Kristina Mizell v. Terri Anne Coggins
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket10-26-00045-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-26-00045-CV
Kristina Mizell,
Appellant
v.
Terri Anne Coggins,
Appellee
On appeal from the
County Court at Law No. 1 of Johnson County, Texas
Judge John E. Neill, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. CC-D20250221
JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kristina Mizell appeals from a protective order rendered against her
and in favor of Terri Anne Coggins. In five issues, Mizell contends the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the order, the trial court failed to
consider all of the evidence, the trial court erred by issuing a protective order
that is indefinite in duration, the protective order is overbroad, and rendition
of the nunc pro tunc order was improper. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mizell and her ex-husband, Anthony Nerio, divorced in December 2025.
Prior to that, Coggins began dating Nerio. In mid-November, at a time when
Nerio was living with Coggins in her home, Mizell sent several text messages,
some threatening, to Coggins. She also sent various packages with offensive
contents to the home and left broken plates across the driveway. Coggins, on
behalf of herself and her adult son, Matthew, who lives in her home, applied
for a protective order against Mizell based on stalking.
After a hearing, the trial court found there are reasonable grounds to
believe Mizell committed stalking against Coggins and rendered a protective
order as requested, dated January 13, 2026. Because the order was silent as
to its duration, the County Attorney representing Coggins filed a motion for
entry of a protective order nunc pro tunc. On January 15, 2026, the trial
court granted the motion and found that the order will remain in effect for
the duration of Coggins’s and Mizell’s lives.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In her first issue, Mizell asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the stalking finding. She argues that sending text messages over the
course of two or three days does not meet the statutory requirement of a
continuing course of conduct demonstrating continuity of purpose. In her
Mizell v. Coggins Page 2
second issue, Mizell contends the trial court erred by rendering judgment
without reviewing all the evidence.
Standard of Review
In an appeal of a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial court’s
findings of fact have the same weight as a jury’s verdict, and we review the
legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence used to support them just as we
would review a jury’s findings. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000).
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo; that is, we review the
trial court’s legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their
correctness. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789,
794 (Tex. 2002).
A party who challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support
an issue upon which it did not have the burden of proof at trial must
demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse
finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex.
2011). Evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-
minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. We credit favorable
evidence if a reasonable finder of fact could, and disregard contrary evidence
unless a reasonable finder of fact could not. Id. If there is any evidence of
probative force to support the finding, i.e., more than a scintilla, we will
Mizell v. Coggins Page 3
overrule the issue. Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388
(Tex. 2005) (per curiam).
Applicable Law
After a hearing, if the trial court finds there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the applicant is the victim of an offense listed in Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 7B.001(a)(1), which includes stalking, the trial
court shall issue a protective order. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
7B.001(a)(1), 7B.003(b). A person commits the offense of stalking if the
person, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or
course of conduct that is directed at a specific other person, knowingly
engages in conduct that causes the other person to feel harassed, terrified,
intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended;
and would cause a reasonable person under circumstances similar to the
circumstances of the other person to feel harassed, terrified, intimidated,
annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 42.072(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(D).
Discussion
Coggins testified that she received text messages from Mizell’s phone
number. She explained that originally, the messages “were just railing at
[her], just hateful, vile things to say.” At some point the messages turned
Mizell v. Coggins Page 4
threatening. On direct, she stated the texts were sent over the course of two
weeks in October or November.
Applicant’s Exhibit 3 contains the undated text messages Mizell sent to
Coggins. Generally, they contain crude insults and threats laced with
profanity. Included in the messages are the following:
I have dreams of f*****g you up. . . can’t wait until
they do Come true.
I’m not going away . . . I’ll be your worst f*****g
nightmare. I know where you live, I know where you
work, I know what you drive I know where your ugly
ass kid works. I’m gonna get your ass . . . I don’t
know when but it’ll come.
And revenge will be mine . . . you don’t want to admit
your role in this, but Bitch I f*****g got you! One day
you will face the wrath of a woman who didn’t like
you, didn’t trust you is looking for you every f*****g
day!! I’m not going away.
Coggins also testified that Mizell sent her videos over social media and
mailed four or five packages to her home. Two of the packages were
addressed to Nerio, but Coggins considered them to have been sent to her
also because they are a couple. The packages contained various
embarrassing items, apparently meant to be a prank. Additionally, Mizell
left broken dishes on her driveway with messages written on the back.
