Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00282-CV Flavia Munos, Appellant v. Alejandro Macias, Appellee On appeal from the 13th District Court of Navarro County, Texas Senior Judge H. D. Black Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. D23-31526-CV JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Flavia Munos appeals from a take nothing judgment rendered after a jury trial in her trespass to try title suit against Alejandro Macias. In her sole issue, Munos asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We affirm. BACKGROUND For several years, Munos and Macias shared both a personal and professional relationship. They bought and sold real estate for profit. In December 2020, the property in dispute was purchased at a Navarro County foreclosure sale and titled in Munos’s name. The parties dispute whether Macias contributed a portion of the purchase price or whether Munos paid the full purchase price. In 2023, Macias filed a petition for divorce. Munos filed an answer and a counterclaim for a “Declaratory Judgment of Title Ownership of Real Property” asserting she is the owner in fee simple of the parcel of property at issue and that Macias unlawfully dispossessed her of the property. Because there was no marriage between the parties, Macias nonsuited his divorce suit. He also asserted that Munos’s declaratory judgment action was actually a trespass to try title claim, pleaded not guilty, and counterclaimed for relief under his own trespass to try title claim. He asserted that he owns a 45.73% interest in the property based on his contribution to the purchase price of the property and requested title in his name or partition. Additionally, he asserted that Munos breached her confidential relationship and requested imposition of a constructive trust on the property. Seventeen Munos v. Macias Page 2 months later, after obtaining new counsel, Macias nonsuited his trespass to try title claim. The trial court determined that Munos’s declaratory judgment claim was a trespass to try title claim1 and the case was heard by a jury. The jury found that there was a breach of a special trust or fiduciary relationship, or actual or constructive fraud, by Munos in relation to the property at issue. However, the jury found that Munos was not unjustly enriched by the breach of trust or fraud. Further, the jury answered “no” in response to the question, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Flavia C. Munos, has a superior title to ‘the property in question’ over the rival claimant, Alejandro Macias?” After considering the jury’s answers, the trial judge rendered judgment ordering “that the parties take nothing against each other” and taxed costs against the party incurring same. Munos filed her notice of appeal. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT In her sole issue, Munos contends that the jury’s finding that her deed does not show a title superior to Macias’s claim is not supported by the evidence as a matter of law. She argues that no reasonable juror would conclude that her “Sheriff Tax Deed is not superior title to [Macias’s] claim of title.” 1 See Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826, 836 (Tex. 2021) (held that a party does not turn a trespass to try title dispute into a Declaratory Judgment action through artful pleading, and a party does not forfeit its trespass to try title action by inartfully naming it); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 783; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001. Munos v. Macias Page 3 Therefore, she asserts, the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Standard of Review A trial court may disregard a jury’s verdict and render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) if a jury’s finding has no support in the evidence or if a directed verdict would have been proper. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV under a legal- sufficiency standard. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989). A party attacking the legal sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding upon which it had the burden of proof must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of its proposed disposition. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). In reviewing such a matter-of-law challenge, we employ a two-part test. We first examine the record for evidence that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Id. If there is no evidence to support the finding, we then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. A proposition is established as a matter of law when a reasonable fact finder could draw only one conclusion from the evidence presented. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at Munos v. Macias Page 4 814-16. The final test for legal sufficiency must always be “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. at 827. Applicable Law In a trespass to try title suit, when the defendant pleads “not guilty,” the defendant admits possession of the subject property and claims superior title. TEX. R. CIV. P. 790; Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 107 S.W.2d 564, 569-70 (Tex. 1937). The burden of proof is then on the plaintiff to establish that the plaintiff has a title superior to the defendant’s title. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex. 1994). In a trespass to try title action, a plaintiff may prove legal title by establishing: (1) a regular chain of title of conveyances from the sovereign to the plaintiff; (2) a superior title to that of the defendant out of a common source; (3) title by limitations; or (4) possession that has not been abandoned. Brumley, 616 S.W.3d at 832. Where the plaintiff relies on record title, she has the burden of proving superior title from the sovereign or from a common source with the defendants. See Gillum v. Temple, 546 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Discussion Here, as evidence of her title, Munos presented a Sheriff’s Tax Deed naming her as purchaser of the property at a Navarro County, Texas tax Munos v. Macias Page 5 foreclosure sale. Macias never claimed to have record title, therefore, title from a common source cannot be shown. If no common source has been agreed to or shown, and the plaintiff relies on record title, she has the burden of tracing title all the way back to the sovereign. See Coleman v. Littles, 214 S.W.2d 678, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1948, no writ). To prove superior title from the sovereign, Munos was required to prove a regular chain of conveyances beginning with a patent from the state and ending with a deed conveying the land to Munos. See Jeffus v. Coon, 484 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1972, no writ). Munos provided only the 2020 Sheriff’s Tax Deed naming her as grantee because she was the highest bidder in a tax sale to satisfy a judgment in favor of Navarro County taxing units against the previous title holder.2 A sheriff’s tax deed establishes a link in the chain of title beginning with the judgment debtor. See Fink, 123 S.W.2d at 384-85. However, Munos made no attempt to show a regular and continuous chain of conveyances back to the sovereign. See Kilpatrick v. McKenzie, 230 S.W.3d 207, 211-14 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Because Munos failed to show either title emanating from a common source or title from the sovereign she is not entitled to recover. See 2 We note that Munos did not produce as evidence the decree of foreclosure or the order of sale to establish a valid divestiture of title out of the judgment defendant through a judicial foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. See Fink v. Grevsgard, 123 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1938, writ ref’d). Munos v. Macias Page 6 Coleman, 214 S.W.2d at 679. Munos’s sheriff’s deed and her failure to show either a continuous chain of conveyances back to the sovereign or title from a common source support the jury’s finding that she did not prove a superior title in the property. See Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Gillum, 546 S.W.2d at 364. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Munos’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We overrule Munos’s sole issue. CONCLUSION Munos did not prove superior title to the property, thus failing to meet her burden on her trespass to try title claim. See Brumley, 616 S.W.3d at 832. Therefore, the trial court’s take-nothing judgment against Munos vests title in Macias. See Hejl v. Wirth, 343 S.W.2d 226, 226 (Tex. 1961) (“If the plaintiff under the circumstances fails to establish his title, the effect of a judgment of take nothing against him is to vest title in the defendant.”). We affirm the trial court’s judgment. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 30, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06 Munos v. Macias Page 7