Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00068-CV IN THE INTEREST OF C.L., A CHILD On Appeal from the 354th District Court Hunt County, Texas Trial Court No. 94909 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their child, Chloe.1 The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that she (1) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” and (2) that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2) (Supp.). The trial court terminated Father’s rights after finding that he had (1) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” (2) “constructively abandoned the child,” and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N) (Supp.), (b)(2). Mother and Father each appeal. In Mother’s appeal, she challenges the trial court’s findings supporting the termination of her parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code and argues that the Department “failed to make reasonable efforts and did not tailor services to Mother’s special needs.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings supporting the termination of his parental rights. Rather, in his sole point of error on appeal, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for an extension of the one-year statutory limitation. Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s determination as to termination under ground E for Mother and to support the trial court’s finding that the 1 We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of the minor child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8. 2 Department made reasonable efforts to return the child, we affirm the judgment as to Mother. Furthermore, we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to proceed to trial and affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Father. I. Evidence at Trial Mackenzie Cook, a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse at Hunt Regional Medical Center (HRMC), testified that on April 24, 2025, Chloe was brought into the HRMC labor and delivery department via ambulance in respiratory distress. She testified that Chloe was “cyanotic in color, blue” upon her arrival, and small for her assumed age of only a few hours old. Mother believed, but was not certain, that Chloe had reached full gestational age prior to her home birth. Chloe was brought to the NICU after her initial assessment in labor and delivery. Cook stated that Mother appeared to be “disassociate[ed] from the situation.” Father was not present until later that day, when he appeared disheveled and loud. Cook was assigned to Chloe’s care on her next shift on April 30, when Chloe was approximately six or seven days old. Mother had been discharged from the hospital by that date, but neither Mother nor Father were present at the NICU with Chloe. Before a baby is released from the NICU, HRMC has a “rooming-in process” during which the parents and the infant are in a boarding room caring for the baby with standard check-in times by the nursing staff. Mother and Father did not consistently visit or care for Chloe in the hospital, so they were unable to do a “room-in” procedure with Chloe. Though HRMC requested that Mother and Father do the “board and stay” so Chloe could be discharged, they failed to do so. The hospital procedure of “rooming-in” allows the hospital to observe the 3 parents’ abilities to change diapers, understand the baby’s cues, safely feed and care for the infant, and to meet the basic needs of the child. Cook explained that Father stated he could not stay when he was not on his medication because of his “symptoms.” Cook said that Mother stated that she would stay one of the days, but then “she fell asleep the night before and then she left.” Cook also stated that she observed Mother “talking to herself” and not interacting with Chloe, but rather Mother “was sitting at the bedside looking around the NICU and just kind of appeared to be out of it and talking to herself.” Father seemed to have difficulty changing Chloe’s diapers and feeding her, at one point attempting to feed Chloe a bottle while she was lying flat on her back, which could cause aspiration. On May 1, Cook recalled that there was a time when Chloe was crying and both Mother and Father were present but not tending to Chloe. When Cook explained that they could tend to Chloe and care for her to alleviate her crying by holding her or offering her a pacifier, checking her diaper, or feeding her, neither Mother nor Father attempted to care for her. Instead, Cook offered Chloe a pacifier, which then calmed her. Later that same day, Father again attempted to feed Chloe while she was lying flat, even after the previous incident when HRMC staff warned him of what could happen if Chloe were fed on her back. Cook never witnessed Mother attempting to care for Chloe while in the NICU. Cook explained that Mother had many opportunities and was even asked to provide care to Chloe, but she would just look to Father. Even though Mother and Father had access to a boarding room, which would have allowed them the opportunity to stay consistently close to Chloe to help meet 4 her needs, they never used it. Cook stated that neither Mother nor Father displayed an ability to safely care for Chloe. Jenna Hebert, the neonatal program manager at HRMC, testified that she was part of Chloe’s care team starting on May 1, 2025. Hebert also testified to witnessing Father attempting to feed Chloe while she was lying flat on her back, a separate incident from what Cook witnessed. Hebert testified that after she gave instructions on how to feed Chloe and it appeared as though Father understood, she went to check on another patient. Upon her return, Father said that Chloe was not hungry and he had put her back in bed. Hebert explained the importance of scheduled feedings for a NICU baby, and Father attempted to feed Chloe again, but he once again began the feeding with Chloe lying on her back, having to be reminded that it was not a proper position. Father continued to state that Chloe was not hungry; however, Hebert was then able to give Chloe her bottle, and she took a full feeding. Hebert was concerned about both Mother and Father because it had appeared that they were not eating, sleeping, or showering. Hebert stated that at