On cross-examination, she said the complained-of acts happened in
mid-November. On redirect, Coggins clarified that the text messages
Mizell v. Coggins Page 5
spanned a period of several weeks but contact with Mizell stretched over
several months.
Nerio testified that Mizell sent him text messages, including one in
which she threatened Coggins and her son. He deleted the messages. He
stated that he believes the broken plates were directed at both he and
Coggins.
Mizell admitted sending a box of Madagascar hissing cockroaches to
Nerio, leaving the broken plates on the driveway, and sending one Tik Tok
video to Coggins. She testified that she sent the text messages shown in
Applicant’s Exhibit 3 to Coggins over the course of three days. She agreed
that someone receiving them could interpret them as threatening.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court stated the following:
So what I’m looking at – and, Counsel, I’m
really kind of discounting a lot of the exhibits as
directed – or as addressed to Mr. Nerio and those
things like the plates where you can’t tell if it was
addressed to Mr. Nerio or addressed to the applicant.
I’m discounting that.
What I can’t discount, what I cannot discount is
the text messages that admittedly respondent sent
over a period of a couple of days or three days – I
can’t remember – and also that she admitted could be
seen as threatening or harassing.
....
So I think just with the messages alone that meets
the definition of stalking. Based on that, the
protective order is granted.
Mizell v. Coggins Page 6
The trial court also later stated that it had Respondent’s exhibits, but it did
not have the exhibits from the Applicant. The court inquired if the
Applicant’s exhibits are “down there?” Based on these statements, Mizell
asserts the trial court did not consider all admitted evidence. We disagree.
The court explained it had reviewed all the evidence and determined
that some of it did not support Coggins’s allegations of stalking. Later, the
court was merely gathering exhibits for the file and asked where Coggins’s
exhibits were. The record reflects that the trial court considered all admitted
evidence. We overrule Mizell’s second issue.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Mizell committed the
offense of stalking. Mizell admitted sending multiple text messages. The
content of the messages is such that would cause a reasonable person to feel
harassed, intimidated, annoyed, or embarrassed. When asked if Mizell did
anything to make her feel annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented,
embarrassed, or offended, Coggins replied that Mizell sent her several text
messages and she felt threatened.
Coggins testified that the messages were sent over the course of two
weeks, while Mizell testified the messages were sent over two or three days.
Either time frame satisfies the statute. The stalking statute’s requirement
that events occur “on more than one occasion” does not require the elapse of a
Mizell v. Coggins Page 7
particular or minimum interval of time. See Hutton v. State, 313 S.W.3d 902,
908-09 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). We conclude that the evidence
is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Coggins is the
victim of stalking. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(D);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7B.003(a), (b); Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d at
388. We overrule Mizell’s first issue.
PROTECTIVE ORDER
In her third issue, Mizell contends the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the duration of the protective order imposed. She asserts the conduct
involved only a brief period of emotionally charged communication occurring
over several days. In her fourth issue, Mizell contends the protective order is
overbroad. She references Coggins’s son and argues the record contains no
evidence of stalking behavior directed toward “additional individuals.”
The length or duration of a protective order is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). When the proper standard of review is abuse of
discretion and the appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to
exercise its discretion and whether it erred in its application of that
discretion. Id. In our sufficiency review, we use the traditional standard of
Mizell v. Coggins Page 8
review for legal sufficiency. Gardner v. Gardner, 229 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
As explained above, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that Coggins is the victim of stalking. Once that finding is
made, the court has broad discretion to set the duration of the order for the
parties’ lifetimes without any additional findings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 7B.007(a); Dessens v. Argeroplos, 658 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Although Mizell focuses on the relatively
brief period of time during which she engaged in stalking behavior, her
threats indicated that Coggins would never be safe. Mizell texted twice that
she is not going away. She said she cannot wait until her dreams of “f*****g
[Coggins] up” come true. She said she did not know when, but she was going
to “get [Coggins’s] ass.” She said she wanted revenge and “one day” Coggins
would face Mizell’s wrath. We conclude the trial court had sufficient evidence
on which to exercise its discretion and did not abuse its discretion by ordering
that the protective order is effective for the duration of Coggins’s and Mizell’s
lives. Exxon, 348 S.W.3d at 215; Dessens, 658 S.W.3d at 448. We overrule
Mizell’s third issue.
