Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 20, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00676-CV ——————————— NOEL BELENA VALENCIA WARD, Appellant V. PATRICK JOSE VALENCIA, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court Washington County, Texas Trial Court Case No. CCL9124 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal involves the division of marital property between divorcing spouses Noel Belena Valencia Ward and Patrick Jose Valencia. Noel filed a petition for divorce. She sought a disproportionate share of the marital estate and $126,275 in attorney’s fees. Patrick, in turn, sought $213,190.38 in attorney’s fees and asked that Noel take nothing. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Noel. The jury found that fault grounds existed against Patrick for cruel treatment, adultery, and family violence committed against Noel. The trial court granted the divorce. The trial court was then tasked with dividing the marital estate “in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. In that undertaking, the trial court may consider a variety of factors, including fault. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981). The trial court has discretion over that division. Lynch v. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d 107, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Here, although the trial court awarded Noel a majority of the estate’s assets, the trial court awarded Patrick $75,000 in attorney’s fees, and none to Noel. This ultimately resulted in a division in Patrick’s favor. On appeal, Noel challenges the division. Notably, Noel did not raise a complaint in the trial court concerning the division of the estate, the award of attorney’s fees, or the trial court’s exercise of its discretion as to the division of the estate. To the extent she now seeks to challenge the trial court’s exercise of its 2 discretion (outside of an evidentiary sufficiency challenge), we may not consider that argument. But Noel also contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s division of the estate. To the extent she asserts an evidentiary sufficiency challenge, we consider her argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d); In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 544–45 (Tex. 2022). On this record, however, her argument fails. We thus affirm. DISCUSSION A. Background law The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that a trial court may consider a variety of factors in dividing the marital estate in a “just and right” manner under Section 7.001. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699; Christensen v. Christensen, No. 01-16-00735-CV, 2018 WL 1747260, *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). These non-exclusive Murff factors include: (1) the nature of the property; (2) the disparity of incomes or earning capacities; (3) the parties’ business opportunities; (4) the parties’ relative financial condition and obligations; (5) the parties’ education and physical condition; (6) the disparity in ages; (7) fault in the break- up of the marriage; (8) the benefit the innocent spouse would have received had the marriage continued; (9) the size of any separate estates; and (10) the probable need for future support. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d at 128; Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. 3 A trial court is not required to divide marital property equally. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d at 128. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that the “just and right” standard “may at times lead to a disproportionate division of assets and liabilities of the parties, depending on the circumstances that courts may consider in refusing to divide the marital estate equally.” Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. 1998). A trial court “may order an unequal division of marital property where a reasonable basis exists for doing so.” Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Moreover, “in a divorce granted on a fault basis, the trial court may consider the fault of one spouse in breaking up the marriage when making a property division”—but “this does not mean that fault must be considered.” Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698 (internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court may additionally award attorney’s fees as part of the just and right division of the parties’ marital estate.1 Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335, 369– 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); see also Carle v. Carle, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (Tex. 1950) (“The attorney’s fee is but a factor to be 1 Attorney’s fees may also be awarded in a divorce case pursuant to statute. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 6.708(c) (providing for reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in a divorce suit), 106.002 (pertaining to award of attorney’s fees in a suit that affects the parent-child relationship). Attorney’s fees awarded under these statutory provisions are an independent judgment separate from the community estate. See In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d 118, 142–43 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); In re. L.C., No. 05-23-00632-CV, 2024 WL 5001934, *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 6, 2024, pet. denied). 4 considered by the court in making an equitable division of the estate, considering the conditions and needs of the parties and all of the surrounding circumstances.”). With this background in mind, we turn to our analysis. B. Apart from her evidentiary sufficiency complaint, Noel did not preserve a challenge to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in dividing the estate. Noel challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate. She contends that the award of attorney’s fees to Patrick rendered the overall division unjust and an abuse of discretion. But—beyond an evidentiary sufficiency argument, addressed below—she did not preserve that argument. It is well settled that a party who seeks to preserve a claim for appellate review generally “must complain to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion[,]” and “the trial court must rule or refuse to rule on the request, objection, or motion.” Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery Cnty., 365 SW.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2012); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Noel raised no complaint before the trial court regarding the division of the estate, the trial court’s exercise of discretion in dividing the estate, or the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. She did not object to the division or the award of attorney’s fees, nor did she file any motion related thereto. As a result, beyond evidentiary sufficiency, Noel did not preserve her arguments. See, e.g., Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) 5 (wife waived on appeal her claims regarding trial court’s valuation of 401(k) and court’s refusal to reimburse her separate estate because she did not present them to trial court); Legarreta v. Alvidrez, 631 S.W.3d 546, 549–51 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (husband did not raise argument before trial court as to its characterization of home as community property for purposes of division of estate, and, thus, it was not preserved for appellate review). C. We consider Noel’s evidentiary sufficiency argument—but it does not warrant reversal. On the other hand, in a civil case as to matters decided by the trial court, a party generally may raise an evidentiary sufficiency