Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00377-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF J.L. AND J.L., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 360th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 360-746211-24 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an ultra-accelerated appeal1 in which Appellant (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights2 to her children J.L. (James) and J.L. (Joe),3 based on clear and convincing evidence of two predicate grounds—endangering environment and endangering conduct—and a best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). Mother raises eight issues on appeal.4 Because— pursuant to Family Code Section 263.403(c)—the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction over this case before the trial commenced, the trial court’s order of termination was void. See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. 2012). I. Background In April 2023, the Department of Family and Protective Services received an intake alleging domestic violence between Mother and Father. At that time, James was the couple’s only child. The family was referred to Family-Based Safety Services (FBSS) 1 See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate court to dispose of appeal from judgment terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 days after notice of appeal is filed). 2 The children’s father filed a relinquishment of rights to both children that was accepted by the trial court. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.103. 3 We use aliases to refer to the children in this proceeding. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). We do not address all eight issues because the first issue is dispositive. See Tex. 4 R. App. P. 47.1. 2 to provide an opportunity to address these concerns. FBSS was involved with the family for just under one year, and during that time, multiple other domestic-violence intakes occurred. Then, on January 30, 2024, the Department investigated another domestic-violence intake and found reason to believe for neglectful supervision.5 James was removed on February 2, 2024, and the trial court signed an ex parte order the same day that named the Department as James’s temporary sole managing conservator. Two weeks later, the trial court signed an order for protection of a child as to Joe—also placing him in the Department’s temporary sole managing conservatorship—on February 16, 2024. On November 27, 2024, Father filed a motion to extend the dismissal date under Texas Family Code Section 263.401(b).6 Mother filed a similar motion for extension under Section 263.401 on December 3, 2024. The trial court granted both requests and signed an “Order Retaining Suit on Court’s Docket and Setting Court Proceeding Dates,” on December 4, 2024. Pursuant to Section 263.401(b), the trial court set a new automatic dismissal date: August 1, 2025. 5 An investigation of allegations of child abuse or neglect results in one of five possible dispositions: (1) reason to believe (based on a preponderance of the evidence); (2) ruled out; (3) unable to complete; (4) unable to determine; or (5) administrative closure. In re C.W., No. 02-21-00252-CV, 2022 WL 123221, at *6 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.). 6 That section permits, under particular circumstances, up to a 180-day extension to the time described in Subsection (a). See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a), (b). 3 Then, on March 20, 2025, the trial court issued an “Order for Monitored Return” of both children to Father pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 263.403(a)(2)(A).7 The trial court, following Section 263.403(b),8 also set a new automatic dismissal date for the case: September 16, 2025. The monitored return failed, and on April 23, 2025, the trial court issued a “Temporary Ex Parte Order and Order Setting Hearing for Removal from Monitored Return.” The order removed the children from Father’s home and set a hearing for May 2, 2025. This order did not include the reset date of the automatic-dismissal deadline as required by Section 263.403(c).9 7 A monitored return under this section includes returning the child to the parent or transitioning the child, according to a schedule, from substitute care to the parent while the parent completes the remaining requirements of their service plan that are necessary for the child’s return. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403(a)(2). 8 This section instructs the trial court to schedule a new dismissal date that is not more than 180 days after the date the temporary order is rendered. See id. § 263.403(b). 9 Following the May 2, 2025 hearing, the trial court signed the “Order for Removal from Monitored Return” and reset the automatic-dismissal deadline to October 29, 2025. The trial court did not properly calculate the automatic-dismissal deadline after terminating Father’s monitored return. And, as we explain in the body of this opinion, the trial court later made the same error after terminating Mother’s transitional monitored return. Father’s automatic-dismissal deadline—180 days after his monitored return was terminated by temporary order—was October 20, 2025. See Tex. R. Evid. 201 (a court may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute). But because the trial court ordered Mother’s transitional monitored return before October 20th, thereby extending the deadline for 180 days from the date Mother’s return order was signed, see Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403(b), the miscalculation after Father’s monitored return ended is not relevant to the disposition of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 4 On August 26, 2025, the day before the final