In re S.J.C.

2026 UT App 173 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF S.J.C., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. S.C., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee. Opinion No. 20251310-CA Filed November 13, 2026 Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable David L. Johnson No. 1255579 Kirstin Norman, Alexandra Mareschal, and Jason B. Richards, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred. JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY dissented, with opinion. HARRIS, Judge: ¶1 S.J.C. (Child) was born fifteen weeks premature and with complex medical conditions that required a sterile environment and specialized care. He spent the first five months of his life in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), and when he was ready to be released from the hospital, S.C. (Mother) was not in a  In re S.J.C. position to provide the sort of care Child required. On the day of Child’s discharge from the hospital, the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) obtained a removal warrant and assumed custody of Child. A few weeks later, at an adjudication trial, the juvenile court determined that Child was neglected as to Mother. ¶2 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication order. She does not contest DCFS’s custody over Child; in fact, she acknowledges that Child is at least dependent as to her. But she does challenge the court’s neglect adjudication, asserting that Child—by statutory definition, which she insists is not forward- looking—cannot be neglected as to Mother because he was removed from her custody before she even had a chance to neglect him. In addition, she takes issue with several of the juvenile court’s factual findings, which she asserts are clearly erroneous. For the reasons discussed herein, we reject Mother’s arguments and affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication order. BACKGROUND 1 ¶3 While pregnant with Child, Mother was hospitalized due to complications arising from preterm rupture of membranes. Thereafter, she remained under “close medical supervision” while health care professionals worked to prolong the pregnancy so that Child could reach viability. When Child was eventually born some fifteen weeks premature, it was discovered that he had “multiple congenital conditions, including the absence of his left foot, a clubfoot on the right, and underdeveloped fingers on both hands.” He was also diagnosed with hydrocephalus—fluid on the brain—that required “placement of a shunt” in his skull. Additionally, he required “a nasal cannula for supplemental 1. In this background section, “we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court findings.” See In re M.S., 2023 UT App 74, n.1, 533 P.3d 859 (cleaned up). 20251310-CA 2 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. oxygen.” Because of these conditions, Child is considered a “medically fragile and medically complex” child who requires “an extremely sterile environment,” reliable access to electricity, and constant care. ¶4 After his birth, Child spent more than five months in the NICU, where he “required continuous monitoring, respiratory support, and specialized nutritional care through tube feeding.” During this period, Mother “essentially lived at the hospital” and spent “nearly all of her time at [Child’s] bedside.” While she was at the hospital, Mother was visited regularly by a hospital social worker (Social Worker) and, later, a DCFS caseworker (Caseworker). Through these visits, both Social Worker and Caseworker grew concerned about Mother’s “mental health stability” and worried that Mother “did not have a home to go to” upon Child’s discharge. Mother had been living off and on at her parents’ home in the recent past, and she apparently believed she would be “living with her parents” upon Child’s discharge. But Mother’s mother (Grandmother) had decided—and had communicated to Social Worker and Caseworker—that Mother could not return to her home. Grandmother, however, did not inform Mother of this decision, at least not until after Child’s NICU stay. In fact, Grandmother later acknowledged that, during Child’s hospital stay, she “probably led [Mother] to believe” that she could live with her after Child’s discharge, and she did this not only by failing to inform Mother of her decision but also by passively going “along with what [Mother] was saying” whenever they discussed housing. Nonetheless, both Social Worker and Caseworker recognized Mother’s housing instability and mental health challenges, and they each worked independently with Mother to address these concerns. ¶5 As part of her duties “supporting parents through the difficult experience of having a child in the NICU,” Social Worker checked on Mother “every three to four days” during Child’s NICU stay. Social Worker described Mother as “very quiet,” and 20251310-CA 3 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. she observed that Mother “kept to herself” and “did not seem to want [Social Worker’s] involvement at all.” As the time for Child’s discharge grew near, Social Worker became concerned about Mother’s living situation because Mother apparently planned on returning to Grandmother’s home—an option that (unbeknownst to Mother at the time) was not available. And given Child’s extensive medical needs, Social Worker was worried about “[Child] not hav[ing] a safe place to go.” ¶6 During Child’s NICU stay, Social Worker also developed “some concerns about [Mother’s] mental health stability and her . . . ability . . . to be able to care for” Child. These concerns stemmed primarily from two incidents in the NICU. In the first incident, Mother pushed a nurse who had refused to step back when Mother asked her to, and Mother was “asked to leave” the NICU as a result. Social Worker was “surprised” by Mother’s behavior but felt that it was understandable because Mother “could have just gotten angry that somebody . . . invaded her personal space.” Following the incident, the hospital instituted a “safety plan” for Mother, which required that Mother “not sleep at [Child’s] bedside for a period of time.” In the days that followed, Social Worker observed that Mother “was very good at” following the safety plan. ¶7 In the second incident, Mother confronted a nurse who had been “talking about [Mother’s] former drug dealer”; Mother later explained that “it really upset her” that the nurse was “talking about people from her past” while “in the room with [Child].” The nurse called in Social Worker, who then asked Mother “if she would be willing to walk down to the University of Utah emergency department and get evaluated,” and Mother agreed. Following the evaluation, hospital staff asked Mother to “step away . . . from [Child’s] bedside for a period of 24 hours,” and Mother complied. 20251310-CA 4 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. ¶8 Prompted by her concerns regarding Mother’s housing instability and mental health, Social Worker filed a report with DCFS. The report included allegations that Mother either was or would be unhoused after Child’s discharge. After that, Caseworker began visiting Mother once or twice a week. Caseworker’s “biggest safety concern” was that, upon discharge, Child would not have “a safe, sterile, clean environment with [the] electricity” needed to “run his pumps and his oxygen” and “to charge [his] different devices.” Caseworker tried to help Mother find alternative housing by “offer[ing] [Mother] resources with different homeless shelters.” However, whenever Caseworker “would ask if [Mother] had followed up with housing,” Mother always told her that she had not because “she was just going to be going home to stay with her parents.” At that point, no one had told Mother that Grandmother would not allow Mother to return to her home. ¶9 As time passed, Child’s condition stabilized, and hospital staff began preparing for his discharge. As that date approached, Caseworker tried to let Mother know that they “need[ed] to figure” Mother’s housing situation “out immediately.” Mother, however, continued to avoid seeking alternative housing, relying instead on her belief, supported by Grandmother’s behavior, that she could return to Grandmother’s home. Caseworker “ultimately determined” that upon discharge, Mother “remained without safe or stable housing and was unable to meet [Child’s] complex and critical medical needs.” On this basis, Caseworker requested and received a protective custody warrant for DCFS to assume custody of Child upon his discharge from the hospital. On the date of discharge, Caseworker and other DCFS officials executed the warrant at the hospital; they went into the room Mother was in, “gave her the warrant,” and “let her know that [DCFS] . . . [was] taking custody of [Child].” Caseworker later indicated that Mother’s lack of adequate housing was the overriding reason behind DCFS’s removal of Child from Mother’s custody; indeed, Caseworker testified, “If [Mother had been] able 20251310-CA 5 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. to go back to [Grandmother’s] house, I don’t know that the removal would have happened.” ¶10 Following removal, DCFS placed Child with a foster parent (Foster Mother) who had “completed specialized medical training to provide [Child’s] care,” including “training [for Child’s] oxygen,” his “feeding regimen,” “how to put . . . the [feeding] tube into his nose,” and “how to check to make sure all his vitals [were] good.” During his first few weeks with Foster Mother, not only did Child require frequent care from various medical professionals, but he also experienced such severe symptoms that on two occasions Foster Mother had to take him to the hospital for “breathing and feeding issues” and “respiratory distress.” ¶11 Immediately after Child’s removal, Caseworker continued working with Mother to help her find stable housing. Those efforts were unsuccessful. At the hospital on the day of removal, Caseworker and Mother had a joint phone call with Grandmother, who informed them that it was “[a]bsolutely not” an option, at that time, for Mother to stay at Grandmother’s home. This was apparently the first time that Grandmother had told Mother that she and Child would not be able to stay at Grandmother’s home. Later that same day, Caseworker checked out a DCFS van and took Mother to a local women’s shelter, but no beds were available, and calls to other shelters yielded similar findings. At that point, Caseworker drove Mother to a nearby park, where Mother experienced what Caseworker described as a “mental health breakdown.” During that “crisis,” Mother was “nervous and upset,” asked Caseworker if she “had any dope,” and “jumped out of the van, . . . went around to the back, and . . . started grabbing her belongings and just hucking them out of the van onto the grass.” Mother twice refused help from a mental health crisis response team Caseworker called. Caseworker then decided that she “had to leave [Mother] at” the park, but she continued checking on Mother, returning the next day to inform 20251310-CA 6 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. Mother about Child’s upcoming shelter hearing and to offer her a ride to the courthouse. ¶12 The day after Child’s removal, DCFS filed a verified petition for custody. A day after that, the juvenile court held a shelter hearing at which Mother was present. