Kyle Harmon and Gina Maria Ottavio v. Hunter Scott Brasher and Sarah Nichols, Individually and as Co-Independent Administrators of the Estate of Karrie Ellen Peterson, and Dana Palmer Law Group, PLLC
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket05-25-00853-CV
JudgeBreedlove
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-00853-CV
KYLE HARMON AND GINA MARIA OTTAVIO, Appellants
V.
HUNTER SCOTT BRASHER AND SARAH NICHOLS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS CO-INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF
KARRIE ELLEN PETERSON, DECEASED, AND DANA PALMER LAW
GROUP, PLLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the Collin County Probate
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1107-2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Miskel, Breedlove, and Jackson
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
This is an appeal of a dispute between appellants, Kyle Harmon and Gina
Maria Ottavio, and appellees Hunter Scott Brasher and Sarah Nichols regarding the
ownership of residential property located in Plano, Texas (the Property). In a single
issue, Harmon and Ottavio argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
their statutory bill of review. We conclude Appellants did not carry their burden to
demonstrate substantial error in the probate judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND1
We draw the following facts from the record before us on appeal.
Harmon and Karrie Peterson were business partners in Hair Color
Studios.com, LLC. Harmon testified that, while he was working overseas in 2015,
he asked Peterson to assist him in purchasing the Property. The June 2015 warranty
deed conveying the Property, however, identified H.C.S LLC as the grantee. The
parties dispute the significance of that designation and whether H.S.C. LLC was a
legal entity.
In May 2019, a deed purported to convey the Property from H.C.S. LLC to
Peterson. Harmon testified that he did not know of or authorize that conveyance.
The 2019 deed was not recorded in the Collin County real-property records, but a
copy was provided to the Collin Central Appraisal District. In August 2022, a
corrected instrument was filed changing the grantee identified in the 2015 deed from
H.C.S. LLC to Hair Color Studios.com, LLC.
Peterson died intestate in August 2021. Her children, Brasher and Nichols,
were subsequently determined to be her heirs. During administration of Peterson’s
estate, Harmon and Hair Color Studios.com LLC objected to the inclusion of the
Property in the estate and asserted claims concerning its ownership, but they
nonsuited those claims and pursued a separate civil action. They later nonsuited that
1
The facts of the case are well-known to the parties; therefore, we include here only those
which are necessary to the resolution of the issues on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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action as well. The probate court ultimately included the Property among the estate’s
assets and awarded it to Brasher and Nichols.
Harmon and Ottavio subsequently filed this statutory bill of review
challenging the probate court’s orders concerning the Property. They alleged, among
other things, that Harmon supplied the purchase money for the Property, that the
conveyance to Peterson was ineffective, and that Harmon should have been joined
in the probate proceeding before the court adjudicated ownership of the Property.
The trial court found that Harmon was an interested person with standing to bring
the statutory bill of review and that the bill was timely filed. But following a bench
trial, the court concluded that Harmon and Ottavio failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence an error in the underlying probate orders requiring
revision or correction.
The trial court signed an order denying the bill of review on April 21, 2025,
and subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. It also denied
Harmon and Ottavio’s motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A bill of review is brought as a direct attack on a judgment that is no longer
appealable or subject to a motion for new trial.” Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315
S.W.3d 494, 504 (Tex. 2010). In general, there are two types of bills of review:
equitable and statutory. See Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2015).
Equitable bills of review may apply to a variety of forms of action, but statutory bills
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of review are rarer, and are authorized primarily in probate and guardianship
contexts. Id.
Appellants filed a statutory bill of review in the probate court pursuant to
section 55.251 of the estates code, which provides:
(a) An interested person may, by a bill of review filed in the court in
which the probate proceedings were held, have an order or judgment
rendered by the court revised and corrected on a showing of error in the
order or judgment, as applicable.
(b) A bill of review to revise and correct an order or judgment may not
be filed more than two years after the date of the order or judgment, as
applicable.
Tex. Est. Code § 55.251.
Courts do not look on bills of review with favor, Law v. Law, 792 S.W.2d 150,
153 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (citing Crouch v. McGaw,
138 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1940)), and the grounds on which they are granted are
narrow and restricted. Bakali v. Bakali, 830 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1992, no writ); see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.
2003) (grounds upon which bill of review can be obtained are narrow because
procedure conflicts with fundamental policy that judgments must become final at
some point). The burden on a petitioner seeking a bill of review is heavy because it
is fundamentally important that judgments be accorded some finality. See Layton v.
Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp., 141 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004,
no pet.) (bills of review are scrutinized by courts with “extreme jealousy, and
grounds on which interference will be allowed are narrow and restricted”) (quoting
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Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950)). In a statutory bill of
review proceeding, the movant must show a “substantial error” in a prior decision,
order, or judgment. Valdez, 465 S.W.3d at 226–27; In re Estate of Jones, 286 S.W.3d
98, 100 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (to be entitled to relief by statutory bill
of review of probate court’s order or judgment, party must specifically allege and
prove substantial error by trial court). The substantial error giving rise to a statutory
bill of review “need not have appeared on the face of the record and the movant may
prove the error at trial by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ablon v. Campbell, 457
S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).
We review the grant or denial of a statutory bill of review under an abuse of
discretion standard. Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2008, pet. denied). We indulge every presumption in favor of the court’s ruling. See
Xiaodong Li v. DDX Grp. Inv., LLC, 404 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable
or arbitrary manner, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Id.