hearing was scheduled, the Department filed a motion for continuance, citing that one of the permanency-specialist witnesses was unavailable to testify due to an emergency. The record contains no ruling on this motion, but on October 1, 2025, the trial court issued an “Order for Transitional Monitored Return” of both children to Mother. As with the monitored return to Father, the trial court then reset the suit’s automatic-dismissal date to March 30, 2026, pursuant to Section 263.403(b). Nineteen days later, the Department filed a “Motion for Temporary Ex Parte Order and Motion to Remove from Monitored Return.” The same day—October 20, 2025—the trial court signed a “Temporary Ex Parte Order and Order Setting Hearing for Removal from Monitored Return” that terminated its prior “Order for Transitional Monitored Return” of both children to Mother. This order did not include the reset date of the automatic-dismissal deadline as required by Section 263.403(c). At the subsequent hearing on December 9, 2025, the trial court signed an “Order for Removal From Monitored Return,” and reset the automatic-dismissal deadline for June 5, 2026. The Final Hearing was set for April 22, 2026, and trial commenced on that date. Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court signed an order of termination, terminating Mother’s and Father’s10 parental rights to James and Joe. 10 On the first day of trial, Father’s attorney presented Father’s affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to the trial court. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.103. The trial court accepted Father’s relinquishment and terminated his parental 5 Mother appealed the trial court’s order of termination and, among the eight issues raised on appeal, challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction at the time of the final hearing.11 II. Trial Court Jurisdiction “[W]e are obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdiction.” In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004)). Without subject-matter jurisdiction, a trial court cannot render a binding judgment. Id. (first citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000); and then citing In re Doe (Trooper), 444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014)). A judgment is void when the court that rendered it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020) (citing Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005)); In re J.R., 622 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. dism’d]). “Whether a trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” rights to both children, also finding that it was in the children’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(K), (2). Father did not file a notice of appeal. 11 Mother’s challenge alleges that the trial court improperly extended the dismissal deadline because it utilized a “sham monitored return.” Because we review jurisdictional issues de novo, see In re A.F., 653 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.), and the statute resolves the question about the proper calculation of a dismissal deadline, see Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403, we do not consider Mother’s argument about the validity of her transitional monitored return. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. But we note that Mother made no objection—at the time it began or the time it ended—to the so-called “sham monitored return.” See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). 6 J.R., 622 S.W.3d at 604 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)); see A.F., 653 S.W.3d at 742. Involuntary termination cases face strict statutory deadlines. In re K.A.H., No. 05-16-01067-CV, 2017 WL 1536505, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2017, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code §§ 263.401–.408). When the Department files a suit affecting the parent–child relationship requesting that the parent–child relationship be terminated or that the Department be named the child’s conservator, the trial court must have commenced the trial on the merits12 “on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the [trial] court rendered a temporary order appointing the [D]epartment as temporary managing conservator,” or the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a). If, however, the trial court orders a monitored return, Section 263.401 no longer governs13 the automatic-dismissal deadline; Section 263.403 does. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403; In 12 The trial court may also “grant[ ] an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1).” Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a). Upon findings that extraordinary circumstances warrant the child’s remaining in the Department’s temporary managing conservatorship and that continuation is in the child’s best interest, Subsection (b) permits the trial court to grant an extension of the dismissal date not to exceed 180 days. See id. § 263.401(b). This extension must occur before the automatic-dismissal date. In re C.S., No. 25-0008, 2026 WL 1614382, at *1 (Tex. June 5, 2026). Subsection (b-1), which covers situations where a trial on the merits has timely commenced and the trial court then grants a mistrial or motion for new trial, is inapplicable here. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b-1). “Section 263.401 does not, however, become irrelevant.” In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. 13 & Protective Servs., No. 02-26-00515-CV, 2026 WL 2357227, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2026, orig. proceeding). 