Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 10, 2026. In the Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00513-CV IN THE INTEREST OF C.M., M.M., F.M., AND G.M., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 315th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2024-03059J MEMORANDUM OPINION In this appeal from the judgment after a non-jury trial, Father challenges the termination of his parental rights and the appointment of the Department of Family and Protective Services as the children’s managing conservator. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Father is a parent of three of Mother’s four children. Because Father alone appeals the judgment, we focus on the evidence concerning Father and his three children, whom we refer to as Monica, Fernando, and Gabriel. As further background, Father has a history of stroke, but there is conflicting evidence about his medical history. There are statements in the record that he suffered a stroke in September 2023, which he attributed to hypertension, but there are also statements in some family plan evaluations that Father suffered three strokes in 2021 from smoking synthetic marijuana. At trial, conservatorship caseworker Richeena Scott testified that Father had a stroke in the summer of 2024. It does appear that Father had cranial surgery in the summer of 2024, but there is no more specific evidence about the dates of his hospitalization. In any event, it appears undisputed that Father is paralyzed on his left side and has regular seizures, for which he takes twice-daily medication when it is available. Father stated that he is no longer under a doctor’s care because it is too expensive. He explained that when his medication runs out, he has a seizure and is taken to a hospital, and the hospital gives him a thirty-day supply of seizure medication. He testified that he uses marijuana to “slow down” his seizures but has no prescription for it. This case began when Father’s youngest child Gabriel was born after Father’s cranial surgery in the summer of 2024. At that time, both Mother and baby tested positive for amphetamines, and these results were reported to Child Protective Services. When an investigator telephoned Father ten days later, he denied that he and Mother used drugs. In October 2024, the family was ordered to participate in services. Zyria Short, their caseworker for “family-based safety services,” visited the home of the children’s maternal grandparents, where Mother, Father, and Father’s children had lived throughout the children’s lives. The maternal grandparents are not fluent in English, so Short telephoned an interpreter to translate her conversation with them. According to Short, the maternal grandparents told her during this visit that they were aware that Mother and Father were using illegal drugs. Short explained to the grandparents that the family-based safety plan required the grandparents to supervise the children at all times, in and out of the home, and that none of the children were allowed to sleep in the room with their parents. The safety plan also required Father 2 to complete parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, and a substance-abuse assessment, and to participate in random drug testing. Father submitted to a random drug test on October 14th, and the results were negative. On October 19, 2024, Short visited the home again. While Short was speaking with Mother, the children’s paternal grandfather “was in and out of the home” rather than supervising Mother and Father with the children. Short also saw a playpen in the parents’ bedroom and told the family to move the playpen into another room. Finally, she reviewed the safety plan with the children’s parents and grandparents. When Short visited the family in November 2024, she again saw a playpen in the parents’ bedroom, and she helped move it to another room. Although Short testified that Mother and Father failed to appear for at least two drug tests in November 2024, Father eventually submitted to a drug test on November 27, 2024, and that test was negative. A week later, he had another drug test, and it, too, was negative. On December 16, 2024, Short made an unannounced visit to the home and found the maternal grandparents present, but Mother, Father, and the children were not there. Grandmother later testified that she had gone to the restroom, leaving the children watching television, and when she came out, Mother and the children were gone. When Short asked where Mother and the children were, Grandmother called Mother, and Short spoke with Mother on the phone. Mother told Short that the children were with her at a park three minutes from home. Mother later testified that Father was with them. As a result of this additional violation of safety plan, Short told the parents that a different safety monitor was needed. The family voluntarily agreed to place the children with a maternal aunt. At a hearing in the participation-in-services case on December 18, 2024, the trial court ordered Mother and Father to submit to a drug test. Both initially refused 3 and admitted that the tests would be positive for methamphetamines and marijuana. The next day, Father did submit to a drug test and tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and marijuana. The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed a petition for conservatorship of the children and for termination of both parents’ parental rights, and the trial court appointed the Department as the children’s temporary conservator. That same month, Mother told Short that the aunt who had been caring for the children needed to go out of the country. Mother’s oldest child was then placed with the sister of that child’s deceased father, but there were no placement suggestions for Father’s three children. Monica was placed with a foster family, and Fernando and Gabriel were placed with the same foster family about six weeks later, but the record does not reveal