Full Opinion

Opinion filed August 27, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00069-CV __________ IN THE INTEREST OF Z.M., A CHILD On Appeal from the 326th District Court Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11339-CX OPINION In this accelerated appeal, we address, among other things, the propriety of the trial court’s order that terminated the parental rights of the father1 to his child, Z.M, 2 and the application of the extension procedures in Sections 263.401 and 263.403 of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.401, .403 (West Supp. 2025). 1 Only the father’s parental rights were terminated. Although the mother was originally a respondent in the underlying termination suit, she passed away in October 2025 prior to the final termination hearing. 2 To protect the identities of the child and the child’s family members, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). Appellant, the father, presents five issues on appeal. He first contends that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. See FAM. § 263.401. In his second, third, and fourth issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) he endangered Z.M. pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); (2) termination of his parental rights is in Z.M.’s best interest; and (3) a continuing danger existed that prevented the return of Z.M. to Appellant. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2), (f). In his fifth issue, Appellant contests the trial court’s conservatorship determination. See id. § 153.131 (West 2014). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, and we reverse and remand in part. I. Termination Findings and Standards It has long been held that “[s]undering the ties between parent and child ‘can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.’” In re J.Z.A., 738 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. 2026) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). To that end, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) must “clear[] a high bar” to justify terminating one’s parental rights. In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *6 (Tex. June 5, 2026); see also In re H.S., No. 24-0307, 2026 WL 1614496, at *8–9 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (re- emphasizing that terminating parental rights “‘is always the last resort’ . . . permissible to protect children from serious harm . . . [and] may be exercised only in the absence of other legitimate options.” (quoting D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. 2025))). To support termination under this heightened standard, the Department must present clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or 2 degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). This standard “is unforgiving” and “the government may not sever the legal ties between parents and children without clearing [this] high bar.” K.N., 2026 WL 1614378, at *6–7. In that regard, “[a] lack of evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence.” See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 2012); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial court further found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of our deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). Because “the factfinder remains ‘the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility 3 and demeanor’” under this standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the finding, we weigh the disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all evidence that favors it. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference to the finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted against the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). II. Background and the Evidence Presented at Trial The Department initiated contact with Z.M.’s parents in February 2024 after law enforcement was dispatched to an alleged domestic disturbance between Appellant and the mother. Department investigator Alyssa Jones called the mother, who reported that Appellant assaulted her after she declined Appellant’s sexual advances. Jones met with Appellant at his father’s home where he and nineteen- month-old Z.M. were staying at the time. Appellant explained that he and the mother met at a hotel for Appellant’s visit with Z.M., and that they argued because the mother wanted to remain in the hotel room during the visit. Appellant denied physically assaulting the mother. Although the mother called the police to report her version of events, Jones was unaware of whether Appellant was arrested or charged with any crime following the mother’s report to the police that led to the Department’s involvement. Jones believed that Appellant seemed “open and honest” with her when they met, and they candidly discussed his criminal history. Appellant’s first misdemeanor conviction was for driving while intoxicated in March 1990. Appellant pled guilty to felony sexual assault in 1995 and was placed on community 4 supervision for eight years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2026). In December 1996, Appellant’s community supervision was revoked after he failed to report to his probation officers for several months and did not remain in Tarrant County as required, and his punishment was assessed at imprisonment for seven years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. As a result of this conviction, Appellant was required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.001(5)(A), (6)(A), 62.051, 62.101(a)(1) (West Supp. 2025). In March 2023, Appellant pled