Christiansen Family v. Haas Land Livestock

2026 UT App 166 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CHRISTIANSEN FAMILY TRUST, Appellee, v. HAAS LAND & LIVESTOCK, Appellant. Opinion No. 20251107-CA Filed November 5, 2026 Sixth District Court, Manti Department The Honorable Mandy Larsen No. 210600058 William B. Ingram and Wesley J. Alexander, Attorneys for Appellant Douglas L. Neeley, Attorney for Appellee JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred. HARRIS, Judge: ¶1 This case involves a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of a strip of land (the Disputed Strip) situated along the boundary line separating their respective properties. Haas Land & Livestock (Haas) holds record title to the Disputed Strip, but the Christiansen Family Trust (Christiansen) claims to have acquired the Disputed Strip through operation of the legal doctrine known as boundary by acquiescence. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Christiansen, quieting title to the Disputed Strip in Christiansen and holding Haas liable for trespass. Haas now appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support two of the elements of boundary by acquiescence and challenging one of the court’s evidentiary  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock rulings. For the reasons discussed herein, we reject Haas’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s ruling. BACKGROUND 1 ¶2 Haas owns record title to a parcel of real property in Mayfield, Utah, and Christiansen owns record title to a parcel immediately to the east of the Haas parcel. Haas has owned its parcel since 2021, while Christiansen has owned its parcel much longer, for at least seventy years. A county road runs north to south near the boundary between the two parcels, and a fence (Fence) has existed on the east side of the road since at least 1965. ¶3 In 2021, shortly after purchasing its parcel, Haas had a survey completed that showed that the eastern boundary of its property “went beyond the Fence in an eastern direction into the Christiansen property.” In other words, the survey showed that neither the road nor the Fence was the actual record-title boundary between the parcels and that the record boundaries of Haas’s parcel included a strip of land—the Disputed Strip—on the east side of the road. ¶4 Relying on the survey results—and without consulting Christiansen—Haas “began removing” the Fence and “installing new fence posts along the survey boundary.” In response, Christiansen initiated this lawsuit, seeking to quiet title in the Disputed Strip pursuant to the legal doctrine known as boundary 1. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings,” and we “therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard and only present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Huck v. Ken’s House LLC, 2022 UT App 64, n.1, 511 P.3d 1220 (cleaned up). 20251107-CA 2 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock by acquiescence, and also asserting a trespass claim. The case eventually proceeded to a one-day bench trial. ¶5 At trial, Christiansen called three witnesses, most notably an individual (Predecessor) whose family had owned the Haas parcel for some fifty years. Predecessor’s father owned the Haas parcel from 1970 through 1984, and then Predecessor and her two sisters owned it until about 2020. Predecessor testified that she always understood that her family owned the property “on the west side of the county road” and that the land east of the road “was farmed by” Christiansen. She explained that “there was always a fence” separating the properties but that she “never paid much attention to it” because she and her family “always knew” that the property across the road was Christiansen’s farm and that “the property [Predecessor’s family] owned was across the road” from the Christiansen parcel. She was asked directly whether her family had “ever claimed property on the east side of” the Fence, and she answered by simply stating, “No.” ¶6 Christiansen also called its trustee (Trustee) as a witness. Trustee testified that Christiansen had owned the property east of the road for “at least 70 years” and that the Fence had been there for at least fifty years; he testified that he was sixty-one years old at the time of trial and that he had memories of the Fence as a ten- year-old boy. Trustee also explained that, in about 1995, members of his family had removed a cement irrigation ditch that had been located “right along the [F]ence” so that Christiansen “could farm clear up to the [F]ence.” And Trustee testified that he personally had stopped farming the family parcel in about 1999, but that soon thereafter, Christiansen began leasing the parcel to others who continued farming there, first to one lessee “for quite a few years” and then to the current lessee (Lessee). ¶7 Trustee did acknowledge two potential caveats regarding the boundary line. First, he admitted that Christiansen’s sprinkler irrigation system did not always irrigate the entire Disputed Strip, testifying that there was “always a little gap” between the Fence 20251107-CA 3 