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court determined that removal was appropriate and granted DCFS temporary custody of Child. The court also scheduled an adjudication trial to take place some six weeks later. ¶13 A few days after the shelter hearing, Grandmother allowed Mother to return to her home. But just days later, Mother was arrested on outstanding warrants and taken to jail. The warrants stemmed from probation violations and failures to appear that were connected to crimes Mother had previously been convicted of, including felony trespass and misdemeanor drug possession. ¶14 The adjudication trial occurred as scheduled, and at that point, Mother was still in jail in connection with the outstanding warrants. Mother was nevertheless present for that trial, and she testified that, in her view, her behavior did not amount to neglect because (among other reasons) she not only had been at the hospital for Child’s entire stay but also had breastfed Child while he was in the hospital and knew how to use his feeding tube and otherwise care for him. When asked about her current living situation, Mother responded that if Child were released into her custody at the conclusion of the trial, she could care for him at the jail. The court also heard testimony from four other witnesses— Foster Mother, Social Worker, Grandmother, and Caseworker— who testified about the events set forth above. Much of their testimony centered on the events leading up to Child’s removal, including Mother’s housing situation and mental health challenges and how those things would affect Child’s care. ¶15 During closing arguments, the State pointed to Mother’s “mental health issues” and her homelessness as evidence of neglect. Regarding homelessness, the State pointed out that Child 20251310-CA 7 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. “needed an appropriate placement with electricity, that was sanitary, [where his] medical care needs could be taken care of.” It observed that Mother “didn’t have that” and “didn’t prepare for that,” and it argued from these facts that Mother had “failed in that aspect of it, which would be neglect.” The State also posited that “the neglect could come from as of right now, currently,” as of the time of trial, because Mother was incarcerated at that point and could not take Child “back to the jail,” a fact that showed that Mother was “unable to care for [Child] and provide the proper subsistence of medical care.” On this basis, the State asked the court to enter a finding of neglect rather than dependency, and it emphasized that it was “not asking for [a finding of] abuse.” ¶16 In her closing argument, Mother urged the court to make a finding of dependency rather than neglect, pointing to the “unfortunate circumstances” regarding her housing and mental health struggles. Mother noted that Child’s medical condition was not her fault, and she argued that her lack of stable living conditions wasn’t either, asserting that the housing situation had “occurred not through her own accord and actions but through decisions made by” others, notably Grandmother’s decision to lead Mother to believe that she could live with her upon Child’s discharge. Thus, by asking for a dependency finding, Mother did not dispute that Child was without proper care, but she argued that dependency (rather than neglect) was the proper result because any lack of care had occurred through no fault of her own. See Utah Code § 80-1-102(21) (defining “dependency”). ¶17 At the conclusion of the adjudication trial, the court made an oral ruling, finding that although Mother had “demonstrated genuine care and concern” for Child, “the totality of the evidence” established that Mother was “presently unable to care for” Child and that her “conduct and omission[s] constitute[d] neglect” under the statutory definition. Less than a week later, the court memorialized its oral ruling in a written order. In that order, the 20251310-CA 8 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. court generally found Mother’s trial testimony “not credible” due to the “inconsistent, evasive, and self-contradictory” nature of her statements. Consequently, the court accepted Mother’s testimony only as to “the general circumstances of her hospitalization and [Child’s] NICU stay.” ¶18 The court then set forth its factual findings, outlining Mother’s pregnancy; Child’s birth and NICU stay; DCFS’s warrant execution and placement of Child with Foster Mother; and Mother’s struggles with housing, mental health, substance use, and criminal charges. Four specific findings are particularly relevant to this appeal. First, the court found that Mother’s claim that she breastfed Child “while he remained in the NICU” was “inconsistent with medical records and credible testimony,” indicating that Child’s “nutritional support” was not maintained through “maternal breastfeeding.” In this vein, the court offered its view that Mother’s breastfeeding claim demonstrated a “fundamental misunderstanding—or disregard—of [Child’s] medical fragility.” Second, the court recited that Mother “stated [that Child] did not need [a feeding tube],” which statement the court cited as further evidence of Mother’s “limited insight into [Child’s] ongoing medical needs” and the reality “that she lack[ed] the capacity to provide appropriate care for him.” Third, as to discharge planning, the court found that hospital “staff made repeated attempts to involve” Mother “[t]hroughout [Child’s] NICU stay” but that Mother “declined or disengaged from those efforts.” Finally, it found that Mother’s apparent substance use issues were “an active and unaddressed risk factor” due to her “lack of insight” into “addiction and relapse prevention” and “her refusal to engage in recommended services.” ¶19 Turning to its analysis and conclusions of law, the court determined that, pursuant to subsections (ii) and (iii) of Utah’s 20251310-CA 9 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. statutory definition of “neglect,” 2 see id. § 80-1-102(59)(a), the State had proved “the allegations of neglect” by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the court concluded that Mother’s “untreated mental health issues, unresolved substance use disorder, current incarceration, and ongoing homelessness . . . demonstrate[d] a lack of proper parental care and a failure or refusal to provide necessary care for [Child’s] health, safety, and well-being.” In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Mother’s refusal to participate in mental health and addiction treatment, her failure to arrange for an alternative caregiver for Child while incarcerated, and her refusal of DCFS housing assistance despite lacking her own residence, each of which it found constituted a “failure or refusal” by Mother “to provide necessary care for [Child’s] health, safety, and well-being.” In particular, the court found that Mother had “no fixed residence and continue[d] to move intermittently between friends, relatives, and acquaintances,” leaving her without “any safe, consistent, or appropriate home to which [Child] could be released.” 2. In its ruling, the juvenile court repeatedly cited subsections (ii) and (iv) of the relevant statutory definition in support of its determination that Mother had neglected Child. But the parties to this appeal agree that subsection (iv) is not applicable here because that subsection applies only when another child is present in the home, and none was present here. See Utah Code § 80-1-102(59)(a)(iv). The juvenile court likely intended to instead cite subsection (iii), as its written ruling consistently quotes the language of subsection (iii) following its citations to subsection (iv). And in their appellate briefing, the parties recognize that subsection (iii) is at issue, and they have included arguments based on that subsection. In this opinion, we follow the parties’ lead and assume that the juvenile court’s references to subsection (iv) were typographical errors and that the court intended to reference subsection (iii). 20251310-CA 10 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. ¶20 Based on these determinations, the court concluded that Mother had neglected Child, noting—in a reference to subsection (iii)—that the neglect statute “includes a parent’s ‘failure or refusal to provide proper or necessary care for the child’s health, safety, or well-being.’” The court additionally found that Mother had a “mindset” of “minimizing her instability and refusing to access available housing resources,” and it observed that “[w]hile homelessness alone does not constitute neglect, [Child’s] extraordinary medical fragility require[d] a stable, sanitary, and structured environment that [Mother was] unable to provide.” The court thus concluded that Mother’s “current living circumstances render[ed] her unable or unwilling to meet [Child’s] needs, constituting neglect” under the statutory definition. Accordingly, the court ordered that Child “remain in the custody and guardianship of . . . DCFS for appropriate care and placement.” ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶21 Mother now appeals from the juvenile court’s adjudication order, and she asks us to consider two issues. First, she challenges the court’s determination that her conduct amounted to neglect under the applicable statutory definition. On this issue, Mother’s argument is a legal one: she contends that, even under the facts found by the court, neglect (as statutorily defined) is not present as a matter of law. After the facts are known, “a neglect determination requires a court to operate within a closed universe. Once the facts have been established, the juvenile court is limited to determining whether the statutory criteria for neglect have been met.” In re A.B., 2022 UT 39, ¶ 28, 523 P.3d 168. Thus, a “challenge to the neglect determination” in this context is “a law- like mixed question and [we] review it nondeferentially.” Id. ¶22 Second, and separately, Mother challenges several of the court’s factual findings, asserting that they were clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence. A juvenile court’s 20251310-CA 11 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. “[f]actual determinations are accorded a high degree of deference.” In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 15, 496 P.3d 58. “Under this standard, an appellate court should not perform its own independent reweighing of the evidence to decide how it would have resolved