challenge for the first time on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d) (“In a civil nonjury case, a complaint regarding the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time on appeal in the complaining party’s brief.”). Here, the trial court (not the jury) awarded attorney’s fees and divided the marital estate. To the extent that Noel’s argument is an evidentiary sufficiency challenge, we consider it. See Williams, 646 S.W.3d at 545 (in context of default judgment granting divorce and dividing estate, complaint that property division was not supported by evidence could be raised for first time on appeal); see also Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 547–51 (Tex. 2018) (Devine, J., concurring) (concurring justices would have decided case on evidentiary sufficiency grounds; 6 “A trial court cannot divide the marital estate equitably without evidence of the extent of the community estate or its value”). In its 2022 decision in Williams, the Texas Supreme Court held that the failure to file a motion for new trial did not foreclose the ability to raise on appeal an evidentiary challenge to a default property division. 646 S.W.3d at 545 (“Theresa’s complaint that the trial court’s property division was not supported by the evidence is a sufficiency challenge that may be raised for the first time on appeal regardless of whether she also sought a new trial.”). As the Court explained, “legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not constitute independent grounds for asserting error” in the divorce context; instead, “they are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. Under the circumstances, the Court continued, “[t]o determine whether a trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to support its decision,” the court of appeals should consider: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and, if not, (2) whether the trial court’s division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. Applying that test to this record, the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion in dividing the estate. See id. That resolves this question. 7 First, it bears emphasizing that Noel does not assert that the award of attorney’s fees to Patrick (in which the trial court awarded $75,000 of the more than $200,000 that he sought) was unsupported by the evidence or unreasonable. She does not challenge the fee award itself—as opposed to its effect on the division of the marital estate. Under Texas law, attorney’s fees awarded as part of the division of marital property are not restricted to the prevailing party. Phillips v. Phillips, 296 S.W.3d 656, 673–74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied). Of course, an award of attorney’s fees must be reasonable and supported by evidence. Ayala v. Ayala, 387 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). This evidence includes “‘hours spent on the case, the nature of preparation, complexity of the case, experience of the attorney, and the prevailing hourly rates’ in the community.” Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 369 (quoting source omitted). Here, Patrick submitted an affidavit wherein counsel attested to his rates and years of experience. Counsel swore that the fees were reasonable in light of the case and that they were consistent with fees in the legal community for similar legal services. Patrick also attached to the affidavit an itemized statement of the legal services provided on his behalf, the amount of time his attorney spent on those services, and the corresponding charges. An award of attorney’s fees in a divorce action “may be supported solely by the attorney’s testimony,” id., and the 8 attorney’s affidavit here contains the information required to support the award. See Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). The record reflects that Patrick’s attorney spent considerable time on this case. As explained, Noel does not challenge the fee award itself. Instead, Noel argues that insufficient evidence supports the division of the estate, which, in total, was unfavorable to her, due to the fee award. She argues that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion in making its division. Her argument does not warrant reversal on this record. We look to whether the record contains “more than a scintilla of supportive evidence” to “sustain the challenged property division.” Vick v. Vick, No. 02-23-00436-CV, 2024 WL 5162469, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2024, no pet.). And on this record, the answer is yes. See Williams, 646 S.W.3d at 545; see also Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (A no evidence challenge fails if more than scintilla of evidence supports trial court’s just and right division of community property.). Noel acknowledges that, aside from attorney’s fees, the trial court, in dividing the marital estate, awarded her $36,985.97 and Patrick $28,990.86 in assets, while awarding her $29.511.50 and Patrick $20,741.48 in liabilities. These awards are supported—and Noel does not complain about them. 9 Indeed, the record contains evidence regarding the value of the marital assets and liabilities, and the trial court’s findings of fact confirm that the trial court considered that evidence when dividing the estate. Evidence of property values is essential to support a court’s just and right division of the community estate. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 331 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (record contained no evidence of the value of the marital residence or other property; thus, “trial court had insufficient evidence to divide the property equitably”); Sandone v. Miller-Sandone, 116 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (“Without the ability to determine the size of the community pie, [a court] can make no determination that the slices awarded to each spouse were just and right.”); Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d at 550 (Devine, J., concurring) (“A trial court cannot divide the marital estate equitably without evidence of the extent of the community estate or its value”). To be clear, Noel does not take issue with the trial court’s division of marital property aside from the fee award. And, as explained, she does not challenge the fee award itself; she does not assert that the fee award was unreasonable or unsupported. Her position rests on the notion that the court’s assessment of attorney’s fees against her rendered the overall division of the estate unjust (and to be precise on this point, unsupported by evidence) because it shifted the overall balance against her, despite the jury’s fault finding. See Young v. Young, 609 10 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980) (“[F]ault may be a consideration to be weighed in the division of property. This does not mean that fault must be considered in all cases where a divorce is granted on fault grounds.”). But the award of attorney’s fees had evidentiary support, as did the other aspects of the award, and Noel does not challenge the reasonableness or support of those fees or other award components. Noel preserved only a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. The question before us is not how we would have divided this estate. It is whether the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion. Because it did, we need not reach the second prong of the Williams analysis. See Williams, 646 S.W.3d at 545 (asking “whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and, if not, . . . whether the trial court’s division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”) (emphasis added). Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 11