Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00119-CV JULIAN POOLE, Appellant V. ALICE DEVON POOLE, Appellee On Appeal from the 387th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23-DCV-302252 MEMORANDUM OPINION The trial court dissolved the marriage of Julian Poole (Julian) and Alice Devon Poole (Devon), and divided their marital estate. The trial court named both parents as joint managing conservators of their minor child with Devon being named the parent with the right to designate the primary residence of the child. Julian moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied his motion. Julian filed an opening brief in which he challenged the division of community property in addition to the failure of the trial court to confirm his separate property and reimbursement claims. After Julian’s counsel withdrew, Julian filed a supplemental brief in which he contended: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate; (3) the trial court failed to address his claims for reimbursement; (4) the trial court improperly excluded certain evidence and witnesses; (5) the trial court overlooked the children’s best interest in naming Devon as the parent who could designate the primary residence of the minor child; (6) the trial court erred in awarding child support; and (7) Devon and several of her witnesses gave false testimony. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of the marital estate or confirmation of separate property. As the minor child is no longer a minor we cannot address the issues of custody and possession, but conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support. We further conclude Julian’s evidentiary issues were not preserved for our review. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND Julian and Devon were married in January 1998. They have three children, two of whom were adults by the time of trial. At the time of trial the youngest child was a minor; that child has since turned eighteen. Devon filed an original petition for divorce in March 2023, and Julian filed a counterpetition three months later. Both parties requested confirmation of separate property and disproportionate shares of the parties’ marital estate. As to the minor child, both parties requested joint conservatorship with the right to designate the child’s primary residence, and both parties requested child support. After a bench trial the trial court dissolved the marriage and appointed the parents joint managing conservators of the minor child, naming Devon as the parent with the right to designate the primary residence of the child. A standard possession 2 order was rendered, and Julian was ordered to pay $866.00 per month in child support. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court awarded to Devon: • An undivided fifty percent interest in the home; • All household furniture, furnishings, fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, equipment, clothing, jewelry, and other personal effects in her possession or subject to her sole control; • Funds on deposit in a Chase checking account, a Capital One savings account, Julian’s Halliburton retirement account, a Fidelity Roth Individual Retirement Account, and all individual retirement accounts in Devon’s name; • Fifty percent of Julian’s Fidelity Rollover IRA; and • The flexible spending account in Devon’s name. To Julian, the court awarded: • An undivided fifty percent interest in the home; • All household furniture, furnishings, fixtures, goods, art objects, collectibles, appliances, equipment, clothing, jewelry, and other personal effects in his possession or subject to his sole control; • Funds in a Chase savings account, two Capital One checking accounts, and two Capital One savings accounts; • Retirement accounts in Julian’s name, including a Fidelity Roth IRA, Fidelity Traditional IRA, and Fidelity SEP; • One hundred percent of Julian’s retirement benefits in the Teacher Retirement System; • Fifty percent of a Fidelity Rollover IRA; • A term life insurance policy listed in Julian’s name; • A 2017 Toyota Sienna; and • Undeposited payroll checks in Julian’s name. As Julian’s separate property the trial court confirmed a 1984 Porsche 911 and a 3 1985 Toyota Camry. The trial court awarded Devon her wedding ring as her separate property. Julian, representing himself, filed a motion for new trial in which he alleged that the trial court erred because (1) Julian’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance including failing to present evidence Julian requested to be presented; (2) it was in the child’s best interest to live with Julian; (3) new evidence would “show how Mr. Poole’s case is solid”; (4) Julian’s attorney failed to call certain witnesses; (5) Devon gave false testimony; (6) the trial court “ignored separate property proof”; (7) the community property division was not just and fair; (8) the trial court erred in “handling” the divorce decree; and (9) the trial court “ignored” Julian’s reimbursement claims. As evidence, Julian attached copies of emails he sent directly to the trial court seeking to reschedule trial and submitting certain exhibits directly to the court. The exhibits Julian submitted to the court were not introduced or admitted at trial. A docket sheet entry reflects that a hearing was held on the motion for new trial, which was denied. No record of the hearing was filed with this court. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS As stated above, Julian’s counsel filed an appellant’s brief challenging the trial court’s division of community property and confirmation of separate property. After Julian’s counsel withdrew, Julian filed a supplemental brief in which he added assertions that counsel was ineffective, the conservatorship decision was an abuse of discretion, and certain evidence was not considered. As we discuss below, Julian’s issues challenging the conservatorship decision are no longer reviewable. We address together the challenges to the property division made in Julian’s initial brief and his supplemental brief. 