Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 29, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00147-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF V.J.-A. II, A CHILD On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11778-CX MEMORANDUM OPINION In this accelerated appeal, the mother of V.J.-A. II1 challenges the trial court’s order that terminated her parental rights to the child. 2 In her sole issue, Appellant, the mother, contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that 1 To protect the identity of the child, we use a pseudonym or initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). 2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the presumed father. He did not appeal. termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2026). We affirm the trial court’s order. I. Termination Findings and Standards To terminate one’s parental rights, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) must “clear[] a high bar.” In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165, 178 (Tex. 2026); see also In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 8–9 (Tex. 2026). To support termination, this heightened standard requires that the Department present clear and convincing evidence that (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019). As relevant to this appeal, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Mother: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Mother does not challenge these findings. The trial court further found, among other things, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, and that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother, however, a continuing danger existed in the home that prevented the child’s return to her. See id. § 161.001(b)(2), (f), (g). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 2 was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)); see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 17. Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, we “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Because the factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors it. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). II. Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial On March 3, 2025, the Department filed suit to terminate Mother’s and the father’s parental rights, alleging, among other things, that (1) the parents had endangered the child, (2) the child outcried that Mother’s boyfriend had physically abused him, and (3) the child tested positive for high levels of methamphetamine. 3 The Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the child the following day. The final hearing commenced on March 2, 2026, resumed March 27, 2026, and concluded on April 13, 2026. Mother was not present on March 2. Shandria Taylor is an investigator with the Department. Taylor testified that the Department became involved after the child told personnel at his school that his “step-dad” had picked him up and “shook him really hard.” Although Taylor’s initial attempts to contact Mother were unsuccessful, she eventually contacted Mother in December 2024, and they agreed to meet at the CPS office in Abilene. They met on December 10, and Mother told Taylor that she was no longer “with” the man alleged to have shaken the child; she also denied using drugs and claimed to be sober. During their discussions, Taylor requested that Mother submit to drug testing. While Mother agreed to this, she did not appear for drug testing. Taylor asked Mother if she would agree to the child being drug tested; however, the mother claimed that the child was living with the father. Taylor contacted the father in February 2025 and was advised that the child had been living with him since around Christmastime. The father denied using drugs and expressed concerns that the child “had been exposed to things.” The child drug tested on February 11, 2025, and the results were positive for methamphetamine at levels of 35,679, which is a very high level. Although the parents expressed “disbelief” about the child’s high levels of methamphetamine, when requested and throughout the duration of the case, they stated, for multiple reasons, that they could not be available for drug testing. Both parents had a history with the Department. After the Department sought the child’s removal in March 2025, the parents drug tested; services and placement options for the child were also discussed with Mother at that time. Whenever tested, Mother was never clean. On March 5, the 4 father’s urinalysis (UA) was positive for marihuana, and his hair follicle test was positive for marihuana and methamphetamine; Mother’s hair follicle test on March 4 was positive for methamphetamine. The father also tested positive for marihuana on April 24, 2025, September 10, 2025, December 18, 2025, and January 30, 2026. The father refused to submit to testing for alcohol consumption after being arrested twice for public intoxication. Jennifer Boals is the child’s 2INgage permanency case manager. Mother’s family service plan provided for visitations with the child; however, her visitations were suspended in September 2025, because she would not submit to drug testing. Mother’s visitation was reinstated in December 2025, contingent on several conditions, one of which was that she submit to drug testing; however, Mother continued to refuse to test, despite the Department’s offers to transport her to the testing facility. Mother’s family service plan also required that she maintain a safe and stable home and allow announced and unannounced home visits. At some point, Mother was living at an Econo Lodge motel where she worked at the time. In January 2026, Mother refused to meet with Boals for an announced visit, although there had been others in the past, because Mother said that “she just didn’t want [her] there. That she couldn’t trust [her] because [Boals] was a liar.” Boals attempted to meet with Mother the week before the final hearing commenced but Mother said that she was busy working; other attempts to arrange a meeting were unsuccessful. Mother completed some of the requirements of her service plan, however, Boals testified that Mother had not been compliant with the drug testing requirements. Mother’s hair follicle test was positive for methamphetamine in March 2025, after the child had been removed; Mother did not test again until October 31, 2025, and her hair follicle test on that date was also positive for 5 methamphetamine. Mother told Boals that this positive result was because of a “one- time” relapse. She next tested on December 12, 2025, and her UA was positive for marihuana. On at least twelve occasions, Mother refused to test when requested and, when she did test, she never tested negative for illegal drugs. After the final hearing commenced, Mother was asked to submit to drug testing; as before, Mother told Boals that she would, but she did not. Boals saw Mother at the courthouse on the day the final hearing commenced; however, Mother did not appear in person at the hearing that