Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00511-CV Carlos Alberto RENTERIA CORTEZ, Appellant v. Alondra PACHECO, Appellee From the 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023-0060-AG Honorable Robert E. Cadena, Judge Presiding Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2026 AFFIRMED This restricted appeal arises from a post-answer default divorce decree. Appellant Carlos Alberto Renteria Cortez challenges the decree on the grounds that he did not receive notice of the final hearing and that the evidence is insufficient to support portions of the relief awarded. Because Renteria has not demonstrated error apparent on the face of the record, we affirm. 04-25-00511-CV FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In June 2023, the Office of the Attorney General filed a suit affecting the parent child relationship concerning the two children of appellant Carlos Alberto Renteria Cortez and appellee Alondra Pacheco in the 83rd Judicial District Court of Val Verde County. Following a hearing at which Renteria did not appear, the trial court signed an order establishing parentage and appointing Renteria and Pacheco joint managing conservators of the children. The order also established Renteria’s child support obligation and contained possession and access provisions. The order identified Renteria’s email address as ****renteria511@gmail.com. 1 In August 2024, Renteria, acting pro se, filed a petition for divorce in Ector County. In a handwritten request for electronic court notices filed with his petition, Renteria provided an email address that he contends reads ****tenteria@gmail.com. In his handwritten divorce petition, he provided an address that he contends reads ****tenteria.511@gmail.com. The Ector County district clerk’s docket sheet identified his email address as ****tenteria511@gmail.com. The divorce proceeding was subsequently transferred to the 83rd Judicial District Court in Val Verde County and proceeded under the cause number of the existing SAPCR proceeding. Pacheco thereafter filed an answer and counterpetition for divorce. On January 2, 2025, Pacheco moved to set the divorce for a final hearing. The trial court set the final hearing for March 10, 2025. The automated certificate of electronic service reflects the motion and the order setting the hearing was sent to Renteria at ****renteria511@gmail.com. Renteria appeared pro se at the March 10 hearing and requested additional time to retain counsel. The trial court granted his request and indicated the final hearing would be reset. 1 Renteria’s email addresses have been partially redacted to protect his privacy. -2- 04-25-00511-CV On April 3, 2025, Pacheco filed another motion to set the case for final hearing. The certificate of service reflects the motion was served on Renteria at ****renteria511@gmail.com. The trial court signed an order resetting the final hearing for May 13, 2025. The automated certificate of electronic service reflects that the order was likewise sent to Renteria at ****renteria511@gmail.com. Renteria did not appear at the May 13 final hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of its file and stated that the e-file reflected the order setting the final hearing had been emailed to Renteria. The trial court stated it was satisfied that due process had been followed and proceeded with the hearing. Pacheco testified concerning the grounds for divorce, the parties’ children, child support, and the marital estate. She also testified that Renteria had physically assaulted her during the marriage. According to Pacheco, she filed criminal charges arising from the incident and Renteria pleaded guilty and paid a fine. Pacheco further testified that she and Renteria purchased a residence in Odessa during the marriage. On May 16, 2025, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce. Among other things, the decree dissolved the marriage, appointed the parties joint managing conservators of their children, established Renteria’s child support obligations, awarded Pacheco the Odessa residence, and included a finding of family violence. Renteria subsequently filed this restricted appeal. He contends he was denied due process because he did not receive notice of the May 13 final hearing and challenges several provisions of the final decree as unsupported by sufficient evidence. -3- 04-25-00511-CV ANALYSIS A. Restricted Appeal In his first issue, Renteria argues he satisfied the procedural requirements for pursuing a restricted appeal. Pacheco does not dispute Renteria’s entitlement to the restricted appeal procedure and we agree. To prevail in a restricted appeal, an appellant must establish that (1) he filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) he was a party to the underlying suit; (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the complained of judgment and did not timely file a post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497 (Tex. 2020); Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); In re B.H.B., 336 S.W.3d 303, 305 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied); see TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a), 30. The “face