7 re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 515–17 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). When a trial court orders a monitored return, it must set a new dismissal date, “not later than the 180th day after the date the temporary order is rendered,” unless a trial on the merits has commenced. See Tex. Fam Code § 263.403(b)(2). If the monitored return fails, the section also permits an additional extension under Subsection (c) when “the [trial] court renders a temporary order terminating the transition order issued under Subsection (a)(2)(B).” Id. § 263.403(c). “The new dismissal date may not be later than the original dismissal date established under Section 263.401 or the 180th day after the date . . . the order is rendered under this subsection, whichever date is later.” Id. Here, as noted, the trial court signed a transitional-monitored-return order for Mother on October 1, 2025. On October 20, 2025, the Department filed a motion to terminate the transitional monitored return, and on the same day the trial court signed a temporary ex parte order terminating the transitional monitored return. The trial court’s ex parte order did not include the new dismissal deadline as required under the statute.14 See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403(c). 14 We note that the failure to include the new dismissal deadline in the order is not jurisdictional and has no impact on our calculation of the dismissal deadline under the statute. See, e.g., In re G.L.J., No. 05-23-01296-CV, 2024 WL 2513311, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2024, no pet.) (“As with Section 263.401, courts have held that the requirement to include a dismissal date in a monitored-return order under Section 263.403 is not jurisdictional.” (citing In re J.J., No. 07-20-00361-CV, 2021 WL 1741875, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 30, 2021, pet. denied)). To preserve a complaint that the trial court has failed to comply with the statutory requirement to schedule the new 8 Under Section 263.401, the dismissal calculation begins on the date that the trial court “rendered a temporary order appointing the [D]epartment as temporary managing conservator.” Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a). The Texas Supreme Court has held that “[n]othing in the statute excludes the Department’s [term of] conservatorship obtained through the ex parte order from the calculation of the dismissal deadline in [S]ection 263.401.” In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding on reh’g). Like Section 263.401(a), Section 263.403(c) uses the same language regarding the calculation of a new dismissal deadline. Compare Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a) (“Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the court’s jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent–child relationship . . . is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order.”) (emphasis added), with id. § 263.403(c) (“If before . . . the commencement of the trial on the merits . . . the court renders a temporary order terminating the transition order issued under Subsection (a)(2)(B), the court shall, at the time of the . . . order, schedule a new date for the dismissal of the suit. The new dismissal date may not be later than the dismissal deadline at the time of a motion or order under Section 263.403(c), the party must object. Id. at *7 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). 9 original dismissal date established under Section 263.401 or the 180th day after the date . . . the order is rendered under this subsection . . . .”) (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court miscalculated the automatic-dismissal deadline. Once the trial court orders or terminates a monitored return, Section 263.403 governs the calculation of a new dismissal deadline. See id. § 263.403(b), (c). Section 263.403(c) instructs that, when a monitored return is terminated, the new dismissal deadline is calculated from the date that the temporary order is issued. Id. § 263.403(c). Like Section 263.401, Section 263.403 does not exclude an ex parte temporary order from the calculation of a dismissal deadline. See Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d at 612. Thus, under the statute, the trial court was required to calculate the automatic-dismissal deadline from the date it signed the “Temporary Ex Parte Order and Order Setting Hearing for Removal from Monitored Return,” as it was a temporary order that terminated a transition order. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.403(c). One hundred eighty days after the date the trial court entered the temporary order terminating the transitional monitored return was Monday, April 20, 2026. See Tex. R. Evid. 201. As we noted above, the trial commenced on April 22, 2026, two days after the automatic-dismissal date. Because the trial on the merits had not commenced before the suit was automatically dismissed, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hold the final trial, and its subsequent termination order is void. See, e.g., In re G.P., 665 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023) (orig. proceeding) (holding that after the 10 automatic-dismissal date passed, the trial court did not have discretion to extend the dismissal deadline, making its ruling void). As a result, we dismiss Mother’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (holding that, in general, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders authorized by statute). III. Conclusion Having determined that the underlying suit was automatically dismissed under Family Code Section 263.403(c), we vacate the trial court’s judgment as void and render judgment dismissing the suit. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(e). /s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Delivered: September 3, 2026 11