Jackson v. Ivory Homes

2026 UT App 165 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS BROOKE JACKSON, Appellant, v. IVORY HOMES LTD, MY MOVE MORTGAGE LLC, AND DEREK WENN, Appellees. Opinion No. 20241234-CA Filed November 5, 2026 Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department The Honorable Jared Eldridge No. 230300152 Justin D. Heideman and Justin R. Elswick, Attorneys for Appellant Benson L. Hathaway Jr., Justin W. Starr, Ryan C. Cadwallader, Alyssa Nielsen, and Analise Q. Wilson, Attorneys for Appellees JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. LUTHY, Judge: ¶1 Brooke Jackson became interested in purchasing a home from Ivory Homes LTD (Ivory). As she selected a lot and house plan, Ivory assured Jackson that it “had every confidence” she would be able to obtain the needed financing through its preferred lender, My Move Mortgage LLC dba Momentum Loans (Momentum), and that she should not worry because Momentum would “take care of” her. Based in part on these assurances, Jackson signed a contract to purchase a home. She then paid two deposits totaling $131,000 toward the purchase price. Ultimately,  Jackson v. Ivory Homes however, Momentum did not approve Jackson for financing, and Jackson withdrew from the contract. ¶2 When Ivory did not return Jackson’s deposits, she sued Ivory, Ivory’s sales agent, and Momentum, asserting claims for (among other things) fraud, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss each of Jackson’s claims. Jackson opposed the motion and filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint. The district court denied Jackson’s motion for leave to amend her complaint and granted in full the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Jackson now appeals portions of the district court’s rulings. We affirm. BACKGROUND 1 Jackson’s Decision to Purchase a House from Ivory ¶3 Given “the strength of the housing market, the significant demand for existing homes[,] and the record low interest rates that existed at the time,” Jackson contacted and met with Ivory in early 2022 about purchasing a home. Ivory “made the idea of purchasing new homes very appealing” and “convinced [Jackson] to build a new home” in an Ivory development in Provo, Utah. The purchase price for the lot Jackson wanted was $205,000, and the price for a home with the “Raleigh” design and “PLATINUM PACKAGE” she selected was $578,400, for a total initial purchase price of $783,400. Jackson had not been preapproved for a loan, but Ivory assured her it “had every confidence that [she] would 1. “When reviewing a decision granting a motion to dismiss, we view the facts pled in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Legal Tender Services PLLC v. Bank of Am. Fork, 2022 UT App 26, n.1, 506 P.3d 1211 (cleaned up). 20241234-CA 2 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes qualify” for financing with Momentum. Ivory told Jackson “to not worry” because “Momentum would take care of [her].” 2 ¶4 To place a hold on a building lot, Jackson was required to pay a $5,000 deposit to Ivory. Jackson paid that deposit in response to “the pressured urging and representations” of Derek Wenn, an Ivory sales agent. After receiving the deposit, Ivory sent Jackson a real estate purchase agreement (the Agreement), which she signed on June 14, 2022 (the Agreement Date). Under the Agreement, the initial deposit of $5,000 was nonrefundable, but it was to be credited toward the purchase price. The Agreement ¶5 The Agreement required Jackson to participate in a pre- construction meeting within forty-five days of the Agreement Date to approve the “pre-construction plans and specifications and a site plan,” complete a “color and material selection form,” and pay a pre-construction deposit. The pre-construction deposit was to be no less than fifteen percent of the final purchase price, and it was due by “the Firm Date,” which the Agreement defined as the earlier of forty-five days after the Agreement Date and the date of the pre-construction meeting. As with the initial deposit, the pre-construction deposit was nonrefundable. ¶6 The Agreement identified Jackson’s anticipated lender as Momentum and stated, “‘Lender’—Must be approved by [Ivory].” Elsewhere the Agreement similarly provided, 2. Jackson’s complaint is unclear as to whether these assurances were made before or after Jackson signed the real estate purchase agreement. Because we must “view the facts pled in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to [Jackson],” Legal Tender Services PLLC, 2022 UT App 26, n.1 (cleaned up), we assume Ivory made these assurances to Jackson before she signed the agreement. 