Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00463-CV Dalila AGIZA, Appellant v. Janet MOY, Appellee From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-CV-04461 Honorable Cesar Garcia, Judge Presiding Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 28, 2026 AFFIRMED Dalila AGiza, appearing pro se, appeals the county court at law’s final judgment in favor of Janet Moy in this forcible detainer action. AGiza raises several challenges to the justice court and county court proceedings, contends she did not receive adequate notice of the trial on the merits, asserts her earlier notice of appeal divested the county court of jurisdiction and stayed further proceedings, and complains of deficiencies in the appellate record. We affirm. 04-25-00463-CV BACKGROUND In 2025, Moy filed a forcible detainer action against AGiza. The suit involved property located on Culebra Road in San Antonio. AGiza challenged the justice court proceedings asserting, among other things, that the action was filed in the wrong precinct and that she was not the proper defendant. The justice court rendered judgment awarding Moy possession of the premises. AGiza appealed to the county court, where the case was to be tried de novo. While the de novo appeal was pending, Moy filed a sworn motion alleging AGiza had failed to pay rent into the court registry during the pendency of the appeal. Following a July 10 hearing at which AGiza did not appear, the county court granted the motion, ordered that a writ of possession issue, and awarded Moy $800 in attorney’s fees. The following day, Moy obtained a July 17 setting for a trial on the merits. The setting was dated July 11, signed by the trial court, and included counsel’s certificate stating that the document had been served on AGiza at her mailing address of record. AGiza did not appear for the July 17 trial. The county court proceeded in her absence and heard evidence and argument. A judgment was not entered at that time. On the same day, July 17, AGiza filed a “Verified Limited Special Appearance and Notice of Appeal and Automatic Stay.” She also filed a notice of appeal in this court, specifically challenging the justice court proceedings. In both filings, AGiza claimed that the justice court lacked jurisdiction over her, that all proceedings following her special appearance in justice court were void, and that her appeal automatically stayed further proceedings in the county court. The county court set a hearing for her special appearance on August 14, 2025. However, on August 13, AGiza filed a “Notice of Non-Appearance due to Pending Appeal and Lack of -2- 04-25-00463-CV Jurisdiction” in which she claimed that the county court did not have jurisdiction to conduct the August 14 hearing and that she would therefore not appear. On August 18, 2025, the court signed a final judgment reciting that AGiza, “although duly notified, failed to appear and made default” at the July 17 hearing. The court awarded Moy possession of the premises and $17,600 in rent, together with costs and post judgment interest, and denied all other relief. AGiza appeals. Moy has not filed an appellate brief. 1 ANALYSIS I. JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICE COURT AND COUNTY COURT In her first two issues, AGiza contends the justice court lacked subject matter, territorial, and personal jurisdiction and that, consequently, the county court acquired no jurisdiction on appeal. Her arguments rest on her assertions that the action was brought in the wrong justice court precinct, that she was not the proper defendant, and that the justice court proceeded without ruling on her special appearance. Justice courts have original jurisdiction over eviction actions. TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). Appeals from justice court judgments in forcible detainer actions are tried de novo in the county court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). A trial de novo is a new trial in which the case is presented as though no previous trial occurred. Id. Nevertheless, the county court’s appellate jurisdiction depends on the justice court’s jurisdiction over the underlying action. See Sanchez v. Drake Equinox LLC, No. 02-25-00418-CV, 2026 WL 2130239, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2026, no pet. h.). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be challenged for the first time on appeal. Wreh v. Gianotos, No. 05-19-01213- 1 Moy’s counsel has filed a notice of nonappearance in this case, indicating that Moy no longer owns the property in question. -3- 04-25-00463-CV CV, 2021 WL 2548708, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 22, 2021, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993)). In support of her jurisdictional challenge, AGiza asserts that the eviction action was filed in the wrong justice court precinct and that she was not the proper defendant. AGiza is correct that, under section 24.004(a) of the property code, the justice court in the precinct where the property is located has jurisdiction over an eviction action. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.084; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.6(c). However, she provides no citations to the record supporting either of her assertions and no substantive legal analysis explaining those alleged defects and how they deprived the justice court of jurisdiction. An appellant’s brief must contain a clear and concise argument supported by appropriate citations to the legal authority and the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Conclusory assertions unsupported by substantive analysis do not satisfy this requirement. See Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Moreover, on our own review of the appellate record, we find that it contains no evidence establishing that the property at issue was located outside the precinct of the justice court in which the suit was filed. Unlike Sanchez, in which the property’s location outside the precinct was undisputed, AGiza offers only her unsupported allegation that the suit was filed in the wrong precinct. See Sanchez, 2026 WL 2130239, at *1. That allegation alone does not establish a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex.1996)). Nor does AGiza’s assertion that she was not the proper defendant establish a jurisdictional defect. Whether AGiza was entitled to possession or personally liable under the alleged tenancy -4- 04-25-00463-CV concerns the merits of the eviction action, not the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate it. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 777 (Tex. 2020) (distinguishing between merits of a claim and subject matter jurisdiction). AGiza further complains that the justice court proceeded without ruling on her special appearance. However, the county court conducted a trial de novo, and AGiza was required to preserve her personal jurisdiction objection in that court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 120a; see also Kaminetzky v. Dosohs I, Ltd., No. 14-03-00567-CV, 2004 WL 1116960, at *4 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] May 20, 2004, no pet.) (explaining trial de novo is “a new and independent action” which moots objections made in prior proceeding in justice court). Although AGiza filed a special appearance in the county court, she declined to attend the scheduled hearing, asserting that her pending appeal deprived the county court of jurisdiction to proceed. Her notice of appeal, however, did not divest the county court of jurisdiction or automatically stay its proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 29.5; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13. When AGiza declined to appear, the county court dropped the special appearance hearing from its docket, and AGiza did not pursue a ruling on her special appearance before the case proceeded to judgment. A party asserting a special appearance must timely request a hearing and secure a ruling on the motion. See Witty Yeti, LLC v. Plummer, No. 04-22-00075-CV, 2022 WL 3046942, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.). By declining to attend the scheduled hearing and failing to obtain a determination of her special appearance, AGiza deprived this court of a county court ruling to review and thus failed to preserve her personal jurisdiction complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Because AGiza has not established that the justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and did not preserve her personal jurisdiction challenge in the county court, we overrule her first two issues. -5- 04-25-00463-CV II. NOTICE OF THE JULY 17 TRIAL In her third issue, AGiza contends the county court violated her due process rights by conducting the July 17, 2025, trial on the merits without adequate notice. She asserts that Moy’s counsel mailed the trial setting on July 15 and that she did not receive it until July 19, two days after trial. A party who has appeared is entitled to notice of a trial setting. L.B.L. Oil Co. v. Int’l Power Services, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 390, 390–91 (Tex. 1989). Although Rule 245 generally requires at least forty-five days’ notice of an initial trial setting, eviction appeals are governed by expedited procedures permitting trial after eight days have elapsed from the filing of the justice court transcript. TEX. R. APP. P. 245, 510.12; see Cattin v. Highpoint Village Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). We need not resolve, though, whether Rule 245’s notice requirement applies to an eviction appeal because AGiza has not demonstrated reversible error concerning notice of the trial setting. See Abend v. Federal National Mortg. Ass’n, 466 S.W.3d 884, 885–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The clerk’s record contains an order setting the case for trial on July 17, accompanied by counsel’s signed certificate stating that the setting was duly served on AGiza on July 11. A certificate of service constitutes prima facie evidence of service and gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of receipt. TEX. R. APP. P. 21a(e); Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005). AGiza disputes the date of service, alleging that counsel mailed the setting on July 15 and that she received it after trial. But the record contains no evidence corroborating those dates. Although AGiza references a postmarked envelope, there is none in the record. While Rule 21a provides that nothing in the rule precludes a party from offering proof that the notice was not -6- 04-25-00463-CV received, such proof must amount to more than bare assertions. See Kuntze v. Hall, No. 10-12- 00087-CV, 2012 WL 5193226, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 18, 2012, pet. denied). More importantly, AGiza did not seek relief from the county court based on the alleged lack of notice. Her July 17 objection concerned the July 10 hearing on Moy’s motion regarding unpaid rent, not the July 17 trial on the merits. Although AGiza subsequently alleged that she had not received timely notice of the July 17 trial, she did so in a notice explaining her refusal to attend a hearing on her jurisdictional objections. She did not request that the county court set aside the trial