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock and the terminus of where the sprinkler system’s wheel line allowed the water to reach. Second, he acknowledged that a 2013 survey commissioned by Christiansen showed that the Fence was not the record boundary line and that the actual boundary line was located east of the Fence. On this point, though, he said that he had “never even looked at that” survey in relation to the Disputed Strip because the 2013 survey had been commissioned to examine another part of the property. In any event, Trustee maintained that Christiansen (and, later, its lessees) had “almost always farmed right up to the [F]ence” and had grazed cattle on the Disputed Strip right up to the Fence, and that—until 2021— no neighboring owner had ever objected to the Fence’s location or to Christiansen’s use of the Disputed Strip up to the Fence. ¶8 Christiansen concluded its evidentiary presentation by calling Lessee, an individual who testified that he had leased the Christiansen parcel for approximately the last twenty years. Lessee testified that he was familiar with the Fence and that it had stood for “forty plus” years. Lessee corroborated much of Trustee’s testimony, explaining that while there is sometimes a gap between the Fence and the farmed crops “[d]epending on how the wheel line comes up” the field, water still sometimes reached the Fence and that—at least up until 2021, when Haas removed the Fence—he had “always let somebody put” cattle on the Disputed Strip to graze up to the Fence. ¶9 For its part, Haas called a single witness—its owner (Owner)—who testified that Haas purchased its parcel in 2021. Owner also stated that prior to Haas purchasing the property, he had regularly walked along the county road and had never observed cattle on the Disputed Strip. He opined that the Fence could not hold cattle in any event because it was in “disrepair” and was overgrown with “wide sections of brush” where “you [couldn’t] even see the [F]ence.” Owner also discussed the survey he commissioned following Haas’s purchase of its parcel, and he testified that the survey showed that the record boundary of the Haas parcel was on “the east side of” both the Fence and the road. 20251107-CA 4 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock Relying on those survey results, Owner removed the Fence, “rolled all the old wire up, and saved all the” fence posts. He then cleared what he considered to be a lot of junk—including “multiple bags of beer bottles, beer cans, old rugs, pipe, concrete, a couple of old tractor wheels, rims, some old axles, [and] some old springs”—from the Disputed Strip. ¶10 After considering the evidence presented and the parties’ written closing arguments, the trial court ruled in favor of Christiansen. In the written order memorializing its decision, the court found that the Fence had run along the west side of the Disputed Strip for “at least 70 years.” It found that Predecessor had never believed that her family’s property extended east of the Fence and that Predecessor instead “recognized the Fence as the west boundary of” the Christiansen property. The court further found that, in about 1995, Christiansen had removed the cement ditch so that the property “could be farmed up to the Fence” using a sprinkler system. And regarding farming “up to the Fence,” the court noted that “the growth [of Christiansen’s crops] up to the Fence” varied “between years” and that the sprinkler water did not always “reach every corner of” the Disputed Strip. The court determined that for at least the last twenty years, Christiansen and its lessees had continuously farmed and grazed the land up to the Fence until Haas removed it in 2021. Finally, the court found Owner’s testimony regarding the Fence’s state of disrepair and junk accumulation to be not credible, observing that those claims “lacked any corroborating photos or other testimony which could have easily supported” them. ¶11 Based on these findings, the court reached certain conclusions of law. The court first determined that the Fence constituted a visible line that the parties and their predecessors had “treated as a boundary,” and it determined that the gap between the Fence and where Christiansen farmed “is not such that a reasonable landowner would not have notice[d]” that Christiansen was “using the [F]ence as a boundary.” Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that “there was mutual 20251107-CA 5 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock acquiescence in the historic [F]ence line” for “a period longer than 20 years” and that Christiansen had “occupied the property up to the historic [F]ence such that it would have given a reasonable landowner notice that [Christiansen was] using the line as a boundary.” Operating from these premises, the court concluded that “the historic [F]ence line” had “become the boundary of the properties,” and on that basis, it ordered that title to the Disputed Strip be quieted in Christiansen. The court also found Haas liable for trespass and agreed to determine damages at a subsequent evidentiary hearing. ¶12 Thereafter, in motions and other papers