20241234-CA 3 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes “[Jackson’s] use of any lender other than [Momentum] must be approved by [Ivory], in [Ivory’s] sole discretion.” The Agreement also stated, however, that while Ivory had “a business relationship with Momentum,” Jackson was “not required to use Momentum’s lending services as a condition of [her] purchase” and that she could “use any financial institution of [her] choice.” ¶7 Per the Agreement, Jackson was to complete a loan application within seven days of the Agreement Date and to provide Ivory—by the Firm Date—with a letter from Momentum confirming that she was qualified for the necessary financing. By signing the Agreement, Jackson acknowledged that Ivory had “no control over Momentum’s, or any other lender’s, credit decisions or underwriting processes”; that “[Jackson’s] lender, and not [Ivory], [was] the only party authorized to make commitments as to the terms of” any loan; and that Ivory had “encourage[d] [Jackson] to obtain [her] own independent financial, tax, and legal advice.” Moreover, the Agreement stated that Jackson’s obligations under the Agreement, “including but not limited to [her] obligation to purchase the [home], [were] not contingent upon [Jackson] obtaining financing acceptable to [Jackson].” ¶8 By signing the Agreement, Jackson also agreed to the following release and waiver: [Jackson] hereby waives and releases [Ivory] and . . . [Ivory’s] employees . . . from any and all liability for, and shall indemnify [Ivory] and [Ivory’s employees] from any and all liability for, and shall indemnify [Ivory] and [Ivory’s employees] against all past, present, future, contingent, anticipated and perceived claims of any nature . . . that arise from [Jackson’s] actions, [Jackson’s] failure to act and [Jackson’s] making financial decisions with respect to advice, opinions, projections or other information given to [Jackson] by [Ivory] or [Ivory’s employees] 20241234-CA 4 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes (either at [Jackson’s] request or on the initiative of [Ivory] or [Ivory’s employees]) regarding . . . financial . . . aspects of this transaction. Jackson further waived and released Ivory “from all claims in equity of any nature, except as specifically reserved in [the] Agreement[,] arising from perceived breaches by [Ivory].” ¶9 The Agreement stated that Jackson was “not relying upon any warranties, promises, guarantees or representations made by [Ivory], by anyone acting or claiming to act on behalf of [Ivory] or by [an Ivory employee], including any sales agent, unless the same [was] reduced to writing and made part of [the] Agreement.” And, finally, the Agreement contained the following integration clause: [The] Agreement and the documents that are specifically referred to herein constitute the entire understanding and agreement of the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein as of the date hereof, and supersede all prior oral and written agreements, discussions and understandings of the parties hereto as to the matters set forth herein. No representations have been made to induce the parties hereto to enter into this Agreement, except as are set forth herein. No amendment, change, or modification of any provision contained in this Agreement shall be effective unless fully set forth in a writing signed by both [Jackson] and [Ivory]. To be clear, no representation of any sales agent or other [Ivory employee] shall be binding on [Ivory], unless such representation is then fully set forth in writing and signed by both [Jackson and Ivory]. 20241234-CA 5 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes The Pre-construction Meeting and Pre-construction Deposit ¶10 Jackson had been told that Momentum would reach out to her to “work on pre-qualifying [her]” for a loan, but Momentum did not do so before the pre-construction meeting. Thus, “it was [Jackson] who was compelled to initiate the conversation regarding pre-qualification for a home loan.” And as the pre- construction meeting approached, Jackson still did not know whether she was qualified to purchase the home. Nevertheless, based on Ivory’s “confident reassurance,” Jackson went to the pre-construction meeting and chose upgrades for the home, resulting in a new purchase price of about $872,000. Based on the new purchase price, the required pre-construction deposit totaled $126,000, which Jackson paid. Jackson’s Inability to Obtain Financing from Momentum and Her Withdrawal from the Agreement ¶11 After Jackson paid the pre-construction deposit, she “pleaded with [Momentum] to communicate what else” it needed for her to qualify for a loan. Momentum eventually provided Jackson with a loan application form. During the application process, “Momentum and [Ivory] repeatedly reassured [Jackson] that everything was looking great.” Then Momentum “went silent, and communications again ceased.” Jackson nevertheless continued to inquire of Momentum “to confirm her pre- qualification,” and Momentum “kept assuring . . . Jackson that things looked great and to not worry.” But Momentum again “became extremely difficult to communicate with and [was] largely unresponsive.” Jackson scheduled meetings with Momentum, but the meetings were canceled. In the meantime, Ivory was constructing the home. ¶12 “In March 2023, [Momentum] finally requested [Jackson’s] tax returns.” Jackson’s returns made use of the “Augusta 20241234-CA 6 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes Strategy.” 