust. 2015 UT 79, ¶ 30 (emphasis omitted). In that case, our supreme court declined to read the trust “as reserving only those powers to amend that are consistent with the creation of an irrevocable trust,” because “the plain language” of the provision reserving for the settlor a power to alter or amend the trust “contain[ed] no such limitation.” Id. ¶ 31. Instead, the court confirmed that “a settlor’s unrestricted power to amend a trust includes, by definition, the power to revoke the trust.” Id. ¶ 32. Then, notwithstanding the plainly conflicting provisions declaring both that the trust was irrevocable and that the settlor retained, in effect, a power to revoke the trust, the court did not direct that the resulting ambiguity be resolved through factual 20251237-CA 10 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson findings based on extrinsic evidence of intent. Instead, it held that because the settlor “reserved an unrestricted power to amend any and all provisions of the [t]rust, . . . the [t]rust [was] revocable under Utah law.” Id. ¶22 Dahl establishes as a rule in Utah that when a settlor expressly reserves an unrestricted power that, in effect, allows the settlor to revoke the trust, the trust is revocable even if it contains a provision purporting to make the trust irrevocable. See id. In other words, “[a] statement that the trust is intended to be irrevocable will control, unless it is contradicted by other terms of the trust.” 7 George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 1000, Westlaw (database updated May 2026). ¶23 This rule accords with the view taken by other jurisdictions. See Tantleff Trusts v. FDIC, 938 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Under the general law of trusts, ‘a statement that the trust is intended to be irrevocable will control, unless it is contradicted by 7. Caron asserts that the holding in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, was based on the canon of construction that says “general terms and provisions are restricted by specific terms and provisions following them.” Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40, ¶ 16, 392 P.3d 985 (cleaned up). Viewed through this lens, Caron casts Dahl as having “held that the specific reserved power [to amend the trust] controlled [over the general declaration of irrevocability], rendering the trust revocable as a matter of law notwithstanding the irrevocability declaration.” This is a plausible reading but one that we cannot confirm. The Dahl court indicated that it was “employ[ing] familiar principles of contract interpretation,” but it ultimately provided no explicit insight into the familiar principles on which it based its ruling, beyond looking to the plain language of the trust to ascertain the settlor’s intent. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶¶ 29, 31–32. Nevertheless, whether an unspoken principle underlying Dahl was the specific-over- general canon or something else, the rule that emerged was plain, and—as we demonstrate, see infra ¶ 23—it is neither unique to Utah nor unmoored from sound policy considerations. 20251237-CA 11 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson other terms of the trust.’” (quoting George G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 1000 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)); Bassford v. Bassford, 183 A.3d 680, 693 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018) (holding, where the trust instrument contained a provision reserving the right of the settlor to revoke the trust, that the trust was revocable even though its title included the term “irrevocable”); Moore v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Macon, 130 S.E.2d 718, 721–22 (Ga. 1963) (holding that notwithstanding an irrevocability clause in the relevant trust instrument, the settlor could revoke the trust because she was the only beneficiary); Schellentrager v. Tradesmens Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 88 A.2d 773, 774 (Pa. 1952) (“The fact that the deed declared the trust to be irrevocable did not automatically make it so. It was only as irrevocable as the terms of the deed in operation permitted it to be.”). The rule from Dahl is also supported by the notion that “a person who sets up a trust without consideration should not in the end be regarded as a stranger in the realm of his [or her] own benevolence. Words used by [the settlor] in the creation of the trust are not to become weapons against [the settlor] unless no other interpretation is possible.” In re Schautz’ Trust, 151 A.2d 457, 460 (Pa. 1959). 