of the record” consists of all papers on file in the appeal, including the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 497; Paez v. Trent Smith Custom Homes, LLC, No. 04- 13-00394-CV, 2014 WL 1089751, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 19, 2014, no pet.). The record establishes, and the parties do not dispute, that Renteria timely filed his notice of restricted appeal, was a party to the underlying proceedings, did not participate in the May 13 final hearing that resulted in the divorce decree, and did not timely file a post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, Renteria satisfied the first three requirements for pursuing a restricted appeal. We therefore sustain his first issue to that extent and turn now to whether his remaining issues establish error on the face of the record. See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 497; Mireles v. Mireles, No. 04-13-00041-CV, 2013 WL 5948174, at *1 (Tex. App.— San Antonio Nov. 6, 2013, no pet.). -4- 04-25-00511-CV B. Notice In his second issue, Renteria contends the trial court violated his due process rights by conducting the May 13 final hearing without providing him notice of the setting. Specifically, Renteria argues that the record affirmatively demonstrates that notice of the May 13, 2025, final hearing was sent to an incorrect email address. Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires reasonable notice of a contested trial setting and permits notice to be served in accordance with Rule 21a. TEX. R. CIV. P. 245. A trial court’s failure to comply with the rules of notice deprives a party of the constitutional right to be present and voice his objections and is a violation of fundamental due process. Campsey v. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); Platt v. Platt, 991 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no pet.) (both citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1988)). Thus, when a party does not receive notice of a trial setting as required by Rule 245, a post-answer default judgment should be set aside. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d at 771; Platt, 991 S.W.2d at 484. It is generally presumed that a trial court hears a case only after proper notice has been given to the parties. Campsey, 111 S.W.3d at 771; Custom–Crete, Inc. v. K–Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, in a restricted appeal, the appellant bears the burden to rebut that presumption by affirmatively demonstrating lack of notice from the face of the record. Grant v. Grant, No. 04-12-00315-CV, 2015 WL 5438949, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 16, 2015, no pet.). “This burden may not be discharged by mere allegations, unsupported by affidavits or other competent evidence, that the appellant did not receive proper notice.” Campsey, 111 S.W.3d at 772. -5- 04-25-00511-CV Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a governs manner of service. When electronic service is required, a document must be served electronically through the electronic filing manager (“EFM”). TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a)(1). Electronic service is complete upon transmission of the document to the serving party’s electronic filing service provider. Id. at 21a(b)(3). A certificate of service constitutes prima facie evidence of the fact of service. Id. at 21a(e). Proper service under Rule 21a gives rise to a presumption that the document was received, which may be rebutted by evidence of nonreceipt. See Kuntze v. Hall, Nos. 10-12-00087-CV & 10-12-00186-CV, 2012 WL 5193226, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 18, 2012, pet. denied) (citing Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005)). The application of these principles is illustrated in Echartea v. Flores, 691 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). There, counsel changed law firms and notified opposing counsel of his new email address but failed to update his email address in the EFM. Id. at 776–77. Notice was subsequently served through the EFM at the address remaining on file, and counsel did not receive it. Id. Echartea argued that the serving parties should have known his contact information had changed based on email correspondence with his counsel’s new firm. Id. at 780-81. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Rule 21a was designed to avoid “confusion and disputes over service, including disputes over whether service was sent to the correct email address.” Id. at 780. The court further explained that even if the employees of opposing counsel’s firm had noticed the different contact information in Echartea’s attorney’s email signature, the serving parties were still required to serve him through the EFM at the email address on file. Id. at 781. Although they could have sent an additional copy to the different address, no rule or duty required them to do so. Id. -6- 04-25-00511-CV In this case, the record reflects that ****renteria511@gmail.com was repeatedly identified as Renteria’s electronic service address. The February 2024 SAPCR order identifies that email address for Renteria. The March 10 final hearing setting was