Comprehensive Training Center, LLC and Eri Funding Group, Inc. v. Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-0772
JudgeBland
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0772
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Comprehensive Training Center, LLC and
ERI Funding Group, Inc.,
Petitioners,
v.
Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
Argued September 15, 2026
JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE HAWKINS filed a concurring opinion.
As the Education Code permits, a school district’s board of
trustees delegated its authority to its superintendent to make budgeted
purchases under $25,000. Without the board’s knowledge, the
superintendent engaged consultants to provide grant-writing and
administration services to the district in exchange for a contingent fee.
When the district successfully obtained a federal grant, the consultants
presented the district with an $817,500 bill.
The district refused to pay, and the consultants sued, invoking
Local Government Code Chapter 271. Chapter 271 waives immunity in
suits against local governments to enforce “properly executed”
contracts. 1 The district responded with a jurisdictional plea, contending
that the superintendent had no authority to bind the district in this
instance. We hold the consulting contracts exceeded the
superintendent’s authority to make budgeted purchases under $25,000.
Thus, the contracts lack the proper execution required for a Chapter 271
waiver of governmental immunity. The court of appeals reached the
same conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment granting the
district’s jurisdictional plea.
I
Respondent Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District is a public
school district in Hidalgo County. In November 2020, the district’s
superintendent, Gregory Rodriguez, signed contracts with Petitioners
Comprehensive Training Center, LLC and ERI Funding Group, Inc. to
provide consulting services to the district in an effort to secure a federal
grant offered to schools with high poverty rates. The consultants
presented Rodriguez the option to pay either an $8,000 flat fee or a
contingent fee for their services. Rodriguez opted for the contingent fee,
agreeing to pay ERI Funding Group and Comprehensive Training
Center 7.114% and 2.886%, respectively, of the total grant monies
1 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 271.151(2)(A), .152.
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awarded. The district received a grant worth approximately $8 million,
or about $1.635 million per year. The district used the funds to establish
programs for student academic support and extracurricular activities.
In September 2021, Rodriguez terminated the contracts.
Rodriguez testified he did not request the board’s permission either to
enter into or to terminate the contracts. After Rodriguez terminated the
contracts, he asked the board to approve a settlement payment to the
consultants. The board declined to approve the settlement.
In January 2022, the consultants sued the district for breach of
contract. The consultants alleged the district breached their contracts
by refusing to pay them collectively about $817,500 in contingent fees
for their services.
The district filed a jurisdictional plea invoking governmental
immunity. The district contended that Rodriguez had not “properly
executed” the contracts as Chapter 271 requires for a waiver of the
district’s immunity. 2 The district proffered its local policy requiring that
Rodriguez obtain board approval for “any single, budgeted purchase of
goods or services that costs $25,000 or more.” The policy otherwise
provided that Rodriguez could “make budgeted purchases for goods or
services” under $25,000. The district observed that the cost to the
district for these contracts far exceeds that amount. Further, it noted,
the board of trustees did not approve the consulting contracts. As a
result, the district urged, Rodriguez had no authority to purchase these
services without board approval. To support its plea, the district
2 See id.
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included Rodriguez’s affidavit, the contracts, the board’s policy, the
consultants’ demand letter, and the consultants’ invoices.
The consultants responded that Rodriguez had properly executed
the contracts under Chapter 271 because their fees were not an
ascertainable cost at the time Rodriguez agreed to them. The
consultants proffered testimony from their president, Rodriguez’s
deposition testimony, the consultants’ demand letter, the contract
termination letter, and the district’s discovery responses. The trial court
denied the district’s plea, and the district filed an interlocutory appeal.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment granting
the district’s plea. 3 The court held Rodriguez lacked authority to bind
the district because the district had not budgeted for grant-writing
services. 4 The court relied on Rodriguez’s testimony that the district
“hadn’t . . . specifically budgeted” for grant-writing services and noted
that the consultants adduced no contrary evidence the district had done
so. 5
II
When the government asserts immunity, it presents a challenge
to the trial court’s jurisdiction. 6 We review this jurisdictional
3 732 S.W.3d 927, 931 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024).
4 Id. at 930–31.
5 Id.
6 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26
(Tex. 2004). “In suits against the government, . . . all statutory prerequisites to
suit are jurisdictional requirements.” Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis
Cent. Appraisal Dist. ex rel. Crigler, 694 S.W.3d 752, 759 n.33 (Tex. 2024)
(citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034).