no point during her care of Chloe did she feel that either Mother or Father was capable of caring for Chloe. Josh Arbuckle, an investigator for the Department, was assigned to Chloe’s case when she was brought into HRMC with respiratory issues and Mother refused to allow the hospital to administer medication. Arbuckle testified that Mother informed him that she discovered she was pregnant around the seven-month mark of her pregnancy and she did not seek prenatal care. Father informed Arbuckle that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and psychosis. While Father did not report any use of illegal drugs, he admitted to drinking alcohol 5 even though he was advised not to while on his medication. Father’s responses worried Arbuckle because Father could not stay on topic and Father told Arbuckle that he believed the newborn baby was already trying to say “dada.” When Arbuckle visited Mother and Father’s residence, he noted that the electricity to their unit was coming from an extension cord running from a neighbor’s unit, into which Mother and Father had plugged “several surge protectors” to power their residence. Arbuckle stated, There was no appliances at all. No stove, no refrigerator, no sink, no microwave. That was in the kitchen. The only item that was there for [Chloe] was a brand‐new crib and a brand‐new car seat. The restroom did not have any running water. The toilet had fecal matter and waste material stacked up on several days of use. The shower did not look like the hardware was attached and could be utilized for any type of bathing. The room that the parents stated that [Chloe] would be going into had some security issues or minor cracks with weathering, bugs getting into there, so ‐‐ in other words, the window could fall out at that point. He stated that the living conditions were not suitable for a child. The Department attempted to contact family members as possible placements for Chloe during the pendency of the case, but it was unsuccessful in finding such placement. Chloe was removed on May 1, 2025, and placed with a nonrelative. Mother testified that she had no history of illegal drug use, contrary to her medical records, which reflected that she used methamphetamine from ages seventeen to twenty-two. She also disputed that she was still involved with Father, though she admitted that she was with him the night prior to her testimony when Father was arrested. Mother had a prior criminal history involving assault both as a juvenile and as an adult. At the time of trial, Mother lived in a 6 unit in her own mother’s building and admitted that she has never paid her own bills and received electricity through an extension cord. Mother was also asked about her personal hygiene, and though she testified that she typically showers every other day, she also agreed that her medical records stated that she had “gone closer to six months between taking showers” in the past and admitted that she brushes her teeth “twice a month” because she feels daily brushing is “kind of a lot, every day.” Mother stated that she was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2023, and that she had been admitted to Glen Oaks Hospital, a mental-health hospital, several times. She denied having homicidal thoughts during her time at Glen Oaks, though the medical records state that she had. Mother disputed many of the notes in her medical records related to her behaviors and reasons for admission. Though she had been prescribed medication for her schizophrenia, she had not taken the medication since 2024 and stated that she was “fine” without the medications. Around her third or fourth month of pregnancy, Mother had a pregnancy test done at the hospital, as she was trying to get “Medicaid to help [her] pay for when [she] gave birth.” Though it was recommended, she did not obtain prenatal care, stating that she did not have a ride to visit the doctor’s office. And while she obtained Medicaid in her seventh month of pregnancy, she still did not obtain prenatal care. On the day Mother went into labor, she explained that she did not realize what it felt like to go into labor, and it was not until several hours later when her sister called for an ambulance. Chloe was born in the ambulance on the way to HRMC. Mother admitted that she refused medications for Chloe at the hospital. Chloe was in the hospital for eight days, during which 7 time Mother stated that they did not use the boarding room because it was not offered until a few days prior to Chloe’s discharge and that she and Father were just sleeping by Chloe’s bedside and slept one time in their truck. Mother admitted to not being forthcoming in her psychological evaluation and with different medical providers. She also admitted that she had not been able to maintain stable employment or pay her own bills, though she stated that her mother has offered to help her until she finds employment. Mother explained that she also did some parenting and substance abuse classes, submitted to an intellectual and developmental disabilities test, an IQ test, and psychological tests, as well as all drug testing requested of her. She visited Chloe on a weekly basis. While Mother admitted she knew the Department did not want her to be around Father, the night prior to the final hearing, Father was arrested while with Mother. Mother explained that she would not allow Father to be around Chloe unsupervised unless he could prove that he would “act[] right.” Mother stated that she loved Chloe and that they have been able to bond “[a] little bit.” The Department elicited testimony from Mother that she was not entirely truthful in her evaluations, that she did not complete her parenting courses, did not maintain stable, safe, and appropriate housing, nor a stable income, she continued to operate a motor vehicle without a license, and did not take the required life-skills classes. Michelle Collins, the conservatorship caseworker for the family, testified that Chloe was placed in foster care at the time of the final hearing and had been with the foster family for seven 8 months. Collins testified that Chloe was bonded with the family, both the caregivers and the other children in the home, and the family was “adoption-motivated” and a good