Ovintiv USA, Inc F/K/A Petrolegacy Energy II, LLC and XTO Holdings, LLC v. High Noon Resources, LLC

Opinion filed July 10, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-21-00103-CV __________ OVINTIV USA, INC. F/K/A PETROLEGACY ENERGY II, LLC 1 AND XTO HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellants V. HIGH NOON RESOURCES, LLC, et al., Appellees 2 On Appeal from the 118th District Court Martin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 7302 OPINION 1 Post-submission, PetroLegacy Energy II, LLC merged with Ovintiv USA, Inc. and Ovintiv USA, Inc. became the surviving entity. We have substituted Ovintiv USA, Inc. as the successor to PetroLegacy’s claims pursuant to PetroLegacy’s motion. All references in this opinion to “PetroLegacy” refer to the claims that PetroLegacy assigned to Ovintiv USA. All references in this opinion to “Appellants” are to Ovintiv USA, Inc. f/k/a PetroLegacy Energy II, LLC and XTO. 2 There are numerous Appellees in this appeal. Those filing briefs in this appeal included: 1) Element Petroleum Properties, LLC; 2) Jase Minerals, LP and Jase Family, Ltd. (Jase); and 3) Earle H. Chandler, Jr., Frederick H. Chandler, Tommy Sue Chandler Black, Mary Grace Chandler McFarland, John Franklin Childress, Frances Childress Ross, 5Ross LP, Wayne Bissett, and James H. Chandler (the Chandler Appellees). Post-submission, Element assigned its claims to High Noon Resources, LLC. We have substituted High Noon Resources, LLC as the successor to Element’s claims pursuant to Element’s motion. All references in this opinion to “Element” refer to the claims that Element assigned to High Noon Resources. The Chandler Appellees have joined in, and adopted by reference, Element’s Appellee’s brief in its entirety.  This is an appeal from a summary judgment. It concerns mineral conveyances that occurred in 1958 and 1962. It began as a suit to interpret three mineral deeds executed on the same date in 1962. The grantors in each of the deeds conveyed to the grantee “an undivided one-twenty-fourth (1/24th) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands.” At the time that the grantors executed the three 1962 mineral deeds, they each owned more than a 1/24 interest in the mineral estate; they each also owned an additional undivided 1/24 executive right interest. This case concerns the disposition of the collective 1/8 additional executive interest of the three grantors to the 1962 mineral deeds—did they convey it to the grantee in the 1962 mineral deeds, or did they continue to possess it after the conveyance? The trial court determined that the grantors retained the additional executive interest (which it labeled “the undivided 1/8 leasehold interest”) after the 1962 mineral deeds, and that Appellee Element Petroleum Properties LLC is the successor-in-interest of that 1/8 leasehold interest. This appeal also concerns a secondary question—the nature of a royalty interest retained in a 1958 mineral deed wherein the parties used a “double fraction” to describe the reserved interest: “one-fourth (1/4th) of the usual one-eighth (1/8th) royalty (and Grantors shall be entitled to 1/4th of the 1/8th royalty irrespective of the amount of royalty actually provided for in any lease executed by Grantee, its successors or assigns).” We characterize this dispute as “secondary” in nature because Appellants contend that a construction of the 1958 mineral deed was not properly presented to the trial court for resolution. The secondary dispute focuses on the question of whether the grantors in the 1958 mineral deed retained a fixed or floating royalty interest. The trial court determined that the grantors retained a fixed royalty interest. 2  Appellants bring three issues that challenge the trial court’s rulings. We affirm. Background Facts On August 6, 1957, E. H. Chandler and William A. Childress acquired an undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate of the C. C. Slaughter Ranch,3 consisting of over 25,000 acres in Martin County. Chandler4 and Childress also acquired the surface estate of the C. C. Slaughter Ranch in the 1957 deed. On August 1, 1958, Chandler and Childress executed a mineral deed wherein they conveyed an undivided 1/4 interest in the mineral estate of the C. C. Slaughter Ranch to High Crest Realty Company. Chandler and Childress also conveyed in the same deed to High Crest the executive right to lease Chandler’s and Childress’s retained 1/4 interest in the mineral estate. The 1958 mineral deed to High Crest contained the following reservation: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, Grantors shall be entitled to receive one- fourth (1/4th) of the cash bonus for any such lease, one-fourth (1/4th) of the delay rentals, and one-fourth (1/4th) of the usual one-eighth (1/8th) royalty (and Grantors shall be entitled to 1/4th of the 1/8th royalty irrespective of the amount of royalty actually provided for in any lease executed by Grantee, its successors or assigns), one-fourth (1/4th) of any shut-in gas royalty or penalty royalty, or other payment paid in lieu of actual production and marketing. As noted previously, this reservation presents a secondary issue in this case—did Chandler and Childress reserve a fixed 1/32 royalty, or did they reserve a floating royalty of one-fourth of whatever royalty was specified in a future lease? Element and the other Appellees assert that Chandler and Childress reserved a fixed 1/32 royalty in the 1958 mineral deed and that they conveyed an “excess royalty” to High All references to “the C. C. Slaughter Ranch” are to the tract of over 25,000 acres described in 3 the 1957 deed. 4 All references to “Chandler” are to E. H. Chandler. 