where Fernando and Gabriel were during that six-week gap. Father had not completed any parenting or substance-abuse treatment prior to the children’s removal, but he entered a thirty-day inpatient treatment program for substance abuse at the end of December 2024. He and Mother ended their relationship, and after Father’s discharge from the treatment facility, he moved in with his own mother. At Father’s first post-discharge drug test in February 2025, he tested positive for a barbiturate and for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and marijuana. A drug screen in March 2025 was entirely negative, but on May 6, 2025, Father tested positive for marijuana, amphetamines, and methamphetamines. On May 29, 2025, Father again tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamines. He failed to appear for any further drug tests until October 2025, when he again tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamines. In January 2026, he tested positive only for marijuana. The case was tried without a jury in January and February of 2026. The evidence shows that when Mother was expecting Father’s first child in 2022, Father was arrested for possession of methamphetamines. Two months after the child’s 4 birth, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six months’ confinement in the county jail.1 Father stated that he always left the home to use drugs and denied that he was ever around his children while he was under the influence, but Mother testified that she and Father would leave the children with her parents while they left to use drugs and that she and Father would return “hours later.” When Father was asked how long he would stay high on such occasions, Father repeatedly responded, “Why is that important to this case?” When the trial court directed him to answer the question, Father stated, “That is how I answer it.” Father acknowledged that he has continued to use illegal drugs while this case has been pending and that his visitation with the children was suspended due to his refusal to submit to drug tests. He testified that although he still smokes marijuana, he has now stopped using methamphetamines. By the start of trial, Father had applied to enroll in parenting classes and was waiting to hear back from the course provider. He had not attended any of the recommended therapy or outpatient substance-abuse programs. Father testified that he is not seeking to have the children returned to him, but he wants to retain his parental rights and have the children placed with their maternal grandparents or with his own mother. Around November 2025, Father gave the Department his mother’s address, but the Department did not perform a home assessment because Father lives there as well. Father had not previously offered to move out—he has no income or disability benefits—but at trial he stated, “I’m going homeless today so that the kids can have a home assessment at my mom’s house.” When asked if he was “able to potentially look at other options for housing” for 1 There were other arrests and convictions before the children were born, but the methamphetamine conviction is most relevant to this case. 5 himself, Father answered, “I mean, yeah. There is a lot of trees, lot of trees covering up the rain. Hell, yeah. Sorry.” As for Father’s three children themselves, caseworkers reported that they appeared to be in good health, clean, and well-fed before their removal. The children reportedly had routine check-ups and no special needs. Conservatorship caseworker Richeena Scott confirmed that there have never been any concerns that the children were being physically abused. Post-removal, Father’s children were said to be thriving with their Foster Parents. Foster Father testified that the children appeared “very underweight” when they came into his care. He stated that Fernando had a phobia about water, but that the Foster Parents were helping him to overcome it. Foster Mother testified that Fernando also was slightly delayed in starting to walk. Both Foster Parents described ways in which the children have been thriving in their care and the Foster Parents’ desire to adopt them. Scott testified that the children have gained weight in foster care and that Monica’s “cholesterol is down,” which suggests that it had been elevated when the children were removed. Scott recommended terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, pointing out that it has been more than a year since the children were removed and they are now established, safe, healthy, and thriving in their current placements, whereas the parents “still aren’t on track.” To terminate the parent-child relationship, the trial court must make two findings. In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). First, the trial court must find that a predicate ground for termination has been satisfied, which typically requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has either committed a prohibited act or has failed to perform a required act. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1). If the trial court finds such a predicate ground for termination, the trial court still must additionally find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). 6 The trial court found termination was in the children’s best interest and that Father (1) knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings; (2) engaged, or knowingly placed the children with others who engaged, in endangering conduct; and (3) used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the children and either failed to complete a court-ordered treatment program or continued to abuse a controlled substance after completing such a program. The trial court accordingly terminated Father’s parental rights and appointed the Department as the children’s sole managing conservator. II. ISSUES PRESENTED In four issues, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding of each of the three predicate grounds for termination, as well as the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. In his fifth issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that it is in the children’s best interest to appoint the Department as the children’s managing conservator. The conservatorship finding requires proof only by a preponderance of the evidence, but the termination findings require proof by clear and convincing evidence. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.005 (preponderance standard applies unless otherwise specified) with id. § 161.001(b) (clear-and-convincing findings apply to termination findings). Under the standard for clear and convincing evidence, the measure or degree of proof must produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that the allegation sought to be established is true. Id. § 101.007. This heightened burden of proof results in a “correspondingly searching standard of appellate review.” See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of parental rights, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 7 finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. This standard does not mean that we disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Id. When deciding whether the finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence, we must also consider undisputed evidence contrary to the finding. Id. In a factual-sufficiency review, we give due consideration to both the disputed evidence contrary to the finding as well as all of the evidence favoring the finding. Id. The evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. Id. III. THE PREDICATE FINDINGS The trial court here made findings under the predicate grounds of Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1), subsections (D), (E), and (O), each of which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence of endangerment. Subsection (D) requires proof that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) requires proof that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” § 161.001(b)(1)(E). And Subsection (O) requires proof that, among other things, the parent used a controlled substance “in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). 8 We must affirm the trial court’s judgment if the evidence is sufficient to support the best-interest finding and even one predicate ground for termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). But when the appellant challenges findings of predicate grounds (D) or (E), as Father does here, we must consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support those findings first. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining that due process requires consideration of predicate grounds D and E because those grounds can have significant collateral consequences for parents in future termination proceedings involving different children). A. Subsection D: The Children’s Environment Before Removal A factfinder may infer endangerment from “a course of conduct” that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being—the focus of grounds (D) and (E)—or to the child’s health and safety—the focus of ground (O). In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024). 2 Because Father’s persistent drug use was a course of conduct (as used in section (E)) that created endangering conditions (as used in section (D)), the evidence supporting these two predicate findings largely overlap. Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a predicate finding under subsection (D) because (1) the evidence that the children were underweight is speculative and inconclusive, and there is substantial evidence to the contrary; (2) while the children lived with Father in their maternal grandparents’ home, they were in good health, well-fed, and clean; (3) there is no evidence of abuse or neglect; (4) there is no evidence that Father ever used drugs around the children or cared for them while under the influence; (5) his criminal 2 Although the court referred to grounds (D), (E), and (P) in In re R.R.A., former subsection (O) has since been repealed, and the subsequent subsections “moved up,” so that former subsection (P) is now section (O). 9 history occurred before the children were born; (6) his only prior involvement with Child Protective Services concerned allegations of neglectful supervision, but CPS was unable to make a determination in the case; and (7) the Department did not assess Father’s current home with his mother. Father is at least partially correct in suggesting that the evidence is insufficient to support an inference that the children were underweight before their removal. Although the Foster Parents testified that the children appeared underweight when placed in their care, the children were not placed with the Foster Parents immediately. The uncontroverted evidence is that the children were well-fed and in good health when living with their parents and maternal grandparents, but the children were subsequently removed to an aunt’s home and there is no evidence that Father ever lived with any of the children again. Although Monica was placed with the Foster Parents four days after leaving the maternal grandparents’ home in December 2024, Fernando and Gabriel were not placed with that family until an additional six weeks had passed. It is not clear where Fernando and Gabriel were before being placed with the foster family, but they were not with Father, who was then attending an inpatient treatment program for substance abuse. Thus, as to at least two of Father’s three children, it cannot be inferred that the children became underweight while living with him. Nevertheless, an endangerment finding requires proof of a substantial risk of harm; it does not require evidence that harm has already been inflicted. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. And a parent’s pattern of illegal drug use accompanied by circumstances indicating related dangers to the child can establish a substantial risk of harm. Id. Such circumstances are present here. To begin with, “a parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during pregnancy and corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the effects of that drug use can contribute to an 10 endangering environment and thus support an endangerment finding.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022). Mother and Gabriel both tested positive for drugs at Gabriel’s birth, and drug use during pregnancy supports a finding of direct injury to that child. In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). Although Father denied knowledge of Mother’s drug use, Mother testified that she and Father used drugs together. And tellingly, from the time that Father began submitting to drug tests in September 2024 until he and Mother ended their relationship three months later, their drug-test results were largely synchronized: every time that Mother tested positive for a particular controlled substance, Father did, too. A reasonable factfinder could infer from this evidence that Father did not attempt to protect the unborn child from Mother’s drug use because Father and Mother were using drugs together. Mother and Father both testified that they did not use drugs in the home they shared with the children and the children’s maternal grandparents but left the house to use drugs; Father additionally testified that he was never high around his children. We presume that the factfinder did not find this testimony credible. Moreover, Mother testified that she and Father would not return home until “hours later.” When asked how long Father would stay high on these occasions, Father refused to answer other than to insist that the answer was not important to the case. But clearly, the answer is important: if Father remained impaired for an extended or unpredictable period of time, then he must have either remained absent for the same extended or unpredictable amount of time or returned home while still under the influence. Father’s insistence that it does not matter how much time he spent, or spends, under the influence is itself evidence that his drug use has seriously impaired his parenting abilities. Father’s persistent use of illegal drugs was both a course of conduct and an endangering condition posing a substantial risk to the children’s physical and emotional well-being. 11 Father’s argument concerning his criminal history only highlights this risk. Father was arrested for possession of methamphetamines while Mother was expecting their first child, but he was convicted and served his six-month sentence after the child was born. See in re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022) (parental conduct can contribute to an endangering environment); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (conduct before the child was born can be considered as part of a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that had the effect of endangering the child). Yet despite the risk of further arrests and convictions that would take him away from the children, and the certainty that his visitation rights with his children would be suspended, he continued to use methamphetamines during the pendency of this case. As for Father’s prior history with CPS, CPS investigated allegations in 2023 that the children were at risk from negligent supervision due to Mother’s and Father’s drug use. CPS closed the investigation without making a determination whether the allegations were supported, because CPS concluded that the risks were controlled in that the maternal grandparents were able to monitor the situation and protect the children. As to Father specifically, CPS concluded that the doctor who was treating Father after his stroke would be able to monitor him for drug use. But Mother and Father themselves later compromised the very controls the Department relied upon to keep the children safe. Mother and Father removed the children from the maternal grandparents’ home without their knowledge and in violation of the safety plan. Father additionally testified that he is no longer under a doctor’s care. Finally, Father points out that the Department did not investigate his mother’s home as a possible placement. But subsection (D) deals with the children’s 12 conditions or surrounding before removal, and there is no evidence that Father’s mother was ever part of the children’s conditions or surroundings. Viewed in the light favorable to the trial court’s finding, the evidence is legally sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that predicate finding (D) is true. Viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is not so significant as to prevent the factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. We therefore overrule Father’s first issue. B. Subsection E: The Parent’s Course of Conduct To support a finding under predicate ground (E), the Department had the burden to show that the parent has “engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Termination under subsection (E) must be supported by evidence that the parent’s “voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct” endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360. In his challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding under subsection (E), Father repeats many of his arguments concerning subsection (D), and we reject those arguments for the reasons already explained. To these arguments, Father adds that he completed an inpatient treatment program for substance abuse, and although he continued his drug use after completing the program, he cites evidence that he has now stopped using methamphetamines and expressed the desire to reengage with services. But this slight evidence of improvement does not compel a different result. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that a parent’s use of methamphetamine poses an immediate danger to a child’s physical health or safety. In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 530 (Tex. 2023). Scott testified that Father’s drug test performed just before the 13 trial began was positive only for marijuana, but “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of drug use and irresponsible choices.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)). In fact, a single test that is positive only for marijuana is entirely consistent with Father’s history: he has abstained before but has repeatedly returned to using methamphetamines. He would have had to abstain while jailed or hospitalized, and in 2024, Father had negative test results from September through December 4th. But two weeks later, he admitted that he was using methamphetamines. He then went to an inpatient treatment program for a month and necessarily had to abstain, but at his first drug test after being discharged, he again tested positive for methamphetamines.3 Despite this history, Father never participated in the therapy and outpatient treatment programs recommended to help him overcome his substance-abuse problems. Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that Father’s longstanding substance abuse has been a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his children, and that it continues to pose the same substantial risks to them. We overrule his second issue. Having considered and overruled Father’s challenges under grounds (D) and (E), it is unnecessary to consider Father’s challenge to ground (O). IV. THE BEST-INTEREST FINDING Courts strongly presume that a child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re A.Y.C., 665 S.W.3d 800, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston 3 At different times, drug tests were performed on Father’s saliva, urine, or hair, or some combination of these, but no party offered any evidence about the length of time that methamphetamines were detectable by a particular type of test. 14 [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). Thus, the Department must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent should no longer have any relationship with the child. Id. The best-interest analysis is “child-centered and focuses on the child’s well- being, safety, and development.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. A child’s need for permanence through the establishment of a stable, permanent home is the paramount consideration in a best-interest determination. In re B.J.C., 495 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The same evidence supporting a predicate finding may be probative of the child’s best interest. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631–32. No specific set of facts is required to establish that termination is in a child’s best interest, but there are several nonexclusive factors that may guide the factfinder’s best-interest determination. In re L.M., 572 S.W.3d 823, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). These factors include (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s current and future emotional and physical needs; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) any acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 15 A. The Children’s Desires When Father’s children were removed, Monica was 2, Fernando was 1, and Gabriel was less than four months old. By the time of trial more than a year later, the children were still too young to express their desires, but the factfinder in such cases may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well- cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Under the Foster Parents’ care, the children have gained weight, and the Foster Parents have helped Fernando overcome his phobia about water. The Foster Parents testified that they and the children are bonded and that there is no difference in the way the Foster Parents treat these children and their own biological child. They all go on outings every weekend as a family, and Foster Mother testified that the children call her, “Mom.” The Foster Parents hope to adopt the children. In evaluating the desires of a very young child, another relevant consideration is whether the child has any conscious knowledge of the parent. In re J.T.G., No. 14- 10-00972-CV, 2012 WL 171012, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 19, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Because the children were extremely young when they were placed with the Foster Parents and Father’s visitation was suspended due to his drug use, the factfinder could reasonably infer that the children would no longer have remembered Father by the time of trial. This factor supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. B. The Children’s Current and Future Emotional and Physical Needs As we have previously said, “A parent who lacks stability, income, and a home is unable to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs.” Id. Father has no income, and throughout the pendency of this case, he has relied on others to provide housing and support to himself and his children. There are no similar 16 concerns about the Foster Parents. When added to Father’s history of using methamphetamines, this evidence strongly supports the trial court’s finding that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. C. Present and Future Emotional and Physical Danger to the Children There is no evidence that the Foster Parents pose a threat to the children’s emotional or physical well-being, but the same cannot be said of Father. As previously discussed, a parent’s use of methamphetamine poses an immediate danger to a child’s physical health or safety, and although Father has intermittently abstained from such dangerous drugs, he has repeatedly returned to them. The evidence, too, strongly supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. D. Parenting Abilities The defects in Father’s parenting abilities were forcefully demonstrated at trial by his refusal to state how long he would remain under the influence of controlled substances after using them and his repeated insistence that the answer is unimportant in determining whether his parental rights should be terminated. But the importance of the question is obvious: all of the time that Father spent around the children in that state was time during which he posed an immediate danger to them, and all of the time that Father stayed away from the children because he was under the drug’s influence was time he was not parenting them at all.4 Father’s insistence that the amount of time he spent directly endangering the children or failing to parent them is of no importance powerfully supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. 