4 I. Standard of Review Most of the appealable issues in a family law case, including the issues in this case, are evaluated against an abuse of discretion standard. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). When we review a family law case under the abuse of discretion standard, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence do not constitute independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support its decision, we consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Cantu v. Cantu, 556 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). We conduct the applicable sufficiency review when considering the first prong of the test. Id. We then determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Id. Because of the fact-intensive nature of reviewing family law issues, an appellate court must afford great deference to the factfinder on issues of credibility and demeanor because the parties’ behavior, experiences, and circumstances are conveyed through words, emotions, and facial expressions that are not reflected in the record. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024) (“Reviewing courts . . . must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.”). II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate. In Julian’s opening brief and in issues three, five, and six of his supplemental brief he challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the failure to 5 confirm his separate property. In a divorce decree, the trial court “shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001. A “just and right” division does not require a trial court to divide the marital estate into equal shares. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981). To disturb a trial court’s division of property, a party “must show the trial court clearly abused its discretion by a division or an order that is manifestly unjust and unfair.” In re Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (quoting Stavinoha v. Stavinoha, 126 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). A. Just and Right Division To determine whether the assets of the community estate were divided in a just and right manner, an appellate court must have the trial court’s findings on the value of those assets. Pineda v. Pineda, No. 14-22-00683-CV, 2024 WL 2150088, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Without findings of fact, the appellate court does not know the basis for the division, the values assigned to the community assets, or the percentage of the marital estate that each party received. Id. Here, the trial court did not file, nor did any party request, findings of fact or conclusions of law. The final divorce decree states how the property will be divided, but it does not state the value the court assigned to each asset or liability, the net value of the community property, or the factors it considered in dividing the community property. Property inventories filed by the parties cannot serve as a substitute for findings of fact by the trial court. Do v. Vu, No. 14-23-00729-CV, 2025 WL 1037264, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. 6 op.). Thus, if a party does not request findings of fact from the trial court, the party cannot establish whether the trial court intended the division to be equal or disproportionate, and if disproportionate, what factors the trial court found to warrant an unequal distribution if one was intended. See Pineda, 2024 WL 2150088 at *3. Julian argues that the division of property was disproportionate, that Devon overstated the value of the home, and that the trial court had no justification for a disproportionate division. Because we do not know what values the trial court assigned to the community property assets or the percentage of the property awarded to each party, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community property.1 B. Separate Property Julian also contends that the trial court failed to confirm as his separate property a Capital One account, Fidelity account, pre-marriage vehicles, a $35,000 inheritance, and separate funds used toward a down payment on the home. The Family Code defines separate property as property owned or claimed by a spouse before marriage, acquired during the marriage by gift, devise, or descent, or recovered for personal injuries sustained during the marriage. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001; Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15 (“All property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse.”). The characterization of property as either 1 In challenging the trial court’s division of the community estate, Julian asserted that the trial court erred in ordering the sale of the home. This issue is no longer in dispute because, after the final decree was signed, the parties agreed to resolve the issue of the real property outside of the final decree. 7 community or separate is determined by the inception of title to the property. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d at 111. Inception of title occurs when a party first has a claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested. Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). All property possessed by either spouse during or upon dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(a). To overcome the community-property presumption, the spouse claiming certain property as separate property must trace and clearly identify the property claimed to be separate. Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The party seeking to overcome the presumption must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(b). “Clear and convincing” evidence means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). An inventory was admitted into evidence in which Julian listed as his separate property $70,000 in the Capital One account, $20,299 in a Fidelity SEP retirement account, a 1994 Porsche 911, and a 1995 Toyota Camry. The trial court awarded as separate property the two vehicles Julian purchased before the marriage. Julian contends that the bank account, retirement account, and inheritance are all separate property. Julian also requested reimbursement of the $70,000 he contributed toward the down payment on the parties’ home. The spouse claiming the separate nature of property must trace and clearly identify the property claimed to be separate. Landry v. Landry, 731 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. 2026). Such tracing requires establishing the separate origin of the property through evidence showing the time and means by which the spouse obtained 8 possession of the property. Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Litigants may trace separate property through documentary evidence, including bank or business records. Landry, 731 S.W.3d at 633. Any doubt as to the character of property should be resolved in favor of the community estate. Nguyen v. Pham, 640 S.W.3d 266, 271–72 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). 1. Inheritance Tania Arlinghaus, Julian’s sister, testified that their father died intestate. Their mother set aside portions of their father’s estate and used the funds for each of the four children. Arlinghaus’s college tuition was paid with the funds; she did not receive funds directly. Julian testified that he received $35,000 from his father’s estate. Julian did not provide probative evidence of what happened to the $35,000. For example, he did not testify that he deposited those funds into a separate account or that he purchased items or other financial instruments with those funds. Julian did not present any documentary evidence, such as probate documents or bank deposit receipts, to trace his inheritance sufficient to confirm as his separate property. Other than Julian’s testimony that he received $35,000, there was no evidence of the inheritance. Because Julian failed to present evidence of tracing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to confirm the inheritance as Julian’s separate property. 2. Accounts Julian testified that he opened a Capital One account prior to the marriage but that he had made additional deposits to the account during the marriage. Julian could not remember the account balance at the time of the marriage and testified that the balance “included other accounts from banks being sold, merged into it.” Julian testified that he used approximately $70,000 from that account to make a down 9 payment on the home the couple purchased ten years after their marriage. When asked whether the funds in the Capital One account were either funds received prior to marriage or proceeds from the sales of cars that were his separate property, Julian responded: My testimony is — that was 30 years ago. I’m not 100 percent. But I believe it was 100,000 and I was going to settle on 70 to be generous. I have proof of a CD of, you know, 20 — sorry. The account with 20,000, a CD with 12, another with 6, pre-purchases, the financial, you know, things we talked about a minute ago, two Porsche vehicle sales, all of that. Julian did not introduce documentary evidence of the CD or other accounts he testified about. He also did not introduce evidence of the account’s balance as of the date of the marriage, account activity during the marriage, or the most recent balance prior to trial. Julian testified he made deposits to the Capital One account during the marriage, but did not present evidence of the amounts and character of those deposits. Julian’s evidence about the Capital One account is analogous to the evidence presented concerning bank accounts opened before marriage in Hopf v. Hopf, 841 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). In Hopf, the husband had opened a retirement account before marriage. Id. at 900. The record in that case failed to reflect the balance of the account at the time of the marriage or the amounts and character of deposits and withdrawals. Id. at 900–01. Absent this evidence, we held that the balance was presumptively community property. Id. at 901. We find no evidence in the record about the balance of the Capital One account before marriage, or of the amounts or character of deposits or withdrawals during the marriage. Generally, when separate funds and community funds are 10 commingled in a single bank account, we presume that community funds are withdrawn first, before separate funds are withdrawn. Smith, 22 S.W.3d at 146. The balance was presumptively community property, and the trial court did not err by including the account in the marital estate. Julian’s evidence is similarly vague on the Fidelity SEP account, which was awarded to Julian in the division of the marital estate. When asked whether he had the account at the time of the marriage Julian testified he believed he had an account, but was unclear on the account number. Julian also testified he was “not 100 percent” on the balance at the time of the marriage. The record contains a copy of an investment report from Fidelity Investments purporting to reflect the account value of the Julian Poole-SEP-IRA. The statement is for October 2023, and shows an account balance of $19,789.96. There is no evidence of the balance in 1998 at the time of the marriage, whether any funds were accrued during marriage, or the amounts and character of any deposits or withdrawals. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err by including this account in the marital estate. See Hopf, 841 S.W.2d at 901. C. Reimbursement Claim Julian also argues the trial court failed to address his reimbursement claim of separate property funds used to purchase the marital residence. Reimbursement is an equitable right that arises when the funds or assets of one estate are used to benefit and enhance another estate without the first estate receiving some benefit. McCartney v. McCartney, 720 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). The trial court’s discretion in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is as broad as its discretion to effect a just and right division of the community estate. Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988) (“In the final analysis, great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to value a 11 claim for reimbursement.”). Family Code section 3.402 codified many reimbursement claims existing at common law and requires a spouse seeking reimbursement to a marital estate to prove: (1) that the spouse or both spouses used property of the marital estate to confer a benefit on the property of another marital estate; (2) the value of the benefit described by subdivision (1); and (3) that unjust enrichment of the benefited estate will occur if the benefited estate is not required to reimburse the conferring estate. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.402(b). A party claiming a right of reimbursement must plead and prove that expenditures were made and that they are reimbursable. In re Marriage of O’Brien, 436 S.W.3d 78, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Julian asserted that he was entitled to reimbursement for the $70,000 he used from the Capital One account to make a down payment on the home. Julian presented no evidence tracing what portion of the down payment may have come from separate funds or community funds. The home was purchased ten years after the couple married during which time deposits and withdrawals were made into the Capital One account that commingled separate and community funds. Julian provided no evidence to establish that he used his separate property to make a down payment on the home. Mere testimony that property was purchased with separate property funds, without any tracing of funds, is generally insufficient to rebut the community presumption. Liu v. Li, No. 14-23-00810-CV, 2025 WL 1936929, at *8 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, he failed to establish that the trial court erred in not reimbursing those funds. Having concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the division of property we overrule appellant’s first issue in his opening brief and his third, fifth, and sixth supplemental issues. 12 III. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the challenges to conservatorship. In Julian’s fourth supplemental issue he argues that the trial court “abused its discretion in ordering a parenting plan contrary to the child’s best interest.” In Julian’s supplemental issues eleven and twelve Julian challenges medical benefits for the child and violations of temporary orders involving the child. The divorce decree provides that the orders of possession apply to the child “while that child is under the age of eighteen years and not otherwise emancipated.” Because the child turned eighteen while this appeal was pending, the challenged parts of the final decree addressing possession and access are no longer in effect, and we lack jurisdiction to review them. Sexton v. Sexton, No. 14-25-00331-CV, 2026 WL 879351, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In Julian’s second supplemental issue and as part of his eleventh supplemental issue Julian challenges the trial court’s “handling” of the decree. It appears Julian is challenging the timing of the signing of the decree. To the extent Julian challenges the “handling” of the decree, we conclude Julian has failed to make persuasive arguments demonstrating the trial court erred because it signed the decree before giving more time for Julian or his attorney to review it. See Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 542 n.9 (Tex. 2025) (“if the briefing does not make arguments the court finds persuasive, its decision on an issue may reflect that failure”). We overrule Julian’s supplemental issues two, four, eleven, and twelve. IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support. Beyond conservatorship, however, the trial court’s order implicates financial obligations that accrued prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday, including child support. Therefore, a live controversy remains to such extent, and we proceed to 13 analyze Julian’s issue in which he challenges child support. See In re J.O.A., No. 14- 14-00968-CV, 2016 WL 1660288, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (financial obligations are exception to mootness due to child’s age). In Julian’s thirteenth supplemental issue he challenges the trial court’s child support award as “contested and not accurate.” Julian contends Devon’s “Child Support numbers used by [the trial court] are off.” Specifically, Julian contends the numbers did not include: correct benefits, 2025 benefit changes, or the “HSA deduction.” At trial, Devon presented evidence using Julian’s salary and the Texas Attorney General’s 2024 tax charts to establish a monthly child support obligation of $866.28. Julian did not object to Devon’s evidence. The child support amount was calculated using Julian’s earnings statement and applying the Family Code’s child support guidelines. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.125. The trial court ordered Julian to pay $866.00 per month in child support, which was in line with the guidelines. The amount of a periodic child support payment established by the child support guidelines is presumed to be reasonable, and an order of support conforming to the guidelines is presumed to be in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.122(a); In re A.M.P., 368 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Julian did not object to Devon’s evidence, and presented no evidence at trial, and no argument on appeal, to overcome the presumption. We overrule Julian’s thirteenth issue. V. The doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel does not extend to divorce cases. In Julian’s first supplemental issue he argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 14 ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal context is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The Supreme Court of Texas has determined that parents are entitled to effective assistance in termination proceedings, and it has adopted a two-pronged test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on Strickland. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003). The subject of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding also has the right to effective assistance of counsel. See In re Protection of H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 355–56 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.). The doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does not extend to divorce cases. Henry v. Cook, No. 14-25-00089-CV, 2026 WL 1396084, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule appellant’s first supplemental issue. VI. The challenges to the evidence were not preserved for our review. In Julian’s ninth supplemental issue he contends the trial court erred in not considering his evidence. Before trial, Julian filed several documents directly with the court, including home appraisals, financial reviews, responses to interrogatories, photos of the children, witness statements, and home refinance approval notices. Two of Julian’s exhibits, one being an appraisal report, and the other photos, were admitted into evidence. Julian did not introduce the remaining documents into evidence at trial. The second supplemental clerk’s record also contains several documents filed directly with the court after the final decree was signed. In his supplemental brief Julian refers to those documents as new evidence and challenges the trial court’s refusal to re-open the evidence after the decree was signed. To show that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence, a complaining party must preserve error by actually offering the evidence and obtaining an adverse ruling from the court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Evid. 15 103(a); In re Marriage of Rangel & Tovias-Rangel, 580 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Julian did not preserve this issue for review because he did not offer the evidence at trial, nor did he obtain an adverse ruling. We overrule Julian’s ninth supplemental issue. In Julian’s tenth supplemental issue he contends the trial court abused its discretion in not considering his new evidence. A party seeking a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence must demonstrate to the trial court that (1) the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial, (2) the failure to discover the evidence sooner was not due to a lack of diligence, (3) the evidence is not cumulative, and (4) the evidence is so material it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010). A party’s allegations alone will not be enough to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Aldous v. Bruss, 405 S.W.3d 847, 857 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Instead, the party must introduce admissible evidence at a hearing on the motion for new trial that establishes such essential facts as the party’s lack of prior knowledge of the newly discovered evidence, the party’s prior diligence toward discovering the evidence, and the nature of the newly discovered evidence. Mousilli v. Sweed, No. 14-20-00866-CV, 2022 WL 1218583, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the movant failed to introduce admissible relevant evidence during the hearing demonstrating the existence of the newly discovered evidence. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Wilson, 725 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The record shows the trial court conducted a hearing on Julian’s motion for 16 new trial, but the appellate record does not include a reporter’s record from the hearing. As to the purported new evidence, the record does not reflect that the evidence was presented with Julian’s motion for new trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Julian’s motion for new trial. We overrule Julian’s tenth supplemental issue. Finally, in Julian’s supplemental issues seven and eight, he contends that Devon and other witnesses committed perjury and that Devon’s case was based on hearsay. Julian does not cite to any portion of the record where he objected to perjured testimony or hearsay, and independent review has revealed no such objections. By failing to timely raise issues of perjury and hearsay in the trial court, Julian waived these contentions. We therefore overrule supplemental issues seven and eight as unpreserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). CONCLUSION Having overruled appellant’s sole issue raised in his opening brief and all issues raised in his supplemental brief we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Randy Wilson Justice Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Wilson, and Boatman. 17