Coombs v. Natural Choice LLC

2026 UT App 145 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS KIRK WADE COOMBS; ROCHE RANCHES, INC.; WF GORING AND SONS, INC.; VICARS TRUCKING, INC.; YOUNG RESOURCES LTD PARTNERSHIP; J6 RANCHES, LLC; BURKE N. UDY; CORINNE H. UDY; AND N.W.R. LTD PARTNERSHIP, Appellees, v. NATURAL CHOICE, LLC, Appellant. KIRK WADE COOMBS; ROCHE RANCHES, INC.; WF GORING AND SONS, INC.; VICARS TRUCKING, INC.; YOUNG RESOURCES LTD PARTNERSHIP; J6 RANCHES, LLC; BURKE N. UDY; CORINNE H. UDY; AND NATURAL CHOICE, LLC, Appellees, v. N.W.R. LTD PARTNERSHIP, Appellant. Opinion Nos. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA Filed September 24, 2026 First District Court, Brigham City Department The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard No. 160100162 Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Rachel Phillips Ainscough, Hannah Leavitt-Howell, Mikayla Irvin, and Laura J. Fuller, Attorneys for Appellant and Appellee Natural Choice, LLC Troy L. Booher, Taylor P. Webb, Olivia C. Shaughnessy, David E. Kingston, Todd Weiler, and Kristen Kiburtz, Attorneys for Appellant and Appellee N.W.R. LTD Partnership  Coombs v. Natural Choice Jonathan R. Grover, Attorney for all other Appellees JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge: ¶1 In the underlying case, Kirk Wade Coombs; Roche Ranches, Inc.; WF Goring and Sons, Inc.; Vicars Trucking, Inc.; Young Resources LTD Partnership; J6 Ranches, LLC; Burke N. Udy; and Corinne H. Udy (collectively, Landowners) brought claims against N.W.R. LTD Partnership (NWR) and Natural Choice, LLC (Natural Choice), alleging that the negligence of NWR and Natural Choice caused a wildfire that spread to and damaged their properties. At the close of trial, the jury found that NWR and Natural Choice were both negligent and both caused damages, but it attributed one hundred percent of the fault to NWR. Having done so, it assessed compensatory damages against NWR (but not against Natural Choice), after which it awarded punitive damages against both NWR and Natural Choice. ¶2 NWR and Natural Choice separately appealed, and we address both appeals in this opinion. NWR argues in its appeal that the special verdict form completed by the jury was inconsistent and requires a new trial and that the trial court erred in determining otherwise. Natural Choice argues in its appeal that the trial court erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a vicarious liability claim that it asserts Landowners never pleaded. We agree that the jury verdict was inconsistent and requires a new trial, so we vacate the verdict and remand this case for further proceedings. We also exercise our discretion to provide guidance upon remand related to Natural Choice’s vicarious liability argument, determining that the trial court did not err in 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 2 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice considering the vicarious liability claim to have been sufficiently pleaded. 1 BACKGROUND ¶3 NWR owns land in a canyon in Box Elder County that borders properties owned by Landowners. Natural Choice leased this land from NWR via a lease agreement signed on July 1, 2014. Natural Choice is owned by Jeremiah Kingston, who is related to certain partners and shareholders of NWR. The Fire ¶4 In the summer of 2016, Luke Nelson, who is also related to Jeremiah, 2 was working for NWR. According to Luke, Box Elder County warned him that the thistle on NWR’s property was becoming a problem and needed to be taken care of. Luke said he then informed Jeremiah about the notice to remove the thistle. ¶5 However, another relative, Samuel Kingston, who was the one who attempted to remove the thistle, would later testify that he was not aware of any direction from the county to cut down thistle. Instead, he understood that he was going to knock down weeds on the property to clear out the area so he could make improvements to the water pumping system—a job that he said he was hired to perform as an independent contractor. 1. Each appellant raises additional issues in its appeal. However, because we determine that a new trial is necessary based on the inconsistent verdict, we need not reach these additional issues. 2. Because multiple individuals involved in this case share a last name, we refer to the involved individuals by their given names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 3 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice ¶6 Either way, on August 3, 2016, Natural Choice sent Samuel to clear the thistle with a backhoe. Samuel drove the backhoe up the canyon to the property and began using the bucket on the backhoe to flatten the thistle. At some point, “a fire started where the weeds had just been knocked down by the backhoe.” Samuel first responded by using the backhoe to push the burning thistle into areas of dirt in an attempt to stop the fire. While Samuel was trying to stop the fire, he also took out his cell phone and attempted to call 911 and Jeremiah, but he had no service. When it became clear that the fire was beyond his control, Samuel began driving the backhoe down the canyon for help. Somewhere along the way, his cell phone gained service and a call to Jeremiah successfully went through. ¶7 Firefighters soon arrived at the scene and, after fighting the fire for some time, were finally