Full Opinion

Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed August 27, 2026. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00180-CV ROSALINDA E. ROMERO, Appellant V. TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND CORP., Appellee On Appeal from the 98th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-009170 MEMORANDUM OPINION In this appeal from an order granting a plea to the jurisdiction, we consider whether the Legislature intended § 122.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. We hold that it did not, and so we affirm the trial court’s order. BACKGROUND Rosalinda Romero began working for the Texas Permanent School Fund Corporation (the Fund) in 2007.1 On June 3, 2024, Romero reported for jury duty at around 8:00 a.m., but when she learned that her report time had changed to 1:30 p.m., she returned home to telework. After a break for lunch, Romero returned to the courthouse at around 12:50 p.m. but was soon discharged. She then drove home, where she worked from 3:30 to 4:00 p.m. When Romero entered her time for the day on the Fund’s time-tracking software, she logged the entire eight-hour day as jury duty. Later that month, the Fund discharged Romero. Romero sued the Fund, alleging in a single claim that it unlawfully terminated her employment for serving as a juror in violation of § 122.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Fund answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the Legislature did not clearly and unambiguously waive the Fund’s sovereign immunity for claims under § 122.001.2 Romero responded that the Legislature did so when it amended § 122.001 to cover employers generally instead of just “private” employers. The trial court granted the Fund’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. Romero appeals. DISCUSSION In a single issue, Romero argues that the trial court erred by granting the Fund’s plea because § 122.001(a) waives the Fund’s sovereign immunity. We hold that § 122.001 does not clearly and unambiguously do so.3 The Fund is “entitled to sovereign immunity to the same extent as any other 1 The Fund is a special-purpose governmental corporation that manages and invests the State’s permanent school fund. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 43.052; see also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (establishing the permanent school fund). 2 The Fund also argued that Romero had not alleged a claim for which immunity is waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021. 3 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“[A] statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.”). 2 state agency.”4 Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.5 When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.6 If a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity is allegedly implicated, as it is here, the waiver must be clear and unambiguous.7 To determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity, we may consult several aids to help analyze the statute for legislative consent to sue.8 Prior to 2019, § 122.001 stated that “[a] private employer may not terminate the employment of a permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror[.]”9 In 2019, the Legislature enacted two separate amendments to § 122.001. One amendment, SB 370, removed the word “private” before “employer.”10 The other, HB 504, retained the private employer designation but expanded protection to “grand jurors.”11 Both amendments were enacted and took effect on September 1, 2019.12 4 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 43.056(a). 5 Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004). 6 Id. at 226. 7 PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juvenile Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 301–02 (Tex. 2019); see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034. 8 Hillman v. Nueces Cnty., 579 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. 2019). 9 Act of May 17, 1985, 69th R.S., ch. 959, § 1, sec. 122.001, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3315 (emphasis added). 10 Act of May 14, 2019, 86th R.S., ch. 234, § 1, sec. 122.001, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 408, 408 (“An employer may not discharge ... any permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror[.]”). The amendment also expanded the scope of prohibited activities to include intimidation and coercion. Id. 11 Act of May 17, 2019, 86th R.S., ch. 356, § 1, sec. 122.001, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 657, 657 (“A private employer may not terminate the employment of a permanent employee because the employee serves as a juror or grand juror.”). 12 Because both amendments amend the same text, there are two operative versions of Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 122.001 (a) and (b). “[W]hen the Legislature passes two acts in the same session, we must construe the two acts in harmony with one another.” Wichita Cnty. v. Hart, 3 Section 122.001(a) does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Fund’s immunity. Nothing in either version mentions “immunity” or the ability to sue the State.13 While the Legislature intended to prohibit employees in general from being terminated for jury service, it did not clearly waive immunity for government employers in particular. Nor can the intent to prohibit certain acts be transformed into a waiver simply because the Fund falls within the meaning of one word— “employer” (in the SB 370 version). This is reinforced by (1) the prohibition against construing statutory terms in isolation,14 and (2) statutory aids that we use to identify a waiver in the absence of express language specifying that “immunity is waived.”15 Those statutory aids are: (1) whether the statutory provisions, even if not a model of clarity, waive immunity without doubt; (2) ambiguity as to waiver is resolved in favor of retaining immunity; (3) immunity is waived if the Legislature requires that the entity be joined in a lawsuit even though the entity would otherwise be immune from suit; (4) whether the Legislature provided an objective limitation on the governmental entity’s potential liability; and (5) whether the statutory provisions would serve any purpose absent a waiver of immunity.16 Here, all five factors weigh against a waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute neither waives immunity without doubt nor requires the State to be joined. Chapter 122 does not limit the government’s potential liability and would subject the State to 917 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. 1996). 13 Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 122.001 with TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152 (“A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract ….”) (emphasis added) and TEX. TAX CODE § 112.052(a) (“A person may bring suit against the state ….”). 14 Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014). 15 Hillman, 579 S.W.3d at 360. 16 Id. 4 indeterminate damage awards. The statue serves an important purpose absent waiver: prohibiting employers from taking certain unlawful acts against an employee for serving as a jury. And if there is any remaining ambiguity on the point, we resolve it in favor of retaining immunity. Romero argues that because the Legislature passed two amendments—HB 504 with the word “private” and SB 370 without it—the Legislature must have intended SB 370 to extend liability to non-private employers. And because the previous version of § 122.001 specified “private” employers, we should view the deletion of that word in SB 370 as a clear and unambiguous waiver of Texas PSF’s immunity. But deleting the word “private” cannot substitute for language clearly waiving immunity, for the reasons we’ve discussed. Neither can the interpretive canons on which Romero relies (surplusage and useless acts) make the statute clear, since “[c]anons of construction are unnecessary to construe a clear statute.”17 But even were we to apply those canons, we would not find a waiver. There are other viable readings that retain immunity while giving effect to every word. For example, “private” may refer only to privately held corporations, such that its absence in SB 370 would ensure Chapter 122’s protections extend to employees of publicly held corporations. It could even prohibit (as Romero argues) retaliation by government employers. But we need not express an opinion one way or the other, beyond this: the statute does not effect a clear and unambiguous waiver under either reading. Romero also directs our attention to SB 370’s “Author’s/Sponsor’s Statement of Intent” by Senator Kirk Watson.18 [Reply at 2] But it is a well-established rule that “we do not resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, such as legislative history,” when 17 See City of San Antonio v. Realme, 731 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. 2026). 18 See S. Comm. on State Affs., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 370, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019). 5 “a statute’s unambiguous language controls the outcome.”19 In this case, it would not be obvious to all other lawmakers reading the proposed bill (with or without the legislative history) that the amendment was intended to expand government liability to employees, especially in the absence of a fiscal note saying so.20 We believe that rule applies here. We overrule Romero’s issue. CONCLUSION The Legislature has instructed us that when governmental immunity is the issue, there is no “reading between the lines.” We affirm the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s plea to the jurisdiction. /s/ Scott A. Brister Scott A. Brister Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. (Farris, J., concurring). 19 Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Tex. 2017). 20 See Fiscal Note, Tex. S.B. 370, 86th R.S. (2019) (“No fiscal implication to the State is anticipated.”). 6