Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-25-00536-CV LaDonna Marie COLEMAN, Appellant v. LEADOFF ENTERPRISES, LLC d/b/a Diamond Association Management & Consulting, Appellee From the County Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025-CV-0147 Honorable William (Bill) G. Squires III, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2026 AFFIRMED Appellant LaDonna Marie Coleman appeals the county court’s order granting appellee Leadoff Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Diamond Association Management & Consulting’s motion to dismiss and the county court’s separate order granting Diamond’s attorney’s fees. Based on the law and record, we affirm. 04-25-00536-CV BACKGROUND Coleman, a pro se litigant, filed suit in Guadalupe County Justice Court, Precinct 2 against Diamond in connection with what she alleged were excessive fines and the general mistreatment of her by Diamond, the management company for her residential subdivision—The Village of Mill Creek—in Seguin, Texas. After Diamond answered and moved to dismiss under Rule 91a, Coleman amended her pleading changing her allegations to suggest she was being targeted for her emotional support chickens—and Diamond’s general dislike of her. Diamond moved to dismiss under Rule 91a again, and the justice court granted the motion. Coleman timely appealed to the county court. In the county court, Diamond again filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. After an August 20, 2026 hearing, the county court granted the motion and, thereafter issued a supplemental order granting Diamond’s request for attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 91a.7. This appeal followed. ORDER GRANTING RULE 91A MOTION TO DISMISS Coleman’s handwritten allegations in her original petition identify her claims as: excessive over fines, harassment, invasion of privacy, mental anguish, cruelty to the disabled, verbal abuse, misappropriation of authority, and discrimination. She amended her petition a few months later to allege Diamond began harassing her because it disliked her “emotional support” chickens and personally disliked her for reasons unrelated to any lack of compliance with HOA by-laws and fined her $515 in association fees. 1 Diamond moved to dismiss each of Coleman’s claims in the county court pursuant to Rule 91a. It identified them as: (1) harassment, (2) invasion of privacy, (3) mental anguish, (4) cruelty to the disabled, (5) verbal abuse, (6) misappropriation of authority (excessive fines), 1 She included, as an exhibit, her HOA account ledger reflecting $515 in unpaid association fees. -2- 04-25-00536-CV (7) discrimination, and (8) Diamond’s purported non-compliance with ADA rules. Diamond argued Coleman’s claims had no basis in law or fact because she failed to “cite any statute or legal precedent which outlines any cause [of action] for damages,” or otherwise “allege any facts that substantiate” the claims. 2 In opposition to the motion, Coleman argued Diamond was “guilty of selective enforcement” of homeowners’ association rules and that in the event Diamond presented evidence to the contrary, it was fabricating evidence. She did not amend her petition to add these allegations. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b) (permitting parties to amend challenged causes of action three days before hearing). 3 At the beginning of the hearing, the county court explained to Coleman how the proceeding would unfold and what she could expect. Coleman informed the court she had dropped all of her claims in her amended petition other than: (1) “unvalidated fining,” (2) “fabrication of evidence,” and (3) ADA violations. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5. The county court repeated these “claims” several times to ensure that those were the only claims Coleman asserted in her amended petition, and Coleman confirmed that was correct. Diamond argued Coleman’s claims failed as matter of law because Coleman “pled a series of labels and grievances,” but not a single cognizable claim and no facts to support her purported claims and otherwise reiterated its brief arguments on the fines and ADA claims. Diamond further 2 With respect to Coleman’s claim for misappropriation of authority (excessive fines), it contended Coleman’s own exhibits show her claim had no basis in law because she had not paid the $515 in fees she claimed to be owed. As to Coleman’s claim for purported ADA non-compliance, Diamond argued the claim had no basis in law because the rules in question only covered “public accommodations,” i.e., facilities open to the general public. 3 Coleman included a series of photographs in opposition to the motion that we may not consider in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 91a motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; see, e.g., 17714 Bannister v. TAS Envt’l. Svcs. LP, No. 05-22-00820-CV, 2023 WL 7401502, at *5 n.7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (photos may not be considered pursuant to Rule 91a.6). -3- 04-25-00536-CV contended it lacked notice of Coleman’s fabrication of evidence claim but, in any event, the claim was based on the penal code and not cognizable as a civil claim. 