8 ¶24 With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the relevant language of the Trust Agreement. We first examine the Payment Provision and conclude that it gives Caron an unrestricted power of withdrawal, which—based on the above- identified rule from Dahl—prevails over the Irrevocability Provision. We then address and reject Ken’s argument that the Payment Provision should instead be harmonized with the Irrevocability Provision by subjecting Caron’s exercise of the withdrawal power to the discretion of the trustee. Ultimately, 8. Ken maintains that In re Schautz’ Trust, 151 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1959), is “of no help” here because it did not concern an irrevocable trust. While it is true that In re Schautz’ Trust addressed an issue arising under a revocable trust—namely, the scope of the settlor’s revocation power, see id. at 458–60—the general principle for which we cite In re Schautz’ Trust applies regardless of whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable. 20251237-CA 12 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson given our conclusion that Caron holds an unrestricted withdrawal power that prevails over the Irrevocability Provision, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the Trust Agreement requires Ken to transfer the Fairground property and forty-two irrigation company shares to Caron on her written request. A. The Payment Provision grants Caron an unrestricted withdrawal power that prevails over the Irrevocability Provision. ¶25 The Payment Provision states, “The [t]rustee shall further pay principal, to the [settlor] upon written request.” By its terms, this provision gives Caron, as the settlor, an unrestricted withdrawal power. ¶26 Under Utah trust law, a “[p]ower of withdrawal” is “a presently exercisable power of appointment other than a power exercisable only upon consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest.” Utah Code § 75B-2-103(6). A “[p]ower of appointment” is “a power that enables a powerholder acting in a nonfiduciary capacity to designate a recipient of an interest in, or another power of appointment over, the appointive property.” Id. § 75A-4-102(13)(a). A “[g]eneral power of appointment” includes “a power of appointment exercisable in favor of the powerholder.” Id. § 75A-4-102(6). And a “[p]resently exercisable power of appointment” is “a power of appointment exercisable by the powerholder at a relevant time.” Id. § 75A-4-102(14)(a). ¶27 Applying these definitions, the Payment Provision grants Caron a general power of appointment over the Trust’s assets because it allows her, as a nonfiduciary, to designate herself—the powerholder—to be a recipient of an interest in the appointive property, namely, the Trust’s assets. See id. § 75A-4-102(6), (13)(a). This designation occurs through a written request to the trustee, as it must, because legal title to the Trust’s property is vested in the trustee. See Jessup v. Five Star Franchising LLC, 2022 UT App 86, ¶ 50, 515 P.3d 466 (“A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is vested in a trustee . . . .” (cleaned up)). 20251237-CA 13 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson Caron’s general power of appointment is presently exercisable because its exercise is not limited to any particular occurrence or point in time and, thus, it may be exercised at any relevant time. See Utah Code § 75A-4-102(14)(a). Because the Payment Provision does not make Caron’s presently exercisable general power of appointment subject to the consent of the trustee or a person holding interest adverse to Caron’s, her presently exercisable general power of appointment constitutes an unrestricted power of withdrawal. See id. § 75B-2-103(6). ¶28 Ken resists this conclusion on two grounds. First, he argues that “one of the central aspects of a ‘power of withdrawal’ is that it gives the powerholder the immediate ability to exercise control over trust property.” He then contends that “the Payment Provision is different” because “it requires Caron to submit a written request to the trustee for payment of principal.” However, as already noted, requiring the settlor to submit a written request to the trustee in order to exercise his or her withdrawal power is a necessary feature of a trust. Because legal title to a trust’s property is vested in the trustee, see Jessup, 2022 UT App 86, ¶ 50, the settlor lacks authority to personally execute the instrument necessary to transfer the trust’s property. Yet as long as the settlor retains the unilateral power to direct the trustee to make such a transfer, the settlor’s lack of authority to personally execute the instrument of transfer does not mean that the settlor lacks the power of withdrawal. Thus, here, because the Payment Provision plainly directs that the trustee “shall . . . pay principal” upon the settlor’s written request, it reserves for Caron an unrestricted power of withdrawal, despite the necessity for her to deliver a written request to initiate a withdrawal. ¶29 Second, Ken points to the language of the Payment Provision that “requires the trustee to ‘pay principal’ to Caron upon written request.” He argues that the district court’s interpretation of the Payment Provision “did not require Ken to ‘pay’ anything” but, rather, “ordered the removal of nearly half of the assets from the Trust.” Ken