Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00273-CV STACIE ANN SHAKIR, Appellant V. SP SHEFFIELD LP, Appellee On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1239110 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Stacie Ann Shakir was evicted from Sheffield Square Apartments in 2017, and in 2024, she sued Sheffield in justice court for a variety of claims arising from her eviction. The justice court granted judgment in favor of Sheffield and Shakir appealed to the county court at law, which granted summary judgment in Sheffield’s favor. On appeal Shakir contends she was entitled to a jury trial and that the trial court or opposing counsel committed criminal offenses. We conclude that Shakir has not challenged all grounds on which the trial court may have granted summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND I. Justice Court Proceedings Shakir sued Sheffield in justice court alleging claims purportedly connected to her eviction in 2017. Shakir initiated her suit by filling out a pre-printed Small Claims Petition. Under the section titled “Cause of Action,” Shakir stated: Petition for Damages due to Multiple Violations of the Federal Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Texas Debt Collection Act, Misrepresentation, Fraud Inducement, Non-Authorized Disclosure of Address & Identity Theft. The small claims petition does not contain any more facts on which Shakir based her suit. The record contains a copy of the eviction judgment from 2017, which lists AM Sheffield Square, LLC, dba Sheffield Square as the landlord plaintiff. Sheffield answered, asserting affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and laches because the eviction occurred seven years before Shakir filed suit. Sheffield further asserted that Shakir’s claims were barred by res judicata and there was a defect in parties. Sheffield filed a motion for summary disposition in the justice court on its affirmative defenses. The justice court granted the motion and dismissed Shakir’s suit without stating the grounds on which it relied. II. County Court at Law Proceedings Shakir filed a timely notice of appeal to the county court at law in which she argued she did not receive notice of the change in hearing date. Sheffield answered in the county court at law, again asserting the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches, res judicata, and a defect in parties. Sheffield also asserted counterclaims for abuse of process, and sanctions under Rule of Civil Procedure 13. Sheffield filed a motion for summary judgment in the county court at law in 2 which it alleged it did not own the property at the time Shakir was evicted; another entity, AM Sheffield Square, LLC conducted the eviction. Sheffield further argued that the statute of limitations expired before Shakir filed suit. Sheffield asked the court to grant the motion, dismiss Shakir’s claims, and set its counterclaims for a non-jury trial. Attached to Sheffield’s motion was an affidavit from its attorney stating that Sheffield had no dealings with Shakir because it acquired the property three months after Shakir was evicted in 2017. Also attached was the original eviction judgment showing that Shakir was evicted on March 14, 2017. Shakir did not respond to the motion. The county court at law granted the motion for summary judgment without stating its reasons, and dismissed all counterclaims. This appeal followed. ISSUES PRESENTED So far as we can determine, Shakir presents four issues for review. We group those issues as follows. In Shakir’s first three issues she asserts her right to a jury trial. We group together as Shakir’s fourth issue all of her allegations that the trial court or opposing counsel committed criminal offenses. She contends that the trial court violated Chapter 38 and section 6.03 of the Texas Penal Code, and that the trial court and opposing counsel conspired against her federal rights in violation of 18 United States Code section 241 and violated a court order in contravention of Texas Penal Code section 25.07. ANALYSIS I. Appeal To County Court at Law A party who is dissatisfied with a justice court judgment may appeal to a county court at law for a trial de novo. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.1. When an appeal is 3 taken from justice court to county court, a “trial de novo” means a new trial, “in which the entire case is presented as if there had been no previous trial.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3; see also Searcy v. Sagullo, 915 S.W.2d 595, 596 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (“A party receives de novo review in the county court which is essentially a new trial before a different judge.”). We therefore review the summary judgment rendered by the county court at law. II. Standard of Review and Governing Law We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Assoc., Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018). A summary judgment movant must prove conclusively that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); City of Houston v. Sauls, 690 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. 2024). A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has the burden to conclusively establish that defense. Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. 2021). Once the defendant produces evidence sufficient to establish the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with competent controverting evidence that raises a fact issue as to one element of the defendant’s affirmative defense. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014). If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged on appeal, the judgment must be affirmed. Jinsun, LLC v. Mireskandari, 694 S.W.3d 773, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.). III. Statute of Limitations Sheffield sought traditional summary judgment, among other things, on the ground that the statute of limitations expired on Shakir’s claims. Shakir asserted claims that Sheffield engaged in fraud in addition to violations of the Federal Fair 4 Credit Reporting Act, Federal Fair Debt Practices Act, and the Texas Debt Collection Act. Sheffield asserted that Shakir’s claims accrued in 2017 when she was evicted. Because Shakir did not file suit in justice court until seven years after the eviction any applicable statute of limitations expired before Shakir filed suit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (Fair Credit Reporting Act; five years, or two years from discovery); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; one year); Tex. Fin. Code § 392.404 (Texas Debt Collection Act; two years); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 (fraud; four years). In the trial court Shakir did not file a response to the motion alleging her claims accrued later than 2017 or otherwise challenge Sheffield’s assertions. Shakir has not challenged this potential ground for summary judgment on appeal. Because Shakir failed to adequately challenge this ground on which the trial court may have granted summary judgment, we must uphold the judgment. See Collins v. D.R. Horton-Tex. Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 39, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). CONCLUSION Because Shakir failed to negate all grounds on which the trial court may have based its summary judgment, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Randy Wilson Justice Panel consists of Justices Wilson, Hart, and McLaughlin. 5