3 Crest. Element described the “excess royalty” in its original petition as “the right to royalties over and above the usual 1/8 that might be provided for in any oil and gas lease covering the 1/4 interest in the Minerals retained by Chandler and Childress.” After executing the 1958 mineral deed to High Crest, Chandler and Childress conveyed to third parties all interests retained by them in the 1958 mineral deed. Those interests are not relevant to this suit. Instead, the interests that are in controversy arise from those that Chandler and Childress conveyed to High Crest in the 1958 mineral deed. As set forth below, Chandler and Childress later reacquired a portion of the interests that they conveyed to High Crest in the 1958 mineral deed. On December 29, 1961, High Crest executed a mineral deed wherein it conveyed one-half of all rights it acquired in the 1958 mineral deed to Coronet Investment Company, one-quarter to Chandler, and one-quarter to Childress. By virtue of this 1961 mineral deed, Chandler and Childress collectively reacquired a 1/8 interest in the mineral estate and a 1/4 interest in the executive rights to the minerals. On March 10, 1962, Chandler and Childress conveyed by mineral deed to Wayne Chandler, Jr. and William E. Chandler one-third of their interests (collectively, an undivided 1/24 interest in the mineral estate and a 1/12 interest in the executive rights). On April 7, 1962, Wayne and William conveyed all their interests (collectively, an undivided 1/24 interest in the mineral estate and a 1/12 interest in the executive rights) to Excuderunt, Inc. After these conveyances, Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt each owned a 1/12 interest in the executive rights and an undivided 1/24 interest in the mineral estate. On October 31, 1962, Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt each executed mineral deeds in favor of General Crude Oil Company wherein each of them 4 conveyed “an undivided one-twenty-fourth (1/24th) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Martin County.” The “described lands” consisted of tracts of approximately 7,000 acres, which included a portion of the C. C. Slaughter Ranch.5 The initial question to be resolved in this appeal focuses on these three mineral deeds executed on October 31, 1962. As previously noted, in addition to the 1/24 mineral interest that Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt each owned, they also each owned a 1/12 undivided interest in the executive rights. Simply put, we must determine whether Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt conveyed their additional, collective 1/8 executive interest along with the collective 1/8 mineral interest that they conveyed to General Crude. We will refer to this additional 1/8 executive interest as “the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest.” We note in this regard that the trial court described the disputed 1/8 executive interest as the “undivided 1/8 leasehold interest” in the operative interlocutory order granting Element’s motion for partial summary judgment. As set forth below, the first issue in this appeal concerns who owned the disputed 1/8 executive right as a result of the 1962 mineral deeds and thereby had the right to lease it for production. With respect to the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest, Element had leases from successors-in-interest of Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt (the grantors in the 1962 mineral deeds). PetroLegacy had leases from successors-in-interest to General Crude (the grantee of the 1962 mineral deeds). Element filed the underlying suit solely against PetroLegacy asserting several causes of action based on PetroLegacy’s claim that Chandler, Childress, and Excuderunt conveyed the 5 The property descriptions in the 1962 mineral deeds from Chandler and Excuderunt are identical; they describe conveyed tracts of 7,009.6 acres. The property description in Childress’s 1962 mineral deed is slightly different, and the tract that it conveyed was larger—7,280 acres. 5 disputed 1/8 leasehold interest to General Crude when they conveyed their collective 1/8 interest in the mineral estate in the 1962 mineral deeds. PretroLegacy filed a counterclaim against Element asserting a claim for trespass to try title. Early in the litigation, Element filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that it held superior title to the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest. PetroLegacy subsequently filed a motion to abate and to compel joinder seeking an order requiring Element to join all successors-in-interest to Chandler and Childress under the 1958 deed with respect to Element’s excess royalty claim. In response, Element asserted that it only sought a declaration concerning its own rights under the 1962 mineral deeds. The trial court granted PetroLegacy’s initial motion to abate and compel joinder. Element filed an amended petition wherein it joined numerous “Rule 39 Defendants,” including Appellant XTO, the majority of the Chandler Appellees, and Jase. XTO entered its appearance in the underlying proceedings by filing a general denial and a plea