able to extinguish it. By that point, the fire had burned over 20,000 acres, including portions of Landowners’ properties. The Lawsuit Filings and Discovery ¶8 In October 2016, Landowners sued NWR, seeking damages caused by the fire. Landowners asserted claims of negligence and nuisance, among other claims. NWR then filed a third-party complaint against Natural Choice, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and indemnification. Landowners thereafter amended their complaint to include Natural Choice as an additional defendant. ¶9 Landowners later amended their complaint again, this time adding claims of vicarious liability and alter ego against NWR. Landowners asserted that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, NWR was “responsible for the negligence and any breach of duties . . . by Natural Choice which ha[d] caused damages to [Landowners].” Landowners also argued that 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 4 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice because there was “such a unity of interest, ownership[,] and control by [NWR] and Natural Choice that they [were] inseparable one from another,” the two entities were alter egos of each other and, thus, “each [was] personally liable for the actions of the other, and judgment must therefore be entered against [NWR] and Natural Choice, jointly and severally.” ¶10 Landowners’ amended complaint contained essentially the same allegations of negligence as found in their first complaint. Specifically, Landowners alleged, “On or about August 3, 2016, [NWR and Natural Choice], their agents or employs, started or ignited a fire while scraping and cleaning a thistle patch with a backhoe.” Landowners then argued that NWR and Natural Choice “owed a duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of performance implemented by any person operating equipment or starting a fire” and that NWR and Natural Choice “owed a duty to [Landowners] to act in a reasonable manner when using their backhoe to prohibit causing destruction to [Landowners’] property.” Landowners also argued that NWR and Natural Choice had breached these duties “by wrongfully igniting a wildfire which consumed [Landowners’] properties.” However, despite the fact that the amended complaint clearly treated the operation of the backhoe on the day of the fire as central to Landowners’ claims, and despite the fact that the amended complaint had mentioned the actions of “agents or employs,” Samuel was not mentioned by name anywhere in the amended complaint. ¶11 Nonetheless, early filings in the case by Natural Choice seemed to reflect its understanding that Samuel was acting on its behalf, with Natural Choice characterizing itself as the party that “was using a backhoe” on the day of the fire and the “only party present at the time the fire was started.” And when Natural Choice provided initial disclosures in August 2017, those disclosures identified Samuel as an “individual likely to have 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 5 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice discoverable information” because he had been “working for [Natural Choice] on the day of the fire” and was “likely to have information about the use of the backhoe by Natural Choice.” Additionally, during their depositions, both Jeremiah and Samuel testified that Samuel was an employee of Natural Choice, and for the deposition of the company, Samuel was designated as a rule 30(b)(6) representative to answer certain questions as “a representative” and “an agent” of Natural Choice, see Utah R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (“A party may name as the witness a corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which questioning is requested, and direct the organization to designate one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons to testify on its behalf.”). ¶12 Shortly before trial, in September 2023, the court held a hearing to discuss proposed jury instructions and objections that had been recently raised in response to them. Landowners had proposed an instruction telling the jury that Landowners were asserting that Samuel was an agent of Natural Choice “acting within the scope of [his] employment when the fire started,” and then instructing the jury that if the jury agreed with that assertion, it must find Natural Choice liable for Samuel’s actions. At the hearing, Natural Choice opposed the instruction, arguing that in Landowners’ amended complaint “they never allege[d] that Natural Choice [was] vicariously liable for the acts of another person” and, thus, that Landowners were “trying to give instructions regarding a cause of action that they did not bring.” ¶13 Landowners responded, pointing out that “all of the causes of action against Natural Choice . . . [were] for conduct which Natural Choice as an entity could not itself engage in” and that “Natural Choice could only be held liable for starting a fire vicariously.” They then asserted that “because [Samuel] was an employee or agent of Natural Choice, Natural Choice [was] liable 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 6 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice for his actions in starting the fire, regardless of whether the words ‘respondeat superior’ appeared in the complaint or not.” ¶14 The court agreed with Landowners, determining