Full Opinion

Affirm and Memorandum Opinion filed September 10, 2026 In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00163-CV MARK SMITH, Appellant V. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Appellee On Appeal from the 250th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-19-003913 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Mark Smith, appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for sanctions against counsel for Appellee, Bank of America, N.A. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s motion, we affirm. BACKGROUND Bank of America filed the underlying suit to collect a debt it alleged Smith owed. Throughout the course of the proceedings, Smith filed many documents, including documents entitled “Notice of Service of Defendant’s First Discovery Document,” “Second Discovery Document,” “Notice of Demand,” “Notice of Default,” and “Final and Full Default with True Bill,” among others. He also filed a motion for sanctions against Bank of America’s counsel in 2024, contending that Bank of America filed frivolous pleadings and failed to respond to Smith’s filings. 1 Bank of America filed a notice of non-suit without prejudice in 2025, pursuant to Rule 162 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the non-suit, the trial court held a hearing on Smith’s motion for sanctions, which it denied. The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The motion for sanctions was the final motion pending in the trial court before finally disposing of the case. Smith then filed this appeal. LEGAL STANDARDS We review a ruling on a motion for sanctions using an abuse of discretion standard. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). For a trial court to abuse its discretion in this context, it must act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993). In reviewing a sanctions order, we are not bound by the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Am. Flood 1 Smith’s motion sought sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and the inherent authority of the court. Rule 13 authorizes the imposition of sanctions against an attorney, a represented party, or both, who files pleadings, motions, or other papers that are both groundless and brought in bad faith or to harass. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. 2 Rsch., Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006). Rather, we “must independently review the entire record to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. DISCUSSION Smith correctly observes that even after Bank of America filed its notice of non-suit, his motion for sanctions remained pending and ripe for ruling. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. The trial court held a hearing on Smith’s motion and ultimately ruled on it. Smith, however, contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) not reviewing his motion; (2) not requiring Bank of America to submit evidence to refute the motion; and (3) issuing findings and conclusions that Smith claims are inconsistent and do not support the trial court’s ruling. We disagree. First, Smith is incorrect that the trial court did not review his motion prior to ruling. Although Smith correctly points out that the trial court indicated at the hearing that it had not yet reviewed his motion, the trial court nevertheless held a hearing on the motion, allowing both sides to present argument and evidence. At the hearing, the trial court took the motion under advisement, indicating it would later review the motion. It issued its ruling three days later. In the order denying the motion, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed “the Motion, Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions, arguments of the party and counsel, and the file.” The record therefore does not support Smith’s argument. Secondly, Smith contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion because Bank of America presented no evidence, only argument of counsel. Although Smith is correct that argument of counsel is not evidence, Smith misunderstands the burden of proof on a motion for sanctions. Under Texas 3 law, it is presumed that counsel acted in good faith absent evidence sufficient to overcome that presumption. See Nath v. Tex. Child.’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014). The trial court had no duty to impose a requirement on Bank of America to refute Smith’s evidence. Rather, Smith had the burden of overcoming the presumption of good faith. Id. Bad faith is the “intent to engage in conduct for an impermissible reason, willful noncompliance, or willful ignorance of the facts,” including “conscious doing of a wrong for a dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718– 19 (Tex. 2020). Smith’s testimony was largely that Bank of America did not respond to his filings, largely refused to communicate with him, and that its suit caused him harm. The trial court was within its discretion to conclude Smith did not meet his burden to overcome the presumption of good faith based on his testimony and the documents in the file. Lastly, Smith contends that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are internally inconsistent and do not support its ruling. Specifically, Smith contends that the trial court improperly concluded his sanctions motion did not survive Bank of America’s non-suit. We examine the entire record, not merely the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, to determine whether the denial of a motion for sanctions was an abuse of discretion. Am. Flood Rsch., Inc, 192 S.W.3d at 583. Regardless, the trial court’s findings and conclusions are procedurally and legally sound. The trial court acknowledged that the motion for sanctions remained pending in the face of Bank of America’s non-suit, but it concluded that no other claims for relief were pending, no motions to compel discovery were pursued, 2 and no evidence was presented that would provide a 2 The motion for sanctions also did not cite Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215, pertaining to discovery abuse, as a ground for sanctions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215 (“Abuse of Discovery; Sanctions.”). 4 basis for sanctions. Accordingly, Smith has failed to demonstrate any inconsistency in the trial court’s findings and conclusions or any other basis for reversal of its ruling. CONCLUSION Smith has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for sanctions. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying Smith’s motion for sanctions. /s/ Scott K. Field Scott K. Field Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 5