3 Momentum “reviewed [the] returns and applied the ‘Augusta Strategy’ all the way up the chain of reviewers.” Eventually, however, “the underwriters would not count that tax strategy as income” and declined to approve Jackson for a loan. Having failed to qualify for a loan from Momentum, Jackson eventually “was compelled to withdraw” from purchasing the home. The Lawsuit ¶13 Jackson sued Ivory, Wenn, and Momentum, asserting against each defendant causes of action for fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and civil conspiracy. Ivory, Wenn, and Momentum jointly filed a motion to dismiss all of Jackson’s claims. Jackson responded by opposing that motion and filing a motion for leave to amend her complaint. ¶14 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in full. Relevant to this appeal, the court determined that (1) Jackson’s fraud-based claims were “barred by the economic 3. The Augusta Strategy is based on section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code and originated so that residents of Augusta, Georgia, could rent their homes tax-free during the Masters golf tournament. Vlad Rusz, How Business Owners Can Use the Augusta Rule Tax Strategy, Forbes, https://forbes.com/councils /forbesfinancecouncil/2023/02/28/how-business-owners-can-use- the-augusta-rule-tax-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/45JW-NAN8]. Under the strategy, a business entity owned by the homeowner rents the homeowner’s residence for up to fourteen days per year for a legitimate business purpose and deducts the rental cost as an ordinary business expense, while the homeowner receives the rent as income but is exempt from paying federal income tax on it. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 280A(g). 20241234-CA 7 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes loss doctrine”; (2) Jackson “waived all equitable claims” against Ivory and Wenn, including her claim for unjust enrichment; and (3) Jackson’s breach-of-contract allegations constituted “legal conclusions that [were] contradicted by the terms of the [Agreement].” The court denied Jackson’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, concluding that the proposed amended complaint “would not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Jackson now appeals. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶15 Jackson asserts that the district court erred by dismissing her fraud-based claims against Ivory and Wenn and her unjust enrichment and breach-of-contract claims against Ivory. 4 “Because a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, the standard of review is correctness. This standard of review grants no deference to the decision of the district court.” Lavender v. FCOI Pres., LLC, 2025 UT App 47, ¶ 37, 569 P.3d 1037 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 570 P.3d 660 (Utah 2025). ¶16 Jackson also asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint. Generally, we review the denial of a motion for leave to amend under an abuse of discretion standard. See Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 11, 427 P.3d 4. Jackson also requests reinstatement of her claim against Ivory for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but only if we reverse the dismissal of her breach-of-contract claim against Ivory. Because we affirm the dismissal of her breach-of-contract claim against Ivory, we do not disturb the dismissal of her claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Jackson does not challenge the dismissal of any of her other claims against Ivory and Wenn, nor does she challenge the dismissal of any of her claims against Momentum. The dismissal of those claims therefore stands. 