In her application for a protective order, Coggins asked for protection
for her adult son, Matthew, who lives in her home. In one of her text
Mizell v. Coggins Page 9
messages in which Mizell threatens to be Coggins’s “worst nightmare,” Mizell
notes that she knows where Coggins’s son works. Although the statute does
not require a separate evidentiary finding of stalking directed at a non-
applicant family or household member, this can be construed as a threat
against Coggins’s son. The court made the requisite finding that Coggins is
the victim of stalking and, as directed by statute, issued a protective order.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7B.003(a), (b). As authorized by
statute, the conditions of the protective order that Mizell must obey also
apply to members of Coggins’s family or household. See id. art. 7B.005(a)(2).
Accordingly, the protective order is not overbroad. We overrule Mizell’s
fourth issue.
NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER
In her fifth issue, Mizell asserts the trial court improperly rendered a
nunc pro tunc order. She argues that adding the lifetime term of duration
where the order previously did not specify a duration constitutes a material
substantive change which cannot be addressed in a judgment nunc pro tunc.
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to use a
standardized form when issuing a protective order. Id. art. 7B.003(d). The
trial court is to mark one of several boxes in Section XIV of the form, entitled
“Duration of Protective Order,” to indicate when the order expires. As
Mizell v. Coggins Page 10
applicable here, when the court issues an order under Article 7B.003, the
court has the option of specifying an expiration date that is shorter than the
duration of the parties’ lives or choosing the option “[F]or the duration of the
Respondent’s and the Applicant’s lives.”
At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally granted the application
for a protective order. Coggins’s counsel, the County Attorney, handed a
proposed order to the court which it approved and signed. Mizell’s counsel
asked, “May I ask how long it’s for, Your Honor?” The court replied,
“Indefinite.” However, the January 13, 2026 order left all of the options in
the “Duration of Protective Order” section blank.
The following day, the County Attorney filed a Motion for Entry of
Protective Order Nunc Pro Tunc asserting that Section XIV should be
marked to reflect that the protective order was granted under Article 7B.003
and will remain in effect for the duration of the Respondent’s and the
Applicant’s lives. On January 15, 2026, the court signed an Order Granting
Applicant’s Motion for Protective Order Nunc Pro Tunc. The court found that
Section XIV does not specify that the order was granted under Article 7B.003
and that the order will remain in effect for the duration of the Respondent’s
and the Applicant’s lives. The court also found that “the errors in judgment
are clerical errors and did not result from judicial reasoning or determining.”
Mizell v. Coggins Page 11
The court ordered the Johnson County Clerk to enter the Protective Order
Nunc Pro Tunc correcting the errors.
Whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of
law we review de novo. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986).
A judicial error is an error that occurs in the rendering, as opposed to the
entering, of a judgment and cannot be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc.
Id. at 231. Rendition of judgment occurs when the judge’s decision is
officially announced either orally in open court or by a signed memorandum
filed with the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam).
A trial court may issue a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical
error made in entering a final judgment. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231. A
clerical error is a mistake or omission that prevents the judgment as entered
from reflecting the judgment as rendered. In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d 62, 66
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). A clerical error does not
arise from judicial reasoning or determination. Id. at 67.
Appellate courts may review for no evidence and factual insufficiency of
the evidence the trial court’s factual determinations on whether a judgment
has been rendered. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232. The protective order was
granted pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B.003. At the close
Mizell v. Coggins Page 12
of the hearing, the trial court stated that the duration of the protective order
is “indefinite.” The term “indefinite” is defined as not precise and having no
exact limits. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indefinite.
In ruling on the duration of the protective order, the mandated
preprinted form gave the trial court two options. It could state a specific date
shorter than the duration of the parties’ lives, or it could choose “for the
duration” of the parties’ lives. The court’s response to counsel did not state a
specific date. While the term “indefinite” is not a choice on the form, the
duration of the parties’ lives can be said to be “not precise” or “having no
exact limits.” We conclude the trial court’s response provides legally and
factually sufficient evidence that the court rendered judgment on the issue of
the duration of the protective order. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232.
The January 13 order as entered did not reflect the order as rendered
in open court and therefore the error is clerical. See In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d
at 66. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the motion for entry
of protective order nunc pro tunc. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231. We
overrule Mizell’s fifth issue.
Mizell v. Coggins Page 13
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Mizell’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order.
ANDREA WESTERFELD
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Harris, and
Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
CV06
Mizell v. Coggins Page 14