In the Interest of K. R. v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
Date FiledNovember 5, 2026
Docket09-26-00211-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-26-00211-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF K.R.
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On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 250308-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his minor child,
“Kathleen.”1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory
grounds exist for termination of Father’s parental rights and that termination of his
parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1) (E), (P), (2). 2
1
To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the child
and parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, but she is not a party
to this appeal.
1
Father’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);
In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders
procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The brief presents the
attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable
grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the
Court that she gave Father a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Father of his
right to file a pro se brief, and provided Father a copy of the appellate record. The
Court notified Father of his right to file a pro se response and of the deadline. Father
did not file a response with the Court.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by
Father’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)
(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,
no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we have found nothing that would
arguably support an appeal, and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit.
See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by
indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346
2
S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new
counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Should
Father decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, his respective
counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the
standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 2016).
AFFIRMED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on September 21, 2026
Opinion Delivered November 5, 2026
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
3