4 When the court inquired whether Coleman had any legal authority to support the existence of her claims under Texas law, she referred the court to (a) her motion for sanctions against Diamond, (b) her motion for summary judgment, and (c) her brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Specifically, she referred the court to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as federal caselaw that she cited in her sanctions motion as support for her contention that Diamond fabricated evidence in violation of the Texas Penal Code. 5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the county court granted the motion and dismissed Coleman’s claims explaining that even if the allegations supporting them were taken as true, Coleman was not entitled to legal relief because her claims were not recognized under Texas Law and did not entitle her to the relief sought. The court specifically noted dismissal was proper because Coleman failed to cite any statutes or legal precedent outlining the existence of her purported causes of action under Texas law. 6 The court also noted Coleman’s claim for fabrication of evidence was not a cause of action but a criminal offense, and further explained Coleman cited certain Federal Rules in support of her contentions not applicable to Texas cases. The county court also explained Coleman’s ADA-based claim had no basis in law because it addressed rules that only applied to public accommodations or facilities open to the general public inapplicable here. 4 Diamond did not move for a continuance in order to amend or withdraw its motion to dismiss to address the fabrication of evidence cause of action. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.5(b). 5 Diamond objected to the use of Coleman’s motions to find legal support to determine whether Texas recognized her claims, specifically arguing that the additional documents should not be considered because they included matters that were “not originally pled in either the original petition or the amended petition.” But the court did not rule on Diamond’s objection, Diamond did not reassert it, and it does not re-raise it here. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. 6 The court also correctly noted that Coleman had, nonsuited her other claims, but, for clarity, granted the motion on those as well because Coleman had not pointed the court to any authority as to the existence of those claims. -4- 04-25-00536-CV A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has “no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020). A claim has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; see, e.g., Carden v. Minton, Bassett, Flores & Carsey, P.C., No. 24-0834, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1851869, at *4 (Tex. June 26, 2026); Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. For example, a plaintiff’s cause of action lacks any basis in law if (1) the claim is not recognized by Texas law or (2) it is, but the plaintiff has alleged facts that defeat it. 7 Parker v. Ohio Dev., LLC, No. 04-23-00069-CV, 2024 WL 1864756, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 30, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 8 In deciding a Rule 91a motion, we accept nonconclusory factual allegations as pleaded— but not the plaintiff’s legal conclusions—and construe petition allegations liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, especially for pro se litigants. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Carden, 2026 WL 1851869, at *13; Li v. Pemberton Park Cmty. Ass’n, 631 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam) (stating courts should review and evaluate pro se pleadings with “liberality and patience”). In considering the motion, we “may not consider evidence” but must strictly decide the motion based on the substance of a plaintiff’s pleading along with a narrow class of exhibits attached to the pleading. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. Set forth in Rule 59 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the permissible exhibits are: notes, accounts, bonds, mortgages, records, and all other 7 And Rule 91a.1 “does not limit the universe of legal theories by which the movant may show that the claimant is not entitled to relief based on the facts as alleged.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 655. 8 A claim has no basis in fact “if no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. -5- 04-25-00536-CV written instruments that constitute “in whole or in part, the claim sued on.” 9 TEX. R. CIV. P. 59. We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo. Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. B. Analysis Here, we find it worth reiterating that we are compelled to review and evaluate Coleman’s pleadings with liberality and patience. See Li, 631 S.W.3d at 706. In conducting such a review in the Rule 91a context, the trial court’s role in developing the record for appeal can be critical to understanding exactly what claims a pro se is pursuing in their lawsuit. The county court here performed this critical role well. During the Rule 91a hearing, the county court went to great lengths to identify Coleman’s claims, with Coleman leading the way. Coleman plainly stated she had three causes of action: (1) “unvalidated fining,” (2) “fabrication of evidence,” and (3) ADA violations. She alleged in her amended petition that she was charged “unwarranted fines” because Diamond disliked her and her emotional support chickens. But without more, this does not support her contention that Diamond’s actions gave rise to a claim for relief recognized under Texas law. 10 Coleman argues she stated a claim for arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory enforcement under Texas Property Code § 202.004 because Diamond selectively enforced the Association’s bylaws and fining policy by penalizing her for conduct that was routinely ignored when committed by similarly situated neighboring homeowners. But, she makes no such allegations anywhere in her petition or amended petition, and nothing in those documents would 9 Coleman attaches an excerpt of unknown origin in large block-text, purporting to describe the limits of HOA powers without identifying any source, statute, date, or other matter. Nothing in the exhibit suggests that the text is a note, account, bond, mortgage, record, or other written instrument under Rule 59. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. She separately includes what appears to be a medical record print out suggesting she had recently undergone an infected right total knee revision arthroplasty. Although such a record might constitute a basis for damages, if proven to be proximately caused by Diamond’s purported actions, it does not address the cognizability of her claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 59. 10 Coleman’s pleading exhibit also shows she has not paid any fine. -6- 04-25-00536-CV suggest she was being subjected to selective enforcement. Although we must treat the filings of pro se litigants with liberality and patience, we may not apply a liberal construction of the petition’s allegations as a license to read into it a cause of action that it does not contain. See Li, 631 S.W.3d at 706; City of Madisonville v. Hernandez, No. 10-22-00151-CV, 2022 WL 17489755, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 7, 2022, pet. denied). That is precisely what we would be doing here if we agreed with Coleman. Nor are we aware of any legal support under Texas law for a fabricated evidence claim. As the county court correctly observed, fabricated evidence is a criminal offense, not a civil cause of action. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 37.09. As to Coleman’s claim for ADA non-compliance, Coleman’s petitions include no allegations other than a lone conclusory allegation of “cruelty to the disabled.” This vague conclusory reference, without more, does not entitle Coleman to relief. 11 We don’t doubt that Coleman feels she was mistreated by Diamond. And we are mindful that in the context of Rule 91a, Li compels us to avoid any requirements of talismanic language to state a claim where the substance of an issue is fairly presented. See Li, 631 S.W.3d at 704. Finally, we should only affirm a grant of a Rule 91a motion if the allegations—read with liberality and patience and taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them—do not entitle her to the relief sought. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. But the pleading of 11 During the hearing, Coleman explained the basis of the claim was Diamond’s sending her “certified letters” to her front door when it knew she had knee surgery and could not walk to her front door. These allegations do not appear in Coleman’s amended (or original) petition, and we may not consider them. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. But even if Coleman had included them, she has failed to show how bringing certified letters to her front door violated her rights under the ADA. See generally Jordan v. Tarrant Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 07-16-00034-CV, 2016 WL 4135219, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (describing disability discrimination claim under ADA); Hagood v. Cnty. of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d 515, 525 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (addressing reasonable accommodations in employment settings under ADA); Craig v. Beeville Family Practice, L.L.P., No. 13-10-00405- CV, 2012 WL 1656492, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 10, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (providing ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled in public accommodations). -7- 04-25-00536-CV a theory of liability not recognized under Texas law, without any factual allegations to support it, is a quintessential case of failing to state a claim without any basis in fact or law. Accordingly, Coleman’s contentions are overruled. 12 CONCLUSION We affirm the county court’s August 20, 2025 order granting Diamond’s motion to dismiss and its September 15, 2025 order granting Diamond’s attorney’s fees. Lori Massey Brissette, Justice 12 In parts of three sentences in her summary of argument and conclusion, Coleman challenged the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Diamond, explaining “[t]he trial court erred by . . . awarding attorney’s fees” to Diamond because the award was “predicated entirely on” the trial court’s erroneous dismissal of her claims, and we should vacate the award. Because Coleman failed to make any “appropriate citations to authorities” or otherwise provide any substantive analysis in relation to this issue, nothing is presented for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Haynes v. Haynes, No. 04-15-00107-CV, 2017 WL 2350970, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 31, 2017, pet. denied). Further, because we hold the trial court properly dismissed her claims, the trial court had authority to award attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7. It held a hearing in which evidence was presented as to the services performed, who performed the services, when the services were performed, the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and the reasonable hourly rate for performing the services. See Taylor v. Aspy, No. 04-21-00387-CV, 2023 WL 5257677, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 16, 2023, pet. denied). Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court’s abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. -8-