U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Rmtp Trust Series 2021 Cottage-Tt-V v. Business Unlimited 27, LLC
CourtTexas Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-0558
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 26-0558
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U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for RMTP Trust
Series 2021 Cottage-TT-V,
Petitioner,
v.
Business Unlimited 27, LLC,
Respondent
═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
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PER CURIAM
“Default judgments are ‘greatly disfavor[ed]’ under Texas law,
consistent with the strong policy preference for adjudicating cases on the
merits.” Tabakman v. Tabakman, 728 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. 2025)
(alteration in original) (quoting In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689
S.W.3d 916, 921, 925 (Tex. 2024)). As a result, “[f]or well over a century
the rule has been firmly established in this state that a default judgment
cannot withstand direct attack by a defendant who complains that he
was not served in strict compliance with applicable requirements.”
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990). We demand
“meticulous adherence to service requirements” when reviewing a
default judgment, Shamrock Enters., LLC v. Top Notch Movers, LLC,
728 S.W.3d 693, 699 (Tex. 2026), mindful that it “‘generally must be set
aside’ if a defendant can show service of process was invalid,” Huffman
Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Colter, 740 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Tex. 2026) (quoting
Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex.
2006)).
In the case now before us, Respondent Business Unlimited 27,
LLC sought to sue Petitioner U.S. Bank National Association, as
Trustee for RMTP Trust Series 2021 Cottage-TT-V, in connection with
a lien sale. But it served a citation addressed to “US Bank National
Association” instead of the proper entity, “U.S. Bank National
Association, as Trustee for RMTP Trust Series 2021 Cottage-TT-V.” The
deadline then lapsed for Petitioner to timely answer. Two days after the
deadline, Respondent moved for default judgment, which the trial court
granted that same day.
Petitioner then brought this direct attack on the default
judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379
S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2012). It asked that the default judgment be set
aside, and it moved for a new trial. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. __ S.W.3d __, 2026
WL 1041632, at *4 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2026).
We reverse. In an unbroken line of cases dating back a century,
we have held that a default judgment cannot withstand direct attack
unless the face of the record affirmatively demonstrates proper service
of citation. See Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.
2
1994) (collecting cases). “There are no presumptions in favor of valid
issuance, service, and return of citation in the face of a [direct] attack on
a default judgment.” Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836 (alteration in original)
(quoting Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d
884, 885 (Tex. 1985)). This rule reflects the bedrock principle that a
judgment cannot be rendered against a defendant absent proper service
accompanied by acceptance, waiver, or an appearance. Absent proper
service, a defendant has no duty to act. See id. at 836-37.
For a service of citation to be valid, it must show the names of the
parties and be directed to the appropriate defendant. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 99(b). It is the responsibility of the party requesting service, not the
process server, to ensure that the citation is accurate. Id. R. 99(a). If
there are any citation errors, the requesting party must amend the
citation before judgment is rendered. Primate Constr., 884 S.W.2d at
153; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 118. A citation directed to an entity other than
the appropriate defendant is not validly served—even if the registered
agent receives the citation and the appropriate defendant has actual
knowledge of the lawsuit. We reiterate today what we said two decades
ago: “Receiving suit papers or actual notice through a procedure not
authorized for service is treated the same as never receiving them.”
Fidelity, 186 S.W.3d at 574 n.1 (citing Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836).
Here, the citation was addressed to “US Bank National
Association.” But the entity Respondent sought to sue is “U.S. Bank
National Association, as Trustee for RMTP Trust Series 2021
Cottage-TT-V.” Although Respondent came close to naming the
appropriate defendant, “close” is not strict compliance, and we have long
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held that even minor errors fall short. See Uvalde, 690 S.W.2d at 884-85
(holding that the exclusion of “Jr.” from registered agent’s name failed
to show strict compliance); Hendon v. Pugh, 46 Tex. 211, 212 (1876)
(reversing default judgment when return was served on “J.N. Hendon”
instead of named defendant “J.W. Hendon”); see also Deutsche Bank,
Nat’l Tr. Co v. Kingman Holdings, LLC, No. 05-14-00855-CV, 2015 WL
6523712, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 5, 2015, no pet.) (holding that
service on “Deutsche Bank National Trustee Company” was insufficient
for proper service against “Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company, as
Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1, Inc., Trust 2006-NC5 Mortgage
Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-NC5”). Respondent’s citation
omitted the crucial distinction that Petitioner was being sued in its
capacity as Trustee for the RMTP Trust Series 2021 Cottage-TT-V.
Accordingly, the no-answer default judgment cannot stand.
Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we grant the
petition for review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, vacate the
trial court’s default judgment, and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
OPINION DELIVERED: November 20, 2026
1 Defects in service of process implicate jurisdiction and are not subject
to the usual rules governing preservation of error. See PNS Stores, 379 S.W.3d
at 273 (citing Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008)); Wilson, 800
S.W.2d at 836-37. As a result, we reject Respondent’s argument that the
service defect is not properly before us.
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