the matter in the first instance.” Id. ¶ 32 (cleaned up). A juvenile court’s findings “should be respected unless the court failed to consider all of the facts or reached a decision against the clear weight of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up); accord In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 21, 525 P.3d 519. ANALYSIS I. Neglect ¶23 First, Mother assails the merits of the juvenile court’s neglect adjudication, asserting that the facts found by the court do not amount to neglect under the applicable statutory definition. For the reasons discussed, we find this assertion unpersuasive. ¶24 Under Utah law, neglect can be proved in any one of several ways. See Utah Code § 80-1-102(59)(a). While the juvenile court found neglect under several subsections, “to affirm we need conclude only that neglect was established under one of the bases.” In re G.H., 2023 UT App 132, ¶ 28, 540 P.3d 631. In this case, the guardian ad litem (the GAL) points us to subsection (iii) of the statutory definition and contends that the facts here meet the requirements of that subsection. Under that provision, “‘[n]eglect’ means action or inaction causing . . . failure or refusal of a parent . . . to provide proper or necessary subsistence or medical care, or any other care necessary for the child’s health, safety, morals, or well-being.” Utah Code § 80-1-102(59)(a). Thus, to establish neglect in this case, the State must prove two elements: (1) that Child lacked “proper or necessary subsistence or medical care, or any other care necessary for [his] health, safety, morals, or well-being” and (2) that this lack of care resulted from Mother’s “action or inaction causing . . . failure or refusal . . . to 20251310-CA 12 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. provide” such care. See id. We address each element, in turn, and conclude that each one is met here. A. Lack of Proper or Necessary Care ¶25 The first element of proving neglect is to show that Child lacked “proper or necessary subsistence or medical care, or any other care necessary for [his] health, safety, morals, or well- being.” See id. This phrase is undefined by statute, and our supreme court has noted that it is “vague and conducive to a variety of reasonable interpretations.” In re A.B., 2022 UT 39, ¶ 41, 523 P.3d 168. But in interpreting similar phraseology found in subsection (ii)—“lack of proper parental care”—we have held that these words “naturally incorporate notions of reasonableness,” see In re A.S., 2024 UT App 52, ¶ 32, 548 P.3d 181. And in interpreting the likewise similar phraseology of the dependency statute—“without proper care,” see Utah Code § 80-1-102(21)—we have held that the words “proper care” mean “the level of care and attention that the child reasonably needs under the circumstances.” See In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 43, 556 P.3d 86. In our view, these principles apply just as well to subsection (iii) as they do to subsection (ii) or to the dependency statute, and we therefore hold that the “proper or necessary . . . care” referred to in subsection (iii) means “the level of care and attention that the child reasonably needs under the circumstances.” Id.; see also id. ¶ 42 n.11 (noting the similarities in phrasing between subsection (ii) and the dependency statute, and determining that because “the words ‘proper’ and ‘care’ are common to both definitions,” we could “draw guidance” from subsection (ii) cases in interpreting the dependency statute). ¶26 In this case, Mother does not dispute that at the time Child was discharged from the hospital, she was not capable of providing Child with the care he reasonably needed under the circumstances. After all, she had nowhere to live, and Child—a high-medical-needs newborn—could hardly accompany her to a 20251310-CA 13 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. park or a family shelter. But she nevertheless argues that the juvenile court misapplied subsection (iii) to her conduct because, at the precise moment DCFS served the removal warrant on her, Child was still in the hospital and his needs were being met. She asserts that, as of that moment, she hadn’t yet neglected Child, and she posits—using a grammatical analysis—that the statutory definition of neglect does not permit a neglect adjudication “based on future or anticipated actions.” Specifically, Mother points to the definition of a “neglected child” as one who “has been subjected to neglect,” and she argues that the linguistic construction of the statute—in particular, its use of the past-tense locution “has been”—requires past or ongoing harm rather than prospective harm. (Quoting Utah Code § 80-1-102(60) (emphasis added).) Operating from this premise, Mother argues that “there are no findings or evidence in this record that [she] ever refused or failed to provide necessary care” for Child. ¶27 We reject Mother’s argument for two reasons. First, by conceding dependency, Mother has undermined her grammatical argument regarding the first element of the neglect statute. As noted above, Mother acknowledged at the adjudication trial that the statutory definition of dependency is satisfied in this case. And Mother maintains this position on appeal, arguing that a dependency finding below “would have been adequate” and “legally appropriate,” and she asks us to reverse the juvenile court’s neglect determination “and instruct the juvenile court to amend its adjudication order to make a determination of dependency instead [of neglect].” 