day because a warrant had been issued for her arrest. Mother did appear on March 27 when the final hearing resumed and testified that the active warrant was for unpaid traffic tickets. According to Mother, she was at the courthouse on March 2 but left to go to work, and because of a family emergency. After removal, the child was temporarily placed in a foster home in San Angelo. The fictive kin and relatives that the parents recommended for placement either declined to take the child or were not suitable because they had criminal or negative histories with the Department. Since his placement, the child’s behavior had improved, he was participating in gymnastics, and he was excelling academically. He was diagnosed with ADHD, and he was prescribed medication and attending therapy. The child’s placement had recently changed because the foster family in San Angelo was transferred to South Carolina; the child was thereafter placed in a foster home in Dallas that was “a potential long-term option.” Boals testified that the Department’s goal was adoption, and that termination of the parent’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interest because neither parent engaged in or were compliant with their services, nor did they demonstrate the ability or desire to maintain a safe, drug-free home environment for the child. 6 Mother testified that she last used methamphetamine in May or June 2025. She claimed that she did not submit to drug testing when requested by the Department because she preferred to pay for the testing. However, Mother never provided the results of any purported testing that she paid for. According to Mother, she did not work any services because she moved out of state and was homeless. Mother conceded that the child was removed in 2018 when he was an infant because she had used illegal drugs while she was pregnant with him. Mother has six biological children; none live with her. She admitted that one of her other children was removed in 2023 after that child tested positive at birth for methamphetamine and marihuana. Her rights to that child were terminated. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)/Guardian Ad Litem for the child also recommended that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. After the final hearing concluded, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights and found termination to be in the child’s best interest. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed. III. The Best Interest of the Child In her sole issue, the mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court, as the factfinder in this case, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we will not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). 7 With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). In fact, evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest finding. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Nevertheless, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. Because the best interest of the child is always the paramount consideration, the best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of only one factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence 8 illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 23 (Although the heightened standard of appellate review applies to both the grounds for termination and the best interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). Thus, the absence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Moreover, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. A parent’s pattern of substance abuse “implicates most of the Holley factors,” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied), and can support a best interest finding because of the “attendant risks to employment, 9 housing, and prolonged absence from the [child].” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–81 (Tex. 2024) (A parent’s pattern of drug use may pose a danger to a child’s physical or emotional well-being.); see J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[D]rug use and its effects on the parent’s life and ability to parent and care for a child may establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re R.R.L., No. 11-25-00263-CV, 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Evidence of endangerment is relevant to the best interest analysis.). Notably, a parent’s use of “so-called hard drugs” such as methamphetamine is treated differently than the use of “less destructive ones” like marihuana. E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 608; see also In re J.B., No. 11-26-00093-CV, 2026 WL 2869295, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 24, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Here, the trial court could have rationally concluded that Mother risked the child’s safety and well-being by failing to adequately care for and supervise the child. The mother’s endangerment of the child and disregard for the child’s health and safety permitted the inference that she is unable to meet the physical and emotional needs of the child in the future. See In re U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d 391, 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“In reviewing the parenting abilities of a parent, a fact finder can consider the parent’s past neglect or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.”); see also In re S.B., 597 S.W.3d 571, 584 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied) (“Neglect can be as dangerous to the children’s well-being as direct physical abuse.”). The Mother’s history of drug use, the child’s positive drug test that showed the presence of high levels of methamphetamine, and the mother’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of the underlying termination suit, when she was at risk of losing her child, supports the trial court’s best interest finding. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551 10 (citing In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)); see also J.B., 2026 WL 2869295, at *6. Persistent drug use by a parent poses infinite potential dangers to their child, and the possibility that the parent may be impaired or later imprisoned. In re C.M., No. 11-24-00009-CV, 2024 WL 3187335, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551); In re S.B., No. 11-24- 00267-CV, 2025 WL 920044, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 27, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Thus, a parent’s continuing pattern of illegal drug use may support a best interest finding, S.B., 2025 WL 920044, at *6 (collecting cases), because of the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the child[].” See In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279–81). Although Mother completed some of the conditions of her service plan, she was not compliant with her drug testing requirements. A parent’s failure to comply with a court-ordered service plan for reunification may also be considered in the trial court’s best interest determination. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013); C.M., 2024 WL 3187335, at *6 (collecting cases). Further, the trial court need not discount the mother’s lack of stability simply because she complied with some of her service plan requirements—here, partial compliance was insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and the trial court’s concerns for the child’s safety. See G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *7; see also J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best interest finding). Mother denied using illegal drugs and claimed to be sober but provided no proof to support her assertions. Even so, evidence of any recent, temporary, or improved conduct, especially of short duration, does not negate the 11 probative value of a parent’s history of drug abuse and irresponsible choices, and, alone, is not sufficient to avoid termination of one’s parental rights. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 346; In re M.A., No. 11-26-00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *13 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet.); G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *7; see also In re A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817, 830 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied). On several occasions throughout the duration of the case, Taylor requested that Mother submit to drug testing. Despite her agreement to test, she never appeared for drug testing. In fact, both parents stated multiple reasons why they could not be available for drug testing. Nevertheless, when tested, Mother was never clean. The father’s urinalysis (UA) was positive for marihuana, his hair follicle test was positive on March 5 for marihuana and methamphetamine, and Mother’s hair follicle test on March 4—after the child had been removed—was positive for methamphetamine. Mother’s service plan provided for visitations with the child; however, her visitations were suspended in September 2025, because she did not submit to drug testing. After the testing in March 2025, Mother did not test again until October 31, 2025, and her hair follicle test on that date was positive for methamphetamine. According to her, this positive result was because of a “one-time” relapse. Mother’s visitation was later reinstated in December 2025, contingent on several conditions, one of which was that she submit to drug testing; however, Mother continued to refuse to test—despite the Department’s offers to transport her to the testing facility—until December 12, 2025, and her UA on that date was positive for marihuana. Altogether, on at least twelve occasions, Mother did not drug test when requested and, when she did, she always tested positive for illegal drugs. In addition to previous requests, after the final hearing commenced, Mother was asked to submit to drug testing, and although she told Boals that she would, she did not. As the case 12 progressed, Mother claimed that she did not submit to drug testing as requested by the Department because she preferred to pay for the testing. However, Mother never provided the results of any testing that she purportedly paid for. The failure to submit to requested drug testing permits the inference that the parent used illegal drugs during the pendency of the termination proceeding and would, if tests were performed, test positive. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281; see also In re A.R.D., 694 S.W.3d 829, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied); In re M.L.S., No. 11-26-00132-CV, 2026 WL 3160328, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 22, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Thus, the trial court could have reasonably found that Mother used methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. Mother has a history with the Department and admitted that the child was removed in 2018 when he was an infant because she used illegal drugs while she was pregnant with him. See In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (A parent’s drug use during pregnancy “supports a finding of direct injury to the child.”). Mother has six biological children, none of which live with her, and she admitted that one of her other children was removed in 2023 after that child tested positive at birth for methamphetamine and marihuana. Mother’s rights to that child were eventually terminated. See R.R.L., 2026 WL 616107, at *7 (Courts may look to a parent’s treatment of other children in deciding whether that parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the child, which is likewise relevant to the best interest analysis. (citing Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.))). In cases such as this, a parent’s history with the Department and their refusal or inability to address the issues that caused the Department’s concerns weighs in favor of termination. See In re A.D., No. 11-25-00383-CV, 2026 WL 1752038, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 18, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 13 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552 (The factfinder may consider a parent’s prior history with the Department.). In addition to the considerations that we have discussed above, Mother’s plans for herself and the child are ill-defined. See U.G.G., 573 S.W.3d at 402. Mother was living at an Econo Lodge motel, and there was also a period when she was homeless. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Mother failed to demonstrate her ability to secure and provide the child with a safe, stable, drug- free home environment, and that her behavior would not change in the future. When compared to the Department’s plan for the child—to be adopted into a safe and stable home environment—this factor weighs in favor of termination. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.”). Finally, because of the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not discount the child’s improvement since removal. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746–47; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Since his removal and subsequent placement, the child has improved behaviorally, physically, and academically. As such, the trial court could have rationally inferred that relinquishing the child to Mother’s care would subject the child to further uncertainty, risk, and instability, which is contrary to the child’s best interest. See In re E.M., No. 11-24-0310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). Therefore, upon considering the evidence as it relates to Mother’s actions and inactions, the emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, Mother’s lack of demonstrable parental abilities and stability, her history and pattern of illegal drug 14 use, and the Department’s plans for the child, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s sole issue on appeal. IV. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the order of the trial court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE October 29, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 15