filed before the damages hearing was held, Haas began alluding to a video of the Fence that had been taken in 2021. Haas had made no effort to introduce this video during trial; instead, Haas first mentioned this video in its memorandum in opposition to a post-trial motion filed by Christiansen in which Christiansen sought sanctions for Haas’s alleged failure to abide by the court’s ruling. In that memorandum, Haas stated that it had “video evidence” that would “show [that] the old [F]ence was in a significant state of disrepair” in 2021, and it commented that this evidence could cause the court to “yet change its ruling [and] conclude that [Christiansen could not] prove the elements of boundary by acquiescence.” Later, in disclosures submitted in advance of the damages hearing, Haas again referenced the video, identifying it as evidence it would offer at the damages hearing. But at the time these filings were made, there was no motion pending asking the court to amend its findings and conclusions; indeed, the court had already resolved—and partially granted—a motion by Haas to amend its post-trial findings, which motion made no mention of the video. Thus, all of Haas’s references to the video occurred not only after the trial but also after its motion to amend the post-trial findings had been resolved, and these references were all made in the context of filings submitted in connection with the trespass damages hearing. 20251107-CA 6 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock ¶13 At that damages hearing, Haas sought—on four separate occasions—to introduce the video of the Fence. In its first attempt, Haas argued that the video was “relevant . . . to [Christiansen’s] ability to farm” the Disputed Strip. The court declined Haas’s invitation to admit the video on this basis, stating that the video was “not relevant” because the court was “not considering any damages” regarding Christiansen’s “inability or ability to farm the [Disputed Strip].” In its next two attempts, Haas argued that Christiansen had “opened the door” to introduction of the video because it had “referred to the [F]ence and the hole in the [F]ence,” an event that Haas believed made the video “relevant as to the state of the [F]ence as it was at the time that it was removed.” The court twice rejected this gambit, stating that it didn’t “remember [Christiansen] saying anything about a hole in the [F]ence” and offering its view that, in any event, the trial record contained “pictures of the [F]ence” that showed its condition to the same extent the video would, so the court was “not sure how the video adds anything.” The court also reiterated that, in the damages hearing, it was not considering Christiansen’s ability to farm the Disputed Strip. Finally, in connection with Owner’s testimony, Haas sought to introduce the video “to show the true value and the state of the [F]ence immediately before it was removed.” The court maintained that it was “still denying” the request to admit the video because it was cumulative of “the pictures . . . already in evidence,” which showed “the state . . . of every fence post and [of] the [F]ence in its entirety that [was] in dispute.” At the conclusion of the hearing, and without considering the video, the court found that Christiansen had sustained $4,420 in damages related to the destruction of the Fence. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶14 Haas now appeals, asking us to consider two overarching issues. First, it contends that the trial court erred in determining, based on the evidence presented, that all the elements of boundary by acquiescence were met. While (as discussed below) 20251107-CA 7 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock there are four elements of boundary by acquiescence, Haas challenges the court’s determinations with regard to only two of them: that Christiansen continuously occupied the Disputed Strip for a period of at least twenty years and that Haas’s predecessors had, during that time, acquiesced to the Fence as the dividing line between their property and Christiansen’s property. These determinations are fact-like and are therefore reviewed with deference; they will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. See Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, ¶¶ 43, 45, 504 P.3d 735 (reviewing for clear error a trial court’s “factual finding” that one of the parties “recognized” a “visible fence line” as the property boundary, and stating that “acquiescence is a highly fact-dependent question” (cleaned up)); see also RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 27, 96 P.3d 935 (“The trial court’s inference of [a party’s] acquiescence is not clearly erroneous.”); Dean v. Kang Sik Park, 2012 UT App 349, ¶¶ 10, 28–31, 293 P.3d 388 (referring to a trial court’s determinations regarding the elements of boundary by acquiescence as “conclusions of law” but nevertheless reviewing them—including the determination regarding occupation—for clear error because they were “highly fact- dependent, with numerous potential fact patterns, which accord[ed] the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to