electronically transmitted through the EFM to Renteria at that email address. The automated certificate of e-service identifies “Carlos Renteria Cortez” as the service contact, identifies ****renteria511@gmail.com as his email address, and reflects that the order setting the case for final hearing was “SENT” to that address. Renteria personally appeared at the March 10 hearing, which supports the presumption that he received notice of that setting at the email address to which it was sent. When the trial court subsequently reset the final hearing for May 13, notice of that setting was electronically transmitted to Renteria through the EFM to ****renteria511@gmail.com, the same electronic service address used for the immediately preceding setting at which Renteria appeared. Renteria nevertheless argues that ****renteria511@gmail.com was not his correct email address because handwritten legal documents he previously filed in Ector County contain different email addresses. Renteria contends those documents affirmatively establish that notice of the May 13 hearing was transmitted to the wrong address. We disagree. The appearance of different email addresses elsewhere in the record does not affirmatively establish that electronic service through the address maintained in the EFM was defective. See Echartea, 691 S.W.3d at 780–81. Indeed, Echartea found service through the EFM address effective even if the serving party knows the recipient is using another email address. See id. As previously noted, Rule 21a requires electronic service through the EFM at the email address on file, and the automated certificate generated through that process constitutes prima facie evidence of service. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a)(1), (e); Longoria v. Garcia, No. 13-23-00352-CV, 2025 WL 480811, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.); Echartea, -7- 04-25-00511-CV 691 S.W.3d at 779–81; Galvin v. Wendel, No. 13-23-00469-CV, 2024 WL 3980690, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.). Renteria does not contend nor does anything on the face of this record reflect that Renteria changed his designated EFM service contact before the May 13 setting. The post judgment record further undermines Renteria’s contention that the face of the record establishes EFM address was incorrect. After the trial court signed the final decree, Renteria retained counsel and filed a motion to extend post judgment deadlines under Rule 306a and a motion for new trial. The automated certificate generated in connection with Renteria’s own post judgment filing again identifies “Carlos Renteria Cortez” as a case contact at ****renteria511@gmail.com and reflects that the filing was transmitted to that address. Thus, the challenged address was identified as Renteria’s EFM contact before the May hearing, when notice of the May hearing was transmitted, and after judgment when his own counsel electronically filed a motion on his behalf. Renteria’s post judgment assertions of non-receipt do not establish otherwise. Renteria’s Rule 306a motion alleges that he “did not receive notice of the proceedings in this case prior to the entry of the Default Judgment.” He similarly asserted that the default judgment resulted from “a lack of notice of the proceedings, not from any fault or negligence” on his part. However, his motion was unsworn, and the record contains no affidavit, declaration, or testimony from Renteria denying receipt of the May 13 setting. Such unsupported allegations do not affirmatively demonstrate lack of notice or rebut the presumption arising from prima facie proof of service. See Galvin 2024 WL 3980690, at *2 (noting adequate evidence of “nonreceipt” may consist of an affidavit from the intended recipient attesting to the fact that the notice was not received); Campsey, 111 S.W.3d at 772 (explaining that presumption of notice may not be discharged by -8- 04-25-00511-CV mere allegations, unsupported by affidavits or other competent evidence, that the appellant did not receive proper notice); Kuntze, 2012 WL 5193226, at *8 (finding sufficient notice where appellant offered no evidence other than her own “bald assertions” that she was not properly served); Longoria, 2025 WL 480811, at *3 (finding unsworn claims that he did not receive notice insufficient proof that appellant did not receive notice at the e-mail address on file with the EFM); see also Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 744–45 (holding the presumption rebutted where the movant filed a sworn motion denying notice and testified at the new-trial hearing that he did not receive notice). At most, the different email addresses appearing in Renteria’s handwritten filings create conflicting information concerning the email addresses he used. They do not affirmatively establish that electronic service of the May 13 setting through the EFM was defective. Rather, the face of the record reflects that the May 13 setting was transmitted through the EFM to the same service address used for the immediately preceding setting at which Renteria appeared, that address remained Renteria’s EFM case contact after judgment, and the record contains no competent evidence rebutting the resulting presumption of service. Because Renteria has not affirmatively demonstrated lack of notice, he has not established error apparent on the fact of the record. Renteria’s second issue is overruled. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his third issue, Renteria challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting several provisions of the final decree. Specifically, he challenges (1) the characterization and award of the Odessa residence, (2) the evidence of the residence’s value, (3) the judgment for unpaid child support, and (4) the trial court’s finding of family violence. In the case of a post-answer default judgment as we have here, the plaintiff is required to offer evidence and prove all aspects of the claim in spite of the defendant’s non-appearance. In re Curnutt, 692 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tex. Spec. -9- 04-25-00511-CV Ct. Rev. 2024); Rouhana v. Ramirez, 556 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). The scope of review in a restricted appeal following a post-answer default judgment is the same as in an ordinary appeal. See Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997); In re Marriage of Butts, 444 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We review the trial court’s decisions regarding marital property and child support for abuse of discretion. Cruz v. Cruz, No. 04-17-00594-CV, 2018 WL 6793847, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 27, 2018, no pet.); Garza v. Garza, 217 S.W.3d 538, 548 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). The trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character that supports its decision. Garza, 217 S.W.3d at 549. “Legal and factual sufficiency challenges are not independent grounds of error in such cases; rather, they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Cruz, 2018 WL 6793847, at *4 (quoting Newberry v. Bohn-Newberry, 146 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).We must therefore review a challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by determining: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of that discretion. Garza, 217 S.W.3d at 549. 1. Characterization and Award of Residence Renteria first argues that the trial court erred by awarding Pacheco the Odessa residence because he alleged in his original divorce petition that he acquired the property before the marriage and that it was therefore his separate property. The record, however, contains evidence to the contrary. - 10 - 04-25-00511-CV Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a). A party seeking to overcome that presumption must establish the property’s separate character by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 3.003(b); Weed v. Frost Bank, 565 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied). At the final hearing, Pacheco testified that she and Renteria purchased the Odessa residence during their marriage for $162,993. Thus, the evidence before the trial court supported the community property presumption rather than rebutting it. Although Renteria had alleged in his petition that he acquired the residence before marriage, his pleading was not evidence of that allegation. See CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Tex. 2016); Ceramic Tile Intern., Inc. v. Balusek, 137 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). And because Renteria did not appear at the final hearing, he presented no evidence tracing the residence to separate property or otherwise rebutting the statutory presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Renteria nevertheless argues the trial court should have questioned Pacheco about the discrepancy between her testimony and the allegation in his petition before awarding her the determine liability and damages when a defendant fails to appear. See O’CONNOR’S TEXAS RULES—CIVIL TRIALS, ch. 7-A, § 4 (2026). Renteria points to no authority, and we have found none, that imposes on the trial court an obligation to develop evidence on behalf of an absent party at a post-answer default hearing. The burden to overcome the community property presumption remained Renteria’s. On the evidence presented, the trial court could reasonably characterize the residence as community property and include it in the marital estate. 2. Value and Division of the Residence Renteria also argues there was insufficient evidence of the residence’s value to permit the trial court to make a just and right division of the community estate. He emphasizes that the - 11 - 04-25-00511-CV $157,000.49 value relied upon at the hearing came from an appraisal district record rather than evidence of fair market value based on comparable sales. The record does not, however, contain a complete absence of evidence from which the trial court could determine the residence’s value and equity. Pacheco testified that the parties purchased the residence in December 2022 for $162,993. She also presented evidence that the Ector County Appraisal District valued the property at $157,000.49 and that the outstanding mortgage balance was $159,530.36. The appraisal and mortgage information were admitted into evidence without objection. We have recognized that an appraisal district valuation admitted without objection may constitute probative evidence upon which a factfinder may rely in determining the value of real property. See Freeze v. Ramirez, No. 04-18-00213-CV, 2019 WL 2014988, at *4 (Tex. App.