Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Enterprise Financial Group, Inc.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-0660
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0660
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Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
Petitioner,
v.
Enterprise Financial Group, Inc.,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
Santander and Enterprise sued each other for breach of contract
when the vehicle protection program they were offering did not work out
as planned. After a jury trial, Enterprise was awarded damages, and
Santander took nothing.
We are asked to decide whether Santander preserved objections
to the jury charge. The court of appeals declined to consider the merits
of the objections because it concluded that none were preserved.
Because we conclude that the objections were preserved, we reverse the
court of appeals’ judgment and remand for that court to consider
whether the charge was erroneous and, if so, whether any error led to
harm.
I. BACKGROUND
Santander makes auto loans to dealerships nationwide.
Enterprise sells consumer protection products, including guaranteed
asset protection (GAP) policies to help pay for losses not covered by
insurance when a car is totaled or stolen. In 2012, the two companies
entered into a Vendor Services Agreement under which Santander
would market and sell Enterprise’s GAP policies as add-ons to car loans.
When an auto dealer purchased one of these policies, Santander,
Enterprise, and the policy underwriter each received part of what was
paid, with the remainder being held in reserve to cover losses. The
arrangement was ultimately unsuccessful, and Enterprise terminated
the Agreement in 2017 and later sued Santander for breach of contract
and declaratory relief. Santander responded with its own counterclaims
for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The case was tried to a
jury.
Each side submitted proposed jury charges before trial. On the
last day of trial, the court marked the cover page of both sides’ charges
“Refused” and signed, saying that doing so “protects your record that the
Court refused your particular jury charges.” The trial court prepared
its own charge and held a charge conference later that day, during which
Santander objected to Questions 8A and 8B of the court’s charge.
Question 8A asked whether Santander’s breach was the result of gross
negligence, bad faith, or willful misconduct and provided definitions of
those three terms. Question 8B asked what sum would reasonably
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compensate Enterprise for its damages, if any, and provided a single
answer blank. It did not define “damages” or list any measures of
damages for the jury to consider.
Santander objected on the basis that consequential damages
could only be awarded upon a finding of gross negligence, bad faith, or
willful misconduct under the Agreement and that the damages question
“opens it up to an award of either direct or consequential” damages
without that predicate finding. Santander also objected that
Question 8B allowed the jury to award Enterprise lost profits from
future contracts even though Enterprise’s evidence was insufficient to
support such an award, and it requested that the jury be instructed to
consider only direct damages.
Enterprise responded that the parties “[d]o not agree what
damages are what” and that the court’s charge “allows the jury to make
a finding that will allow the Court if necessary to revisit the damages
number after trial.” The trial court overruled Santander’s objection to
Questions 8A and 8B and concluded the charge conference after
Santander confirmed that it had no objections to the other questions in
the charge.
The jury found that both parties breached the Agreement, that
Santander’s breach occurred first and was material and not excused,
and that Enterprise’s breach was excused. It found that Enterprise
suffered $5 million in damages and that Santander suffered
$4.2 million. The jury failed to find that Santander’s breach was the
result of gross negligence, bad faith, or willful misconduct, but it found
that Enterprise’s breach was the result of such conduct.
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Because the jury found that Enterprise’s breach was excused, the
trial court disregarded Santander’s damages and signed a final
judgment awarding Enterprise $5 million in damages as well as interest
and attorney’s fees. The trial court denied Santander’s post-judgment
motions.
Santander appealed, arguing (among other things) that the
charge was erroneous and that insufficient evidence supported the
damages award. The court of appeals concluded that none of
Santander’s three complaints about the charge was preserved. ___
S.W.3d ___, 2025 WL 1712081, at *7-10 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18,
2025).
Santander’s first charge complaint was that the broad-form
submission of Question 1 concerning breach of contract by Santander
allowed the jury to consider breach theories that were not pleaded or
tried by consent. The court of appeals overruled that issue because
Santander did not object to Question 1 and could not rely on the trial
court’s refusal of Santander’s proposed jury charge to preserve error for
appellate review. Id. at *7. For the same reason, the court of appeals
concluded that Santander did not preserve its complaint that the
charge—which submitted a general instruction on waiver in its question
regarding Santander’s defenses—should have included an additional
question on a particular waiver defense concerning continued
operations. Id. at *10.
