Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-26-00045-CV Kristina Mizell, Appellant v. Terri Anne Coggins, Appellee On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 of Johnson County, Texas Judge John E. Neill, presiding Trial Court Cause No. CC-D20250221 JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Kristina Mizell appeals from a protective order rendered against her and in favor of Terri Anne Coggins. In five issues, Mizell contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the order, the trial court failed to consider all of the evidence, the trial court erred by issuing a protective order that is indefinite in duration, the protective order is overbroad, and rendition of the nunc pro tunc order was improper. We affirm. BACKGROUND Mizell and her ex-husband, Anthony Nerio, divorced in December 2025. Prior to that, Coggins began dating Nerio. In mid-November, at a time when Nerio was living with Coggins in her home, Mizell sent several text messages, some threatening, to Coggins. She also sent various packages with offensive contents to the home and left broken plates across the driveway. Coggins, on behalf of herself and her adult son, Matthew, who lives in her home, applied for a protective order against Mizell based on stalking. After a hearing, the trial court found there are reasonable grounds to believe Mizell committed stalking against Coggins and rendered a protective order as requested, dated January 13, 2026. Because the order was silent as to its duration, the County Attorney representing Coggins filed a motion for entry of a protective order nunc pro tunc. On January 15, 2026, the trial court granted the motion and found that the order will remain in effect for the duration of Coggins’s and Mizell’s lives. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In her first issue, Mizell asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to support the stalking finding. She argues that sending text messages over the course of two or three days does not meet the statutory requirement of a continuing course of conduct demonstrating continuity of purpose. In her Mizell v. Coggins Page 2 second issue, Mizell contends the trial court erred by rendering judgment without reviewing all the evidence. Standard of Review In an appeal of a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact have the same weight as a jury’s verdict, and we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence used to support them just as we would review a jury’s findings. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo; that is, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). A party who challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an issue upon which it did not have the burden of proof at trial must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). Evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair- minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable finder of fact could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable finder of fact could not. Id. If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, i.e., more than a scintilla, we will Mizell v. Coggins Page 3 overrule the issue. Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). Applicable Law After a hearing, if the trial court finds there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of an offense listed in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 7B.001(a)(1), which includes stalking, the trial court shall issue a protective order. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 7B.001(a)(1), 7B.003(b). A person commits the offense of stalking if the person, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed at a specific other person, knowingly engages in conduct that causes the other person to feel harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended; and would cause a reasonable person under circumstances similar to the circumstances of the other person to feel harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(D). Discussion Coggins testified that she received text messages from Mizell’s phone number. She explained that originally, the messages “were just railing at [her], just hateful, vile things to say.” At some point the messages turned Mizell v. Coggins Page 4 threatening. On direct, she stated the texts were sent over the course of two weeks in October or November. Applicant’s Exhibit 3 contains the undated text messages Mizell sent to Coggins. Generally, they contain crude insults and threats laced with profanity. Included in the messages are the following: I have dreams of f*****g you up. . . can’t wait until they do Come true. I’m not going away . . . I’ll be your worst f*****g nightmare. I know where you live, I know where you work, I know what you drive I know where your ugly ass kid works. I’m gonna get your ass . . . I don’t know when but it’ll come. And revenge will be mine . . . you don’t want to admit your role in this, but Bitch I f*****g got you! One day you will face the wrath of a woman who didn’t like you, didn’t trust you is looking for you every f*****g day!! I’m not going away. Coggins also testified that Mizell sent her videos over social media and mailed four or five packages to her home. Two of the packages were addressed to Nerio, but Coggins considered them to have been sent to her also because they are a couple. The packages contained various embarrassing items, apparently meant to be a prank. Additionally, Mizell left broken dishes on her driveway with messages written on the back. On cross-examination, she said the complained-of acts happened in mid-November. On redirect, Coggins clarified that the