guilty to failing to comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Program (SORP), a third-degree felony, and was placed on community supervision for five years. See CRIM. PROC. art. 62.102(b)(2). In October 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke his community supervision based on a domestic violence incident between Appellant and the mother and his failure to pay court-ordered fees. However, the trial court did not revoke Appellant’s community supervision but instead continued his supervision. Despite this, Appellant remained confined in jail until January 2024. The day after Jones spoke to Appellant at his father’s home, she met with the mother at the Noah Project, a shelter for victims of family violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking. Z.M. was with the mother, so the child was “back and forth between the parents.” The mother confirmed that she brought Z.M. to the hotel for a visit with Appellant, and “they began to tussle” after she rejected him. The mother initially said that while Z.M. was lying on the bed next to where they were standing, Appellant “elbowed her in the face,” and “that it wasn’t intentional, but it wasn’t accidental either.” She clarified that Appellant “hit her intentionally but he didn’t mean her ill will.” The mother said that they began to argue and Appellant then pinned her onto the bed. She eventually left and called police, and Z.M. went home 5 with Appellant. The mother told Jones that she “regretted contacting law enforcement because she felt like she overreacted.” Jones also discussed with the mother the Department’s previous involvement with her and Appellant because of domestic violence between them, but the mother hoped that Appellant had changed. Before then, the Department was involved when Z.M. was born because his cord blood tested positive for cocaine. The mother and Appellant participated in services and that case was closed. The mother stated that consuming alcohol increased Appellant’s propensity for violence, but she nonetheless intended to allow continued contact between him and Z.M. When Jones attempted to implement a safety plan, the mother “was not interested,” “did not believe it was necessary,” and said “that she was not going to participate.” The mother told Jones “to go do what [she] needed to do . . . and she would do whatever she needed to do to get [the Department] out of her life.” On February 14, 2024, the Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of Z.M. Z.M. was drug tested the same day, and was positive for cocaine metabolite, cocaethylene, and benzoylecgonine. The Department created family plans of service for the mother and Appellant, which the trial court amended and adopted as orders of the court in May 2024. The mother refused to submit to drug testing until August 2024 when she was ordered to do so at a hearing, and she tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Appellant tested positive for alcohol in August 2024, but he consistently tested negative for illegal substances. While the case was pending, Appellant continued residing with his father and adult daughter, whose background checks raised no concerns. Appellant completed anger management, counseling, and his psychological assessment, the recommendation of which was “reunification with [Z.M.] and to discontinue classes with [the Department].” The trial court granted the monitored return of Z.M. to 6 Appellant in February 2025, and Z.M. began living with Appellant in his father’s home on March 20, 2025. The mother’s visitation with Z.M. was suspended after she tested positive for cocaine and alcohol in February 2025. The order granting Z.M.’s monitored return prohibited Appellant from allowing the mother access to Z.M. The trial court also ordered Appellant “to complete the remaining requirements imposed under [the] service plan that [were] necessary for the child’s return,” specifically, that he “submit to weekly alcohol testing” and “attempt to submit to hair follicle alcohol testing weekly.” At that time, the Department’s permanency goal was family reunification. In June 2025, permanency case manager Vanessa Gott became the family’s fourth assigned caseworker since Z.M. was removed. According to Gott, whose tangential involvement began in April 2025, Appellant had no outstanding requirements for services when she became the primary caseworker. Then, in August 2025, Z.M. tested positive for marihuana metabolite at the cutoff level of 0.1 picograms per milligram (pg/mg). Appellant’s nail bed test was positive for Delta-9. Gott did not suspect that Appellant used marihuana and believed that Appellant “ha[d] always been up front that he doesn’t use drugs.” She instead surmised that Appellant’s daughter’s marihuana use was the source of Z.M.’s exposure based on a home visit in April 2025 during which she smelled marihuana emitting from the daughter’s vehicle. When Gott discussed Z.M.’s positive test results with Appellant and informed him of her suspicions, he stated “[h]e didn’t think anyone was using mari[h]uana” in the home, and “[h]e knew that his daughter used a vape, but wasn’t sure if the vape was mari[h]uana or something else.” Appellant’s father and daughter refused to submit to drug testing after Z.M. and Appellant tested positive. 