APPLICABLE LAW
In their statutory bill of review, Appellants argued that it was substantial error
for the probate court to have included the Property as an asset of Peterson’s estate
because the deed to the Property violated Texas Business Organizations Code
§§ 101.254(c) and 101.255 and because there was uncontroverted evidence that
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Harmon qualified as the beneficiary of a resulting trust because he paid the purchase
price for the Property.
Appellants, in effect, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
probate court’s judgment. An appellate court sustains a legal-sufficiency challenge
“when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the
court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence
offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more
than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the
vital fact.” Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003) (per
curiam).
The “test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial
would enable [a] reasonable and fair-minded [fact-finder] to reach the [conclusion]
under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). In
reviewing such a challenge, this court credits favorable evidence if a reasonable fact-
finder could, and disregards contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could
not. Id.
In reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge, the court must weigh all
evidence in the record. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (citation
omitted). A finding is overturned for factual insufficiency where it is so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
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DISCUSSION
A. Appellants did not conclusively establish a resulting trust
Appellants first argue that they proved an interest in the Property by providing
evidence that Harmon funded its acquisition such that Hair Color Studios.com LLC
and Peterson held the Property in a purchase-money resulting trust. A purchase-
money resulting trust is an equitable remedy based on consideration. Troxel v.
Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). It arises by law
when a seller conveys title to one person but someone else paid the purchase price.
Id. But “the law is suspicious of resulting trusts, and consequently a heavy burden
of proof is placed on the party attempting to establish the existence of one.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Here, the only evidence of Harmon’s payment of the purchase price is his own
testimony. Appellants also cite to portions of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 22 which include,
among other documents, Harmon’s bank records, as evidence in support of the
resulting trust, but that exhibit shows only that Harmon transferred approximately
$287,000 to an unidentified money-market account a week after the deed to Hair
Color Studios.com LLC. The document does not establish to whom Harmon sent the
2
The trial court excluded all but three pages of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, and Appellants do not
challenge that exclusion on appeal. Thus, the excluded portions are not before us on appeal. See
Synergy Mgmt. Grp., L.L.C. v. Thompson, 398 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no
pet.).
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money, for what purpose he did so, or that Peterson received, and used, Harmon’s
money to buy the Property.
As the finder of fact, the trial court was the sole judge of Harmon’s credibility
and the weight assigned to his testimony. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson,
116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). The trial court observed Harmon’s demeanor on
the stand and could believe none, all, or some of his testimony. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 819.
Appellants argue that the trial court had no choice but to believe Harmon’s
testimony because it was undisputed. But the rules regarding credibility
determinations apply to undisputed testimony. “Undisputed evidence and conclusive
evidence are not the same—undisputed evidence may or may not be conclusive, and
conclusive evidence may or may not be undisputed.” Id. at 816. Indeed, there are
“many instances” in which undisputed evidence is not conclusive. Id.
The trial court could have disbelieved Harmon’s testimony entirely or simply
concluded that Harmon’s testimony was insufficient to carry the elevated burden of
proving a resulting trust. See Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 298.
B. Appellants did not conclusively establish the 2019 deed was invalid
Appellants next argue that the 2019 deed from H.C.S. LLC to Peterson was
invalid under statutes governing certain transactions with limited liability
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companies.3 Texas Business Organizations Code § 101.255(b) requires approval by
an entity’s governing authority in order for an act to bind the entity. Appellants argue
that Peterson lacked any such authority to bind Hair Color Studios.com LLC through
the 2019 deed. However, the only testimony of Peterson’s purported lack of
authority is Harmon’s testimony, which, as discussed above, the trial court was free
to disregard or credit but find to be insufficient. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
819. Further, the record is silent as to the parties’ respective interests, leaving open
the possibility that Peterson acted with authority because she was a majority owner
of Hair Color Studios.com LLC. As the proponents of the bill-of-review, Appellants
bore the burden to conclusively prove Peterson’s lack of authority to enter into the
2019 transaction. Because they did not do so, they failed to establish that the 2019
deed was invalid.
C. Appellants did not conclusively establish that HCS never existed
Appellants argue that Peterson never acquired title to the Property because she
claimed title through a deed from H.C.S. LLC, an entity Appellants claimed never
existed. In support of this assertion, Appellants cite only Harmon’s own testimony
that H.C.S. LLC never existed.4 As with Appellants’ prior two arguments, the trial
court was free to disbelieve Harmon’s testimony or conclude that it alone was
3
We assume for purposes of our analysis, without deciding, that Texas Business Organizations
Code § 101.254(c) would apply to Hair Color Studios.
4
Appellants also cite portions of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 that the trial court excluded, which we
cannot consider before us. See Synergy Mgmt. Grp., L.L.C., 398 S.W.3d at 846.
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insufficient to carry their burden of demonstrating a “substantial error” in the prior
judgment. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819.
Because we conclude that Appellants have not carried their burden to show
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the statutory bill of review, we
overrule their sole issue on appeal.5
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE
5
In their final argument on appeal, Appellants argue that Harmon’s non-joinder in the probate
proceedings constituted substantial error in the judgment requiring reversal. We do not consider
this argument because it was neither properly preserved for our review nor adequately briefed on
appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; 38.1.
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