20241234-CA 8 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes 1155. But “[w]hen the purported futility of the amendment justifies the denial of a motion to amend, we review for correctness.” Id. ¶ 16. ANALYSIS I. Motion to Dismiss A. Fraud ¶17 Jackson asserts that the district court erred by dismissing her fraud-based claims against Ivory and Wenn on the basis that the claims were barred by the economic loss rule. Jackson’s argument on appeal fails to persuade us that the court erred in its application of the economic loss rule. ¶18 One branch of the economic loss rule “applies when a contract exists between the parties.” HealthBanc Int’l, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc., 2018 UT 61, ¶ 12, 435 P.3d 193. “This branch declares that when a conflict arises between parties to a contract regarding the subject matter of that contract, the contractual relationship controls, and parties are not permitted to assert actions in tort.” Id. (cleaned up). Our supreme court explained in HealthBanc that this principle holds true for claims of fraudulent inducement when “the alleged fraudulent inducement overlaps completely with a claim for breach of contract.” Id. ¶ 16. The supreme court held that “[w]hen the subject matter of the inducing promises [is] later negotiated for and included in the contract,” a fraud-in-the-inducement claim stemming from those promises is barred by the economic loss rule. Id. ¶ 19. ¶19 Here, the district court cited the foregoing holding from HealthBanc and determined that the Agreement addressed the subject matter of the promises that Jackson alleges induced her 20241234-CA 9 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes into signing the Agreement. On that basis, the court concluded that the economic loss rule barred Jackson’s fraud-based claims. ¶20 On appeal, Jackson acknowledges that the district court “was generally correct in its assessment of the key holding found in the HealthBanc case.” Moreover, Jackson does not challenge the court’s determination that the Agreement addresses the subject matter of the promises she claims induced her into signing the Agreement. Instead, she notes that the HealthBanc court did not “foreclose the possibility of a fraudulent inducement exception [to the economic loss rule] in some other circumstance.” (Quoting id. ¶ 23.) She then argues that this case presents a circumstance for which there is an established exception to application of the economic loss rule. Specifically, Jackson points to Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235, as establishing an applicable exception to application of the economic loss rule. We disagree. ¶21 In Hermansen, the plaintiffs purchased a building lot in a subdivision. Id. ¶ 2. The sale was negotiated through the developer’s real estate broker. Id. ¶ 3. After the plaintiffs built on the lot, “some parts of [their] home settl[ed] 3.75 inches, causing substantial structural damage.” Id. ¶ 5. The plaintiffs asserted that the settling was due to “significant problems with the stability of the soil and subsurface conditions at the subdivision,” of which the developer’s real estate broker and agent were or should have been aware. Id. The plaintiffs sued the broker and agent for negligence, id. ¶ 9, asserting that “real estate professionals hired by a vendor are expected to be honest, ethical, and competent” and that the broker and agent “each breached that duty when they failed to disclose [the] material defects in the property,” id. ¶ 8. On summary judgment, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the broker and agent, citing the economic loss rule as “preclud[ing] claims for economic loss arising from nonintentional torts.” Id. ¶ 9. 20241234-CA 10 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes ¶22 The plaintiffs appealed to our supreme court. Id. ¶ 1. Addressing the limits of the economic loss rule, the supreme court said that in cases such as Hermansen, “where the line between contract and tort blurs,” the relevant inquiry is “whether a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between the parties.” Id. ¶ 17. The supreme court explained that “when an independent duty exists, the economic loss rule does not bar a tort claim because the claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule.” Id. (cleaned up). The supreme court then concluded that even though a real estate broker hired by a seller does not owe a fiduciary duty to prospective purchasers, the broker “is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his or her statutory duty to the public.” Id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up). That duty, the court explained, is to “disclose facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that [are] known to” the broker because a licensed broker “holds himself [or herself] out to the public as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field.” Id. ¶ 20 (cleaned up). Given the existence of that duty—independent of any contractual obligation—the supreme court reversed the district court’s application of the economic loss rule to dismiss the plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the developer’s broker and agent. See id. ¶¶ 18–23, 38. ¶23 Relying