placement for Chloe. Collins also discussed Mother’s service plan that was implemented by the Department for Mother to be reunited with Chloe.2 Collins stated that though Mother participated in psychological evaluations, her answers in the evaluation and her responses in the notes from the mental-health facility directly contradict each other. Mother had also not been compliant with her medication management. Mother failed to complete her parenting courses and was unable to provide a stable home with “a working refrigerator, microwave, toilet, sink, and bathtub,” as ordered. Mother also never provided Collins with proof of a valid driver’s license or liability insurance. Mother had not provided any evidence of stable employment. Mother visited Chloe weekly during the pendency of the case, and Collins described Mother as struggling and would get frustrated during the visits Collins observed. Collins also noted that she observed hygiene issues with Mother, including foul odors more than once—even after hygiene discussions. Diana Wirt, a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer, testified that Chloe was doing well and reaching her milestones, including crawling, in her current placement. Wirt had difficulty maintaining contact with Mother, though she noted that she was able to see Mother at least a few times. Mother and Father did not present any plan about what their future plans are for Chloe or how they would or could care for Chloe, and Wirt testified that she did not believe 2 The testimony also discussed Father’s incompletion of his service plan; however, because Father does not challenge the termination findings against him, we do not discuss the evidence put forth. 9 either Mother or Father could safely care for Chloe, recommending termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to Chloe. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, found that the Department had met its burden. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that she “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (b)(2). The trial court also terminated Father’s rights after finding that he had (1) “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” and (2) “constructively abandoned the child,” and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (b)(2). II. Mother In her appeal, Mother challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of termination under subsection (E), and (2) whether the Department presented sufficient evidence regarding the reasonable efforts it made to return Chloe to Mother as required by Section 161.001(f) of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (f) (Supp.). A. Standard of Review “Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, ‘“the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is 10 paramount.”’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003)). “A child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.)). “[T]he appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re A.C., No. 06-25-00084-CV, 2026 WL 878798, at*2 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2026, pets. denied) (mem. op.) (alteration in original) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2022)). “Both legal and factual sufficiency review deal with whether ‘a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction,’ but there is a difference between legal and factual sufficiency.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018)). For legal sufficiency, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that” termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the child. In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573). 11 By comparison, when reviewing “factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘“whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d. at 25)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2022)). To make “this determination,” we undertake “an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)). B. Sufficient Evidence Supports Termination Under Subsection (E) Mother first complains of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination was appropriate under subsection (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Subsection (E) provides for termination of parental rights if the parent has “engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Within the context of subsection (E), endangerment encompasses “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than- ideal family environment.” In re I.T., No. 01-18-01013-CV, 2019 WL 1996515, at *8 (Tex. 12 App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). “To ‘endanger’ means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health.” Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). The Department need not “establish that a parent intended to endanger a child to support termination under subsection (E).” Id. “Nor is it necessary to establish the parent’s conduct was directed at the child or caused actual harm; rather, it is sufficient if the parent’s conduct endangers the child’s well-being.” Id.; In re A.B., No. 05-23-00667-CV, 2023 WL 8863490, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re I.T., 2019 WL 1996515, at *8). “Endangering conduct does not have to occur in the child’s presence.” In re A.B., 2023 WL 8863490, at *8 (citing In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). “A parent’s past endangering conduct may create an inference that past conduct may recur and further jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or emotional well-being.” Id. (citing In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d at 171; In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.)). “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” Id. (quoting In re I.T., 2019 WL 1996515, at *8 (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied))). 