that the claim had “been pled sufficiently to be able to move forward.” The court recognized the dispute regarding whether Samuel had ever been employed by Natural Choice, but the court stated that this was “a factual issue that would be determined by the jury” and that it did not have a bearing on whether the claim was sufficiently pleaded. The Trial and the Special Verdict Forms ¶15 A jury trial was held in October and November 2023. One of the many issues addressed at trial was the relationship between Natural Choice and Samuel. Samuel and Jeremiah, on the one hand, testified that Samuel was working as an independent contractor on the day of the fire. Landowners, on the other hand, presented evidence that Samuel was an employee of Natural Choice, questioning Jeremiah and Samuel about their previous deposition testimony where they had agreed that Samuel was an employee and about the fact that Samuel had been designated as a rule 30(b)(6) representative to answer questions on behalf of Natural Choice in its deposition. ¶16 After nine days of testimony, the jury began its deliberations, guided by a special verdict form to which the parties had stipulated. The first four questions on the special verdict form asked (1) whether NWR was negligent in causing the fire, (2) whether Natural Choice was negligent in causing the fire, (3) whether NWR’s negligence was “a substantial factor in causing” Landowners’ damages, and (4) whether Natural Choice’s negligence was “a substantial factor in causing” Landowners’ damages. Several questions later, question 10 asked, “Was Natural Choice an ‘alter ego’ of NWR?” And question 12 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 7 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice asked the jury to allocate “[w]hat percentage of the fault [was] attributable” to each of several entities, including NWR and Natural Choice. ¶17 During deliberations, the jury asked the court, “We need some clarification on question 12 of the special verdict form?” The court responded, “Please be more specific in your request.” The jury then clarified, “We want to know if the percentage of fault to each choice correlates to the [amount] of damages that each defendant would have to pay.” The court discussed the request with the parties, and they agreed on the following response: “It depends on how other questions in the special verdict form are answered.” ¶18 The jury thereafter returned a verdict. The jury answered each of the first four questions in the affirmative, finding that both NWR and Natural Choice were negligent in starting the fire and that the negligence of each was “a substantial factor in causing” Landowners’ damages. The jury also answered question 10 affirmatively, finding that Natural Choice was an alter ego of NWR. But then, in response to question 12, the jury indicated that “100%” of the fault was attributable to NWR and that “0%” of the fault was attributable to each of the other entities, including Natural Choice. The jury also determined the amounts of damages sustained by the individual landowners. ¶19 The jury remained empaneled, as an additional trial day was needed to address the issue of punitive damages. While the jury was still empaneled, NWR filed a motion pursuant to rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and requesting that the court “either return the jury for further consideration, or order a new trial.” NWR argued that the jury’s allocation of all the fault to NWR and none of the fault to Natural Choice “contradict[ed] the jury’s finding that Natural Choice was negligent, and that its negligence 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 8 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice caused some of [Landowners’] damages.” The trial court denied the motion, explaining its view that the verdict was consistent because the jury found that Natural Choice was an alter ego of NWR and, therefore, “in the jury’s mind, [NWR] would have been 100 percent liable because of that.” ¶20 The parties then tried the punitive damages issue. In his statements to the jury, Natural Choice’s attorney argued, “You put 100 percent of the fault on NWR. And so I would suggest to you that the amount of punitive damages to Natural Choice should also be zero.” Nonetheless, the jury ultimately returned a second special verdict determining that NWR and Natural Choice should each be required to pay $1,185,000 in punitive damages. The Posttrial Motion ¶21 After the jury was discharged, NWR filed a motion for a new trial. Among other issues it raised, NWR argued for a second time that a new trial was warranted based on the inconsistent verdict, incorporating the same arguments from its earlier rule 49 motion. At the hearing on the motion, NWR explained that it “still believe[d] that the verdict was inherently and internally inconsistent” and wanted to “preserv[e] that argument for appeal.” The trial court again denied NWR’s request. NWR and Natural Choice then separately appealed. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶22 In its appeal, NWR argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the jury verdict was not inconsistent. “We review for correctness a trial court’s determination of whether a special verdict is inconsistent.” Tooele Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 709. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 9 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice ¶23 In its appeal, Natural Choice argues that the trial court erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a claim of vicarious liability that it believes Landowners had not sufficiently pleaded. Although this issue arose in the context of objections to jury instructions, the underlying issue is whether Landowners sufficiently raised the issue of Natural Choice’s vicarious liability in their pleadings. Thus, we review the trial court’s decision on this matter for correctness. See State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 43, 582 P.3d 772 (“[T]he applicable standard of review for jury instruction issues should be determined as it is for any other issue on appeal. In general, the standard of review is based on the nature of the issue on appeal.”); Aguila v. Planned Parenthood of Utah, 2023 UT App 49, ¶ 11, 530 P.3d 959 (reviewing “under a correctness standard” the district court’s ruling regarding whether a party’s pleading was sufficient (quotation simplified)). ANALYSIS I. The Inconsistent Verdict ¶24 When, as happened here, a potential inconsistency in the jury verdict is brought to the trial court’s attention while the jury is still empaneled, “a powerful option exists that does not exist later: the court can simply ask the jury what it meant.” KTM Health Care Inc. v. SG Nursing Home LLC, 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 36, 436 P.3d 151. Indeed, “it seems terribly inefficient not to obtain clarification from a still-empaneled jury of the meaning of its answers and verdict, especially when we consider that unclarified inconsistent answers often necessitate a retrial of the entire case.” Id. ¶ 43 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, “trial courts must be given a measure of discretion in determining whether inconsistencies are present” and “should be encouraged to seek the jury’s input while they still can, without having to worry about being reversed on appeal because, technically speaking and after comprehensive 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 10 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice research and briefing, the original verdict turned out to be reconcilable after all.” Id. ¶ 37. We therefore grant trial courts in this situation the discretion both to determine whether an inconsistency is present and to choose to send the case back to the jury for clarification. See id. ¶¶ 37, 43. ¶25 However, “if the court elects not to seek clarification from the jury or the inconsistency is not noticed until after the jury has been dismissed, the court must then attempt to harmonize the answers, or order a new trial.” Clyma v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 03-CV- 809, 2008 WL 3394616, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2008), quoted in KTM Health Care Inc., 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 35. Because at that point it is no longer possible to seek clarification from the jury as to any potential inconsistencies, and because of the time and expense inherent in a new trial, courts should then “make every effort to view the special verdict form in a way that permits each of the answers to be reconciled with the others.” KTM Health Care Inc., 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 32. In other words, we will “resolve any inconsistency in favor of giving effect to a jury verdict,” Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 49, 247 P.3d 380, and we will sustain the verdict “if the judgment can be read harmoniously,” id. ¶ 76 (quotation simplified). But if the inconsistency cannot ultimately be resolved, a new trial is warranted. See Olé Mexican Foods Inc. v. J & W Distrib. LLC, 2024 UT App 67, ¶ 29, 549 P.3d 663; KTM Health Care Inc., 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 34. ¶26 NWR asserts that there were inconsistencies in the first special verdict that cannot be reconciled and require reversal and the grant of a new trial. Specifically, NWR points to the jury’s findings, on the one hand, that Natural Choice was negligent in causing the fire and that this negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing damages to Landowners and, on the other hand, that Natural Choice was zero percent at fault. NWR asserts that “[a] party cannot have acted negligently and caused damages yet bear no fault.” We agree. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 11 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice ¶27 Under Utah’s comparative fault scheme, fault allocation is the mechanism by which responsibility for damages is assigned. See Utah Code § 78B-5-818(3) (“No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant . . . .”). And the statutory scheme defines “fault” as “any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees.” Id. § 78B-5-817(2). Thus, fault exists when a party’s negligence proximately caused or contributed to the sustained damages. ¶28 The jury instructions here were largely consistent with this statutory scheme. The instructions stated that “[f]ault means any wrongful act or failure to act” and that “[t]he wrongful act or failure to act alleged in this case is negligence.” The instructions then told the jury it “must also determine whether a person’s fault caused [Landowners’] harm” and