7 The monitored return ended in August 2025, and Z.M. was placed in a foster home in Bellevue, Texas. The mother again tested positive for cocaine in August 2025, then died unexpectedly in the beginning of October 2025. Appellant informed Gott of the mother’s death and disclosed that, although he was uncertain of the cause, he “had concerns that it could have possibly been from drug use.” The final termination hearing commenced on November 5, 2025. The Department offered Appellant’s and the mother’s service plans as well as several of the trial court’s orders. When the final hearing resumed on January 29, Jones and Gott testified. Appellant was the third and final witness before the final hearing concluded on February 2, 2026. Z.M. was still living in the foster home in Bellevue, which was not a long-term or adoptive placement. His foster parents were only willing to care for him “until a decision [was] made on the case” regarding the termination of Appellant’s parental rights. Gott explained that the Department had not located a permanent placement for Z.M. at that time but was in the process of requesting a home study for a maternal aunt who had contacted the Department. In addition to Appellant’s convictions for sexual assault and failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements, the Department offered Appellant’s 1995 judgment of conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault, a 1996 judgment for driving while his license was suspended, and two judgments of conviction for violating a protective order in 2021. On two occasions in 2021, Appellant was convicted following his plea of no contest to violating a protective order that was issued on June 26, 2021, that named the mother as the protected person. Gott had not discussed Appellant’s criminal history with him “in detail,” but acknowledged his difficulty in securing housing because of his criminal history and status as a sex offender. Relying on documentation prepared by the three previous caseworkers, Gott stated that Appellant did not complete his mental health intake appointment at the 8 Betty Hardwick Center as required by his service plan. She also attested that Appellant failed to complete a parenting course. However, Appellant testified that he attended his intake appointment at the Betty Hardwick Center, was advised that he “didn’t need any help,” and forwarded the letter he was given to the caseworker that was assigned to him at that time. Appellant testified that no one informed him that this requirement was considered incomplete. Gott admitted that she had not contacted anyone at Betty Hardwick to determine the accuracy of her predecessors’ notes. Although Appellant was initially reluctant to promptly submit to drug and alcohol testing, Gott did not suspect that Appellant “was trying to be deceptive”; she “just [didn’t] think he was making it a priority.” She consistently maintained that drug use was not a concern with Appellant, though she believed that that “he [did] occasionally drink a few beers.” Gott believed that Appellant abided by the condition of the monitored return to prohibit the mother from having unsupervised access to Z.M., was employed with a landscaping company, and was “able to take care of [Z.M.].” The Department’s “major concern” was Appellant’s unstable housing situation. Gott did not dispute that Appellant’s attempts to secure housing since the monitored return ended were met with difficulty. For instance, because of his reportable conviction, he was not eligible for government assistance through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and several of his lease applications were summarily rejected. Appellant testified that he submitted “at least seven or eight” lease applications and in turn paid several hundred dollars in application fees. Gott acknowledged Appellant’s recent “bad luck” that contributed to the delay, including his father’s stroke and subsequent hospitalization, and Appellant’s own hospitalization in the months before the final hearing. 9 Notwithstanding the “uphill fight,” Appellant was able to rent an apartment from his employer and signed a lease on January 21, 2026. Pursuant to the arrangement between him and his employer, Appellant took “a significant pay cut just to establish [his] residence.” He moved in “[m]ost of [Z.M.’s] stuff,” including “his bed[,] [h]is little table he can eat on that matche[d] his bed[,] [a] little setup for some of his clothes[,] [and] [h]is little play box.” Appellant could not move any of his own belongings to or take possession of the apartment until he registered his new address. See CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.051, 62.055. When Gott testified on January 29, she had not yet been to the apartment that Appellant had leased to assess its safety and suitability for Z.M. because she had received the lease that day. But even assuming the apartment was appropriate for a child, Gott still had concerns regarding Appellant’s stability, reliable transportation, childcare arrangements, and the need to ensure that Z.M. was “not exposed to any assaultive behavior.” She clarified: I just want to be sure that not only is it stable housing, but there is a stable environment which [Appellant] is willing to continue accepting help if counseling was provided. But he has already stated that, you know, he just wants [Z.M.] home. He doesn’t think he has anything else that he needs to do. So, that’s where the concern is. Gott confirmed that Appellant had not been arrested for violent or assaultive offenses while the underlying proceedings were pending. Aside from Appellant’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, his other criminal convictions predate Z.M.’s birth. Additionally, Appellant consistently attended parent-child visitation, which went “very well.” Gott observed that “[Z.M.] [was] very bonded to [Appellant],” “[t]hey interact[ed] well,” Appellant played