13 Mother asserts in her brief that the Department relied on her mental-health issues to form the basis of its subsection (E) arguments, rather than presenting an actual course of endangering conduct. We disagree with this interpretation of the evidence. The Department presented evidence regarding Mother’s inability to care for Chloe, both while she was pregnant by failing to obtain any prenatal care and after Chloe’s birth, including during Chloe’s NICU stay and during Mother’s visitations after Chloe’s discharge. Mother struggled with basic care and understanding of Chloe and did not seek to improve her abilities in any way. Though she attended some parenting classes, Mother did not complete the courses required of her. Mother admittedly could not find stable employment and the testimony shows that Mother’s living arrangements were unfit for a child—including no electricity, no running water, fecal matter filling the toilet, and no diapers, formula, or food for a child. Mother’s living conditions remained much the same throughout the course of the case. See In re A.T., 406 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pets. denied) (“Unsanitary conditions can qualify as surroundings that endanger a child.”). Mother also struggled with her own personal hygiene, even when others attempted to intervene and offer help. Mother did not shower regularly and admitted that she did not see a need to regularly brush her own teeth. Furthermore, as it relates to Mother’s mental health, Mother had been hospitalized several times and admitted to assaulting her family members. While Mother admitted to having been diagnosed with schizophrenia, she had done nothing to take care of herself and refused to take her medications. Though she denied it in her testimony, Mother’s medical records reflected that she had “homicidal thoughts” toward her father and sister. “While mental incompetence or 14 mental illness alone are not grounds for termination of the parent-child relationship, ‘[w]hen a parent’s mental state allows the parent to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child, that conduct has bearing on the advisability of terminating the parent’s rights.’” In re E.G., 643 S.W.3d 236, 253 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.) (alteration in original) (quoting In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)). Given the undisputed evidence, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother’s conduct and the condition of the environment she intended to bring Chloe into would subject Chloe to a life of uncertainty and instability and thus endanger her physical and emotional well-being. The evidence is thus legally and factually sufficient to support the statutory predicate finding of termination under subsection (E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); In re I.T., 2019 WL 1996515, at *8. We overrule Mother’s first issue. C. The Department’s Reasonable Efforts to Return Chloe By her second issue, Mother argues that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to return Chloe because there was no evidence that Mother’s service plan “was written in a manner that was clear and understandable” to her. Our sister court in Austin recently discussed Section 161.001(f), noting its recent addition to the Texas Family Code, and stated, Though subsection 161.001(f) is new to the [Texas] Family Code, the phrase “reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent” is not new to [S]ection 161.001, as it appears in subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N), known as the “constructive abandonment” predicate ground. See [TEX. FAM. CODE ANN]. § 161.001(b)(1)(N); In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet[s]. denied). We presume that the legislature enacted this amendment 15 “with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it.” JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 597 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. 2019) (quoting In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)). So, when considering whether the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to return the child[] to Mother, we look to relevant jurisprudence construing the Department’s reunification efforts under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N). See In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d at 328–29 (citing In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 92 (Tex. 2021)[ (orig. proceeding)]). Our sister courts of appeals that have examined subsection 161.001(f) have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 328; In re K.N.S., No. 12-25-00171-CV, 2025 WL 3724545, at *9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 23, 2025, [pet. denied]) (mem. op.); In re M.B., No. 14-25-00418-CV, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3275376, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 25, 2025), [withdrawn & superseded by No. 14-25-00418-CV, 2026 WL 2265725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] August 6, 2026, (no pet. h.)]. “Generally, implementation of a family service plan by [the Department] is considered a reasonable effort to return the child to the parent.” A.D. v. Tex[.] Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (quoting In re A.L.H., 468 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.)). D. F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 731 S.W.3d 726, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, no pet.) (ninth alteration in original). Here, the Department developed a service plan for Mother, and the trial court ordered that Mother complete those services as part of the reunification process. Mother argues, however, that it was “unreasonable” for the Department to create a service plan and “believe[d] that any of the services would reasonably be achievable for [Mother] without additional assistance” given Mother’s “mental and intellectual deficiencies.” Mother argues that the plan was not written in such a way that she could reasonably understand it, though Mother never raised this issue to the Department or before the trial court. Mother blamed her inability to complete her service plan on transportation and timing, stating that there were office closures and she needed to use the time to search for a job. Mother never indicated an inability to understand her service plan. The 16 Department created a service plan, attempted to assist Mother in working through her services, made efforts to work with family members to find a non-foster placement for Chloe, and continued contact with Mother throughout the course of the proceedings. “This constitutes sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child[] to Mother.” In re D. F., 731 S.W.3d at 742–43 (citing A.