Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00364-CV ___________________________ MELISSA HOLLMANN AND SCOT HOLLMANN, Appellants V. VAN SHAW, Appellee On Appeal from the 236th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 236-267402-13 Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION Courts presume that the Legislature “understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.” The wisdom or expediency of a law is for the Legislature to determine, not this Court. Enron Corp. v. Spring Ind. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1996) (citations omitted). This is an appeal from a final judgment after a bench trial. This case has been ongoing since 2013 with a long and convoluted history. In short, Appellants Melissa and Scott Hollmann (the Hollmanns) were judgment creditors of Paul Kramer and PK Industries d/b/a Castlegate Homes. To satisfy their judgment against Kramer (underlying judgment), the Hollmanns sought to recover funds owed to him from his former employer, Poly America, LP (PA). Appellee (Shaw) had a competing claim to PA’s funds owed to Kramer. PA interpleaded the funds (interpleaded funds) into the registry of the court. The trial court ultimately entered judgment that Shaw recover on his claim for the interpleaded funds. Because the trial court found that the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment upon which their claim was based had become dormant, and also because they failed to prosecute their claim for the interpleaded funds with due diligence, the court rendered judgment that the Hollmanns recover nothing on their claim for the interpleaded funds. The trial court also awarded trial and conditional appellate attorney’s fees to Shaw from the Hollmanns under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.009 (TDJA), denied the Hollmanns their request for attorney’s fees under the TDJA, and assessed court costs against the Hollmanns. We 2 will affirm the trial court’s judgment except that we (1) will modify the judgment to carry 7.5 percent post judgment interest instead of 8.5 percent and (2) will reverse the attorney’s fee award to Shaw and remand that issue to the trial court to determine a just and equitable fee when properly segregated. A. Background Because of the lengthy history of this case, we will set out only those matters pertinent to our disposition of the case. This case was originally filed on August 13, 2013, by Shaw against PA as an application for writ of garnishment claiming that PA owed monies to Kramer under a noncompete agreement and that Kramer owed Shaw money pursuant to a default judgment that Shaw had acquired. Another party, David Bell, intervened on October 24, 2013, claiming an interest in those same funds held by PA,1 while Shaw nonsuited his application for writ of garnishment on the same day. The Hollmanns intervened in the case on November 11, 2013, claiming to have a judgment dated April 25, 2011, against Kramer in the amount of $695,986.95 plus postjudgment interest at five percent. The Hollmanns claimed that they should recover the funds owed by PA to Kramer in satisfaction of their judgment debt, asked for a writ of garnishment of the funds owed by PA to Kramer, and made liability claims against Kramer and his company, PK Industries, Inc. 1 Bell alleged that Shaw had assigned to him the default judgment that Shaw had acquired. 3 As of March 7, 2017, PA, having previously deposited $120,000 into the registry of the court, interpleaded an additional sum of $240,000, disclaimed any interest in these funds, and asked the court to determine to whom the funds should be distributed. No writs of garnishment or attachment were ever issued against PA or the interpleaded funds. Thereafter, Bell and Kramer2 nonsuited their claims against the interpleaded funds, leaving only the Hollmans seeking distribution of the interpleaded funds. On June 4, 2019, Shaw, who was still in the case as a defendant to claims raised against him by the Hollmanns, counterclaimed against the Hollmanns asserting various causes of action, including a claim for declaratory relief that the interpleaded funds were rightfully his by virtue of an earlier note and assignment from Kramer. He also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. Shaw’s crossclaim against Kramer for recovery on a debt owed to him by Kramer was also still pending. With this background established, we will focus directly on the matters related to this appeal—the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for Shaw against Kramer on Shaw’s debt claim against Kramer, the court’s denial of the Hollmanns’ claim to the interpleaded funds, the factual sufficiency of the proof of Shaw’s attorney’s fees due to segregation problems, and the judgment interest rate. Kramer had asserted claims against PA. 2 4 1. Shaw’s Summary Judgment Against Kramer Shaw’s summary judgment motion against Kramer was based on his crossaction filed on June 2, 2014. In that crossclaim, Shaw alleged in bare conclusory fashion that he had loaned Kramer money that had not been repaid as required, constituting a breach of contract resulting in injury to Shaw. He sought recovery of attorney’s fees for prosecution and collection of the debt claim. Nowhere in the crossclaim did Shaw assert a claim for declaratory judgment or attorney’s fees under the TDJA against anyone. In his summary judgment motion, Shaw contended that Kramer had judicially admitted in certain of his pleadings the existence of the loan note, the principal amount of $200,000, and the interest rate of 10 percent per annum. Shaw’s affidavit established that the loan remained unpaid and that the outstanding indebtedness as of April 1, 2024 was $465,000. Shaw also contended that Kramer admitted that the note assigned the PA noncompete payments (interpleaded funds) owed to Kramer to Shaw for the loan repayment. Shaw contended that the Hollmanns had no standing to contest the note since they were strangers to the transaction. The