contends that “[t]his distinction is not meaningless” because “to the extent Caron requests payment 20251237-CA 14 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson of [t]rust principal, Ken has discretion to determine the source of that payment . . . and he may choose to ‘pay principal’ to Caron starting with the Trust’s more liquid assets—for example, the brokerage accounts—rather than through a forced sale and subsequent payment of real property.” “In any event,” Ken asserts, “‘pay[ment]’ of principal does not unambiguously permit removal of [t]rust assets.” We are not persuaded. ¶30 Although Ken maintains that there is a difference between paying principal and removing principal from a trust, he offers no explanation for what that difference is or how principal could be paid without removing it from the Trust. And while Ken says that if Caron requested the payment of principal, he would have “discretion to determine the source of that payment,” the only authorities he cites in support of that proposition are (1) the code provisions imposing on him a duty to administer the Trust prudently and preserve its corpus if possible and (2) the Trust Agreement provisions that grant him discretion in managing the Trust’s assets. But these authorities do not limit Caron’s ability to designate specific assets when requesting a payment of principal. ¶31 In sum, we conclude that, by its plain terms, the Payment Provision gives Caron an unrestricted power of withdrawal. ¶32 Further, we conclude that, just as an “unrestricted power to amend a trust includes, by definition, the power to revoke the trust,” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 32, 459 P.3d 276, an unrestricted power of withdrawal includes a power to revoke the trust, see Utah Code § 75B-2-603(4) (“During the period the power may be exercised, the holder of a power of withdrawal has the rights of a settlor of a revocable trust under this section to the extent of the property subject to the power.”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 74 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2007) (“[I]f the terms of a trust merely provide that the settlor reserves a power of withdrawal, and the power is unrestricted and subject to no unfulfilled condition precedent, that power constitutes a power of revocation.”). ¶33 Because the Payment Provision grants Caron an unrestricted power of withdrawal and, thus, the power to revoke 20251237-CA 15 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson the Trust, it conflicts with the Irrevocability Provision. However, based on the above-identified rule from Dahl—namely, that when a settlor expressly reserves an unrestricted power that, in effect, allows the settlor to revoke the trust, the trust is revocable even if it contains a provision purporting to make the trust irrevocable, see Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 32—we hold that the unrestricted power of withdrawal reserved for Caron in the Payment Provision prevails over the conflicting Irrevocability Provision. B. Caron’s exercise of the Payment Provision’s power of withdrawal is not subject to the trustee’s discretion. ¶34 We are mindful that “where two seemingly conflicting . . . provisions reasonably can be reconciled, [we are] required to do so and to give both effect.” Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1360 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (cleaned up). Indeed, when interpreting written instruments, we must “look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless.” Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 28, 210 P.3d 263. Here, Ken urges us to harmonize the Payment Provision and the Irrevocability Provision by reading Caron’s exercise of the Payment Provision’s withdrawal power as being subject to the trustee’s discretion. In support of this proposed reading, Ken points to various provisions of the Trust Agreement that afford the trustee discretion related to the Trust’s principal, and he suggests that the discretion given to the trustee in those instances requires that Caron’s exercise of the withdrawal power must also be subject to the trustee’s discretion. Addressing each in turn, we conclude that none of the provisions Ken identifies supports a reading of the Payment Provision that makes Caron’s exercise of the withdrawal power granted thereunder subject to the trustee’s discretion. 