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (“determining [the] Department made reasonable efforts to return [the] child to [the] parent by developing [a] service plan, attempting to communicate with parent, and attempting family placement”); C.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00852-CV, 2019 WL 3367524, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“concluding [the] Department made reasonable efforts to return [the] child to [the] parent by developing [a] service plan, attempting to communicate with [the] parent, assisting parent with scheduling visits, and determining whether parent secured drug-free housing”)). We overrule Mother’s second issue. III. Father’s Denial of His Motion for Continuance Father does not challenge the trial court’s termination findings, but rather, Father argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to retain the case on the docket. A. Standard of Review “A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the trial court’s discretion.” In re A.R., No. 06-22-00065-CV, 2023 WL 1769269, at *14 (Tex. App.— Texarkana Feb. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.D., No. 06-18-00105-CV, 2019 WL 17 1302932, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). “We are not to substitute our judgment for the trial court’s [judgment] . . . .” In re A.R., 2023 WL 1769269, at *14 (quoting In re J.D., 2019 WL 1302932, at *6). For this reason, “[w]e will sustain the trial court’s ruling absent a finding that ‘the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.’” In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2022, pet. denied) (quoting In re R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (quoting Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007)). B. Motion for Continuance Here, as the trial court called the case for trial, Father’s trial counsel announced that he had filed a motion to retain “moments” before the case was called. The basis for the motion to retain was that Father had been unable to complete his services due to numerous arrests during the course of the proceedings, including being arrested the night prior to the final hearing. He sought a continuance of 180 days. The trial court allowed Father’s trial counsel to call witnesses in support of his motion to retain, who confirmed that Father had been arrested four times in the year prior to the final hearing, and was arrested the evening prior to the hearing. In arguing the motion, Father’s trial counsel argued that extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant a continuance, namely that Father was admitted to a mental-health facility based on an emergency detention order. The trial court denied Father’s motion, discussing the repeated arrests of Father as the cause for his unavailability. 18 C. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying the Motion for Continuance Father argues that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. “A state’s attempt to terminate the parent-child relationship is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)). “Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that the involuntary termination of parental rights implicates fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “In light of this weighty precedent, there can be no doubt that [Father’s] right to retain custody of [Chloe] is a constitutionally protected liberty interest and must be afforded procedural due process.” Id. (citing Martinez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 116 S.W.3d 266 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied); In re G.C., 66 S.W.3d 517, 525 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)). Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits, the court may not retain the suit on the court’s docket after the time described by Subsection (a) unless the court finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest[s] of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (Supp.). “The absence of a party to a proceeding is not an adequate ground for a continuance unless the party shows that it had a reasonable excuse for not being present and that its absence resulted in prejudice.” In re T.M., No. 02-09-00145-CV, 2009 WL 5184018, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Erback v. Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1943, writ ref’d w.o.m.); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); Com. Standard Ins. Co. v. Merit Clothing Co., 377 S.W.2d 179, 181 19 (Tex. 1964) (“holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling a motion for continuance because, in part, the record did not reflect any harm”); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.); Richards v. Schion, 969 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.)). “When the movant seeks a continuance because of an absent witness, it must show the materiality of the absent witness’s testimony.” Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 252; Fountain v. Knebel, 45 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); Humphrey v. Ahlschlager, 778 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ)). Father does not discuss any extraordinary circumstances in his brief that would support a continuance in a termination case. Father’s motion for continuance, argument at trial, and argument in his appellate brief concern the reason why he was absent from trial. Father did not show by affidavit (or otherwise) at trial and has not shown on appeal that he would have testified to facts that are contrary to or that are mitigating from the testimony offered by the Department. He has also not explained how his presence at trial would have potentially changed the trial court’s parental termination decision. Thus, under the standards described above, because Father has not demonstrated that his absence and the denial of his continuance motion resulted in prejudice, we overrule his sole issue. See In re T.M., 2009 WL 5184018, at *6. 20 IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Charles van Cleef Justice Date Submitted: August 21, 2026 Date Decided: September 10, 2026 21