Santander also complained on appeal that Question 8B permitted
the jury to award lost profits, which were not recoverable under the
Agreement without a finding that a party’s breach was the result of bad
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faith, gross negligence, or willful misconduct and were not supported by
evidence. Id. at *7-9. The court of appeals determined that this
complaint was not preserved for three reasons. First, it concluded that
Santander’s objection that Question 8B permits damages without the
predicate finding in Question 8A did not sufficiently alert the trial court
that one of the elements of damages in Question 8B should not be
included in the charge. Id. at *9. Next, the court of appeals concluded
that Santander’s complaint that an instruction on gross negligence, bad
faith, and wrongful conduct “should be given under the contract” was a
complaint about the placement of Question 8A, not the elements of
damages included in Question 8B. Id. at *9. Finally, the court of
appeals determined that Santander’s objection that “there should only
be instructions for direct damages” in Question 8B based on Enterprise’s
failure to elicit evidence of lost profits did not alert the trial court that
Question 8B impermissibly allowed the jury to find both direct damages
and lost profits in a single answer. Id. at *9.
Santander separately complained that there was insufficient
evidence to support the damages awarded to Enterprise under the
charge as given. The court disagreed, concluding that the testimony of
Enterprise’s President and CEO that Enterprise suffered an out-of-
pocket loss of $6 million and held back $1 million that should have been
paid to Santander supported the $5 million award, and that the record
included ample evidence that Enterprise’s out-of-pocket losses were
caused by Santander’s refusal to agree to price increases for the
program’s policies. Id. at *12-13. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, and Santander filed a petition for review.
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II. ANALYSIS
In this Court, Santander argues that it preserved its jury-charge
objections. We agree. First, Santander argues that it preserved an
objection to Question 8B at the charge conference. “A party objecting to
a charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the
grounds of the objection.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 274. A party preserves a
challenge to the broad-form submission of a question “by making timely
and specific objections that there was no evidence to support . . .
disputed items submitted in [a] broad-form charge.” Thota v. Young,
366 S.W.3d 678, 691 (Tex. 2012).
Question 8B asked the jury to decide what damages, if any,
Enterprise suffered because of any breach of contract by Santander. The
charge did not identify what measures of damages the jury should
consider or provide separate blanks for direct or consequential damages.
Santander objected to Questions 8A and 8B and argued:
[T]he damages provision opens it up to an award of either
direct or consequential without a first finding of . . .
negligence, bad faith or similarly wrongful conduct and we
likewise think that the gross negligence bad faith and
wrongful conduct instruction should be given under the
contract because of the contract and because [Enterprise
has] failed to elicit any evidence of los[t] profit and
therefore, they can’t . . . meet their evidentiary burdens
and therefore there should only be instructions for direct
damages.
(Emphases added.) Santander thus made a “specific objection that there
was no evidence to support” an award of lost profits and argued that
Question 8B must be limited to direct damages only. See id. In doing
so, Santander “pointed out distinctly the objectionable matter”—the
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submission of a damages question that permitted an award of lost
profits—and stated “the grounds of the objection”—that there was no
evidence of lost profits. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 274.
Enterprise understood this objection: it responded that the
“evidence does support” the submission of Question 8B, acknowledged
that the parties disagree on what damages should be awarded, and
argued that the question as submitted would permit the trial court to
“revisit the damages number after trial.” 1 This response confirms that
Santander’s objection was sufficiently plain to make the trial court
aware of its complaint. See State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d
235, 241 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that test for preserving error in charge
for appellate review is simply “whether the party made the trial court
aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling”).
Yet the court of appeals concluded that Santander’s no-evidence
objection failed to alert the trial court to the error Santander was
asserting on appeal. ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1712081, at *9. According
to the court of appeals, Santander failed to argue specifically that the
question presented an improper amalgamation of lost profits and direct
damages. In the court of appeals’ view, Santander should have asked
the trial court to include separate blanks for direct and consequential
damages.
1 Enterprise was incorrect that the question would permit the trial court
to revisit the damages after trial: the question gave only a single answer blank
and provided no instructions regarding any measure of damages. In
responding to Santander’s objection, Enterprise chose not to request separate
answer blanks for direct and consequential damages, which would have
allowed the trial court to revisit Enterprise’s entitlement to each measure of
damages after trial.
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We disagree. Santander did object that the question permitted
an award of amalgamated lost profits and direct damages, arguing that
the question “should only [have] instructions for direct damages”
because Enterprise “failed to elicit any evidence of los[t] profit.”