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determination de novo, 7 taking evidence favoring the nonmovant as true
and indulging reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. 8 If the
government challenges a lack of facts supporting a waiver of immunity,
then the plaintiff must produce evidence to support a claimed waiver. 9
It is a “foundational rule” that a party suing the government bears the
burden to establish a waiver of immunity. 10
Before 2005, parties contracted with a local government at their
peril. Governmental immunity barred any breach of contract suit
against the government. 11 That year, the Legislature enacted
Chapter 271, subchapter I, 12 waiving governmental immunity for
contract claims against local governments arising out of contracts
“subject to this subchapter.” 13 The statute defines a “[c]ontract subject
to this subchapter” as “a written contract stating the essential terms of
the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental
7 City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 457 (Tex.
2020).
8 City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 448 (Tex. 2024).
9 Id. at 447–48.
10 Id. at 447.
11 See Campbellton Rd., Ltd. v. City of San Antonio ex rel. S.A. Water
Sys., 688 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex. 2024). Public school districts generally enjoy
governmental immunity from both liability and suit unless immunity is waived
by state law. El Paso Educ. Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d
521, 526 (Tex. 2020).
12 Act of May 23, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 604, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
1548 (codified at Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.151–.160).
13 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.152.
5
entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental
entity.” 14
A court need look no further than the four corners of the contract
to determine whether it states all essential terms and provides goods or
services to the local government. 15 When the government contests
proper execution, however, the party seeking a waiver of immunity must
show that its government counterpart possessed the authority to bind
the local government. 16
The Education Code grants a local school board the authority to
“enter into contracts as authorized under this code or other law and
delegate contractual authority to the superintendent as appropriate.” 17
In an earlier encounter with Chapter 271, we held that a superintendent
“cannot bind the government to a contract based on apparent
authority.” 18 Rather, a school official must possess actual authority to
bind the district. 19
Turning to this case, the district’s policy delegates limited
contracting authority to the superintendent, permitting budgeted
purchases under $25,000:
The Board delegates to the Superintendent or designee the
authority to make budgeted purchases for goods and
14 Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 271.151(2)(A).
15 See Campbellton Rd., 688 S.W.3d at 118–22.
16 See Amex Props., 602 S.W.3d at 533.
17 Tex. Educ. Code § 11.1511(c)(4).
18 Amex Props., 602 S.W.3d at 533.
19 See id. at 533 n.63.
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services. However, any single, budgeted purchase of goods
or services that costs $25,000 or more, regardless of
whether the goods or services are competitively purchased,
shall require Board approval before a transaction may take
place.
The consultants do not dispute that the board of trustees never approved
their contracts. Rodriguez properly executed them on the district’s
behalf only if he made a budgeted purchase for goods or services under
$25,000. 20
A
We begin with the cost limitation. As a preliminary matter, the
consultants contend the district bore the burden to demonstrate the
district’s cost to purchase the consultants’ services. Once a local
government asserts and supports with evidence its immunity from suit,
however, the plaintiff must adduce facts supporting a waiver of
immunity. 21
The district asserted in its jurisdictional plea that the contracts
cost more than $25,000 each, referring to the consultants’ demand letter
and invoices totaling $817,500. The consultants then bore the burden of
adducing facts contravening the district’s proof.
The consultants do not challenge the district’s proof. Rather, they
contend the limits on the superintendent’s authority are inapplicable
20 See id. at 532 (“[A] contract is properly executed when it is executed
in accord with the statutes and regulations prescribing that authority.”
(emphasis omitted)); Tex. Educ. Code § 11.1511(c)(4) (confining a
superintendent’s authority to enter into contracts on behalf of a school district
to the authority the board delegates to the superintendent).
21 Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 448 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28).
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because the parties could not ascertain a contingent cost at the time the
superintendent agreed to pay for it. The district owed no money upfront,
and the cost, if any, was unknown at the time of execution.
The limits on Rodriguez’s authority to bind the district, however,
were known. Rodriguez had no authority to bind the district to unlimited
or unascertainable liability, however far in the future. 22 The board of
trustees instead had granted the superintendent limited authority to
make budgeted purchases costing less than $25,000.
When governments delegate authority, they delegate only that
authority expressed. 23 An uncapped contingent fee, in this case resulting
in an $817,500 invoice, falls outside the superintendent’s authority to
make budgeted (and thus ascertainable) purchases costing less than
$25,000. Accepting unwritten authority to enter contingent fee
agreements in an uncertain amount circumvents the expressed and
known monetary limit on this superintendent’s contracting authority.
The consultants alternatively contend that the district could
recoup the cost of their fees out of the federal grant money the district
receives, revenue made possible only through their efforts. School
districts, however, accept federal grant funds subject to restrictions and
22 See Amex Props., 602 S.W.3d at 533.
23 See Town of Lakewood Village v. Bizios, 493 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex.
2016) (recognizing that “political subdivisions . . . possess [only] those powers
and privileges that the State expressly confers upon them.” (quoting Tex. Dep’t
of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tex. 2004))).