1. Article Four ¶35 Ken first points to the provision in Article Four of the Trust Agreement that gives the trustee discretion to “provide as much of the principal . . . as the [t]rustee, in his/her sole and absolute 20251237-CA 16 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson discretion, deems advisable for the payment of any of the [settlor’s] valid obligations as confirmed by the [t]rustee” (the Obligations Provision). Ken argues that the Obligations Provision “would be unnecessary if Caron could request any of the principal at will for any reason,” because Caron could thereby obtain trust principal and pay her obligations herself, without the assistance of the trustee. Ken’s argument is unavailing. Caron’s granting the trustee the ability to assist her in paying her obligations with trust principal serves a meaningful purpose that would not be achieved if, in all events, Caron had to pay her obligations on her own and had to go through the process of submitting written requests for trust principal to do so when her personal funds were insufficient to meet her obligations. For this reason, a plain reading of the Payment Provision does not render the Obligations Provision superfluous. ¶36 Ken also points to the various provisions of Article Four that collectively give the trustee discretion regarding the Trust’s principal in various specific contexts—namely, discretion to use the principal to (1) provide for Caron’s education, health, maintenance, and support in the event she becomes disabled; (2) pay insurance premiums on policies owned by Caron or the Trust; and (3) as noted, pay Caron’s obligations. Ken does not suggest that these provisions—by their terms—make Caron’s exercise of the Payment Provision’s withdrawal power subject to the trustee’s discretion. Instead, he asserts that in light of these provisions, if Article Four is construed generally as “impos[ing] a discretionary limitation on Caron’s access to [t]rust principal,” that would harmonize the otherwise conflicting Payment Provision and Irrevocability Provision. “But harmonizing a document’s various provisions does not mean abandoning the clear meaning of one in order to give effect to the plain meaning of another.” Crosbie v. 750 West Owners Ass’n, 2026 UT App 9, ¶ 43, 586 P.3d 10. Because the plain text of Article Four does not support the notion that Caron’s exercise of the withdrawal power is subject to the trustee’s discretion, we cannot simply abandon the Payment Provision’s plain meaning in an effort to resolve the 20251237-CA 17 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson conflict between the Payment Provision and the Irrevocability Provision. 2. Article Six ¶37 In further support of his effort to harmonize the Payment Provision and the Irrevocability Provision by making Caron’s withdrawal power subject to the trustee’s discretion, Ken points to the provision in Article Six that gives the trustee “all powers” and authorizes the trustee “to do all acts in the management of the [t]rust [e]state as if [the trustee] were the absolute owner thereof.” Ken does not contend that this provision mandates the interpretation of the Payment Provision he champions; rather, he asserts only that his proposed interpretation would “ensure[] harmony with” this provision. But Ken’s proposed interpretation of the Payment Provision is not necessary to ensure its harmony with this provision because the Utah Uniform Trust Code provides that “[t]o the extent a trust is revocable by a settlor, a trustee may follow a direction of the settlor that is contrary to the terms of the trust.” Utah Code § 75B-2-603(1)(a). Under this statute, the Payment Provision’s withdrawal power may be unrestricted and yet not conflict with the trustee’s general power to manage the Trust’s assets as if he were their absolute owner. ¶38 Ken also points to the provision in Article Six that states, “Unless specifically limited, all discretion conferred upon the [t]rustee shall be absolute, and his/her exercise conclusive on all persons interested in any [t]rusts hereunder” (the Absolute Discretion Provision). However, the Absolute Discretion Provision easily harmonizes with Caron’s unrestricted withdrawal power because the unrestricted withdrawal power specifically limits the trustee’s powers by directing the trustee to comply with any written request by the settlor to pay principal. Thus, the Payment Provision’s withdrawal power triggers the express qualifier that removes the absolute discretion otherwise provided to the trustee in the Absolute Discretion Provision. The Absolute Discretion Provision is therefore in harmony with the Payment Provision as we have construed it. 20251237-CA 18 2026 UT App 158  Jenson v. Jenson 3. Article Ten ¶39 Finally, Ken points to the spendthrift clause of Article Ten. The purpose of a spendthrift clause is to place “a valid restraint . . . on the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the [trust] beneficiary’s interest.” Spendthrift Trust, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Ken argues that “if Caron retain[s] the ability to remove most or all [t]rust assets at will, her creditors or assignees [will] also be able to reach the entirety of the [t]rust assets . . . and the [s]pendthrift [c]lause would serve no purpose.” Yet the Utah Uniform Trust Code anticipates this exact scenario, saying, “To the extent a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.” Utah Code § 75B-2-603(2). Thus, the statute resolves any conflict that might otherwise have existed between the Payment P