with Z.M., read to him, and made sure he was fed. It appeared to Gott that Appellant had “quite the concern over [Z.M.]’s well-being” and could provide for Z.M.’s needs. She agreed that terminating Appellant’s parental rights would be traumatic for Z.M. “because he does have a 10 bond with [Appellant].” In fact, Z.M. started attending play therapy because he became so upset when the visits ended and he missed Appellant between visits. Notwithstanding Z.M.’s bond with Appellant, and contrary to the Department’s initial permanency goal of reunification, the Department sought to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. Gott opined that termination was in Z.M.’s best interest “[a]t this time,” because the Department was concerned that Z.M. might “be[] exposed to any aggressive behavior due to the involvement we’ve had with the family.” She expounded: We would like to see some stability in that home that he’s going to maintain. . . . As far as with termination, we’ve been in this case for almost two years, and so we are kind of still at the same point, so I’m still in the agreement of termination. Gott’s testimony concluded on January 29. On February 2, Appellant described his new apartment, which Gott “had a chance to walk through” after the last setting. He was awaiting a callback from the Sex Offender Registry Detective at the Abilene Police Department to schedule an appointment, but he hoped to register his new address within a week. Appellant averred that, despite his service plan requirements interfering with his employment, he completed “everything on the list” “because [his] son was the most important thing.” Although he repeatedly lost jobs while attempting to satisfy his service plan requirements, he remained continuously employed while the case was pending. Appellant also reserved a place for Z.M. at a daycare facility, confirmed that he was employed in landscaping, and had a vehicle for transportation. At the close of evidence, Z.M.’s attorney ad litem expressed her opposition to terminating Appellant’s parental rights: What I’ve seen is a bond between the two of them, dad and son, and I know he wants to be with his dad. . . . I just don’t . . . feel that it is in [Z.M.’s] best interest for [Appellant’s] parental rights to be terminated. 11 [Z.M.] is not in a long-term placement . . . [or] a pre-adoptive home. . . . [W]here he wants to be is with his father, and you can tell every time you see the two of them together. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights and found termination to be in the best interest of Z.M. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed. III. Jurisdiction Over the Case: Sections 263.401 and 263.403 In Appellant’s first issue, he asserts that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on August 16, 2025, because it failed to properly extend the dismissal deadline. The legislature enacted Section 263.401 to encourage the prompt resolution of suits in which the Department requests termination of the parent-child relationship. In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex. 2021). In a parental termination proceeding, a trial on the merits must commence by “the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator.” FAM. § 263.401(a). The failure to do so without a valid extension under subsection (b) deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the suit, resulting in its automatic dismissal. See id. § 263.401(c). Section 263.401 “incorporate[s] heightened protections against government interference with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 599 (Tex. 2023). “In recognition of this interest, all branches of Texas government have implemented strong due-process protections for parents facing termination of their parental rights.” Id. But the fundamental interests of parents and the policy favoring the prompt resolution of termination suits are important only to the extent that they advance the child’s best interest. See FAM. § 153.002 (“The best interest of the child shall always 12 be the primary consideration of the court.”). To that end, the automatic dismissal date may be extended “in exceptional circumstances, but only if the trial court properly grants a limited extension before the one-year deadline.” In re C.S., No. 25- 0008, 2026 WL 1614382, at *1 (Tex. June 5, 2026) (citing FAM. § 263.401(a)). “Notwithstanding Section 263.401,” Section 263.403 allows a trial court to retain jurisdiction and render an order for the monitored return of the child. See FAM. § 263.403(a). In relevant part, Section 263.403 provides: (a-1) Unless the court has granted an extension under Section 263.401(b), the [D]epartment or the parent may request the court to retain jurisdiction . . . . (b) If the court renders an order under this section, the court shall: .... (2) schedule a new date, not later than the 180th day after the date the temporary order is rendered, for dismissal of the suit unless a trial on the merits has commenced. (c) If before the dismissal of the suit or the commencement of the trial on the merits a child placed with a parent under this section must be moved from that home by the department or the court renders a temporary order terminating the transition order issued under Subsection (a)(2)(B), the court shall, at the time of the move or order, schedule a new date for dismissal of the suit. The new dismissal date may not be later than the original dismissal date established under Section 263.401 or the 180th day after the date the child is moved or the order is rendered under this subsection, whichever date is later. FAM. § 263.403 (emphasis added). Appellant contends that the trial court’s February 13, 2025, extension order that was issued pursuant to Section 263.401(b- 3) foreclosed its ability to issue further extensions under other applicable provisions. “Statutory construction is a question of law, and [our] review is conducted de novo.” City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez, 399 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex. 2013). “Our ultimate purpose when construing a statute is to [discern] the Legislature’s intent,” 13 and the statute’s text is the best indication of it. Id. We must not interpret the statute in a manner that renders any part or provision meaningless or superfluous. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008). “In ascertaining a term’s meaning, courts look primarily to how that term is used throughout the statute as a whole.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Statutory terms should be interpreted consistently in every part of a statute. Id. Thus, “courts should not give an undefined statutory term a meaning out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions, although it might be susceptible of such a construction if standing alone.” Id.; see also State v. Haltom Med. Invs., L.L.C., 153 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (“Unless there is language clearly indicating a contrary intent, words or phrases used in different parts of a statute are presumed to have the same meaning throughout, and where the meaning in one instance is clear, this meaning will be attached in all other instances.”). The plain and unambiguous language of Section 263.403(a-1) precludes the parties from requesting that the trial court retain jurisdiction over the case for an additional six months if the trial court has previously granted an extension under Section 263.401(b). FAM. § 263.403(a-1). However, the remaining applicable subsections of the Family Code specifically permit the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the case for a monitored return or transition monitored return “[n]otwithstanding Section 263.401,” even if the monitored return fails. Id. § 263.403(a), (b), (c). Importantly, as detailed above, in the event of a failed monitored return, the trial court must set a new dismissal deadline that “may not be later than the original dismissal date established under Section 263.401 or the 180th day after the date the child is moved [from the monitored return] . . . , whichever is later.” Id. § 263.403(c). Consequently, we conclude that Sections 263.401 and 263.403 do not prohibit the trial court from extending the dismissal deadline to order 14 a monitored return or transition monitored return, as it did here, even if it has previously extended the dismissal deadline, so long as the new dismissal deadline is set no later than the 180th day after a child is removed from a monitored return. See L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 516–17. On February 13, 2025, the trial court signed an order extending the dismissal deadline to August 16, 2025, pursuant to Section 263.401. See FAM. § 263.401. The trial court’s order and its purpose included specific findings that: (1) Appellant made a good faith effort to complete his service plan but needed additional time to be compliant; and (2) it intended to return the child to Appellant upon the completion of his service plan. FAM. § 263.401(b-3). Then, on February 24, 2025, the trial court held a permanency hearing during which it considered the monitored return of Z.M. to Appellant. The trial court signed its order granting a transition monitored return on March 26, 2025, and extended the dismissal deadline to August 23, 2025, in compliance with Section 263.403(b). The trial court terminated the monitored return on August 21, 2025, and, pursuant to Section 263.403(c), extended the dismissal deadline to November 18, 2025. The final hearing commenced on November 5, before the November 18 dismissal deadline passed. Thus, the trial court retained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.3 See In re P.Z.F., 651 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, pet. denied). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. IV. Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) – Endangerment In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the trial court’s findings that he endangered Z.M. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). 3 Our interpretation of these extension provisions does not conflict with In re Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, No. 02-26-00515-CV, 2026 WL 2357227, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2026, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.), which held that a trial court may not invoke Section 263.401(b) to further extend a dismissal deadline already set under Section 263.403(c) following a failed monitored return. Here, by contrast, the trial court granted one extension under Section 263.401(b) 15 The statutory endangerment grounds require clear and convincing proof that the parent has: “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child,” or “(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. 2014). “[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that ‘expose[s a child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,” E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803, but “does not require actual harm.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). To terminate a parent’s rights based on endangerment under subsection (D) or (E), the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child,’” nor must “the child actually suffer[] injury.