Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00223-CV ——————————— RAMESH KAPUR, Appellant V. THE NEW PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION OF NEWPORT, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 165th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-01555 MEMORANDUM OPINION Ramesh Kapur, doing business under the assumed name of AIC Management Company, owns two residential properties in a subdivision in Harris County. The homeowners association for the subdivision, New Properties Association of Newport, Inc. (Newport), sued Kapur for past due maintenance assessments and collection fees. Newport moved for summary judgment on its claims, and the trial court granted the motion. In five issues, Kapur contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Newport and in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm. Background This is Newport’s third lawsuit against Kapur for unpaid assessments and related charges. The first two were filed in 2019, consolidated, and dismissed for want of prosecution on January 6, 2022.1 Newport filed this suit against Kapur on January 10, 2022, alleging that Kapur had not paid any subdivision assessments on his properties since 2009. It sought to recover from Kapur past due assessments and other charges to his properties and to establish the amount of and foreclose on its liens against Kapur’s properties. Kapur’s answer, entitled “Defendant’s Original Answer and Counterclaims,” included two section headings: “General Denial” and “Affirmative Defense.” Under “Affirmative Defense,” he alleged that Newport brought two previous lawsuits against him which were dismissed for want of prosecution and Newport’s actions, 1 Harris County Court at Law No. 3, Cause No. 1137966. 2 “past and current [are] tantamount to causing harassment and mental anguish to which Kapur files his counterclaims.”2 Newport answered Kapur’s filing and generally denied his allegations. It refuted Kapur’s allegation that the suit was brought without notice. According to Newport, all conditions precedent to filing the lawsuit were met. It attached copies of notices, including an opportunity to cure, that Newport’s attorney sent to Kapur by certified mail, return receipt requested, on May 9, 2019. The notices informed Kapur that a lien affidavit had been filed against each of his properties and that absent payment of the outstanding charges within 30 days, it would file a lawsuit to recover that amount, plus attorney’s fees and other charges, and request foreclosure of the liens. Newport’s accounting records showed that as of February 1, 2023, Kapur owed a total of $10,307.94. On July 31, 2024, Kapur tendered two certified checks totaling $7,900, the amount of the unpaid assessments; it did not include the attorney’s fees and costs charged by Newport, which Kapur disputed. In response, Newport proposed a three-month payment plan, which stated that the total amount due for delinquent charges relating to Kapur’s property as of August 2024 was 2 Kapur mentions the statute of limitations in his response to the summary judgment motion and in his appellant’s brief. He did not provide any argument or citation to authority to support this affirmative defense in the trial court, so it is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 3 $8,114.71. Newport informed Kapur that if it did not hear from him about the payment plan within 10 days, it would return his checks and proceed with the lawsuit. Kapur did not respond, and Newport returned the checks. Newport then moved for summary judgment on traditional grounds. It explained that the purchase of all lots within the subdivision were subject to its Declaration of Reservations, Restrictions, Covenants and Liens, which was filed in the Harris County property records and attached to its motion. The Declaration holds each property owner responsible for the payment of monthly maintenance assessments, as well as any collection expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting such payments. Each property owner’s payment obligations were secured by an express vendor’s lien on the property. In his response, Kapur objected to the validity of the May 2019 notices of lien sent to him by Newport’s attorney but did not deny having received them. Kapur also made certain evidentiary objections about Newport’s summary judgment evidence, but he did not obtain a ruling on any of them. The trial court signed a final judgment granting Newport’s motion and awarding Newport $13,450.56 in damages for past due assessments and other charges due from Kapur through July 1, 2024, $4,200.00 for attorney’s fees incurred by Newport, costs of court, and postjudgment interest. The trial court also ordered foreclosure of Newport’s liens in the amount of the judgment against Kapur’s 4 interest in the properties. And it awarded $7,500 in appellate attorney’s fees in the event of an unsuccessful appeal by Kapur. Summary Judgment A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Under the traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In our review, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). When the trial court’s summary judgment does not state the basis for the court’s decision, we must uphold the summary judgment if any of the theories advanced in the motion have merit. Id. at 216. We liberally construe Kapur’s pro se brief, but we decline to address issues that he raises in passing without analysis or citation to pertinent authority. Courts hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys, so pro se litigants are required to properly present their case to the trial court and on appeal and must comply with all applicable rules of procedure. See, e.g., Frias v. Rios, No. 5 01-25-00676-CV, 2026 WL 616064, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2026, no pet. h.); In re L.C., No. 01-21-00521-CV, 2022 WL 1572273, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2022, no pet.). B. Analysis 1. Finality of judgment In his first issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court’s judgment is not final because it did not dispose of his “counterclaims for harassment and mental anguish.” He raised this issue in his motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. “Under the general one-final-judgment rule, a judgment is final if it either ‘actually disposes of every pending claim and party’ or ‘clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.’” Estate of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2026) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001)). The trial court’s judgment declares, in boldface font: “This is a final judgment, which disposes of all claims and all causes of action made or asserted by any party to this action.” The judgment does not deny all relief not expressly granted or otherwise dispose of Kapur’s purported counterclaims. This omission is erroneous. But because of the judgment’s unmistakable finality language, it is nevertheless final for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Tanner v. Black, No. 01-17-00883-CV, 2019 WL 1064568, at n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2019, no pet.). 6 We overrule Kapur’s first issue. 