4 See also In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“Those who are unwilling to devote the time, effort, and resources required to raise and care for a child cannot meet that child’s emotional needs now or in the future.”). 17 E. Programs Available to Assist in Promoting the Children’s Best Interests Although the Department made programs available to Father to assist in promoting the children’s best interests, Father has made little or no use of them. At the beginning of the case, he attended an inpatient treatment program for his substance-abuse disorders, but he relapsed immediately upon discharge. Therapy and outpatient substance-abuse treatment have been available to Father throughout the case, but he has never taken advantage of those opportunities. Although he was taking steps to enroll in parenting classes by the time of trial, his long delay in doing so meant that he still had not attended a single class. Again, this evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. F. Plans for the Children The Foster Parents’ testimony demonstrated their deliberate consideration of the children’s best interests, both now and in the future. Prior to their removal, the children had lived their entire lives with their maternal grandparents, who spoke Spanish rather than English, and the Foster Parents, who speak no Spanish, actively sought out ways to preserve the children’s cultural and linguistic heritage. The children are exposed to the Foster Parents’ neighbors and friends who are native speakers of Spanish, and who help the Foster Parents incorporate Spanish words into their own communication with the children. The Foster Parents plan to learn Spanish with the children with the help of a tutor. Foster Father testified that learning multiple languages would help the children in the future and that he planned to have the children tutored in Vietnamese as well as Spanish. In addition, the Foster Parents have been educating themselves about Latin culture and cuisine and making sure that the children see themselves represented in toys and media at home. Foster Father also testified that it is important to engage the children’s interests with extracurricular activities. After Foster Father determined that Monica 18 is not currently interested in beginning karate, he and Foster Mother began investigating whether Monica was interested in “Mommy-and-Me” programs in music or gymnastics. Fernando and Gabriel were still too young to have outside interests, but the Foster Parents plan to do the same for them when they are a little older. The only evidence of Father’s plans for the children is his testimony that he does not want his parental rights terminated and his request to have the children placed with their paternal grandmother or maternal grandparents. We conclude that this factor, too, supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. G. Stability of the Proposed Placement With their Foster Parents, the children could continue their stable placement with the family that they know best. The Foster Parents testified that have lived at their current residence for over five years, and that both are gainfully employed at jobs that provide employee benefits. They also have a social support network of family, friends, and neighbors, and they actively involve the children’s half-sister in their lives. Father’s circumstances contrast sharply with those of the Foster Parents. Father has shown no income. He is unable to provide housing even for himself and has always relied on others to house his children. There is no evidence that Father has supportive friends or relatives other than his mother. Although Father wants the children placed with his own mother or the children’s maternal grandparents, Father has lived at both places, and at both, he continued using methamphetamines. The maternal grandparents repeatedly violated the safety plan or allowed Mother and Father to do so, and there is no evidence at all about Father’s mother’s suitability to 19 parent the children; Father’s failure to call her as a witness is unexplained. In sum, Father offered no evidence that a suitable alternative placement is even available. Again, this factor supports the best-interest finding. H. Parental Acts or Omissions That May Indicate the Relationship Is Not a Proper One, and Any Excuse for Such Acts or Omissions In analyzing the preceding factors, we have already discussed evidence of the many acts and omissions indicating that Father cannot properly act as a parent to his children. Father does not contend that there is any excuse for these acts and omissions. Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. We overrule this issue and affirm the part of the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights. V. THE CONSERVATORSHIP FINDING In his final issue, Father challenges the Department’s appointment as the children’s managing conservator. A trial court’s order “terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and the child of all legal rights and duties with respect to each other, except that the child retains the right to inherit from and through the parent unless the court otherwise provides.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206(b). Thus, a person whose parental rights over a child have been terminated no longer has a legal i