proceedings, grant a new trial, or otherwise remedy the alleged notice defect, and she obtained no ruling on that complaint. See Abend, 466 S.W.3d at 885–86; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Because the record contains prima facie evidence of service and AGiza failed to present her notice complaint to the county court for ruling, she has not demonstrated reversible error. AGiza’s third issue is overruled. III. EFFECT OF AGIZA’S JULY NOTICE OF APPEAL AGiza also contends that her July 17 notice of appeal immediately divested the county court of jurisdiction and stayed further proceedings. We disagree. The county court’s July 10 order granting Moy’s motion for failure to pay rent was not a final judgment disposing of the de novo eviction proceeding. In LaFontaine v. Hendricks Property Management, LLC, this court held that an order for issuance of a writ of possession entered during the pendency of a de novo eviction appeal was neither a final judgment nor an independently appealable interlocutory order. No. 04-11-00044-CV, 2011 WL 1158399, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 30, 2011, no pet.). Accordingly, AGiza’s notice of appeal did not deprive the county court of authority to proceed to a final judgment. Instead, her notice of appeal became effective -7- 04-25-00463-CV only after the county court actually rendered final judgment three weeks later. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.1(a). AGiza also relies on section 24.007 of the Property Code, but that provision governs the suspension of the county court’s judgment pending appeal, not the court’s authority to continue proceedings before final judgment. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007; Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 786 (Tex. 2006). Thus, section 24.007 did not operate to stay the July 17 trial or prevent the county court from rendering final judgment. AGiza’s notice of appeal also did not automatically suspend enforcement of that judgment. Statutorily, a county court’s judgment may not be stayed pending appeal unless the appellant files a supersedeas bond within ten days after the judgment is signed. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.007 (mandating that “a judgment of a county court in an eviction suit may not under any circumstance be stayed pending appeal unless…the appellant files a supersedeas bond”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1, 24.2(3). Indigency does not eliminate the supersedeas requirement. Although an indigent party may proceed without prepaying costs, indigence does not relieve an appellant of the obligation to file a supersedeas bond to suspend enforcement of the judgment. See Morse v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 05-18-00999-CV, 2018 WL 4784585, at *1 (Tex. App.— Dallas Oct. 4, 2018, no pet.) (“[a] defendant’s indigence does not relieve him of the obligation to file a supersedeas bond”). AGiza’s notice of appeal and statement of inability to afford costs did not satisfy the supersedeas requirement. AGiza’s fourth issue is overruled. IV. APPELLATE RECORD AND REMAINING COMPLAINTS AGiza further contends that the absence of a certified record deprived her of meaningful appellate review. Whatever deficiencies existed when AGiza filed her brief, the appellate record -8- 04-25-00463-CV now includes a certified clerk’s record and supplemental clerk’s record. The supplemental record contains the August 18 final judgment and is certified by the county clerk. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c) (permitting supplementation of the clerk’s record). The appellate record includes a reporter’s record of the July 10 hearing, but no reporter’s record of the July 17 trial on the merits. The final judgment nevertheless recites that the trial court heard evidence and argument before awarding possession and $17,600 in rent. An appellant bears the burden to present a record sufficient to demonstrate reversible error. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002). In the absence of a reporter’s record of the trial, we presume the evidence supports the judgment. See Van Ness v. Hobbs, No. 01-22-00631-CV, 2023 WL 3311124, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2023, no pet.). Nothing in the record establishes that AGiza requested a reporter’s record of the July 17 trial or that a record of that proceeding was made and subsequently lost or destroyed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6 (c), (f). Accordingly, the absence of a reporter’s record of the July 17 trial does not establish reversible error. See Tex. Integrity Homes, LLC v. Garcia, No. 05-24-01310-CV, 2026 WL 2021435, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (citing Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987)). AGiza also challenges Judge Lisa Jarrett’s participation in the county court proceedings based on the absence of an assignment order. The record reflects Judge Jarrett signed the July 10 order concerning Moy’s motion for failure to pay rent, whereas Judge Cesar Garcia presided over the July 17 trial on the merits and signed the August 18 final judgment. AGiza identifies no authority establishing that the absence of an assignment order in the appellate record renders the final judgment void, nor does she demonstrate that Judge Jarrett’s participation resulted in reversible error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), 44.1(a). -9- 04-25-00463-CV AGiza’s remaining issues are overruled. CONCLUSION Finding no reversible error on the record before us, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. H. Todd McCray, Justice - 10 -