2. Attorney’s fees In his second issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees as damages and allowing for their double recovery. a. Attorney’s fees as contractual damages Kapur asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees as damages, but he concedes that they are recoverable when authorized by contract and proven by competent evidence. Written instruments like the Declaration are contractual in nature. See Weston Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cassell, No. 01-23-00200-CV, 2025 WL 1583524, at *2 (June 5, 2025, no pet.). The lots purchased by Kapur, like all lots in the subdivision, are subject to the Declaration, which holds the owner responsible for “monthly maintenance charges hereby imposed, together with all collection expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred in connection therewith.” The Declaration also allows for the creation of a lien against the owner’s property in the amount of unpaid maintenance assessments and other charges, including attorney’s fees and court costs. This language does not limit Kapur’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees to those incurred only in successful collection efforts or only in the instant litigation. The record shows that Newport filed two previous lawsuits in an attempt to collect the delinquent assessments from Kapur. Kapur acknowledges that Newport did not 7 recover attorney’s fees in those lawsuits. And Kapur did not object to the evidence of Newport’s attorney’s fees that Newport attached to its summary-judgment motion. b. Propriety of attorney’s fee award Kapur also asserts that the trial court awarded a double recovery of attorney’s fees, but the record does not support this assertion. The attorney’s fee charges in the damages are two entries in Newport’s account ledger for $500 each, incurred in previous collection efforts. The other evidence submitted with Newport’s summary judgment motion concerned only those attorney’s fees incurred in this litigation. It consisted of the affidavit of its attorney, Dennis McQueen, who calculated that he spent 12 hours working on this litigation at an hourly rate of $350. McQueen attested that the time spent and amount charged was reasonable and necessary, and Kapur did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and necessity of the charges. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court supports the award of attorney’s fees. We overrule Kapur’s second issue. 3. Notice of past due assessments In his third issue, Kapur argues that Newport was not entitled to recover fees and costs because it failed to give him written notice of delinquency by certified mail 8 and a 45-day opportunity to cure under Property Code section 209.0064(b). Under that provision, [a] property owners’ association may not hold an owner liable for fees of a collection agent retained by the association unless the association first provides written notice to the owner by certified mail that: (1) specifies each delinquent amount and the total amount of the payment required to make the account current; (2) if the association is subject to Section 209.0062 or the association's dedicatory instruments contain a requirement to offer a payment plan, describes the options the owner has to avoid having the account turned over to a collection agent, including information regarding availability of a payment plan through the association; and (3) provides a period of at least 45 days for the owner to cure the delinquency before further collection action is taken. TEX. PROP. CODE § 209.0064(b). The record shows that Newport filed copies of the notices that Newport’s attorney sent to Kapur by certified mail, return receipt requested on May 9, 2019. These notices specified the unpaid charges for each property owned by Kapur and showed the total amount of the payment required to make the accounts current. See id. § 209.0064(b)(1). They notified Kapur of the amounts due at the time Newport filed its earlier lawsuits. Kapur did not make any payments after receiving them. Kapur acknowledges that he received a statement of account for each of his properties at a Newport board meeting in April 2022. Kapur also corresponded with Newport about the unpaid charges in July and August 2024. While Kapur disputes the total amount stated in Newport’s account statements, he does not dispute that he 9 received actual notice of the unpaid charges. And at no time did Kapur ask the trial court for a 45-day abatement. See id. § 209.0064(b)(3). As a result, he waived statutory notice. We overrule Kapur’s third issue. 4. Tender In his fourth issue, Kapur argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of Newport because his July 2024 tender of two certified checks totaling $7,900 extinguished his debt to Newport. “Valid tender is an unconditional offer of and actual production of funds by a debtor to pay a sum not less than the amount due on a debt or obligation.” Anglo- Dutch Petroleum Int’l , Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 522 S.W.3d 471, 489 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The tender “generally must include everything the creditor is entitled to, and a tender of any less sum is not effective.” Id. at 490. If a tender meets these requirements, it will defeat a claim for interest on the debt accruing after the date of the tender. Id. at 489. “The party asserting a valid tender has the burden of proving it.” Id. While Kapur disputed the total amount he owed Newport, he concedes in his appellant’s brief that the amount he owed for principal assessments was $7,930. This was less than the amount due and thus did not constitute tender. Kapur also mentions earlier attempts to make payments, but does not cite any evidence showing that the 10 amount of each attempted payment would have fully satisfied the amount he owed at the time he tried to pay. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest. We overrule Kapur’s fourth issue Motion for New Trial In his fifth issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial without a hearing. A trial court can exercise its discretion over whether to hold a hearing on a motion for new trial in most civil matters and is required to do so only when the motion raises a fact issue for which evidence must be heard. Bishop v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 01-18-01115-CV, 2020 WL 4983246, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Hensley v. Salinas, 583 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1979). Kapur’s motion sought to vacate or modify the summary judgment; a trial court is not required to hold a hearing in a summary judgment proceeding. See Coteril-Jenkins v. Tex. Med. Ass’n Health Care Liab. Claim Tr., 383 S.W.3d 581, 591 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). Kapur mentions but does not re-urge any of the issues raised in his response to Newport’s summary judgment motion or in his motion for new trial on their merits in his appellant’s brief or provide appropriate citations to authorities in support of granting the relief he requested. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain 11 a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Thus, Kapur has not shown that the trial court erred in denying his motion without hearing. We overrule Kapur’s fifth issue. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan. 12