text messages Mizell v. Coggins Page 5 spanned a period of several weeks but contact with Mizell stretched over several months. Nerio testified that Mizell sent him text messages, including one in which she threatened Coggins and her son. He deleted the messages. He stated that he believes the broken plates were directed at both he and Coggins. Mizell admitted sending a box of Madagascar hissing cockroaches to Nerio, leaving the broken plates on the driveway, and sending one Tik Tok video to Coggins. She testified that she sent the text messages shown in Applicant’s Exhibit 3 to Coggins over the course of three days. She agreed that someone receiving them could interpret them as threatening. At the close of the hearing, the trial court stated the following: So what I’m looking at – and, Counsel, I’m really kind of discounting a lot of the exhibits as directed – or as addressed to Mr. Nerio and those things like the plates where you can’t tell if it was addressed to Mr. Nerio or addressed to the applicant. I’m discounting that. What I can’t discount, what I cannot discount is the text messages that admittedly respondent sent over a period of a couple of days or three days – I can’t remember – and also that she admitted could be seen as threatening or harassing. .... So I think just with the messages alone that meets the definition of stalking. Based on that, the protective order is granted. Mizell v. Coggins Page 6 The trial court also later stated that it had Respondent’s exhibits, but it did not have the exhibits from the Applicant. The court inquired if the Applicant’s exhibits are “down there?” Based on these statements, Mizell asserts the trial court did not consider all admitted evidence. We disagree. The court explained it had reviewed all the evidence and determined that some of it did not support Coggins’s allegations of stalking. Later, the court was merely gathering exhibits for the file and asked where Coggins’s exhibits were. The record reflects that the trial court considered all admitted evidence. We overrule Mizell’s second issue. The record supports the trial court’s finding that Mizell committed the offense of stalking. Mizell admitted sending multiple text messages. The content of the messages is such that would cause a reasonable person to feel harassed, intimidated, annoyed, or embarrassed. When asked if Mizell did anything to make her feel annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended, Coggins replied that Mizell sent her several text messages and she felt threatened. Coggins testified that the messages were sent over the course of two weeks, while Mizell testified the messages were sent over two or three days. Either time frame satisfies the statute. The stalking statute’s requirement that events occur “on more than one occasion” does not require the elapse of a Mizell v. Coggins Page 7 particular or minimum interval of time. See Hutton v. State, 313 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Coggins is the victim of stalking. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(D); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7B.003(a), (b); Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d at 388. We overrule Mizell’s first issue. PROTECTIVE ORDER In her third issue, Mizell contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the duration of the protective order imposed. She asserts the conduct involved only a brief period of emotionally charged communication occurring over several days. In her fourth issue, Mizell contends the protective order is overbroad. She references Coggins’s son and argues the record contains no evidence of stalking behavior directed toward “additional individuals.” The length or duration of a protective order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). When the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion and the appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and whether it erred in its application of that discretion. Id. In our sufficiency review, we use the traditional standard of Mizell v. Coggins Page 8 review for legal sufficiency. Gardner v. Gardner, 229 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). As explained above, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Coggins is the victim of stalking. Once that finding is made, the court has broad discretion to set the duration of the order for the parties’ lifetimes without any additional findings. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7B.007(a); Dessens v. Argeroplos, 658 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). Although Mizell focuses on the relatively brief period of time during which she engaged in stalking behavior, her threats indicated that Coggins would never be safe. Mizell texted twice that she is not going away. She said she cannot wait until her dreams of “f*****g [Coggins] up” come true. She said she did not know when, but she was going to “get [Coggins’s] ass.” She said she wanted revenge and “one day” Coggins would face Mizell’s wrath. We conclude the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and did not abuse its discretion by ordering that the protective order is effective for the duration of Coggins’s and Mizell’s lives. Exxon, 348 S.W.3d at 215; Dessens, 658 S.W.3d at 448. We overrule Mizell’s third issue. In her application for a protective order, Coggins asked for protection for her adult son, Matthew, who lives in her home. In one of her text Mizell v. Coggins Page 9 messages in which Mizell threatens to be Coggins’s “worst nightmare,” Mizell notes that she knows where Coggins’s son works. Although the statute does not require a separate evidentiary finding of stalking directed at a non- applicant family or household member, this can be construed as a threat against Coggins’s son. The court made the requisite finding that Coggins is the victim of stalking and, as directed by statute, issued a protective order. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7B.003(a), (b). As authorized by statute, the conditions of the protective order that Mizell must obey also apply to members of Coggins’s family or household. See id. art. 7B.005(a)(2). Accordingly, the protective order is not overbroad. We overrule Mizell’s fourth issue. NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER In her fifth issue, Mizell asserts the trial court improperly rendered a nunc pro tunc order. She argues that adding the lifetime term of duration where the order previously did not specify a duration constitutes a material substantive change which cannot be addressed in a judgment nunc pro tunc. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to use a standardized form when issuing a protective order. Id. art. 7B.003(d). The trial court is to mark one of several boxes in Section XIV of the form, entitled “Duration of Protective Order,” to indicate when the order expires. As Mizell v. Coggins Page 10 applicable here, when the court issues an order under Article 7B.003, the court has the option of specifying an expiration date that is shorter than the duration of the parties’ lives or choosing the option “[F]or the duration of the Respondent’s and the Applicant’s lives.” At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally granted the application for a protective order. Coggins’s counsel, the County Attorney, handed a proposed order to the court which it approved and signed. Mizell’s counsel asked, “May I ask how long it’s for, Your Honor?” The court replied, “Indefinite.” However, the January 13, 2026 order left all of the options in the “Duration of Protective Order” section blank. The following day, the County Attorney filed a Motion for Entry of Protective Order Nunc Pro Tunc asserting that Section XIV should be marked to reflect that the protective order was granted under Article 7B.003 and will remain in effect for the duration of the Respondent’s and the Applicant’s lives. On January 15, 2026, the court signed an Order Granting Applicant’s Motion for Protective Order Nunc Pro Tunc. The court found that Section XIV does not specify that the order was granted under Article 7B.003 and that the order will remain in effect for the duration of the Respondent’s and the Applicant’s lives. The court also found that “the errors in judgment are clerical errors and did not result from judicial reasoning or determining.” Mizell v. Coggins Page 11 The court ordered the Johnson County Clerk to enter the Protective Order Nunc Pro Tunc correcting the errors. Whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of law we review de novo. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986). A judicial error is an error that occurs in the rendering, as opposed to the entering, of a judgment and cannot be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc. Id. at 231. Rendition of judgment occurs when the judge’s decision is officially announced either orally in open court or by a signed memorandum filed with the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). A trial court may issue a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical error made in entering a final judgment. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231. A clerical error is a mistake or omission that prevents the judgment as entered from reflecting the judgment as rendered. In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). A clerical error does not arise from judicial reasoning or determination. Id. at 67. Appellate courts may review for no evidence and factual insufficiency of the evidence the trial court’s factual determinations on whether a judgment has been rendered. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232. The protective order was granted pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B.003. At the close Mizell v. Coggins Page 12 of the hearing, the trial court stated that the duration of the protective order is “indefinite.” The term “indefinite” is defined as not precise and having no exact limits. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indefinite. In ruling on the duration of the protective order, the mandated preprinted form gave the trial court two options. It could state a specific date shorter than the duration of the parties’ lives, or it could choose “for the duration” of the parties’ lives. The court’s response to counsel did not state a specific date. While the term “indefinite” is not a choice on the form, the duration of the parties’ lives can be said to be “not precise” or “having no exact limits.” We conclude the trial court’s response provides legally and factually sufficient evidence that the court rendered judgment on the issue of the duration of the protective order. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232. The January 13 order as entered did not reflect the order as rendered in open court and therefore the error is clerical. See In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d at 66. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the motion for entry of protective order nunc pro tunc. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231. We overrule Mizell’s fifth issue. Mizell v. Coggins Page 13 CONCLUSION Having overruled all of Mizell’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order. ANDREA WESTERFELD Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed CV06 Mizell v. Coggins Page 14