of “not guilty” to Element’s claim for trespass to try title. Jase entered its appearance by filing a general denial. Element later filed a motion asking the trial court to lift the abatement on the basis that Element had added all the parties that the trial court specified in its joinder order. In response, PetroLegacy asserted that Element had not complied with the trial court’s order because it had not joined all necessary parties. PetroLegacy also filed an amended motion to dismiss the suit based on its contention that Element had not joined all necessary parties. The trial court ultimately entered an order lifting its earlier abatement. The trial court also entered an order specifying that Element was only required to join 1) XTO; 2) the lessors of the leases identified in Element’s pleading; 3) and “any and all persons claiming any part of the undivided 1/4 non-executive mineral estate reserved in the High Crest Deed whose interests fall within the disputed acreage subject to Element’s Leases.” 6  Jase filed a motion for partial summary judgment wherein it sought a declaration that the grantors in the 1958 High Crest deed only reserved a fixed 1/32 royalty interest. In response, PetroLegacy filed another motion to abate and request for an order compelling Jase to join necessary parties. PetroLegacy asserted that the relief requested by Jase in its motion for partial summary judgment concerned mineral interest owners in over 25,000 acres and that all of them needed to be joined because their interests might be affected. Jase filed a second motion for partial summary judgment wherein it attempted to limit the scope of its requested relief with respect to PetroLegacy’s joinder contention. XTO filed a motion for summary judgment wherein it asserted that, in the 1962 mineral deeds, the grantors conveyed to General Crude the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest, and that it thereby owned the interest. XTO additionally noted in its motion for summary judgment that it “adopts and incorporates by reference” PetroLegacy’s motion for summary judgment. In this regard, XTO was PetroLegacy’s lessor. PetroLegacy filed its motion for summary judgment on the same day that XTO filed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing on the pending matters on December 2, 2019. The first matter considered by the trial court at the hearing was PetroLegacy’s subsequent motion to abate the case pending its request for Jase to join additional parties based upon the relief requested in Jase’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court then considered the pending motions for summary judgment, including PetroLegacy’s contention that there was no basis for granting Jase’s motion for summary judgment because Jase had not pleaded a claim for affirmative relief. The trial court ultimately denied PetroLegacy’s subsequent motion to abate for the joinder of additional parties with respect to Jase’s motion for partial summary judgment. It also granted Element’s motion for partial summary judgment, denied 7 PetroLegacy’s and XTO’s motions for summary judgment, and granted Jase’s motion for partial summary judgment. Afterwards, the trial court entered a final judgment that incorporated the three previously referenced interlocutory orders. Based upon the parties’ stipulation of damages, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Element against PetroLegacy for $471,837. The trial court also ordered PetroLegacy to pay attorney’s fees of $350,000 to Element, and to pay Element’s future attorney’s fees in the event of an appeal. Analysis Issues on Appeal Appellants jointly filed a brief in this appeal. Their first issue concerns the interpretation of the 1962 mineral deeds with respect to the disposition of the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest. They contend that the trial court erred by granting Element’s motion for summary judgment and denying their motions for summary judgment on this issue. In their second issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred by denying PetroLegacy’s motion to abate and compel the joinder of all interest holders that claimed under the 1958 High Crest deed. In their third issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in declaring that the 1958 High Crest deed reserved a fixed royalty. They assert two sub-issues in support of their third issue: 1) that no party asserted an affirmative claim for relief seeking a construction of the 1958 High Crest deed; and 2) the plain language of the deed reserved a floating royalty. Ownership of the Disputed 1/8 Leasehold Interest Appellants’ first issue focuses on the correct interpretation of the 1962 mineral deeds and the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of Element and denying summary judgment for PetroLegacy and XTO on the matter. We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Lujan v. Navistar, 8 Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).6 When the parties file competing summary judgment motions and the trial court grants one and denies the other, “we consider the summary judgment evidence presented by both sides, determine all questions presented, and if the trial court erred, render the judgment the trial court should have rendered.” Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. 2015). We review a trial court’s construction of a deed de novo. See Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff, 596 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. 