Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION No. 04-26-00447-CV IN THE INTEREST OF R.C.L. and J.J.L., Children From the 81st Judicial District Court, Frio County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-04-00098CVF Honorable Melissa Uram-Degerolami, Associate Judge Presiding Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: November 10, 2026 AFFIRMED This appeal arises from the trial court’s order, signed after a bench trial, that terminates the parental rights of appellant J.L.J. (“Father”), the biological father of two daughters — R.C.L. (born July 2020) and J.J.L. (born October 2021). 1 In four issues, Father argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father’s motion for extension of time, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b); (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s predicate endangerment findings, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that there was a continuing danger that 1 To protect the identities of the minor children in this appeal, we refer to the Children and their family members by initials or pseudonyms. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 04-26-00447-CV prevented the children’s return to Father, see id. § 161.001(f); and (4) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In April 2025, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the “Department”) initiated the underlying proceeding by filing a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to R.C.L. and J.J.L., as well as J.L., their then-sixteen-year-old half-sister. 2 Thereafter, the trial court signed an “Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency” that, among other things, appointed the Department as the children’s temporary sole managing conservator. Although the service plan in the record does not contain Father’s signature, the trial court found that Father signed a family service plan, 3 and it was adopted and incorporated into a court order. Meanwhile, R.C.L. and J.J.L. were placed with foster parents. At trial, William Joseph McKay, a police officer with the Pearsall Police Department, testified that on April 2, 2025, he responded to a weekday, daytime call for service regarding a domestic violence incident at the home of Father and S.M., Father’s then live-in girlfriend. Upon making the scene, Officer McKay noticed that both Father and S.M. appeared agitated and showed signs of having been in an altercation. S.M. told Officer McKay that the incident began when Father accused her of cheating on him. Father “put [his] hand” on S.M., and then S.M. pepper sprayed Father. Father, according to Officer McCay, was not cooperative because he did not want S.M. sent to jail over the altercation. Officer McKay noticed that Father’s head appeared to have been hit by a blunt object and that he was wiping his face from having been pepper sprayed. From 2 The parental rights of C.J.K. (“Mother”), the biological mother of R.C.L. and J.J.L., had previously been terminated. C.J.K. is not a party to this appeal. 3 Father does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he signed the family service plan. -2- 04-26-00447-CV what Officer McKay learned, J.J.L. was in the room when the altercation occurred, but she did not appear distraught. J.L. and R.C.L. were at school when the altercation occurred. Pearsall Police Department protocol for cases of domestic violence is to arrest one of the participants. In this case, Officer McKay arrested S.M. Durey Ramirez, an investigator with the Department, testified that the April 2, 2025 incident prompted the Department to launch an investigation and remove the children from Father’s care. Ruby Sacuedo, a caseworker with the Department, testified that upon removal, J.J.L. was diagnosed with significant hearing loss due to severe ongoing ear infections that were never properly treated. In October 2025, J.J.L. underwent cochlear implant surgery to allow her to use hearing aids. Meanwhile, R.C.L. was diagnosed with twelve cavities. Saucedo noted that most of R.C.L.’s “baby teeth” had fallen out even though she was only five years old. Saucedo attributed R.C.L.’s dental condition to neglect. Saucedo also testified as to the original service plan for Father. Created in April 2025, Father’s service plan included a psychological assessment, individual counseling, domestic violence and parenting classes, random drug tests, and “OSAR,” 4 if Father tested positive for drugs. By all accounts, Father successfully worked through many of the services: • Psychological Assessment – Father completed the psychological assessment on July 2, 2025. • Individual Counseling – Father received individual counseling from May 17, 2025 through August 27, 2025. Father was successfully discharged from individual counseling. • Domestic Violence Prevention Classes – Father participated in multiple domestic violence prevention programs. The first program was through San Antonio Fatherhood, and Father successfully completed this program on July 30, 2025. Father also completed two batterer intervention programs, the first in July 2025 and the second in January 2026. 4 O.S.A.R. stands for Outreach, Screening, Assessment, and Referral, an acronym referring to the protocol that would be required of Father if he tested positive for drug use. -3- 04-26-00447-CV • Parenting Classes – Father completed parenting classes offered by San Antonio Fatherhood on August 19, 2025. Notwithstanding Father’s successful completion of several family services, he and S.M. continued in a relationship that was prone to domestic violence incidents. When the Department’s investigation began in April 2025, Father and S.M. merely lived together. However, in July 2025, they married. On September 2, 2025, S.M. called the police because Father “broke in [the] home through boards.” On November 15, 2025, S.M. again called the police because of a domestic violence incident involving Father. Saucedo recalled that this domestic violence incident prompted Father to cancel a visit with the children because Father “did not want his daughter[s] to see him with scratches on him.” This domestic violence incident led to Father being arrested the following month on a charge of unlawful restraint and assault bodily injury to a family member. The April 2, 2025 domestic violence incident was not the first between Father and S.M. When