— San Antonio May 8, 2019, no pet.). Thus, although Renteria argues other evidence would have provided a more accurate measure of fair market value, the trial court had before it evidence of the purchase price, appraised value, and outstanding indebtedness. That evidence permitted the trial court to reasonably determine that little or no equity existed in the residence. Moreover, the decree did not award Pacheco an unencumbered asset worth $157,000. The award was accompanied by the debt associated with the residence. In fact, Pacheco testified that she had been investigating refinancing the residence. The evidence further showed that Renteria was awarded two vehicles purchased during the marriage, including one with approximately $4,673 in equity, while Pacheco received a vehicle with no equity. Considering the evidence before the trial court and its broad discretion in making a just and right division, we cannot conclude the award of the residence to Pacheco constituted an abuse of discretion. - 12 - 04-25-00511-CV 3. Child-Support Arrearage Renteria next challenges the portion of the decree awarding a judgment for $28,698.32 in unpaid child support. He argues Pacheco offered insufficient evidence to establish the amount because the Attorney General’s balance report admitted at the hearing was unauthenticated and did not identify the parties by name. In the February 13, 2024, SAPCR order, the trial court had already ordered Renteria to pay $1,493 per month in child support and rendered judgment for $28,314 in retroactive child support through February 8, 2024. At the final hearing, Pacheco testified regarding that existing child- support obligation and introduced the Attorney General’s balance report reflecting an arrearage of $28,698.32. She testified that she received the report from the Attorney General and confirmed the amount reflected. By failing to appear at the hearing, Renteria waived any hearsay objection he might have had to the report. See Perry v. State, 957 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. ref’d) (discussing admission of attorney general summary reports as competent evidence of arrearages in spite of hearsay objection). Further, while the report did not identify the parties by name, it identified the same trial court cause number under which the SAPCR and divorce proceedings were pending. Thus, the report was not the sole evidence connecting the arrearage to Renteria. The existing SAPCR order established his obligation and prior arrearage, Pacheco identified the Attorney General report as reflecting the current arrearage, and the report corresponded to this cause. On this record, we cannot say the trial court’s judgment for $28,698.32 in unpaid child support was an abuse of discretion. 4. Family Violence Finally, Renteria challenges the trial court’s finding that family violence occurred during the marriage. He argues there was no documentary evidence establishing that he was convicted of - 13 - 04-25-00511-CV an offense arising from the incident or that the incident was anything more than “a minor dust- up.” Family violence may be defined as an act by one family member against another family member that reasonably places the second member in fear of imminent physical harm. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004. A finding of family violence under the Family Code does not depend upon proof of a criminal conviction. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in making a family violence finding if some evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support its decision. Interest of J.M.S., No. 05-22-01296-CV, 2024 WL 2287205, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2024, no pet.). Pacheco provided direct testimony concerning her allegations of family violence. She testified that Renteria confronted her while she was holding their daughter. According to Pacheco, she believed Renteria was going to hit her and raised her hand to protect the child. Renteria then grabbed Pacheco’s arm and “yanked” Pacheco and the child to the ground, causing Pacheco to fall on the child and injure her. Pacheco further testified that she reported the incident, that Renteria pleaded guilty, and that he paid a fine. A police incident report concerning the event and a complaint were also admitted into evidence. This testimony, along with the supporting documentation, constitutes evidence of the underlying conduct regardless of whether Pacheco separately produced additional documentation of a criminal conviction. On this record, we cannot conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s family violence finding. Renteria’s third issue is overruled. - 14 - 04-25-00511-CV CONCLUSION Because Renteria has failed to establish reversible error apparent on the face of this record, we affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce. H. Todd McCray, Justice - 15 -