2020). An appellate court may only construe a deed as a matter of law if it is unambiguous. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 874 (Tex. 2018) (citing J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2005)). If a deed is worded in such a way that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning, then the deed is not ambiguous. Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 601 (Tex. 2018). Here, the parties do not contend that the 1962 deed is ambiguous, nor do we determine it to be ambiguous. Our task when construing an unambiguous deed is to “ascertain the intent of the parties from the language in the deed” as expressed within the “four corners” of the instrument. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). The four- corners rule requires the court to ascertain the intent of the parties solely from all of the language in the deed. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. 2017) (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461). The intent that governs is not the intent that the parties 6 We note that the Texas Supreme Court has recently revised Rule 166a. Although the “rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law,” it has resulted in a renumbering of the provisions of the rule. See Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The amendments to this rule only apply to motions for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026. Because the motions for summary judgment in this case were filed prior to that date, we refer to the rule in effect at the time the motions were filed. See id. 9 meant but failed to express, but rather the intent that is expressed. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462. As stated in Altman v. Blake: There are five essential attributes of a severed mineral estate: (1) the right to develop (the right of ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, (5) the right to receive royalty payments. 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986). The first issue that we must address in this case focuses on the executive right—the right to lease. See id. The nature of the interest conveyed by a deed is ascertained from the language of the deed itself. See Endeavor Energy Res., LP v. Trudy Jane Anderson Testamentary Tr., by & Through Anderson, 644 S.W.3d 212, 223–24 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. denied). The grantors to the 1962 mineral deeds each conveyed “an undivided one-twenty-fourth (1/24th) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Martin County.” PetroLegacy and XTO assert that the grantors to the 1962 mineral deeds also conveyed their additional 1/24 executive interests that they each owned because they did not expressly reserve them in the deeds. They base their contention on the holding in two opinions from the Eighth Court of Appeals: Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 846, 849–50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied) and Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied). These two opinions are nearly identical, and they address the same conveyance. Because of the similarity of the opinions, we will restrict our discussion to Anadarko. In Anadarko, the grantor owned a 1/3 mineral interest and 4/9 executive right. 393 S.W.3d at 848. According to the opinion, the grantor conveyed the 1/3 mineral 10 interest in deeds that were silent as to the 4/9 executive right. 7 Id. The Eighth Court of Appeals concluded that “when a mineral interest is conveyed, the executive right incident to that interest is also conveyed unless specifically reserved. Accordingly, unless executive rights are expressly reserved or excepted in a deed, they pass under the deed, even if their proportion is greater than the mineral interest conveyed.” Id. at 850 (internal citation omitted). Element acknowledged at oral argument that the holding in Anadarko is contrary to the trial court’s interpretation of the 1962 mineral deeds. The court in Anadarko based its decision on two Texas Supreme Court opinions: Day & Co., Inc. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) and Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011). PetroLegacy and XTO also rely on Day and Lesley in support of their first issue. Day involved a conveyance wherein the grantor, “Day, Inc.” (as denoted by the court), owned all of the surface, one-half of the minerals and all of the executive rights to an eighty-acre tract. 8 786 S.W.2d at 668. Day, Inc. conveyed ten of the eighty acres to the Shoafs, reserving an undivided one-quarter interest in the minerals and excepting the one-half of the mineral estate that was previously reserved by Day, Inc.’s predecessors-in-interest. Id. However, the conveyance of the ten acres was silent with respect to the executive rights held by Day, Inc. Id. Day, Inc. asserted that it owned three-fourths of the executive right to the minerals of the ten-acre tract after the conveyance, including the executive right attributable to the one-half interest in the minerals reserved by Day, Inc.’s predecessors-in-interest. Id. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that The opinion in Anadarko did not set out the exact language of the deed at issue. However, 7 Element submitted a certified copy of the deed at issue in Anadarko as an exhibit to its first amended motion for summary judgment. 