Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00976-CV ——————————— JAMES HALE, Appellant V. LANESBOROUGH CORPORATION AND TEXAS SFI PARTNERSHIP 24, LTD., Appellees On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-66282 MEMORANDUM OPINION James Hale sued the owners of the apartment complex where he resided for negligence, alleging that persistent fire alarms damaged his hearing. After the suit had been pending for about seventeen months and was due to go to trial shortly, the owners moved for summary judgment, asserting that Hale lacked evidence that the breach of any duty they may have owed him caused his alleged hearing loss. The trial court granted summary judgment in the owners’ favor, and Hale appeals. We affirm. BACKGROUND When the owners moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the issue of causation, Hale opposed summary judgment on two grounds. He first asserted that he had designated an expert who would testify at trial that the persistent fire alarms caused his hearing loss, and he argued that this expert designation satisfied his summary judgment burden. But Hale did not file any expert evidence in admissible form as to causation, such as an affidavit made by the expert or excerpts from the deposition of the expert. Hale secondarily asserted that the trial court should not consider the owners’ motion because they did not move for summary judgment until after the deadline for doing so stated in the docket control order had expired. After the trial court granted no-evidence summary judgment to the owners, Hale moved for a new trial, reasserting the same arguments about causation that he made in opposition to summary judgment. Hale once again did not file any expert evidence in admissible form as to causation. His new trial motion was denied. 2 DISCUSSION Hale makes the same arguments he made below, asserting that the trial court erred in granting no-evidence summary judgment in light of his expert designation and because the owners’ motion was untimely. We reject both of his arguments. I. In response to a proper no-evidence summary judgment motion, the nonmovant has the burden to adduce some evidence as to each challenged element of his claim, and an expert designation is not evidence. The standard for no-evidence summary judgment is familiar and uncontroversial. When, as here, a party moves for summary judgment on the ground that no evidence supports a specified element of a claim, the trial court “must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).1 So, to avoid summary judgment here, Hale had to “adduce more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of fact” on the causation element of his negligence claim. Mason v. AMed-Health, Inc., 582 S.W.3d 773, 781 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). We, of course, review a summary judgment de novo. Id. at 780. It is settled that expert evidence of causation is required in a case like this one, in which a plaintiff asserts that an event caused him to develop a medical condition 1 We cite and quote the former version of the summary judgment rule because it was the one in effect when the trial court granted summary judgment. The rule has not been changed in any way that would matter here if the new version applied instead. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt. to 2026 change (“Other than the deadline changes, Rule 166a’s rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law.”). 3 when the alleged connection between the two is not of such a basic nature as to lie within the general experience or common sense of jurors. See, e.g., Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 665–68 (Tex. 2007) (general rule “has long been that expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors” but not required when causal connection between event and condition is of such basic nature that jurors may rely on their experience and common sense, as with auto wrecks and broken bones). Hale does not dispute that he needs expert evidence to prove the cause of his hearing loss. Instead, he argues that designation of an expert who will testify about causation at trial is evidence of causation, enough to defeat no-evidence summary judgment. Texas law is to the contrary. Pleadings and other papers, like summary judgment motions and responses, are not evidence. E.g., Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995) (pleadings generally not evidence even if sworn or verified); Adams v. Downey, 124 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (summary judgment motions and responses are not evidence). An expert designation is no different because it is only counsel’s representations about the expert’s proposed testimony. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.3, 195.5(a) (requiring disclosure of subject matter on which expert will testify and “general substance of the expert’s mental impressions and opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them” for retained experts). 4 Hale does not cite any decisions holding a party may rely on an expert designation to defeat no-evidence summary judgment, and we are aware of none. See Abdo v. Richmond Stop Food Mart, No. 01-20-00031-CV, 2021 WL 3358017, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (party cited no authority and court found none “allowing a party to use its own responses to a request for disclosure to defeat a motion for summary judgment”). Our court and others have rejected the idea that parties may rely on their disclosures as summary judgment evidence. See id.; Stauder v. Nichols, No. 01-08-00773-CV, 2010 WL 2306385, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant’s own responses to request for disclosure “do not constitute summary judgment proof”); accord Primary Media Grp., Inc. v. Nicholson, No. 05-24-01337- CV, 2026 WL 1699003, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same holding and collecting cases from other Texas courts saying likewise). Accordingly, the trial court had no choice but to grant no-evidence summary judgment because Hale did not adduce any evidence of the challenged element of causation. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). We therefore overrule Hale’s first issue. II. A trial court has broad discretion to hear a summary judgment motion filed after the deadline for doing so stated in a docket control order, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by doing so here. Trial courts have broad discretion to control the disposition of the cases before them with economy of time and effort for themselves, counsel, and litigants. Metzger 5 v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). When, as here, a trial court hears a summary judgment motion filed after the deadline stated in a docket control order, it has implicitly modified that deadline, and we will not reverse its decision to do so unless the appellant shows a clear abuse of discretion. Schoen v. Redwood Constr., Inc., No. 01-09-00371-CV, 2011 WL 478563, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Given the broad discretion a trial court has to control its docket, it generally does not abuse its discretion by hearing a motion for summary judgment after the deadline stated in a docket control order. See Choucroun v. Sol L. Wisenberg Ins. Agency–Life & Health Div., Inc., No. 01-03-00637-CV, 2004 WL 2823147, at *1– 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 9, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court did not err in allowing movant to seek summary judgment after docket control order’s deadline given trial court’s inherent authority to modify order); see also Priority One Title, LLC v. Andrado, No. 14-21-00379-CV, 2023 WL 2259092, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Choucroun and holding trial court “does not abuse its discretion by allowing a summary judgment motion to be filed after the deadline set in the court’s docket control order”). Hale has not explained why this general rule should not rule the day here, and we cannot discern any reason it should not. Hearing the no-evidence summary judgment motion later rather than sooner afforded him more time to obtain the 6 necessary evidence of causation. Though Hale claimed he had the necessary expert testimony at his disposal in his expert designation, he nonetheless did not adduce it in admissible form in response to the owners’ motion, even though doing so required him to do no more than file an affidavit from his designated causation expert. Hale does not offer any reason why he was unable to do so at this late point in the case. On this record, Hale has not shown that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion by hearing the owners’ motion. We overrule his second issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. David Gunn Justice Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan. 7