on Hermansen, Jackson contends that the economic loss rule should not apply to her fraud-based claims because “Wenn holds a license as an associate broker” and, thus, had an independent duty “‘to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for his . . . statutory duty to the public.’” (Quoting id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up).) However, real estate brokers do not, by virtue of their licensing, hold themselves out as having particular skills or knowledge in the field of financing, and they have no statutory duty to advise potential purchasers as to whether they qualify for financing. Because real estate brokers have no such independent duty, the holding in Hermansen does 20241234-CA 11 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes not apply here to provide an exception to the economic loss rule when it comes to Jackson’s fraud-based claims. ¶24 In sum, because Jackson does not challenge the district court’s determination that the Agreement addresses the subject matter of the promises that she claims induced her into signing the Agreement, and because Hermansen does not apply to provide an exception to the economic loss rule under the facts of this case, we affirm the district court’s application of the economic loss rule to dismiss Jackson’s fraud-based claims. 5 B. Unjust Enrichment ¶25 Jackson also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her unjust enrichment claim against Ivory. The district court did not err. ¶26 “[A] prerequisite for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the conduct at issue.” Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, ¶ 14, 227 P.3d 246. If there is such a contract, “it, rather than the law of restitution, . . . govern[s] the parties’ rights and determine[s] their recovery.” Id. Jackson does not dispute that the Agreement is an enforceable contract 5. Even if the economic loss rule did not bar Jackson’s fraud claims, Jackson does not allege that she provided Ivory or Wenn any particular information regarding her financial situation. Where there is no suggestion that they had any knowledge regarding the particulars of her financial situation, any reliance Jackson may have placed on their expressions of “confidence that [she] would qualify” for a loan or on their assurances “to not worry” because “Momentum would take care of [her]” was not reasonable. Jackson’s fraud claims fail for this reason as well. See Gerwe v. Gerwe, 2018 UT App 75, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 1113 (identifying reasonable reliance as an element of fraudulent inducement). 20241234-CA 12 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes governing the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the conduct at issue. Indeed, she relies on the existence of the Agreement and its enforceability to assert breach-of-contract claims against Ivory. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing her unjust enrichment claim. 6 C. Breach of Contract ¶27 Jackson further asserts that she successfully asserted a breach-of-contract claim against Ivory. She is mistaken. ¶28 “The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party, and (4) damages.” Richards v. Cook, 2013 UT App 250, ¶ 7, 314 P.3d 1040 (cleaned up). “To establish a breach of contract claim, a party must identify a contracted duty that the other party has breached.” Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App 283, ¶ 41, 288 P.3d 1046 (cleaned up). 6. In addition to relying on the reasoning we employ here to affirm the dismissal of Jackson’s unjust enrichment claim against Ivory, the district court also relied on the provision of the Agreement under which Jackson agreed to waive “all claims in equity of any nature, except as specifically reserved in [the] Agreement.” Jackson now argues that “there is no evidence that [she] was aware that she had potential ‘equitable rights’ or even knew what those ‘equitable rights’ were.” Jackson’s assertion is both partially mistaken and wholly unavailing. The Agreement’s statement that Jackson was waiving “all claims in equity of any nature” plainly informed her that, absent the waiver, she would potentially have such claims. The Agreement also clearly conveyed that, regardless of whether Jackson knew what her equitable rights were, she was waiving any claims based on those rights. Jackson’s unjust enrichment claim fails for this reason as well. 20241234-CA 13 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes ¶29 Jackson states that the “central premise” of her breach-of- contract claim is that Ivory “created a situation by which [she] was required to make ‘non-refundable’ deposits, which deposits were made based on the assurance that [she] would qualify for financing through [Momentum] and