further stated, “If you decide that more than one person or entity is at fault, you must decide each person’s percentage of fault that caused the harm.” The jury was therefore instructed that it needed to allocate what “percentage of fault that caused the harm” was attributable to each of the parties involved. ¶29 Thus, it was inconsistent for the jury to determine that Natural Choice was “negligent in causing the fire” and that its negligence was “a substantial factor in causing some or all of the damages sustained by [Landowners]” and yet also determine that zero percent of the fault was attributable to Natural Choice (that is, that Natural Choice was responsible for none of the fault that caused the harm). These findings cannot be reconciled under any reasonable interpretation of the verdict. ¶30 Natural Choice and Landowners disagree, arguing that the trial court correctly reconciled the special verdict by reliance on 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 12 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice the jury’s additional finding that Natural Choice is an alter ego of NWR. Natural Choice asserts that because the jury was also instructed that “under the alter ego doctrine a stockholder may be liable for the obligations of the corporation,” the jury could have reasonably understood “that it could hold NWR liable for Natural Choice’s actions” and therefore could have chosen to apportion one hundred percent of the fault and liability to NWR. Landowners likewise argue that due to the alter ego finding, the jury “attributed 100% of the fault to NWR because the actions of Natural Choice became the actions of NWR.” ¶31 Certainly the jury, at least initially, experienced some confusion related to the allocation of fault question on the special verdict form, prompting it to request further guidance on the matter. But even assuming the court’s answer to the question did not sufficiently clear up any such confusion and the jury mistakenly understood that an alter ego determination would require it to assign all of Natural Choice’s fault to NWR, that nonetheless does not provide a way for us to interpret the special verdict form in a way that is legally consistent. ¶32 Under an alter ego theory, the alter ego is “liable only to the same extent that the [underlying corporation] is liable.” Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 767 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, “a finding of fact of alter ego, standing alone, creates no cause of action” but “merely furnishes a means for a complainant to reach a second corporation or individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have existed only against the first corporation.” 1 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 41.10 (2026) (emphasis added). Thus, even where the jury determined that alter ego provides a means to hold NWR liable for the fault of Natural Choice, this does not eradicate Natural Choice’s liability for that same fault. If Natural Choice were zero percent at fault, there would be no fault to pass on to NWR through an alter ego determination. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 13 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice ¶33 Moreover, the matter is further complicated here by the fact that Landowners brought claims against NWR directly as well as claims asserting that NWR could be indirectly liable under the alter ego theory. So even assuming the jury decided it was appropriate to pass along all of Natural Choice’s fault to NWR on question 12, it does not follow that all of the fault the jury ultimately attributed to NWR was based on the alter ego theory; some portion of the fault could have been based on direct liability. We are therefore left with no way to discern what percentage of the allocated fault of one hundred percent was a result of NWR’s direct liability and what percentage of the allocated fault was a result of an alter ego finding (which would be fault for which Natural Choice would also be responsible). Thus, the answers the jury ultimately gave simply cannot be reconciled in an unambiguous manner, and we must remand this case for a new trial. II. Guidance on Remand ¶34 Our above determination that a new trial is required makes it unnecessary to address many of the other issues raised on appeal. However, we choose to provide guidance on the issue of which liability theories are available for Landowners to pursue, as that same issue is nearly certain to arise again on remand. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61, 192 P.3d 867 (exercising discretion to address additional issues raised on appeal “for purposes of providing guidance on remand”). ¶35 In its appeal, Natural Choice argues that the trial court erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a claim that they had not sufficiently pleaded. Specifically, Natural Choice argues that Landowners had not sufficiently pleaded that Natural Choice was vicariously liable for the actions of Samuel. We disagree. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 14 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice ¶36 “Utah has adopted the concept of notice pleading, which is defined as a procedural system requiring that the pleader give only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and not a complete detailing of all the facts.” Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT App 144, ¶ 11, 524 P.3d 148 (quotation simplified). This concept is reflected in the requirements set forth by rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring that a pleading “must contain a short and plain: (1) statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) demand for judgment for specified relief”). Rule 8 further requires that pleadings “be construed to do substantial justice.” Id. R. 8(f). “Taken together, these requirements lead to a context specific and flexible approach in applying our rules to parties’ pleadings.” Southern Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan County Comm’n, 2021 UT 6, ¶ 39, 484 P.3d 1160 (quotation simplified). “Under this approach we require only that the basis of the claim must be stated with reasonable certainty and clarity, so the other party will have notice of what he [or she] is obliged to meet.” Id. ¶ 40 (quotation simplified). That is, “pleadings are sufficient where they give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶37 We determine that Landowners’ claim was sufficient under this standard. In its initial allegations, which were later incorporated into the negligence claim, the amended complaint asserted, “On or about August 3, 2016, [NWR and Natural Choice], their agents or employs, started or ignited a fire while scraping and cleaning a thistle patch with a backhoe.” (Emphasis added.) Then, in the negligence claim itself, the amended complaint asserted that NWR and Natural Choice “owed a duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of performance implemented by any person operating equipment or starting a fire” and that they “owed a duty to [Landowners] to act 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 15 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice in a reasonable manner when using their backhoe to prohibit causing destruction to [Landowners’] property.” The negligence claim further alleged that NWR and Natural Choice breached these duties “by wrongfully igniting a wildfire which consumed [Landowners’] properties.” These allegations provided notice to NWR and Natural Choice that Landowners sought to hold them responsible not only for their direct acts but also for the conduct of those acting on their behalf when the fire was ignited with a backhoe. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Natural Choice could have been negligent by igniting the wildfire while using the backhoe without the involvement of an employee or some other individual acting on Natural Choice’s behalf. And we do not see that failing to specifically provide the name of the agent or employee involved rendered Landowners’ claim unclear. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the language of the amended complaint fairly apprised Natural Choice of the nature of Landowners’ claim. ¶38 Further, it is clear from its litigation conduct that Natural Choice had actual notice of the vicarious liability claim involving Samuel and defended itself accordingly as the case progressed and therefore was not prejudiced by any technical pleading deficiency involved in the matter. Natural Choice’s own initial disclosures recognized that Samuel was an “individual likely to have discoverable information” because he had been “working for [Natural Choice] on the day of the fire” and was “likely to have information about the use of the backhoe by Natural Choice.” And years later, Natural Choice designated Samuel as its rule 30(b)(6) representative to answer questions in that regard. Thus, Natural Choice litigated the case for six years being fully aware that Samuel’s conduct was central to Landowners’ claims and that employer-based liability was at issue. Given this, Natural Choice could not, shortly before trial, reasonably claim surprise that Landowners were seeking to hold it responsible for its employee’s actions. Likewise, because allowing Landowners to proceed on a 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 16 2026 UT App 145  Coombs v. Natural Choice vicarious liability theory at this stage did not inject an unforeseen factual dispute into trial or deprive Natural Choice of meaningful discovery, Natural Choice cannot show prejudice from the court’s decision. See Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275–76 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]t is apparent from the defenses raised by [the defendant] that it understood precisely what claims were being made . . . . Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that [the defendant] had notice of [the plaintiff’s] claim and that [the defendant] was not unfairly prejudiced.”). ¶39 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Landowners adequately pleaded that Natural Choice was vicariously liable for the actions of its agents and employees, including Samuel, or in allowing jury instructions related to that subject. CONCLUSION ¶40 Because the jury verdict was inconsistent and cannot be reconciled, we vacate the verdict and remand the case for a new trial. Additionally, we determine that the trial court was correct in ruling that Landowners adequately pleaded a claim against Natural Choice based on vicarious liability, and this conclusion will remain in force during remand proceedings. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA 17 2026 UT App 145