a given set of facts” (cleaned up)). “To qualify as clearly erroneous a trial court’s findings must be either against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346 (cleaned up). “But a finding is not clearly erroneous if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.” Id. ¶15 Second, Haas contends that the trial court erred by excluding video evidence, offered at the trespass damages hearing, showing that the Fence was in disrepair such that it could not contain livestock. Trial courts have “broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and we will disturb an evidentiary ruling 20251107-CA 8 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Samora, 2021 UT App 29, ¶ 18, 484 P.3d 1206 (cleaned up). ANALYSIS I. Boundary by Acquiescence ¶16 Haas first challenges the trial court’s determination that Christiansen acquired title to the Disputed Strip through boundary by acquiescence. To succeed on a claim of boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must demonstrate four elements: (1) a visible line marked by monuments, fences, buildings, or natural features treated as a boundary; (2) the claimant’s occupation of his or her property up to the visible line such that it would give a reasonable landowner notice that the claimant is using the line as a boundary; (3) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary by adjoining landowners; (4) for a period of at least 20 years. Huck v. Ken’s House LLC, 2022 UT App 64, ¶ 12, 511 P.3d 1220 (cleaned up). In boundary-by-acquiescence cases, “a claimant must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.” Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, ¶ 42, 504 P.3d 735 (cleaned up). Although we recognize that the elements of boundary by acquiescence are, to some degree, interdependent, Haas’s challenge focuses on the second and third elements— occupation and mutual acquiescence. 2 We thus focus our analysis on those elements and evaluate them each in turn below. 2. For instance, in this case, Haas’s challenge regarding the extent of Christiansen’s occupation (the second element) necessarily includes invocation of the twenty-year requirement (the fourth (continued…) 20251107-CA 9 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock A. Occupation ¶17 Haas first argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Christiansen continuously occupied the Disputed Strip for the requisite twenty-year period. “Under the occupation element of boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must occupy his or her property up to a visible line in such a manner as to place the nonclaimant on notice that he or she claims the property so occupied.” Id. ¶ 43 (cleaned up). “The occupation element . . . corresponds with the actual, open, and notorious requirements of adverse possession.” Anderson v. Fautin, 2016 UT 22, ¶ 26, 379 P.3d 1186 (cleaned up). In this context, there is no requirement of complete and total occupation—only occupation that would “place a reasonable party on notice that the given line was being treated as the boundary between the properties.” See Dean v. Kang Sik Park, 2012 UT App 349, ¶ 29, 293 P.3d 388 (cleaned up). While de minimis uses will not satisfy this requirement, see Huck, 2022 UT App 64, ¶ 14, a wide variety of uses can—including farming, irrigation, and grazing livestock, see Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 36, 250 P.3d 56 (holding that the occupation element is satisfied when the land is “farmed, occupied by homes or other structures, improved, irrigated, used to raise livestock, or put to similar use”); see also Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that adjoining landowners had demonstrated occupation of a property through uses such as “gardening, recreation, and relaxation”). And under the deferential standard of review we apply here, we “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings” and will not disturb those findings as long as “the evidence is legally sufficient to support” them. Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346. ¶18 Regarding the occupation element, the trial court found that Christiansen or its lessees had farmed the property for “at least 70 years,” that “the Fence ha[d] been in the same place element). But for purposes of our analysis, we evaluate Haas’s occupation-related challenge as one unified argument. 