that [she] need not worry about obtaining the financing.” She asserts that the Agreement contained “certain provisions . . . that, if followed, would have prevented [her] from losing the $131,000.00 ‘deposit’ that she made,” and she identifies and explains a number of provisions that she believes fit within that category. However, the only contracted obligation that she identifies as having been breached was her own obligation to provide Ivory, by the Firm Date, with a letter from Momentum confirming that she was qualified to obtain a loan. She suggests that this failure was due to “Momentum’s delays and failure to communicate,” and she highlights her allegation that after her payment of the pre- construction deposit, “Momentum became even more difficult to communicate with and even canceled scheduled meetings.” She further identifies the arguable incongruity between the Agreement’s statement that Jackson’s “use of any lender other than [Momentum had to] be approved by [Ivory]” and its statement that Jackson was “not required to use Momentum’s lending services.” And she discusses the interplay of additional provisions of the Agreement that she argues allowed Ivory to obtain a “windfall by keeping $131,000.00 of [her] deposits while selling the house at market value to another party.” But she nowhere identifies a contracted duty that Ivory breached. Accordingly, her breach-of-contract claim fails, and the district court did not err by determining as much. 7 7. The underlying gist of Jackson’s breach-of-contract claim is that the Agreement was unfair, perhaps even “[un]conscionable.” But the elements of, and remedies for, a breach-of-contract claim are (continued…) 20241234-CA 14 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes II. Motion for Leave to Amend ¶30 Finally, Jackson maintains that the district court improperly denied her motion for leave to amend her complaint. But she identifies none of the changes between her original complaint and the proposed amended complaint. Nor does she explain how those changes would have allowed the proposed amended complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. She has not, therefore, adequately briefed this argument, see State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 380, ¶ 16, 264 P.3d 770 (“An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.” (cleaned up)), and, for that reason, she has not met her distinct from those of a claim that a contract is unconscionable. Compare Richards v. Cook, 2013 UT App 250, ¶ 7, 314 P.3d 1040 (identifying the elements of a breach-of-contract claim), and TruGreen Cos., LLC v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2008 UT 81, ¶ 10, 199 P.3d 929 (identifying various breach-of-contract remedies, including expectation damages and consequential damages), with Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 461–62 (Utah 1983) (identifying factors for determining unconscionability), and Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 365 n.4 (Utah 1996) (identifying remedies for unconscionable contracts). And neither Jackson’s original complaint nor her proposed amended complaint attempted to state a claim for unconscionability. Nor did they account for the fact that, as Ivory explains, Jackson’s deposits under the contract were designed to “cover [Ivory’s] upfront costs such as design work, permitting, purchasing materials, and hiring subcontractors” and to “deter [Jackson] from reneging after [Ivory] . . . sunk significant time and costs into a custom-designed home.” See generally Sosa, 924 P.2d at 361 (explaining that a determination of unconscionability must take into account “the relative fairness of the obligations assumed” as well as “the mores and business practices of the time and place” (cleaned up)). 20241234-CA 15 2026 UT App 165  Jackson v. Ivory Homes burden of persuasion on this issue, see Crossgrove v. Stan Checketts Props., LLC, 2015 UT App 35, ¶ 6, 344 P.3d 1136 (“[A]n inadequately briefed argument is insufficient to discharge an appellant’s burden of persuasion on appeal.”). CONCLUSION ¶31 Jackson has not persuaded us that her fraud-based claims against Ivory and Wenn survive the economic loss rule. Her unjust enrichment claim against Ivory is barred by the existence of the Agreement. Her breach-of-contract claim against Ivory fails because she has identified no provision of the Agreement that Ivory breached. And she does not challenge the dismissal of the remainder of the claims in her original complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of her complaint. We also affirm the district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, because we determine that her argument in favor of reversal on that point is inadequately briefed. 20241234-CA 16 2026 UT App 165