In Re Edgardo Matos and Maria Rita Puentes
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-0164
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 26-0164
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In re Edgardo Matos and Maria Rita Puentes,
Relators
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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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PER CURIAM
Edgardo Matos and Maria Puentes (collectively “Matos”) sold an
investment property in San Antonio to Patricia Batley in
December 2020. Allegedly without Batley’s knowledge, Matos had hired
Unlimited Contractor Property Services, LLC to repair the foundation
prior to Batley’s purchase. After the foundation “began to substantially
deteriorate,” Batley sued Matos (among others) in January 2022,
alleging common-law fraud, negligence, and violations of the Business
and Commerce Code, including the Deceptive Trade Practices–
Consumer Protection Act. Less than two months later, Matos brought
Unlimited into the lawsuit as a third-party defendant, alleging breach
of contract and breach of warranty.
The case appears to have progressed smoothly until mid-2024.
On July 17, 2024, Matos filed a “Second Motion for Leave to Designate
Responsible Third Party” under Section 33.004 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. By then, Batley had settled with all defendants except
Matos; Unlimited was still a third-party defendant; and trial was
scheduled for 61 days later on September 16, 2024. At Batley’s request,
trial was ultimately continued to July 2025.
Matos and Unlimited reached a settlement by October 2024,
when Matos voluntarily dismissed Unlimited from the lawsuit. The
following month, the statute of limitations expired as to any direct
claims Batley might have asserted against Unlimited.
Matos did not notice a hearing on the responsible-third-party-
designation motion until April 2025. One day before the hearing, Batley
filed her objections to Unlimited’s designation as a responsible third
party and moved to strike the motion. The trial court held a hearing on
Matos’s motion, then denied and struck it in May. The court of appeals
denied mandamus relief without a substantive opinion. 2026 WL
377875, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 11, 2026).
Matos argues that a trial court must grant leave to designate a
responsible third party if no objection is filed within 15 days of service.
Batley did not object within that period; her objection came 281 days
after the motion to designate Unlimited. Matos asserts that the
designation was thus automatic and ministerial and that the trial
court’s contrary actions were therefore a clear abuse of discretion. We
agree.
The Code plainly provides that a defendant may file a motion for
leave to designate a person as a responsible third party on or before the
60th day before the trial date, and the trial court must grant the
requested leave “unless another party files an objection to the motion for
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leave on or before the 15th day after the date the motion is served.” TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a), (f); see also In re Coppola, 535
S.W.3d 506, 507-08 (Tex. 2017) (noting that trial courts have no
discretion to deny a timely filed motion to designate a responsible third
party absent an objection that meets the statutory requirements).
Matos sought leave to designate Unlimited as a responsible third party
61 days before trial, and Batley did not object within 15 days. The trial
court was therefore obligated to grant the motion for leave to designate,
overrule Batley’s untimely objection, and deny her motion to strike. And
contrary to Batley’s argument, subsection (g) is inapplicable here
because her objection was untimely.
While Matos did not immediately set the motion for a hearing,
that is of no consequence to the question facing the trial court. The
statute’s requirements do not turn on delay between filing the motion to
designate and setting a hearing. Indeed, Section 33.004 does not
mention a hearing at all. It would be easy enough for the Legislature to
tether the statute’s timing requirements to the date a motion to
designate is heard or granted rather than to when it is served. A court
may not modify the statutory requirements when a party does not seek
a ruling on a motion to designate sooner, even if as an abstract matter
it may have been more prudent for Matos to have done so.
Batley argues that the trial court was justified in denying and
striking Matos’s motion because the delay in setting the motion for a
hearing created irreversible prejudice and materially changed the
circumstances of the litigation. According to Batley, (1) Matos’s delay
foreclosed her ability to join Unlimited before limitations expired, and
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(2) Matos’s dismissal of Unlimited eliminated Batley’s ability to conduct
discovery. We disagree.
First, Batley had plenty of time to assess whether she should join
Unlimited as a defendant (and whether she thought she could recover
directly from it) before limitations expired. To be sure, a defendant
forfeits the right to designate a responsible third party after limitations
has expired if the defendant failed to timely disclose the party. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(d). The motion for leave to designate
Unlimited as a responsible third party was filed in July 2024. At that
point, Batley was on notice of Unlimited’s existence and that Matos
believed Unlimited caused all or part of Batley’s alleged injury.
Limitations did not run against Unlimited until November 2024. From
Matos’s disclosure of Unlimited, Batley had more than four months to
join it as a defendant and, for whatever reason, did not. Any prejudice
that Batley suffered by failing to join Unlimited was self-inflicted. Even
indulging the doubtful assumption that the statute would permit
overriding its requirements in different circumstances, nothing here
would justify such a result.
Second, Batley had ample time and ability to conduct discovery
with respect to Unlimited, which was a party to the suit for well over
two years. The timing of the motion and the hearing did not impair
Batley’s ability to conduct such discovery. If Batley was prejudiced by
not engaging in discovery, that prejudice was again self-inflicted.
We do not make light of Batley’s quandary, and we recognize that
Matos could have been more diligent in seeking a ruling on the motion.
But it does not follow that the motion could be denied on that basis. This
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holding does not foreclose other relief if warranted; nothing in our
decision today forecloses (or embraces) any motion by Batley to later
move to strike Unlimited’s designation on evidentiary grounds, for
example. See id. § 33.004(l) (providing that “a party may move to strike
the designation of a responsible third party” for lack of evidence
regarding responsibility). But barring the designation altogether
constitutes a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion for which Matos
lacks an adequate remedy by appeal because “a relator need only
establish a trial court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement
to mandamus relief with regard to a trial court’s denial of a timely-filed
section 33.004(a) motion.” Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 510. The trial court
should have granted Matos’s motion and denied Batley’s, and the court
of appeals should have corrected that error by mandamus.
Without hearing oral argument, we therefore conditionally grant
Matos’s petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to grant
the motion for leave to designate Unlimited as a responsible third party.
TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c). We are confident the court will comply, and the
writ will issue only if it does not.
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
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