asked by the Department about a June 16, 2024 domestic violence incident between him and S.M., Father asserted his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. J.L. recalled that during the June 2024 incident, she was asleep and then awakened by Father and S.M. calling for her. When J.L. got to the couple, S.M. was holding a knife. J.L. got involved “[a] little bit” to separate them. J.L. emphasized that she did not get injured, but in J.L. trying to pull Father off, he “kind of like scrapped [J.L.’s] shin with his shoe.” S.M. acknowledged that between January 2024 and the children’s removal in April 2025, there were six calls for police service to the family’s residence because of domestic violence. In addition to domestic violence, Father’s relationship with S.M. was plagued by volatility. Even at the time of trial, Father could not say whether he and S.M. were in a relationship. On Saturday, April 11, 2026, approximately two weeks before the last day of trial, Ramirez saw Father and S.M. in the “bar area” of a ballroom in Pearsall, Texas. Father explained: -4- 04-26-00447-CV I can’t say we’re together. And I can’t say we’re not. You know as they said, yes, they saw us together. But from the referrals — or, you know, from what the counselor advised us she — she told [S.M.] to wait until I get out of rehab to see how — see how the relationship goes. Saucedo learned of the couple’s volatility by speaking with the counselor who provided the couple with couple’s therapy. Saucedo elaborated: both [Father] and [S.M.] needed to have more individual counseling. They had a lot of issues to address before revisiting couple’s therapy. And their last visit in couple’s therapy, which was done on February the 12th, [S.M.] shared with [the counselor] that she was tired and she was done with [Father]. That he just relapses. That she gets four good months out of him and then he is back to using cocaine and being angry. And that she would more than likely have divorce papers for him in [sic] the counter when he was out of rehab. S.M.’s relationship with J.L., Father’s sixteen-year-old daughter, was also strained. Saucedo recounted that, while the Department’s termination petition was pending, the trial court issued an order prohibiting S.M. from contacting J.L. Notwithstanding the trial court’s order, S.M. sent J.L. harassing text and Facebook messages. Saucedo agreed that while consistency is an issue in the case, S.M.’s toxic behavior toward a minor throughout the case was a bigger issue. Saucedo recounted another time where tension between S.M. and J.L. included S.M. forbidding J.L. from retrieving items from S.M.’s home. The trial court, according to Saucedo, ultimately ordered S.M. to return those items. Father, according to Saucedo, admitted that his cocaine use caused him to engage in domestic violence against S.M. While Father tested negative for drugs immediately after the children’s April 2025 removal, in September 2025, he tested positive for cocaine. Saucedo recounted that, in February 2026, while Father and S.M. were participating in couples’ therapy, Father admitted to still using drugs. On February 16, 2026, Father was admitted into a forty-five- day inpatient drug rehabilitation program. He was released on April 2, 2026, approximately a month before the final day of trial. -5- 04-26-00447-CV Father’s substance abuse contributed to several criminal charges. At the time of trial, Father was facing three pending domestic violence charges. When asked by the Department about being arrested on January 19, 2025 for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) a fifth time, 5 Father pleaded the Fifth. By the final day of trial, Father had recently pleaded guilty to this fifth charge. Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, Father agreed to serve ten years’ probation. As of the final day of trial, the children were in a foster home. However, the Department planned on placing the children with J.L.’s adult sister (“Half Sister”) who is also the half sister of R.C.L. and J.J.L. Half Sister, according to Saucedo, is willing to adopt R.C.L. and J.J.L. In Half Sister’s home, R.C.L. and J.J.L. would also be living with Half Sister’s grandmother. Half Sister, who works at a hospital, had already inquired with the local school district about American Sign Language (“ASL”) classes for everyone in the household. The hospital where Half Sister works also provides in-home speech therapy that would benefit J.J.L. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Father allowed the children to remain in a physically or emotionally dangerous condition or surrounding (subsection (1)(D) endangerment by conditions or surroundings); (2) Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children (subsection (1)(E) endangerment by conduct); and (3) termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children (subsection (2) best interest). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). The trial court signed an order that terminated Father’s parental rights to R.C.L. and J.J.L. 6 and appointed the Department as the children’s permanent managing conservator. 5 Father’s previous DWI convictions occurred on: (1) January 11, 2005; (2) May 29, 2008; (3) December 7, 2010; and (4) February 19, 2013. 6 J.L. was one month shy of her eighteenth birthday when the termination order was signed. The termination order does not mention J.L. -6- 04-26-00447-CV Father timely appeals from the termination order. II. DISCUSSION A. Extension The trial court signed the order for protection of a child in an emergency, which appointed the Department as the children’s temporary managing conservator, on April 7, 2025. Under the governing statute, trial must have commenced by “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a). Father orally moved to extend the trial deadline for one-hundred-and-eighty days. Id. § 263.401(b). The trial court considered Father’s motion on March 20 and March 27, 2026. 