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination under [subsection] (D) requires that the child’s environment is a source of endangerment, and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.” C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310. “A parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make the child’s environment endangering to the child.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the parent is aware that the environment creates a potential danger to the child but the parent disregards that risk.” Id. Because conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless before it ordered the monitored return. Upon terminating the monitored return, the trial court set the new dismissal deadline under Section 263.403(c) and did not stack the previous extension under Section 263.401(b). Thus, the concern articulated by the Second Court of Appeals is not present here. 16 the child is exposed to them, the relevant time frame for evaluating the applicability of subsection (D) is before the child’s removal. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. Endangerment under subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s conduct, and whether the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s actions, omissions, or failures to act. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; instead, a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required. Id.; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied). “A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. Further, a parent’s actions prior to and after the child’s birth or removal may show an endangering course of conduct. See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550 (“[E]ndangering conduct may include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth and may relate to the parent’s actions while the parent had possession of other children.”). The Department contacted the mother and Appellant because the mother reported that physical violence had allegedly occurred between her and Appellant. Jones testified that she spoke to the mother, who stated that Appellant elbowed her in the face and pinned her on the bed in a hotel room while nineteen-month-old Z.M. was on the bed. Though Appellant denied any physical altercation with the mother, such evidentiary conflicts raised credibility issues that were for the trial court, as the factfinder, to resolve. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 744–45. “[W]hile the elevated burden of proof was certainly on the Department, it was the trial court’s responsibility to weigh evidence, draw inferences, and evaluate witness credibility.” Id. at 745. Here, the evidence permitted an inference that Appellant and the mother conceivably engaged in a physical altercation in Z.M.’s presence. A parent’s violent 17 conduct, especially in the presence of the child, can “produce an environment that endangers a child’s well-being.” See In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). The trial court could reasonably credit such evidence of Appellant’s alleged conduct and infer that “a substantial risk to the child’s health and safety” existed under the circumstances. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding under subsection (D), and giving deference to its finding, as we must, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant knowingly placed Z.M. in conditions or surroundings that endangered Z.M.’s physical or emotional well-being. FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D); see In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573–74 (Tex. 2005). Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support its finding. Given our resolution of Appellant’s third issue as we discuss below, and because only one statutory ground is necessary to support termination, we need not reach Appellant’s complaints insofar as they relate to the factual sufficiency of the trial court’s finding under subsection (D), nor the evidentiary sufficiency of its finding under subsection (E).4 See FAM. § 161.001(b); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re T.M., No. 11-25-00273-CV, 2026 WL 770620, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. V. The Best Interest of the Child In Appellant’s third issue, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the best interest of Z.M. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant 4 Because we reverse the trial court’s termination order in this case, the trial court’s endangerment findings cannot serve as a basis to terminate Appellant’s parental rights to his other minor children, if any. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019). 18 discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, when it is the factfinder, we generally do not disturb its determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. There is a strong presumption that termination is not in a child’s best interest; therefore, a parental-termination order “must always be a last resort and never a first impulse.” H.S., 2026 WL 1614496, at *1. With respect to the best interest of the child, no unique set of factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547. In fact, evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest finding. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27–28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547– 48; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Nevertheless, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a p