Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00422-CV ——————————— CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant V. ANGELICA HORSLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF G.H. AND AARON HORSLEY, Appellee On Appeal from the 113th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-86062 MEMORANDUM OPINION This personal injury suit arises from a two-car collision at an intersection where the stop sign on one of the streets was allegedly obscured by foliage. The City moved to dismiss Horsley’s premises liability claims against it under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, asserting that Horsley failed to allege facts invoking the Texas Tort Claims Act’s1 limited waiver of immunity or showing that TTCA section 101.060(a)(2) did not preclude her claims. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm. Background In her second amended petition, Horsley alleged that on December 14, 2022, her husband, Aaron, was driving eastbound on Richmond Avenue. Angelica and their minor child, G., were passengers. Another driver was heading northbound toward Richmond Avenue from a side street. At the time of the accident, a stop sign was posted for the northbound traffic at the intersection that required the northbound driver to stop before entering the intersection. But the northbound driver could not see the stop sign, and he collided with the Horsley’s car. The Horsley’s car was overturned, and the Horsleys sustained injuries. Horsley alleged that the stop sign posted on the right side of the roadway was owned by the City and was significantly blocked by overgrown tree branches owned by the City. The driver of the northbound car stated he could not see the sign because it was obscured by vegetation. The condition of the stop sign was almost or 1 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001–101.109. 2 completely covered by vegetation or overgrown tree branches, “causing a malfunction in the traffic control device, i.e. stop sign.” According to Horsley, the City had a duty to ensure that traffic control devices were properly maintained and visible to the public. The City knew or should have known that the stop sign was obscured by overgrown vegetation or trees yet failed to take appropriate action to remedy the dangerous condition in a timely manner and breached its duty of care by allowing overgrown vegetation to block a traffic sign for an unreasonable amount of time, creating a hazardous condition. This breach of duty was a substantial factor in causing the other driver to not see the stop sign, unintentionally run the stop sign, and collide into the Horsleys’ car, and thus proximately caused personal injuries to the Horsleys. The City moved to dismiss Horsley’s petition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Horsley amended her petition and responded. The trial court denied the City’s Rule 91a motion. Motion to Dismiss A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The City used its Rule 91a motion to challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, making the motion, in substance, a plea to the jurisdiction. See Quincy v. Branch, No. 01-25-00469-CV, 2026 WL 88659, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction 3 is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004). We review the trial court’s ruling under the standard of review for a plea to the jurisdiction challenging only the pleadings. Quincy, 2026 WL 88659, at *2 & n.6. This standard requires us to determine whether the pleader has met her burden to allege facts that affirmatively establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over her claims against the City. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. In our review, “we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent.” Id. If the pleadings lack sufficient facts to “affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency” and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226–27. On the other hand, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the plea may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. Under Rule 91a, a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from the allegations, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. Id. The trial court may not consider evidence, but instead must decide the motion based “solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits 4 permitted by Rule 59.” City of Pasadena v. Poulos, 01-22-00676-CV, 2023 WL 7134974, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. Oct. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. As a subdivision of the state, the City has governmental immunity from suit unless waived by the legislature. Id. at 225. The TTCA waives immunity from suit and liability for claims of “property damage, personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2). Pertinent here, the TTCA makes an exception from this waiver of immunity for claims arising from “the absence, condition, or malfunction of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is not corrected by the responsible governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(2). A waiver of immunity under section 101.060(a)(2) exists “only in those situations in which the sign or signal was either (1) unable to convey the intended traffic control information, or (2) conveyed traffic control information other than what was intended.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2002). “A stop sign’s obstruction from view by trees or branches is a ‘condition’ of that 5 sign” within the meaning of that provision. Lorig v. City of Mission, 629 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex. 1982), cited in Garza, 70 S.W.3d at 807. B. Pleading sufficiency In its first issue, the City argues that Horsley did not demonstrate her claim qualified for the TTCA’s limited immunity waiver because she did not plead facts showing that the City controlled the relevant premises. We disagree. Horsley’s pleadings allege that the City “owned the right side of the roadway where the blocked stop sign was,” “owned the traffic control device, i.e., the stop sign, and also owned the trees that were overgrown and blocking any view of the stop sign.” The City appears to assert that Horsley’s allegation that the stop sign is in front of an apartment complex owned by Rama Richmond Properties, LLC, the other defendant below, somehow affects the sufficiency of its allegations about the City’s ownership. But the allegation about Rama Richmond Properties does not call Horsley’s allegations about the City’s ownership of the property and the stop sign into question. A party may sue on alternative theories of liability. Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). We overrule the City’s first issue. In its second issue, the City asserts that Horsley failed to plead facts demonstrating that the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant stop sign’s condition sufficient to avoid application of Civil Practice and Remedies Code 6 section 101.060, which provides that the TTCA does not waive governmental immunity when a claim arises from “the absence, condition, or malfunction of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is not corrected by the responsible governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(2); see State ex rel. State Dep’t of Hwys. & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). Texas follows a “fair notice” standard of pleading. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2007); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 45(b), 47(a). Under this standard, a plaintiff’s pleading is only required to “give a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give the opposing party fair notice of the claim involved.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 230. Horsley alleged that the City “had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition on the premises” and “knew or should have known that the stop sign was obscured by overgrown vegetation or trees.” CR.60 In contending that Horsley was required to allege more specific facts, the City relies on City of Austin v. Dawson, No. 03-21-00023-CV, 2021 WL 3869728 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), which involved the design of a sidewalk ramp, and City of Beaumont v. Isern, No. 09-19-00451-CV, 2020 WL 4680200 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Aug. 13, 2020, no pet.), which involved the condition of a water valve 7 street cover on the roadway. Neither of the alleged defects in those cases present the regularly recurring maintenance issue that foliage near signs does. Trees grow, and trees near a street may, over time, grow enough to obscure signage and require periodic trimming. These facts, which are implied in Horsley’s live pleading, are within common knowledge, and courts can take judicial notice of them. See TEX. R. EVID. 201(b). No greater specificity is required at this stage of the proceeding. See Houston Housing Auth. v. Thomas, No. 14-25-01037-CV, 2026 WL 1955934, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868, 873 (Tex. 2023)). We overrule the City’s second issue. The facts alleged by Horsley, taken as true, give fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which she bases her claim and would entitle her to the relief she seeks. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. For this reason, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the City’s motion to dismiss. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to dismiss. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan. 8