8 Day, Inc.’s predecessors-in-interest, Keaton and Young, reserved one-half of the mineral estate in their conveyance to Day, Inc. Day, 786 S.W.2d at 668. 11 Day, Inc. conveyed the executive right attributable to the one-half interest in the minerals held by its predecessors-in-interest “because Day, Inc. did not reserve or except such interest from the conveyance.” Id. at 669–70. The court acknowledged the “common law property principle which states ‘that a warranty deed will pass all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are reservations or exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed.’” Id. at 668 (quoting Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1956)); see Rahlek, Ltd. v. Wells, 587 S.W.3d 57, 64 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied) (Generally, deeds are construed to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument will allow. (citing Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963))). Thus, Day, Inc. conveyed the executive right attributable to the one- half mineral interest previously reserved by its predecessors when it executed a general warranty deed to the Shoafs for the ten-acre tract without a reservation or exception of such interest from the conveyance. Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669–70. Lesley, a case that originated from within this court’s geographic territory, involved a developer, Bluegreen, that owned the entire executive right in the 4,100-acre mineral estate of a subdivision. 352 S.W.3d at 481. Bluegreen conveyed lots in the subdivision to lot owners in general warranty deeds that were silent with respect to the executive right held by Bluegreen. Id. at 481–82, 486. The Texas Supreme Court in Lesley held that the circumstances were “[v]ery similar” to those in Day, and that Bluegreen conveyed the executive right attributable to the entire mineral estate to the lot owners because it did not reserve the executive right in its deeds to the lot owners. 9 Id. 9 Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court in Lesley addressed the nature of the duty that the owner of the executive right owes to the non-executive interest owner, which the court noted was one of the “principal” issues in the case. Id. at 487–92; see Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 652–53 (Tex. 2019); KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 81–82 (Tex. 2015). In Nicholson and 12  Appellants cite Day and Lesley for the proposition that “[w]hen a mineral interest is conveyed, appurtenant executive rights are also conveyed unless expressly reserved, even if the quantum of the executive right exceeds the fraction of the mineral interest being conveyed.” This statement reflects the outcome of Day and Lesley, but it does not accurately reflect the basis for that outcome. The critical question decided in Day was the disposition of the executive right attributable to the one-half mineral interest reserved by Day, Inc.’s predecessors- in-interest. Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669; see Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486 (discussing Day). As we noted in Rahlek, a deed will pass whatever interest the grantor has in the land, unless it contains language showing a clear intention to grant a lesser estate. 587 S.W.3d at 64 (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)). The executive right attributable to the one-half mineral interest reserved by Day, Inc.’s predecessors-in-interest passed to the Shoafs because Day, Inc. executed a deed that did not show an intent for Day, Inc. to grant a lesser estate than what Day, Inc. owned in the ten-acre tract other than the 1/4th mineral interest that Day, Inc. reserved for itself. Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669–70; see Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486. Reservations and exceptions are methods by which the grantor may “exclude[] for itself a portion of that which would otherwise fall within the deed’s description of the interest granted.” Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 748. But reservations and exceptions are not the only way for a grantor to convey a lesser estate. Id. “A grantor may withhold for itself a part of its estate either by granting the entire estate but reserving the portion it desires to retain or by granting only the portion it desires to convey.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (There is a “difference between a deed that conveys only a partial interest and a deed that conveys an entire Bradshaw, the Texas Supreme Court expounded upon its holding in Lesley with respect to the duty owed by the owner of the executive right. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d at 652–53; Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d at 81–82. 