Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00320-CV THE CITY OF LAREDO, Appellant v. Gilbert ARGUMANIZ, Appellee From the 406th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024CVA001755D4 Honorable David E. Garcia, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 28, 2026 AFFIRMED This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s order denying the City of Laredo’s combined plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. The City asserts the trial court erred in finding genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) the existence of a malfunction under section 101.060(a)(2) and an unreasonably dangerous condition; (2) the application of the discretionary-function exception under section 101.056; (3) the City’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged malfunction; and (4) whether the alleged condition was 04-26-00320-CV open and obvious. Based on our reading of the record and consideration of the issues before us, we affirm. BACKGROUND On May 27, 2023, while leaving a QuikTrip construction site in Laredo, Texas, Argumaniz was in a motor vehicle accident with a semi-truck. Argumaniz stopped at a red light, waited for it to turn green, and proceeded slowly into the intersection. A semi-truck appeared unexpectedly in his lane of traffic and Argumaniz’s vehicle collided with it. According to an incident report filed by the Laredo Police Department, both Argumaniz and the semi-truck driver had green lights because the “lights [were] not synced due to construction on the road.” The report further states that the roadway was blocked by barricades but that the barricades were “usually moved by employees who were currently working construction.” LEGAL STANDARD The City, seeking to assert governmental immunity, filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. See Barrera v. Uvalde Cnty., No. 04-24-00461-CV, 2026 WL 517516, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 25, 2026, pet. denied) (“The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to ‘defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004)). We review that plea de novo because whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 761; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. A party’s characterization of its pleadings does not control how the courts review them. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 448 (Tex. 2024) (“Whatever the government may call its jurisdictional challenge—a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment—we look to its substance.”) In doing so, -2- 04-26-00320-CV we first look to the plaintiff’s pleading to determine if it alleges facts that affirmatively establish the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007). But when, as here, a plea challenges jurisdictional facts rather than merely the pleadings, courts consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. In that way, a plea to the jurisdiction may resemble a traditional summary judgment motion by attaching evidence that conclusively negates jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). If the City’s plea conclusively negates jurisdiction, the burden then shifts to Argumaniz. City of San Antonio v. Peralta, 476 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). To survive the plea, Argumaniz must then produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding jurisdiction. Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Fossil Grp., Inc. v. Harris, 691 S.W.3d 874, 882 (Tex. 2024). WAIVER OF IMMUNITY “Governmental immunity generally protects municipalities and other state subdivisions from suit unless the immunity has been waived by the constitution or state law.” Val Verde Hosp. Dist., 708 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 512 (Tex. 2019)). The Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity for personal injuries and deaths proximately caused by a condition or use of personal or real property if a governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2). City of Grapevine v. Sipes, 195 S.W.3d 689, 691–92 (Tex. 2006). A. EXISTENCE OF A MALFUNCTION, DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION, AND OPEN AND OBVIOUS A governmental unit is immune from suit and liability unless immunity is waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, .025; Tex. Dep’t of -3- 04-26-00320-CV Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2002). Section 101.060(a)(2), however, retains immunity for claims arising from “the absence, condition, or malfunction of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is not corrected by the responsible governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(2). A traffic signal has a “condition” within the meaning of the statute when it is unable to convey the intended traffic-control information or conveys information other than that intended. Garza, 70 S.W.3d at 807. The City contends the traffic signals did not malfunction because they conveyed the traffic- control information they were programmed to convey. In support of its plea, the City presented the affidavit of Robert Peña, Engineering Superintendent for the City’s Traffic Safety Division. Peña averred that, at the time of the collision, the intersection was programmed to accommodate three approaches, none of which included the roadway on which Argumaniz was traveling. According to Peña, the signal Argumaniz claims malfunctioned was not programmed to serve the east side of the intersection but instead directed northbound traffic on FM 1472 turning left onto InterAmerica Boulevard. Peña further averred that the signal was operating correctly for that purpose. The City therefore does not dispute that the signals observed by Argumaniz and the northbound semi-truck driver could display green simultaneously. 