Moreover, it would have been inconsistent for Santander to request a
separate blank for consequential damages when it was objecting that
they could not be submitted to the jury at all because there was no
evidence of the sort of consequential damages Enterprise sought: lost
profits on future contracts.
For these reasons, we hold Santander preserved its objection that
Question 8B of the trial court’s charge permitted an award of damages
for lost profits unsupported by evidence. On remand, the court of
appeals should consider in the first instance (1) whether overruling that
objection was error because the record contains insufficient evidence of
lost profits, and if so (2) whether the error was harmful. 2 See Horton v.
Kan. City S. Ry., 692 S.W.3d 112, 145-47 (Tex. 2024) (holding error not
presumed harmful when question includes theory lacking legally
sufficient evidentiary support).
Next, Santander presses error in the omission of limiting
instructions from Question 1 of the charge regarding breach of contract
and the omission of a separate question regarding its particular waiver
2 In this Court, Enterprise argues that Santander did not present to the
court of appeals its argument that the trial court erred in overruling its
objection because there was insufficient evidence of lost profits. But the court
of appeals’ opinion recognizes that Santander argued “there was no evidence
of lost profits” and that Enterprise responded “any error was harmless because
the jury awarded [damages for] out-of-pocket net loss and not lost profits.” ___
S.W.3d at ___ 2025 WL 1712081, at *8-9.
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theory concerning continued operations. Santander did not object to the
omissions at the charge conference, but it requested the limiting
instructions and question in its pretrial proposed charge, which the trial
court globally marked “Refused.” The court of appeals held that
Santander waived its complaints by not separately objecting after it
received the trial court’s proposed charge omitting the requested
instructions and question. In the court of appeals’ view, a global denial
“based solely on the parties’ pretrial submission of proposed jury charges
does not preserve issues of charge error for appellate review” because “a
proposed jury charge filed pretrial standing alone does not meet the
preservation of error requirements of rules 272, 273, and 274.” ___
S.W.3d at ___ 2025 WL 1712081, at *7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting EYM
Diner L.P. v. Yousef, No. 05-19-00636-CV, 2020 WL 6883171, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Nov. 24, 2020, pet. dism’d)).
In this case, at least, the pretrial proposed charge does not stand
alone. The trial court assured Santander that it was aware each side
had “made [its] proposals” and that although “[w]e’ll also put some
things on the record [at the charge conference] as well,” the global
refusal “protects your record that the Court refused your particular jury
charges.” The express refusal of the proposal—though global—coupled
with the trial court’s assurances of particular preservation and the quite
short time between the refusal and the charge conference makes this
scenario unlike that in Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364 S.W.3d
817, 829-31 (Tex. 2012). In Cruz, we held that filing a pretrial charge
failed to preserve error because the trial court had never refused to
submit the requested questions and the complaining party never
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objected to their omission despite “ample time to review the draft
charge.” Id. at 831. We observed that the trial court has no duty to
“comb through the parties’ pretrial filings to ensure that the [court’s
proposed charge] comports precisely with their requests—that is the
parties’ responsibility.” Id. Importantly, the record in Cruz did not
reveal whether the trial court had refused the question. Id.
Under the specific facts of this case, where a global refusal was
accompanied by assurances that the trial court was aware of and the
record protected as to particular charge requests, we hold that
Santander preserved the refusal of those requests for appellate review.
On remand, the court of appeals should consider whether each refusal
was erroneous and, if so, whether the error was harmful. 3
III. CONCLUSION
Having concluded that Santander preserved its complaints
regarding Questions 1 and 8B of the jury charge and the omitted waiver
question, and without hearing oral argument pursuant to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 59.1, we grant the petition for review, reverse the
3 Santander also argues that even under the charge as given, there is
legally insufficient evidence to support the damages awarded by the jury and
the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. Santander intentionally
requests only a new trial due to this purported proof deficiency, not rendition
of judgment in its favor. Resolving this issue may be unnecessary if the court
of appeals concludes that the charge was erroneous and harmful in any of the
respects just discussed (a matter on which we express no opinion), as the
remedy for that error would likewise be a new trial. Accordingly, we decline to
address Santander’s sufficiency challenge.
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court of appeals’ judgment, and remand for the court of appeals to
consider those complaints in the first instance.
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
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