13 interest but reserves a part of that interest.” (quoting Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 806 (Boyd, J., dissenting))). Applying this principle from Piranha Partners to the 1962 mineral deeds at issue here, the grantors expressed their intent to convey a lesser estate because they only granted a portion of what they owned: “an undivided one- twenty-fourth (1/24th) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Martin County.” Appellants assert in their reply brief that Piranha Partners is inapplicable to the 1962 mineral deeds because it requires the court to give priority to the granting clause over other clauses in the deeds. Specifically, Appellants point to the following clause in the 1962 mineral deeds: TO HAVE AND TO HOLD The above described property and easement10 with all and singular the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunder or any wise belonging to the said Grantee herein its successors, and assigns forever, and Grantor does hereby bind [itself/himself], [its/his] heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns to warrant and forever defend all and. Appellants contend that the additional 1/24 executive interest owned by each of the grantors to the 1962 mineral deeds was an appurtenant right to their respective 1/24 mineral interest, and as such, was conveyed in the 1962 deeds by virtue of the above-quoted provision. Appellants’ reliance on the “to have and to hold” clause is misplaced. This provision is typically referred to as a general warranty clause. See Aloysius A. Leopold, 5 Texas Practice Series: Land Titles And Title Examination § 34.17 (3d ed. 2025) (Form—general warranty clause for Texas deed); see also Gardner Energy Corp. v. McNeil, McNeil, & Holt, No. 08-23-00140-CV, 2023 WL 8937162, 10 The 1962 mineral deeds also conveyed to the grantee “the rights of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and storing, handling, transporting and marketing the same therefrom.” 14 at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 27, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (referring to the clause as a “warranty clause”); Barrow Shaver Res. Co. LLC v. NETX Acquisitions, LLC, No. 06-20-00081-CV, 2021 WL 3571394, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 13, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (referring to the clause as a “warranty/habendum clause”). As we noted in Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M Ranch, Ltd.: The warranty serves to indemnify the purchaser against a loss or injury he may sustain by a defect in the seller’s title. The warranty clause does not convey title nor does it determine the character of the title conveyed. Rather, it warrants that the same estate or any right, title, or interest therein has not been conveyed to any person other than the grantee and that the property is free from encumbrances. 192 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Farm & Ranch Invs., Ltd. v. Titan Operating, L.L.C., 369 S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Stewman Ranch, 192 S.W.3d at 811). Accordingly, the warranty clause in the 1962 mineral deeds upon which Appellants rely did not convey title, nor did it determine the character of the title conveyed by the 1962 mineral deeds. See Stewman Ranch, 192 S.W.3d at 811 (citing Davis v. Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 424–25 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Under the holding in Piranha Partners, the grantors in the 1962 mineral deeds expressed their intent to convey a lesser estate because they only granted a portion of what they owned. See Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 748. By doing so, it was unnecessary for the grantors to reserve or except the executive right interest they owned in excess of the executive right attributable to the 1/24 mineral interest they each owned in order for them to retain this additional executive right interest. See id. To the extent that Anadarko can be read to require a reservation or exception of an additional executive right for it to be retained by the grantor in a 15 conveyance where the grantor only conveys a partial interest, we disagree with its holding. We conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted the 1962 mineral deeds based upon the language of the deeds themselves. The grantors in the 1962 mineral deeds did not convey the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest11 that they also owned because they only conveyed their collective 1/8 ownership interest in the minerals. Appellants additionally assert a policy reason for why the 1962 mineral deeds should be construed as conveying the disputed 1/8 leasehold interest. They contend that the trial court’s construction of the 1962 mineral deeds would permit an improper “naked” executive right. Appellants base this contention on the quantum of royalty interest they assert was reserved by the grantors in the 1958 High Crest deed—a question that we later address in this opinion. We note at the outset that in Nicholson, the Texas Supreme Court made a passing reference to a naked executive right wherein it stated: “To the extent uncertainty exists as to whether ownership of an executive right absent any associated mineral or royalty interest is permissible, we need not address it here because Texas Outfitters owned both the executive right and an associated mineral interest.” 572 S.W.3d at 656 n.13 (citing Monika U. Ehrman, One Oil and Gas Right to Rule Them All, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2018) for the proposition that few cases involve an executive interest without an associated mineral or royalty interest). This statement in Nicholson suggests that the Texas Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the purported impermissibility of a naked executive interest. See id. 11 To clarify, the “disputed 1/8 leasehold interest” refers to the additional, collective 1/8 executive right interest owned by the grantors of the 1962 mineral deeds that they owned in addition to the collective 1/8 interest in the minerals that they owned. 