8
conditions. 24 The record does not show that the district could use the
grant funds to pay the consultants’ fees. 25
The consultants propose “a rebuttable presumption of authority”
for contingent fee contracts because their ultimate cost may not be
ascertainable at the outset. Such a presumption does not comport with
the monetary limit on this superintendent’s contracting authority. A
rebuttable presumption further conflicts with the Education Code’s
limited allowance for board-delegated authority, which may not be
implied. 26
24 See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.031(a).
25 ERI Funding Group’s contract says payments to the consultants
“MUST be utilized from local school funds” but elsewhere states that “the
District may claim . . . indirect grant funds to offset this cost, if they choose.”
Similarly, Comprehensive Training Center’s contract states that the district
can use “direct, indirect, or local school funds” to pay the consultants. Federal
regulations, however, permit districts to use grant funds to pay consultants
only if certain conditions are met. 34 C.F.R. § 75.515(b) (2025). Nothing in the
record indicates such a showing. The federal guidance the consultants rely on
also states that the U.S. Department of Education “rarely approves” requests
to pay consultant fees with grant funds. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 21st Century
Community Learning Centers Non-Regulatory Guidance §§ G-9, 13
(2003), https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/programs/21stcclc/guidance2003.pdf.
Further, the Texas Education Agency’s guidance for the grant awarded to the
district expressly states that “[g]rant funds must not be used to pay for
grant writing services.” Tex. Educ. Agency, Program Guidelines: 2021-2022
Nita M. Lowey 21st Century Community Learning Centers,
Cycle 11, Year 1 at 22 (2020), https://tea4avcastro.tea.state.tx.us/eGrants/21-
22/22695030/proguider5.pdf.
26See Tex. Educ. Code § 11.1511(c)(4) (confining a superintendent’s
authority to enter into contracts on behalf of a school district to the authority
the board delegates to the superintendent); see also Amex Props., 602 S.W.3d
at 533.
9
B
Finally, the consultants argue the district failed to establish that
it did not budget for these contracts. The consultants again reverse the
burden for a jurisdictional plea. 27 The evidence nevertheless shows the
district did not budget for these contracts. Rodriguez never discussed
the grant funding with the board until after the district won the grants.
Rodriguez testified that the district “hadn’t . . . specifically budgeted”
$8,000 in flat fees for the consultants’ services when he agreed to the
contracts.
In response, the consultants suggest broad categories in the
publicly available budget such as “General Administration” might
encompass grant-writing services. The consultants’ suggestion does not,
however, contravene Rodriguez’s testimony that the board of trustees
was unaware of Rodriguez’s endeavor and had not budgeted for it. The
Education Code prohibits school districts from spending public funds “in
any manner other than as provided for in the budget adopted by the
board of trustees.” 28 Board policy, in compliance with the statute,
limited the superintendent to purchases reflected in the budget. As the
court of appeals recognized, Rodriguez had no authority to make
unbudgeted purchases at any cost.
27 See, e.g., Campbellton Rd., 688 S.W.3d at 113 (explaining that the
plaintiff has the “burden to establish, or at least raise a fact issue on,” a waiver
of immunity under Section 271.152); Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 448 (citing
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28).
28Tex. Educ. Code § 44.006(a). Superintendents prepare the budget
“according to generally accepted accounting principles” and must “cover[] all
estimated revenue and proposed expenditures of the district.” Id. § 44.002(a),
(b).
10
In guarding the public treasury, the Legislature has provided
very limited avenues for redress against government wrongs. 29 By
statute, the superintendent had the authority to contract only in the
manner the board of trustees delegated. 30 By policy, this district’s board
did not permit its superintendent to incur uncapped, unbudgeted
liabilities on the district’s behalf. We do not foreclose board action to
amend the budget approving some payment to the consultants. 31 Nor do
we cast doubt on a district’s ability to arrange for services based on a
contingent fee, exercising its own authority under the Education Code.
Rodriguez, however, exceeded his actual authority as the board had
established it.
* * *
29 See Ben Bolt–Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol.
Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 326–27 (Tex.
2006) (recognizing that the Legislature weighs its duty to safeguard taxpayer
funds when determining whether to waive immunity); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code
§ 271.152 (waiving immunity for breach of contract claims only for “contract[s]
subject to this subchapter”).
30 Tex. Educ. Code § 11.1511(c)(4).
31 The board may amend its budget or adopt a supplementary budget to
cover “necessary unforeseen expenses.” Id. § 44.006(b).
11
Because the superintendent exceeded his authority to contract on
the district’s behalf, he did not properly execute the contracts to bring
them within Chapter 271’s waiver of immunity. The district retains its
governmental immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals granting the district’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Jane N. Bland
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
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