Blayne Williams, Sr. v. Norman Bennett
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Date FiledJuly 17, 2026
Docket03-25-00606-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00606-CV
Blayne Williams, Sr., Appellant
v.
Norman Bennett, Appellee
FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-GN-18-006562, THE HONORABLE AMY CLARK MEACHUM, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se appellant Blayne Williams, Sr., appeals from the trial court’s dismissal for
want of prosecution. Williams raises seven issues that, while difficult to parse, mostly relate to
the substance of his underlying claims that were brought against appellee Norman Bennett, who
presided as a hearing examiner over Williams’s appeal of his suspension from the Austin Police
Department. 1 Because we ultimately conclude that Williams has not shown the trial court
abused its discretion by dismissing his claims for want of prosecution, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
1 Specifically, Williams argues that: (1) either Bennett’s or the trial court’s “Failure to
Prosecute Constitutes Palpable Injury”; (2) the administrative proceeding over which Bennett
presided constituted a collateral attack on an expunction order; (3) Williams could sue Bennett,
notwithstanding Bennett’s status as a government official; (4) Bennett did not have jurisdiction
to issue any order with respect to the underlying administrative proceeding; (5) certain portions
of the administrative record are improperly redacted; (6) Bennett allegedly engaged in racial
discrimination; and (7) Bennett violated Section 143.057 of the Local Government Code.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams is a former police officer who was suspended from his duties. Bennett
was the third-party hearing examiner who presided over Williams’s appeal of this suspension. In
2018, Williams sued Bennett in district court, challenging Bennett’s resolution of the appeal.
In February 2025, the trial court notified Williams that his suit was subject to
dismissal for want of prosecution. Williams filed a motion to retain the case, arguing that
“[g]ood cause exists as there are constitutional issues that warrant the Plaintiff . . . to clear his
name” and that dismissal would cause “irreparable harm.” In April 2025, a suggestion of death
was filed concerning Bennett, reflecting that Bennett had passed away on or about June 29, 2023.
On May 20, 2025, the trial court dismissed Williams’s case for want of prosecution. This
appeal followed.
II. DISMISSAL
Williams’s brief focuses almost exclusively on the propriety of Bennett’s actions
during the appeal of Williams’s suspension and seems to confuse a dismissal for want of
prosecution with a determination of the merits of his claims. But a dismissal for want of
prosecution is not ordinarily a judgment on the merits. Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 917
(Tex. 1968). When reviewing a dismissal for want of prosecution, “the central issue is whether
the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence.” MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex.
1997). Thus, to succeed on appeal, Williams was required to show—or at least argue—that he
exercised reasonable diligence in litigating his claims. See id.
“While we liberally construe pro se briefs, we are required to hold pro se litigants
to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and
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rules of procedure.” Ware v. Estate of Simpson, No. 03-14-00083-CV, 2015 WL 9436522, at *6
(Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn,
573 S.W.2d 181, 185–86 (Tex. 1978)). “To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair
advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel.” Id. A generous interpretation of
Williams’s brief suggests that Williams believes it was either the trial court’s or Bennett’s
obligation to timely move his case forward. But Williams does not cite any authority to support
an assertion that anyone other than the plaintiff is responsible for moving his case forward. See
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Nor have we found any authority that supports such a notion. Cf. Royal
Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) (“The plaintiff is ‘the master of the
complaint,’ and therefore controls much about h[is] suit.”).
Here, the case was on file for nearly seven years when the trial court dismissed it.
And during the two years immediately preceding the dismissal order, Bennett had apparently
been deceased. 2 Moreover, Williams’s motion to retain does not discuss what steps, if any, he
had taken to diligently prosecute his case. We conclude that Williams has failed to demonstrate
that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his claims for want of prosecution. See
MacGregor, 941 S.W.2d at 75. Because none of the other issues raised, if meritorious, would
entitle him to any relief from the dismissal for want of prosecution, we overrule all seven issues
Williams raises on appeal. See Henson v. Estate of Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987)
2 Bennett’s death does not deprive either us or the trial court of jurisdiction. See Coven
v. Dailey, 652 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (affirming dismissal
for want of prosecution where appellant “has done nothing . . . to cause the clerk to issue scire
facias requiring [appellee’s] legal representative to defend the suit”); Clark v. Turner,
505 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ) (“[A]lthough there has been a
suggestion of death of the defendant in a case, in the event that proper diligence is not used by
the plaintiff to revive the action, the court would be authorized in dismissing the suit for want
of prosecution.”).
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(declining to address issue raised by petitioner because that was not “[t]he dispositive question”);
Coven v. Dailey, 652 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“While
appellant brings to this Court seventeen separately stated points of error, we believe they all
reduce to the single issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion [by dismissing for want
of prosecution].”).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal for want of prosecution.
__________________________________________
Maggie Ellis, Justice
Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Ellis
Affirmed
Filed: July 17, 2026
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