16  Appellants first cite Day for the proposition that an executive right interest cannot be “naked” and that it must be appurtenant to some other attribute of the mineral estate. In Day, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the nature of the executive right. 786 S.W.2d at 668–69. In doing so, it noted its prior precedent in Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Cain, 355 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1962), wherein it had determined that the executive right is a not an interest in land, but rather was a power of appointment with “its scope and extent . . . governed by the instrument creating it.” Id. at 669 (quoting Cain, 355 S.W.2d at 510). The court in Day overruled Cain by holding that the executive right “is an interest in property, an incident and part of the mineral estate like the other attributes such as bonus, royalty and delay rentals.” Id. Appellants rely on a statement in Day that quotes the dissenting opinion in Cain: “the executive right reserved by the grantor ‘was a property right, an interest in land, appurtenant to the mineral interest therein conveyed, and for the use and benefit of the mineral interest retained and owned by [the grantor].’” Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669 (quoting Cain, 355 S.W.2d at 511 (Smith, J., dissenting)). Appellants’ reading of Day is incorrect. Immediately before citing the statement from the dissenting opinion in Cain, the court in Day stated: “Even when [the executive right] is severed from the other rights or attributes incident to the mineral estate, it remains an interest in property.” Id. This statement in Day recognizes that the executive right can be severed from the other rights that make up the mineral estate. Id. As such, the executive right is severable from the other rights that make up the mineral estate, and it remains an independent interest in property after severance. See id. Appellants also cite the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’s opinion in Luckel v. White for the proposition that “the executive right, unlike other attributes of the mineral estate, must remain ‘appurtenant to’ some other mineral interest.” See 17 Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 489 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). The court of appeals in Luckel cited Day for this proposition. Id. For the reasons expressed in the preceding paragraph, we respectfully disagree with this reading of Day. Legal commentators have opined that under Day, the executive right can be held exclusively from the rest of the mineral estate and can therefore be a naked right. Christopher Kulander, Big Money vs. Grand Designs: Revisiting the Executive Right to Lease Oil & Gas Interests, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 39–42 (2009) (collecting secondary authorities). As summarized by Professor Kulander: In the end, (a) case law in Texas gives no indication that the executive right is not completely alienable as a separate stick within the bundle of interests that comprise the mineral estate; (b) Day appears to all but settle the question that the executive rights, shorn of all other mineral interests, can be held exclusively; and (c) legal commentators seem to agree that the executive right can be held exclusive of all other mineral rights within the mineral estate. Id. at 42. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court’s statement in Nicholson regarding the “uncertainty” of the permissibility of a naked executive right indicates that the court did not prohibit a naked executive right in Day. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d at 656 n.13. Thus, Day does not preclude a naked executive right. See Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669. To the contrary, its language suggests that a naked executive right interest is permissible. See id. Accordingly, the trial court’s construction of the 1962 mineral deeds, which we conclude was correct, did not create an impermissible naked executive right because an executive right may be “naked” under Texas law.12 We overrule Appellants’ first issue. Based on our construction of the 1958 High Crest deed as set out below, the disputed 1/8th 12 leasehold interest that was retained by the grantors to the 1962 mineral deeds did not constitute a naked executive right. 18  Joinder In their second issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred by denying PetroLegacy’s motion to abate and compel the joinder of all interest holders that claimed under the 1958 High Crest mineral deed. Their second issue is directed at their subsequent joinder request, which they sought in response to Jase’s motion for partial summary judgment. In PetroLegacy’s motion to abate, it sought to compel Jase to join “all persons that succeeded to any part of the interests of the Grantors or the Grantee in approximately 25,286.58 acres under the 1958 High Crest Deed.” Specifically, it alleged that “these parties have or claim an interest that would be affected by the declaration sought” by Jase in Jase’s second motion for partial summary judgment. Appellants assert that the trial court erred by only requiring the joinder of parties who owned interests in the same acreage that was the subject of Element’s claim to the disputed 1/8 leasehold estate, which was smaller in size to