3 But by conceding dependency, 3. Although a finding of dependency would still allow the juvenile court to maintain jurisdiction over Child, it would not— by itself—constitute grounds for any later effort to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See Utah Code § 80-4-301(1) (listing the grounds for termination of parental rights, which include that “the parent has neglected or abused the child” but do not include (continued…) 20251310-CA 14 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. Mother necessarily concedes that it would be proper for the court to find that Child, at the time of his discharge from the hospital, was “without proper care” from any source. See Utah Code § 80- 1-102(21) (“‘Dependent child’ or ‘dependency’ means a child who is without proper care through no fault of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.”). Indeed, her briefing explicitly states that she “was—at the time of discharge and through no fault of her own—unable to provide housing and, consequently, medical care” for Child. (Emphasis added.) ¶28 The dependency statute is every bit as present-tense based as the neglect statute; that is, neither statute contains language expressly referencing future conduct, but both are clearly satisfied by present conduct. Compare id. § 80-1-102(21) (stating that “a child who is without proper care” is dependent (emphasis added)), with id. § 80-1-102(59)(a)(iii) (stating that a parent’s current “action or inaction causing . . . failure or refusal . . . to provide proper or necessary . . . care” constitutes “neglect”). Indeed, Mother acknowledges that the neglect statute is satisfied by “past or current acts,” “past or present neglect,” or a failure or refusal of care “begun before now and continuing into the present.” Thus, by conceding that Child was “without proper care” at the moment of his discharge from the hospital, Mother has essentially given away her grammatical challenge to the applicability of the first element of the similarly tensed neglect statute. That is, Mother’s concessions necessarily satisfy the first element of neglect, which concerns itself with whether a child lacks “proper or necessary subsistence or medical care”; indeed, if Child lacks any proper care at all—as indicated by the conceded dependency finding in this case—then Child is definitionally without proper or necessary subsistence or medical care. dependency). For this reason, the collateral consequence exception to the mootness doctrine applies here. See In re A.K.-A., 2026 UT App 167, ¶ 17. 20251310-CA 15 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. ¶29 Nevertheless, Mother pushes back by making another grammar-based argument, this time in an effort to distinguish between the statutory definitions of dependency and neglect. 4 Specifically, Mother contrasts the definition of dependency— which applies when a child “is without proper care,” id. § 80-1- 102(21) (emphasis added)—with the definition of neglect, which requires “action or inaction causing” a lack of proper care, id. § 80- 1-102(59)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Mother contends that the neglect inquiry “looks backward, and . . . requires both an actor and a result,” while the dependency inquiry looks simply to the present, calling for an inquiry “into the child’s situation as it stands” without naming any actor. ¶30 We find Mother’s analysis unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the word “causing” in the neglect statute goes not to the first element of the neglect definition but rather to the second: 4. Mother also directs our attention to a New Jersey case that she believes stands for the proposition that a child cannot be at risk of imminent harm if left at a hospital. See Division of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.P., 313 A.3d 905 (N.J. 2024). But not only is that case non-binding, it is readily distinguishable from the facts of this case. In that case, a mother abandoned her child at a hospital, and the court determined that the mother could not be said to have neglected the child because all the child’s needs were being met at the hospital. See id. at 914–15. For purposes of the legal analysis, the relevant point in time was the period in which the child was in the hospital. In this case, by contrast, the State does not contend that Child was a neglected child during the five months he spent in the NICU; rather, the relevant point in time, for purposes of our neglect inquiry, was the time when Child was discharged from the hospital. As discussed above, at the moment Child was discharged, Mother had nowhere to take him that provided the sterile environment required to accommodate his medically complex needs. For this reason, the New Jersey case is simply not helpful. 