20251107-CA 10 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock during those 70 years,” and that “[a]fter the fall crop ha[d] been harvested, [Christiansen] or its lessee had [livestock] graze the property up to the Fence.” The court also found that, in 1995, Christiansen removed “a cement ditch” that “ran along the Fence . . . so that the property could be farmed up to the Fence.” Further, the court found that Lessee had “leased the [Christiansen] property for the last twenty years,” that he “farms and irrigates up to the Fence,” and that he had “cattle graze the property up to the Fence until September 2021.” Based on these underlying findings, the court determined that Christiansen had “farmed and kept [livestock] on the property up to the cement ditch and/or historic [F]ence for approximately 70 years” and that Christiansen had “occupied the property up to the historic [F]ence such that it would give a reasonable landowner notice that the claimant [was] using the [Fence] line as a boundary.” ¶19 Haas argues that these findings are clearly erroneous. To support its argument, Haas asserts that Christiansen could have only begun farming the Disputed Strip in 1995, after it removed the cement ditch that had previously prevented cultivation up to the Fence. And Haas argues that, even after 1995, Christiansen never actually farmed all the way up to the Fence because, based on Trustee’s and Lessee’s testimony, there was “always” a gap between the sprinkler irrigation line and the Fence. Haas also points to the fact that Christiansen stopped farming the parcel in about 1999 and presented no direct evidence that farming on the parcel resumed until 2004, when Lessee began to farm the property. From this, Haas argues that a multi-year gap in farming prevents Christiansen from being able to satisfy the twenty-year occupation requirement, especially in light of the fact that Haas removed the Fence in 2021. And as to grazing, Haas argues that Christiansen did not show that cattle grazed the property “all year, every year” and instead presented evidence sufficient to prove only that livestock was “sometimes” on the Disputed Strip. ¶20 Christiansen responds that, in making its arguments, Haas has omitted “several uncomfortable but crucial facts” present in 20251107-CA 11 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock the record. Christiansen points us to evidence that additional lessees farmed the property prior to Lessee taking over in 2004. It also notes that, even assuming that a gap between the sprinkler irrigation line and the Fence could indicate that it did not farm parts of the Disputed Strip, there is evidence that cattle grazed on the Disputed Strip during this time. Christiansen thus pushes back against Haas’s contention that Christiansen can’t show twenty years of occupation because the evidence indicates that cattle were only sometimes on the Disputed Strip. Indeed, as the trial court correctly observed, occupation does not necessarily require use every single day, “365 days per year for a 20-year period.” Instead, all that is required is occupation that “place[s] a reasonable party on notice that the given line was being treated as the boundary between the properties.” See Dean, 2012 UT App 349, ¶ 29 (cleaned up). And here, Christiansen points to plenty of evidence in the record that it farmed and grazed the Disputed Strip in a manner that should have given Haas reasonable notice that Christiansen was treating the Fence line as the boundary. ¶21 First, regarding farming, Trustee’s trial testimony supports the court’s finding that Christiansen occupied the Disputed Strip for the necessary period. Trustee testified that—at least since 1995, when Christiansen removed the cement ditch—Christiansen and its lessees “almost always farmed right up to the [F]ence,” that the “small gap” noted by Haas changed year-to-year, and that, in any event, spray from the sprinklers sometimes reached all the way to the Fence. This directly supports the court’s conclusion that “the growth [of Christiansen’s crops] up to the Fence” varied “between years” and that the sprinkler water did not always “reach every corner of” Christiansen’s property. Further, Trustee testified that Christiansen did in fact lease its property—including the Disputed Strip—to others before Lessee began leasing it in 2004, contradicting Haas’s assertion that there could not have been any farming on the Disputed Strip between 1999 and 2004. ¶22 And with respect to grazing, the evidence supports the court’s findings that Christiansen had livestock “graze the 20251107-CA 12 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock property up to the Fence” and that Lessee “had cattle graze the property up to the Fence.” Trustee testified that he would allow cattle to graze up to the Fence, and Lessee testified that he “always let somebody put” cattle on the Disputed Strip to graze up to the Fence—at least until Haas removed the Fence in 2021. ¶23 Thus, the record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings and conclusions on the occupation element. And while that same record perhaps contains evidence that could support a contrary conclusion, our standard of review here dictates that “if there is evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal problem—a fatal flaw—with that evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence that would have supported contrary findings.” Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733 (cleaned up). Accordingly, we reject Haas’s challenge to the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the occupation element. B. Mutual Acquiescence ¶24 Haas next contends that the trial court erred in determining that its predecessors acquiesced in the Fence as the boundary line dividing the properties. Mutual acquiescence occurs when the “claimant and the neighboring landowner recognize and treat the visible line as the boundary dividing their respective properties.” Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, ¶ 43, 504 P.3d 735 (cleaned up). Whether mutual acquiescence exists “is a highly fact-dependent question,” and acquiescence “may be tacit and inferred from evidence of the landowner’s actions which tend to show that the landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the properties.” Id. (cleaned up). Again, given our standard of review, we will view evidence of acquiescence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.” See Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13, 358 P.3d 346. ¶25 On the acquiescence element, the court found that Predecessor “did not believe that her property crossed the Fence” 20251107-CA 13 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock and that she “recognized the Fence as the west boundary of” the Christiansen property. These findings supported the court’s conclusion that “there was mutual acquiescence in the historic [F]ence line.” In its ruling, the court explained that it relied on Predecessor’s testimony in making these determinations. In particular, the court highlighted Predecessor’s understanding that her family owned the property “on the west side of the county road” and that the land to the east of the road “was farmed by” Christiansen. ¶26 Haas argues that the trial court “misstat[ed]” Predecessor’s “subjective belief” regarding the Fence. Specifically, Haas points to Predecessor’s testimony that her property was “on the west side of the county road” and that she “never paid much attention to” the Fence. (Emphasis added.) Based on these statements, Haas contends that the court’s determination that Predecessor acquiesced in the Fence (as opposed to the county road) is “contrary to the evidence.” In Haas’s view, Predecessor’s conduct, “[a]t best, . . . merely show[s] silence or inaction as to the other side of the [c]ounty [r]oad, not that [she] acquiesced in the Fence across the [r]oad as the actual boundary line.” ¶27 In response, Christiansen contends that Haas is “rehash[ing] evidence and arguments rejected” by the trial court and “selectively ignor[ing] testimony and evidence that supports the court’s findings.” It largely points to the same evidence as the trial court in making its argument, citing Predecessor’s testimony that her family’s property “was on the west side of the county road” and that the land to the east “was farmed by” Christiansen. ¶28 After reviewing the record, we agree with Christiansen. As with occupation, the record here contains ample evidence to support the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding mutual acquiescence. Predecessor expressly testified at trial that she understood that her family owned the property on the west side of the county road and that Christiansen farmed the parcel to the east. She further confirmed her belief that her family’s 20251107-CA 14 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock property did not cross the historic Fence line. Although Haas attempts to characterize Predecessor’s conduct as “mere[] . . . silence or inaction as to the [c]ounty [r]oad” rather than acquiescence to the Fence as the boundary line, the trial court drew a reasonable inference that Predecessor recognized the Fence—which ran right next to the road—as the actual boundary. 3 And mutual acquiescence does not require explicit verbal agreements; it may be inferred from a landowner’s actions (or inaction) and long-standing treatment of a visible line as a boundary. See B.G.T.S. Props., LLC v. Balls Bros. Farm, LLC, 2024 UT App 37, ¶ 17, 547 P.3d 215 (“The mutual acquiescence element merely requires silence or indolence by a nonclaimant who may or may not occupy his or her property. . . . The nonclaimant need not provide express consent, but can acquiesce through inaction.” (cleaned up)); Lundahl Farms, 2021 UT App 146, ¶ 43 (“Mutual acquiescence . . . occurs when the claimant and the neighboring landowner recognize and treat the visible line as the boundary . . . . It may be . . . inferred from evidence of the landowner’s actions.” (cleaned up)). Predecessor’s testimony thus supports the court’s inference that the adjoining landowners tacitly recognized and treated the Fence as the boundary dividing their properties, and this evidence is legally sufficient to support the court’s findings and conclusions. See B.G.T.S. Props., 2024 UT App 37, ¶ 17; Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 13. ¶29 To be sure, Haas points to other portions of Predecessor’s testimony—such as her statement that she “never paid much 3. Haas asserts that, based on Predecessor’s testimony, any acquiescence would have had to have been to the county road as the boundary and not the Fence. But this argument can’t help Haas, because the Fence runs right next to the road on its east side; if Predecessor and her family acquiesced to the road as the boundary instead of the Fence, then more property (not less) would transfer to Christiansen by operation of boundary by acquiescence. 