In Re Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-1030
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 25-1030
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In re Cook Children’s Health Plan, Texas Children’s Health Plan,
Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company,
Relators
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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
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PER CURIAM
Justice Sullivan did not participate in the decision.
Relators brought ultra vires claims against the Executive
Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission.
The trial court denied the Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction and
temporarily enjoined her from, among other things, executing certain
contracts. The Commissioner filed an interlocutory appeal, which
automatically superseded the temporary injunction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 6.001(b); In re Tex. Educ. Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679, 680
(Tex. 2021). To prevent emergency filings seeking or opposing temporary
relief under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3, the parties entered
into a “standstill agreement,” which states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any supersedeas rights, Defendant, the
Texas Health & Human Services Commission, and all
employees and agents of the Texas Health & Human
Services Commission (collectively, “HHSC”) will comply
with the terms of the Temporary Injunction Order until the
latest of (a) 30 days after the end of the 89th Regular Session
of the Texas Legislature, regardless of the appellate court’s
ruling on the Joint Motion to Abate; (b) a ruling from the
appellate court on any request for temporary orders under
TRAP 29.3 filed within seven days of the Appeal’s
reinstatement; or (c) disposition of any mandamus
proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court reviewing a ruling
on a request described in (b) above, provided that the
proceeding is filed within seven days of such ruling.
Relators then filed motions for Rule 29.3 relief in the court of appeals.
On November 12, 2025, the court of appeals issued an order
denying Rule 29.3 relief. The court reasoned that under the standstill
agreement, the Commissioner “will continue to abide by the terms of the
trial court’s temporary injunction regardless of how this Court rules on
Appellees’ motions until the Texas Supreme Court resolves the issue.”
According to the court, because its decision “will not affect [the
Commissioner’s] adherence to the terms of the temporary injunction,”
relators “failed to demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable harm”
absent Rule 29.3 relief. Relators filed a mandamus petition in this Court
asking us to vacate the court of appeals’ order, direct that court to decide
relators’ Rule 29.3 motions “on their merits,” and direct the
Commissioner to comply with the temporary injunction in the meantime.
Alternatively, relators ask us to consider the “merits” of their Rule 29.3
motions ourselves and order the court of appeals to grant them.
The judiciary of our State should encourage this kind of standstill
agreement. By voluntarily complying with the temporary injunction, the
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government forestalled emergency satellite litigation over whether the
appellate courts would require it to abide by the injunction’s terms
pending appeal. That agreement prevents the extraordinary burden that
emergency litigation places on courts, attorneys, and parties.
But the court of appeals’ decision turns the agreement on its head.
The court denied relief based solely on the existence of the standstill
agreement, yet by denying the Rule 29.3 motions, the court hastened the
end of that agreement. And the court effectively passed the buck to us;
if we were to deny this mandamus petition, then under the standstill
agreement’s terms, the Commissioner would no longer be required to
abide by the terms of the superseded injunction. That, in turn, would
most likely result in emergency motions for temporary relief from
relators—the very kind of emergency motions that the standstill
agreement was meant to avoid.
We disagree with the court of appeals’ reasoning. The existence
of a standstill agreement like this one does not establish that appellants
will not suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted. Nor, of course,
does it mean that they will. Each case must be evaluated on its own
merits.
Without hearing oral argument, we therefore conditionally grant
the petition for writ of mandamus, vacate the court of appeals’ order
denying the Rule 29.3 motions, and direct the court of appeals to
reconsider those motions. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(c). The writ will issue
only if the court of appeals does not comply.
We note that because we are vacating the court of appeals’ order,
it is as if the court never ruled, and the standstill agreement remains in
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effect. We express no view of whether relators have shown entitlement
to temporary relief under Rule 29.3, and we note that a decision on the
merits of the underlying appeal may render the motions moot.
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
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