20251310-CA 16 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. whether the child’s lack of care is due to the “failure or refusal” of the parent to provide the required care. See id. Exploring what caused the lack of proper or necessary medical care is not helpful in assessing whether such a lack of care exists in the first place. But more substantively, the relevant statutory definitions—for dependency and for the first element of neglect—focus on the same core issue: whether a child lacks needed care. While Mother is correct that dependency is a simple inquiry “into the child’s situation as it stands,” grammatical variations between the two subsections do not alter the fact that a concession of dependency necessarily includes a concession that the dependent child “is without proper care.” See id. § 80-1-102(21). And as already noted, this concession necessarily means that the first element of the neglect definition—which Mother at least tacitly acknowledges encompasses present conduct, see supra ¶ 28—is also met. Stated another way, Mother cannot ask the court to adjudicate Child as dependent while at the same time maintaining that he was never without proper or necessary care for purposes of the neglect statute. Such a position is at odds with the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions. ¶31 Second, even setting Mother’s dependency concession aside, and even if we assume that the neglect statutes (as opposed to the abuse statutes 5) forbid consideration of future conduct, 5. In her reply brief, Mother points out that in one provision regarding “abuse,” Utah’s child welfare statutes do expressly allow juvenile courts to take possible future action into account and to protect children from the threat of potential future neglect. In particular, those statutes allow the State to prove “abuse” by demonstrating “[t]hreatened harm,” a term defined as conduct “indicating that the child is at an unreasonable risk of harm or neglect.” See Utah Code § 80-1-102(1)(a)(i)(B), (94). Thus, if a child is at an unreasonable risk of future neglect, that child can be adjudicated as abused as to the responsible parent. Id. But here, (continued…) 20251310-CA 17 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. Mother’s acknowledgment that the neglect statutes are not limited to consideration of past conduct—and that they allow courts to make a neglect determination based on a present failure or refusal to provide proper or necessary care—is fatal to her argument for an additional reason. The “present moment” in question here—the time of Child’s discharge—wasn’t the exact millisecond Child crossed the threshold of the hospital’s exterior exit door; rather, in our view, it is the entire time period in which Child was being prepped for discharge. Anyone who has ever been discharged from a hospital knows that discharge events are far from instantaneous. But despite the fact that it sometimes can take an hour or two or more, a person’s discharge from a hospital is a unitary occurrence, the entirety of which can be considered the “present” for purposes of assessing neglect. ¶32 Here, Child’s lack of proper and necessary medical care wasn’t some speculative happenstance that might or might not occur at some indeterminate point in the future; rather, Child was being discharged from the hospital, and he had to go somewhere. At the time of that event, Mother lacked stable housing, a sterile environment, and reliable electricity, all of which were necessary to meet Child’s daily medical needs. Accepting Mother’s strict time-based argument here would have required DCFS to engage in a charade: put Child in Mother’s arms inside the hospital, then the State did not plead abuse, nor does it ask us here on appeal to affirm on any alternative ground; indeed, it emphasized at the adjudication trial that it was “not asking for [a finding of] abuse.” Mother thus to some extent concedes that the situation here might be worthy of an abuse-by-way-of-threatened-harm adjudication, but she nevertheless asserts that the State pled the case incorrectly and should not be rewarded for its efforts to—as she sees it—drive a square peg into a round hole. But even if the State might have been able to achieve more or less the same result in this case by pleading abuse, that does not mean that it hasn’t properly proved neglect; the two findings are hardly mutually exclusive. 20251310-CA 18 2026 UT App 173  In re S.J.C. watch Mother walk out of the hospital with nowhere to go, and only then execute the removal warrant. In our view, it wasn’t necessary for the hospital to formally (even if momentarily) release Child to Mother’s custody, unhoused and without the required resources for Child’s medical care, in order for the court to conclude that Child lacked proper or necessary subsistence or medical care at the time of discharge. And under the statute, one episode of neglect—even one that occurs in connection with a singular event—is sufficient. Thus, under the rather unique circumstances presented here, the juvenile court did not impermissibly speculate about Mother’s potential future conduct in making its determination about Child’s lack of proper or necessary care; rather, it quite sensibly determined that Mother was incapable of providing proper and necessary care at the time of discharge. Accordingly, the court’s determination was fully in line with the plain language of the neglect statutes, including the provision defining a “neglected child” as one who “has been subjected to neglect.” See id. § 80-1-102(60). ¶33 For all of these reasons, then, the juvenile court did not err in determining that the first element of neglect was met here, because Mother was unable to provide Child the safe, sterile environment he needed—proper or necessary care under the circumstances—at the time of his discharge from the hospital. B. Action or Inaction Causing Failure or Refusal ¶34 The second element required to prove neglect under subsection (iii) does not call for an examination of the extent to which a parent was at fault for a child’s lack of care. See id. § 80-1- 102(59)(a)(iii). Th