1 Indeed, in its reply, the City states that it is “uncontested” that the signals on northbound FM 1472 and westbound InterAmerica 1 In its fifth issue, the City argues the trial court abused its discretion by overruling its objections to evidence Argumaniz submitted in response to the City’s combined plea to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment. Argumaniz requested discovery regarding the stoplight, to which the City responded that no responsive documents existed. See App. Br. 14. Appellee subsequently obtained the City’s responsive records through a Texas Public Information Act request. Although Rule 193.6 generally requires exclusion of evidence not timely disclosed, exclusion is not required upon a showing of good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a), (b). Because the challenged evidence consisted of the City’s own records, the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to exclude them. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dominguez, 812 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ). -4- 04-26-00320-CV Boulevard were green at the same time. Rather, the City maintains that the simultaneous green indications were intentional because the signal visible from Argumaniz’s direction was intended for northbound FM 1472 traffic turning left onto InterAmerica Boulevard, not for traffic entering from the east side of the intersection. Thus, according to the City, the signals conveyed precisely the traffic-control information they were intended to convey and did not malfunction within the meaning of section 101.060(a)(2). Other evidence supports a contrary inference. The police incident report identifies the collision as occurring on May 27, 2023, at the intersection of InterAmerica Boulevard and FM 1472. The report states that the semi-truck was traveling northbound on FM 1472 and “had a green light,” while Argumaniz “also had a green light,” and further states that the “lights [were] not synced due to construction on the road.” The report also states that the portion of InterAmerica from which Argumaniz entered the intersection was blocked by barricades but that the barricades were “usually moved by employees who were currently working construction.” The City disputes the significance of this evidence and maintains that Argumaniz proceeded from a roadway that was closed to traffic and relied on a signal that was never intended to control his movement. But when a plea to the jurisdiction challenges jurisdictional facts that implicate the merits, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea, and the disputed fact must instead be resolved by the factfinder. Id. at 227–28. Applying that standard, we cannot resolve the parties’ competing accounts of what traffic- control information the signals conveyed to motorists at the time of the collision. The City’s -5- 04-26-00320-CV evidence supports its position that the simultaneous green indications were intentional and that the signal observed by Argumaniz was not intended to control traffic approaching from his direction. Argumaniz’s evidence, however, supports a contrary inference that the signals conveyed conflicting right-of-way information to motorists entering the same intersection while the intersection was under construction. Determining which account more accurately describes the operation and effect of the traffic signals would require us to weigh the conflicting evidence and choose between competing reasonable inferences. That determination is for the factfinder, not this Court. See id. Accordingly, viewing the jurisdictional evidence under the applicable standard, we conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the traffic signals had a condition or malfunction within the meaning of section 101.060(a)(2). The City alternatively characterizes the challenged signal configuration as a discretionary design decision. Although decisions concerning the selection and placement of traffic-control devices may be discretionary, subsection 101.060(a)(2) separately addresses the condition or malfunction of traffic-control devices already installed. See City of Grapevine v. Sipes, 195 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex. 2006); Fort Bend Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth. v. Olivares, 316 S.W.3d 114, 122–23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). As discussed above, the evidence raises a fact issue as to whether the existing signals conveyed traffic-control information other than that intended and therefore had a condition or malfunction within the meaning of subsection (a)(2). See Garza, 70 S.W.3d at 807. The City therefore has not established as a matter of law that Argumaniz’s claim challenges only a discretionary design decision. The City also contends the alleged dangerous condition was open and obvious because Argumaniz knew he was leaving a construction site and the east approach to the intersection was closed and barricaded. But the relevant inquiry concerns the particular condition alleged to have -6- 04-26-00320-CV caused the collision. Here, that condition is not merely the existence of construction or barricades. Rather, Argumaniz alleges that the traffic signals conveyed conflicting right-of-way information: the signal visible from his approach turned green while northbound traffic on FM 1472 simultaneously received a green indication. As discussed above, the evidence concerning that condition is disputed. The police incident report states that the roadway was blocked by barricades but