20251107-CA 15 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock attention to” the Fence—to suggest that a different inference could have been drawn. But on appeal, it is not our role to reweigh conflicting evidence or reassess witness testimony. As noted above, a trial court’s supported finding will stand, even if the record contains evidence that would have supported a contrary finding. See Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733. Because competent evidence supports the trial court’s determinations regarding mutual acquiescence, those determinations are not clearly erroneous. We therefore decline Haas’s invitation to reverse the court’s findings and conclusions regarding mutual acquiescence. II. Evidentiary Rulings ¶30 Finally, Haas challenges the trial court’s refusal to admit and consider video evidence it proffered at the trespass damages hearing, which evidence, Haas argues, would have provided additional support for its contention that the Fence was in a state of disrepair in 2021. As noted, see supra ¶ 15, we review the court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. ¶31 In evaluating whether the court abused its discretion, we first look to the rules governing the admission of relevant evidence—rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. If not relevant, that evidence “is not admissible.” Id. R. 402. Further, even if relevant, a court could still choose to exclude it “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403. ¶32 Haas’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to exclude the video is based on a belief that a different set of rules applies. Citing rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure—a rule that allows a trial court, upon motion, to amend its findings or judgment—Haas argues that the court “excluded the evidence 20251107-CA 16 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock because it considered the trial closed.” In Haas’s view, rule 52(b) allows a court to receive evidence even after a bench trial, and Haas argues that the court thus “incorrectly conclud[ed] that it could not receive . . . video evidence on the condition of the Fence.” Haas misunderstands both rule 52(b) as well as the basis of the trial court’s ruling. ¶33 As an initial matter, rule 52(b) envisions situations in which one party has filed a motion asking the court to amend its findings or judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) (“Upon motion of a party . . . the court may amend its findings . . . .” (emphasis added)). In this case, Haas did indeed file such a motion, but Haas did not ask the court, in connection with that motion, to admit the video evidence in question here. Instead, Haas mentioned this video evidence only after the court had already adjudicated Haas’s rule 52(b) motion. At the time Haas asked the court to consider the video evidence, there was no rule 52(b) motion pending, and the only proceeding at issue was the trespass damages hearing. Thus, Haas’s efforts to invoke rule 52(b) are off base from the start. ¶34 Moreover, Haas overlooks the fact that, in the context of the trespass damages hearing, the court excluded the video evidence on relevance grounds. Indeed, the court repeatedly made statements like, “I find that [the video] is not relevant,” and “I’m not sure how the video adds anything.” The court’s decision to exclude the video on relevance grounds was, on this record, not an abuse of discretion. At the damages hearing, the only thing the court was adjudicating was the amount of damages to which Christiansen was entitled for Haas’s removal of the Fence. As the court pointed out, Christiansen was not seeking any damages for inability to farm or graze the Disputed Strip, so any evidence about whether the Fence was in such disrepair as to not be able to keep cattle from getting out was entirely irrelevant. And the court was already well aware, from evidence (including photos) submitted at trial, of the condition of the Fence in 2021 when Haas removed it, and the court was well within its discretion to deem additional evidence on that point needlessly cumulative. 20251107-CA 17 2026 UT App 166  Christiansen Family Trust v. Haas Land & Livestock ¶35 For all of these reasons, we reject Haas’s challenge to the court’s evidentiary rulings about the proffered video evidence. CONCLUSION ¶36 The trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding occupation and mutual acquiescence are supported by sufficient evidence in the record, and on that basis we reject Haas’s challenges to those findings and conclusions. And we reject Haas’s contention that the court exceeded its discretion in refusing to consider Haas’s proffered video evidence at the damages hearing. Accordingly, we affirm. 4 4. Christiansen requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We decline this request. Fees are to be awarded under this rule “only in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.” Freestone v. Walton, 2025 UT App 41, ¶ 26 n.6, 567 P.3d 616 (cleaned up). While we ultimately reject Haas’s arguments, we do not consider this to be an “egregious” case worthy of rule 33 sanctions. See id. (cleaned up). 20251107-CA 18 2026 UT App 166