7 The trial court denied Father’s motion on March 27, 2026. The trial concluded on May 1, 2026. In Father’s first issue, he argues that, at the time his motion to extend was considered, he had nearly completed all his services and was on track to complete inpatient drug rehabilitation. Father emphasizes that the inpatient drug rehabilitation program he entered in February 2026 would yield lasting sobriety — as opposed to his previous drug rehabilitation programs. At the March 27, 2026 hearing on Father’s motion for extension of time, he explained: [B]ack before 2011 or 2005 when I had those other domestic violences I gained tools from the BIP — these two BIPs. And this rehab program is a lot better than the last one I have been in. So I gained a lot more tools that I can use when I get out. I already gained a sponsor. That’s something I — I didn’t do the last time. I’m already working the steps. Something I didn’t do the last time. So I’m doing something different. And that’s what they say you got to do something different to gain a different outcome. 7 All parties agreed that whatever evidence the trial court considered at the March 20 and 27, 2026 hearings on Father’s motion to extend may also be considered on the merits of the Department’s petition, if the trial court denied the extension that Father sought. -7- 04-26-00447-CV The Department responds that Father had “persisted in drug abuse and violence throughout the case” and “only request[ed] inpatient rehabilitation shortly before trial.” The Department contends that any delay in completing services and establishing a safe, stable home life for the children was due to Father’s own actions. To grant an extension, the trial court must find “that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b) (emphasis added). “Actions that are ‘considered to be the parent’s fault’ will generally not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.” In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting In re G.P., No. 10-13-00062-CV, 2013 WL 2639243, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco June 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)). In In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d 493, 501 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet. denied), our sister court held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance based upon Mother’s voluntary entry into drug rehab, particularly when this was Mother’s second trip to rehab while the case was pending. A 180-day continuance was granted previously when Mother entered drug rehab for the first time . . . . Mother also presented nothing to the trial court that would indicate that delaying the final termination hearing would be in the best interest of J.S.S. Id. In this case, Father began inpatient drug rehabilitation approximately a month before the case was initially set for trial. Under In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d at 501, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance based upon Father’s voluntary entry into drug rehabilitation. Moreover, as Father admits, his recent inpatient drug rehabilitation program was not his first drug rehabilitation program. The trial court may have also considered the fact that, at the time of Father’s motion for extension of time, he was facing charges for driving while -8- 04-26-00447-CV intoxicated for a fifth time. See In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (“In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, a reviewing court is generally bound by the record before the trial court at the time its decision was made.”). At the extension hearing, Father recalled that, in plea bargain negotiations, the State had offered him a six-month intensive drug-treatment program in prison, followed by three months in a halfway house and a period of probation. Father fails to explain how an extension, in light of the uncertainty of pending felony DWI charges, was in the children’s best interest. See In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d at 501 (providing that in determining whether extraordinary circumstances justify a continuance, the focus is on the needs of the child). We overrule Father’s first issue. B. Endangerment In Father’s second issue, he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.001(b)(1)(E). Father acknowledges that there was evidence of a history of domestic violence, cocaine use, and alcohol abuse, but that there was no evidence regarding the impact on the children. The Department responds that Father used drugs and engaged in domestic violence both before and after the children were removed. It emphasizes that Father completed services — including services aimed at helping Father achieve and maintain sobriety — and yet Father remained in a volatile relationship with S.M. According to the Department, the trial court may have found that Father cannot provide a safe home for the children in the long term. 1. Standard of Review A parent-child relationship may be terminated, pursuant to section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, only if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence one of the predicate -9- 04-26-00447-CV grounds enumerated in subsection (b)(1) and that termination is in a child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). Clear and convincing evidence requires “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. We review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under the standards of review established by the Texas Supreme Court in In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266–67 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” Id. at 266. “[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we “must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.” Id. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. 2. Law on Endangerment Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well- being of the child[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). - 10 - 04-26-00447-CV Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. See Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); see also In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). “While both subsections (D) and (E) focus on endangerment, they differ regarding the source and proof of endangerment.” In re N.M.R., No. 04-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 3640223, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “Subsection D concerns the child’s living environment, rather than the conduct of the parent, though parental conduct is certainly relevant to the child’s environment.” Id. (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)). Under subsection (E), the cause of the endangerment must be the parent’s conduct and must be the result of a conscious course of conduct rather than a single act or omission. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. In certain instances, the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding of subsection (D) endangerment is intertwined and overlaps with the evidence supporting the trial court’s subsection (E) endangerment finding. Id. at 131. In such instances, we may consolidate our review of the evidence supporting these findings. Id.; see also In re J.J.V.M.M., No. 04-22-00405-CV, 2022 WL 17479144, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (consolidating examination of subsections (D) and (E) findings). 3. Endangerment Analysis Father contends there is no evidence that his history of domestic violence, cocaine use, and alcohol abuse impacted the children. However, Father fails to appreciate evidence that the trial court may have reasonably credited. First, as for domestic violence, J.L. testified about at least two domestic violence incidents during which R.C.L. and J.J.L. were sleeping in either their bedroom or on the couch. J.L.’s - 11 - 04-26-00447-CV younger sisters reacted to these incidents by crying or running and hiding. J.L. further testified about another domestic violence incident where S.M. went into J.L.’s room to get pepper spray and her car keys. 8 J.L. then heard the couple yell out her name. When J.L. saw the couple, she noticed that S.M. had tried to pepper spray Father, but she had instead pepper sprayed herself. Although J.L. was not pepper sprayed, she “got a whiff” and “started coughing and all that.” R.C.L. and J.J.L were asleep in their room when this incident occurred. “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 n.4 (Tex. 2009) (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). “Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment.” In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). “Violent conduct by a parent toward the other parent may produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a child.” Id. Thus, “[e]vidence of domestic violence is [ ] relevant to endangerment, even if the violence is not directed at the child.” J.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Prot. Servs., 592 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.); see In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d at 727 (“A parent’s abusive or violent conduct can produce a home environment that endangers a child’s well-being.”). Additionally, evidence that a parent “has engaged in abusive and violent conduct in the past permits an inference that the [parent] will continue to engage in violent behavior in the future.” In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d 744, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Accordingly, evidence of domestic violence can support findings under both subsection (D) and (E). See J.G., 592 S.W.3d at 524 (explaining that domestic violence may produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a 8 J.L. explained that every time Father and S.M. went out drinking, S.M. asked J.L. to “hold her stuff.” - 12 - 04-26-00447-CV child supporting termination under subsection (D)); In re P.W., 579 S.W.3d at 727 (“Evidence of domestic violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E).”). Second, as for Father’s alcohol and cocaine abuse, the Texas Supreme Court has written that “[w]hile illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment, a pattern of drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish a substantial risk of harm.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024). “A reviewing court should not evaluate drug-use evidence in isolation; rather it should consider additional evidence that a factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s ability to parent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, one of the factors in denying Father’s motion for extension of the trial date was the uncertainty of Father’s then-pending fifth DWI charge in March 2026, on the eve of trial. Father also emphasizes that he had not tested positive for drugs since September 2025. While technically true, Father fails to appreciate that he admitted in couple’s counseling in February 2026 that he was still abusing cocaine. Father admitted that his drug or alcohol use fuels the domestic violence between he and S.M. Third, R.C.L. and J.J.L. both suffered from conditions that the trial court could attribute to medical neglect. See In re D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 852–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (holding that “a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief that [mother’s] failure to obtain a medical evaluation or any medical care for her infant son, whom she had been told had stopped breathing, met the standard for endangering conduct” under subsection (E)). According to Saucedo, J.J.L. was diagnosed with significant hearing loss due to severe ongoing ear infections that were never properly treated. J.J.L.’s hearing loss necessitated a cochlear implant surgery. R.C.L. had twelve cavities, which Saucedo attributed to medical neglect. Medical neglect - 13 - 04-26-00447-CV may support a finding of endangerment of physical and emotional well-being of a child. Father attributed any neglect to the period of time that the children were in the Department’s care during their first removal. This dispute was for the trial court to reconcile. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (“[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.”). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren]” and “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren].” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support this finding. Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s termination under subsections (D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. We overrule Father’s second issue. C. Continuing Danger Section 161.001(f)(1) of the Texas Family Code provides: In a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services, the court may not order termination of the parent- child relationship under Subsection (b)(1) unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence and describes in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order that [] the department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before commencement of a trial on the merits and despite those reasonable efforts, a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the child to the parent[.] - 14 - 04-26-00447-CV TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(f)(1) (emphasis added). In Father’s third issue, he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under subsection 161.001(f)(1). Father emphasizes that it had been eight months since he tested positive for drugs and six months since there had been any reports of domestic violence between he and S.M. The Department responds that Father used drugs throughout the case. It emphasizes that Father admitted using drugs during a February 2026 counseling session. The Department also argues that Father’s “substance use was a main catalyst for his violence.” It highlights that Father admitted to being at a bar with S.M. shortly after being released from inpatient drug rehabilitation and less than a couple of weeks before the final day of trial. 1. Law on Continuing Danger Subsection (f) was enacted in 2023. 9 We agree with at least two of our sister courts that although the phrase “continuing danger” can be found elsewhere in the family code, “we are unaware of any provision of the Texas Family Code that uses ‘continuing danger’ in the same manner as it is used in section 161.001(f), particularly under the relevant evidentiary standard: clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.R.C., No. 09-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1953219, at *23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jul. 6, 2026, no pet.) (quoting In re T.R., No. 01-25-00924-CV, 2026 WL 958570 at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Subsection (f) provides three statutory elements. First, the Department must prove a “continuing” danger that “remains” despite reunification efforts. See In re T.R.C., 2026 WL 1953219, at *25 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(f)(1)). Therefore, “although conduct and circumstances in the distant past may be relevant, the plain language of the statute requires the trial 9 See Act of May 25, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 7, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 1644–45. - 15 - 04-26-00447-CV court to pay particular attention to more recent conduct and circumstances existing in the time period after removal, during reunification efforts, and leading up to the ‘commencement of a trial on the merits[,]’ to determine whether the [Department] has met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ‘a continuing danger remains[.]’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(f)(1)). Second, the phrase “in the home” focuses on “evidence regarding the circumstances and conditions existing in the parent’s home during the relevant time frame to determine whether the [Department] has met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that despite reasonable reunification efforts ‘a continuing danger remains in the home[.]’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(f)(1)). Third, the phrase “prevents the return of the child to the parent” focuses on “evidence regarding the degree of danger as well as evidence linking the danger to the parent.” Id. 2. Continuing Danger Analysis The evidence is legally and factually sufficient under subsection (f). Father admitted that his drug or alcohol use fuels the domestic violence between he and S.M. Father admitted to using drugs as late as February 2026. The case was called for trial on March 20, 2026, continued on March 27, 2026, and concluded on May 1, 2026. Even if the trial had occurred all on May 1, 2026, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Father was using drugs in the period after removal, during reunification efforts, and leading up to the commencement of a trial on the merits. Second, the domestic violence between Father and S.M. occurred in the home, and it persisted in September and November 2025 — after the children had been removed. In earlier incidents, Father and S.M. called out for J.L. to intervene in the couple’s altercations. J.J.L. witnessed the April 2025 episode that prompted the children’s removal. J.L. testified that R.C.L. and J.J.L. were sleeping in either their bedroom or on the couch during two other domestic violence - 16 - 04-26-00447-CV episodes and that they reacted by crying or running and hiding. Third, Father was seen at a bar with S.M. shortly after he had been released from inpatient drug rehabilitation and less than a couple of weeks before the final day of trial. The trial court may have credited S.M.’s statements in counseling that “she gets four good months out of” Father and then “he just relapses” as evidence that “prevents the return of the child to the parent[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(f)(1). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and recognizing that the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that a continuing danger remains in the home that prevents the return of the R.C.L. and J.J.L. to Father. See id. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support this finding. Further, after considering the entire record, including any disputed or contrary evidence, we conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under Section 161.001(f)(1) of the Texas Family Code. We overrule Father’s third issue. D. Best Interest 1. Law on Best Interest It is the burden of the party seeking termination to establish that termination is in the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In a best interest analysis, we apply the non-exhaustive Holley factors. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 10 The set of factors is not exhaustive, and no single factor is necessarily 10 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). - 17 - 04-26-00447-CV dispositive of the issue. Id. at 372; In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.). We recognize there is a presumption that termination is not in the best interest of a child and that the Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that termination should be a “last resort.” In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tex. 2026); In re K.N., 741 S.W.3d 165, 172 (Tex. 2026). However, promptly and permanently placing a child in a safe environment is also presumed to b