that the barricades were “usually moved by employees who were currently working construction.” Argumaniz testified that he stopped at the signal, waited for it to turn green, and proceeded into the intersection. And the City acknowledges that the signal visible from Argumaniz’s direction and the signal controlling northbound FM 1472 traffic could display green simultaneously. Thus, even if the construction itself and the presence of barricades were open and obvious, the evidence does not conclusively establish that the particular condition alleged here was open and obvious. The alleged condition concerned a signal configuration in which the green signal visible from Argumaniz’s approach did not govern his movement and could display simultaneously with a green signal permitting conflicting traffic to enter the intersection. Resolving that question in the City’s favor would again require us to choose among the competing evidence and reasonable inferences concerning what the traffic-control configuration communicated to a motorist approaching the intersection from Argumaniz’s direction. We may not make that factual determination in reviewing the City’s plea. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227– 28. Accordingly, viewing the jurisdictional evidence in the light required by Miranda, we overrule the City’s first, second, and fourth issues. -7- 04-26-00320-CV B. NOTICE Section 101.060(a)(2) requires “notice” of the relevant condition or malfunction, which may be actual or constructive. McKnight v. Calvert, 539 S.W.3d 447, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see also Harris Cnty. v. Shook, 634 S.W.3d 942, 955 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied); City of Austin v. Lamas, 160 S.W.3d 97, 101–02 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). A fact issue as to constructive notice may arise when the evidence raises a question as to whether the condition “had existed for such a length of time that City, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it.” Kenneally v. Thurn, 653 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also McKnight, 539 S.W.3d at 455. The City argues Argumaniz presented no evidence that it had actual notice of the alleged condition before the collision. The City relies on Peña’s affidavit, in which he averred that the City’s Automated Traffic Management System detected no alarms or malfunctions at the intersection on or before May 27, 2023, and on Robles’s affidavit stating that the City had received no reports, complaints, or claims concerning malfunctioning traffic signals at the intersection during the preceding six months. The City also points out that the communications relied upon by Argumaniz expressly reporting simultaneous green signals occurred after the collision. Even assuming the evidence does not raise a fact issue as to the City’s actual notice before the collision, however, our inquiry does not end there. Section 101.060(a)(2) also permits notice to be established constructively. McKnight, 539 S.W.3d at 455. Here, the City’s own evidence supports an inference that the alleged condition was not necessarily a sudden or transient malfunction. Peña averred that, at the time of the collision, the intersection was programmed to accommodate three approaches, none of which included the roadway on which Argumaniz was traveling. According to Peña, the signal visible from Argumaniz’s direction was not programmed -8- 04-26-00320-CV to serve the east side of the intersection but instead controlled northbound FM 1472 traffic turning left onto InterAmerica Boulevard. Peña further averred that, as Engineering Superintendent for the City’s Traffic Safety Division, he oversaw the operation, maintenance, and performance of the City’s traffic-control devices, reviewed ATMS communications and traffic-signal operation logs, supervised technicians who monitored the ATMS system, and ensured that signalized intersections functioned according to their programmed design. Taken together, this evidence permits a reasonable inference that the signal configuration alleged to constitute the dangerous condition existed before the collision and was subject to ongoing City monitoring. What the evidence does not establish as a matter of law, however, is how long the alleged condition had existed or when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the City should have discovered its allegedly dangerous character. The City maintains that the configuration presented no danger because the east approach was not open to traffic and was blocked by barricades. Other evidence, however, states that although the roadway was blocked by barricades, the barricades were “usually moved by employees who were currently working construction.” The evidence therefore presents competing inferences regarding whether the City could reasonably rely on the barricades to prevent motorists from encountering the alleged condition and whether the condition existed for a sufficient period that the City, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. Those are factual questions. See Kenneally, 653 S.W.2d at 72. Applying the jurisdictional standard discussed above, we conclude the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged condition existed for a sufficient period that the City, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. See id. We therefore conclude the City has not -9- 04-26-00320-CV established its entitlement to dismissal based on lack of notice under section 101.060(a)(2). We overrule the City’s third issue. CONCLUSION Having overruled the City’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. Lori Massey Brissette, Justice - 10 -