Hollmanns filed a response to Shaw’s motion for summary judgment. The Hollmanns contended that the motion sought recovery beyond recovery on the note, meaning recovery of the interpleaded funds. They further contended that the note in question was owed by Paul Kramer Construction LLP, not Paul Kramer, individually, whereas the funds in the court registry were owed to Paul Kramer, individually, and the note did not assign those payments in satisfaction of the LLP’s note. Finally, without 5 citing legal authority, the Hollmanns addressed Shaw’s objection that they did not have standing to oppose the summary judgment motion. They argued that they had standing because the parties were competing for the interpleaded funds and defeating the summary judgment would benefit their claim to the funds. The Hollmanns also objected to the admissibility of the evidence relied upon in the summary judgment motion. The response did not raise limitations as a defense. Shaw replied. In addition to providing legal authorities to support his position, he pointed out that Kramer had guaranteed the LLC’s loan and that the assignment of the PA noncompete payments was part of the repayment terms of the loan. Shaw also raised the dormancy of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment to argue that they had no enforceable claim to the interpleaded funds. By order dated February 6, 2025, the trial court granted Shaw’s Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding His Claim Against Paul Kramer, ordering judgment for Shaw against Kramer for $465,000, plus postjudgment interest as allowed by law. The order did not specify any reasons for the ruling, did not address attorney’s fees, did not rule on any evidentiary objections, and did not address claims for declaratory relief or disposition of the interpleaded funds. 2. Trial Court’s Denial of Hollmanns’ Claim to Interpleaded Funds At the time of trial, the Hollmanns’ live pleadings were (1) Eighth Amended Petition Consisting of Their Request for Distribution to Them of the Funds Currently in The Registry of This Court or Other Equitable Relief as Respects Such Funds, and 6 (2) Answer to Shaw’s Second Amended Counterclaim and Request for Declaratory Relief. Shaw’s live pleadings at trial were (1) Second Amended Counterclaim and Request for Declaratory Relief and (2) Answer to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amended Petition. a. The Hollmanns’ Trial Pleadings In their Eighth Amended Petition, the Hollmanns sought recovery of the interpleaded funds because they were funds that had been owed to Kramer, against whom they had their underlying judgment. They also sought declaratory relief that Shaw was not entitled to the interpleaded funds because, they alleged, Kramer’s note to Shaw and the assignment of the Kramer noncompete payments to Shaw were “bogus, and the agreement is void or voidable and of no force and effect.” The Hollmanns also alleged that the “necessary prerequisites” to allow Shaw a valid claim to the interpleaded funds had not been satisfied. Finally, they sought recovery of their attorney’s fees although no specific statutory basis was stated. The Hollmanns’ Answer to Shaw’s Second Amended Counterclaim and Request for Declaratory Relief included a general denial and the following “affirmative defenses”: Shaw’s alleged promissory note referenced in his Second Amended Counterclaim is invalid, bogus, and of no force and effect as to the interpleaded funds; Shaw’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations or laches; Shaw’s tortious interference with contract/judgment claim is non-actionable; Kramer’s assignment to Shaw was unenforceable, voidable, or void; the Hollmanns’ actions taken in court to collect on their underlying judgment were privileged and justified; the Hollmanns’ 7 position regarding the interpleaded funds is that of a superior financial interest as to Shaw; estoppel; attorney’s fees under the TDJA; and Shaw lacked capacity to challenge the Hollmanns’ right to the interpleaded funds under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Sections 34.001 and 31.006. b. Shaw’s Trial Pleadings In Shaw’s Second Amended Counterclaim and Request for Declaratory Relief, Shaw alleged that he had loaned Kramer monies on various occasions. In particular, Shaw had loaned Kramer Construction Group, LLC the sum of $200,000, which Kramer had fully guaranteed individually. Additionally, Kramer individually executed a promissory note to Shaw for $200,000. Shaw alleged that both notes were due, owing, and unpaid and that the interpleaded funds should be paid to him to satisfy Kramer’s debt. Shaw further alleged that the Hollmanns had tortiously interfered with his contract with Kramer and his entitlement to collect the monies owed him from the interpleaded funds, seeking unspecified damages. Shaw also alleged that the Hollmanns were engaged in a “Continuing Tort” by making “frivolous and groundless claims against [him] for purposes of harassment and other improper motives.” He additionally sought declaratory relief that: (1) the interpleaded funds rightfully belonged to him; (2) the underlying judgment relied upon by the Hollmanns to support their claim to the interpleaded funds had become legally dormant and unenforceable; (3) Kramer’s assignment of the PA payments/monies (interpleaded funds) to Shaw was part of a promissory note and is not subordinate to or subject to any priority of the Hollmanns, 8 or alternatively, the interpleaded funds rightfully belong to Shaw for repayment of the $200,000 loan; (4) the Hollmanns failed to prosecute their lawsuit with diligence, entitling Shaw to dismissal of all claims for want of prosecution; (5) the Hollmanns have no claims against Shaw or anyone else in their Eighth Amended Petition and are not entitled to any remedy asserted in such petition; and (6) such other declarations as are required and equitable related to the foregoing declarative requests. Shaw requested actual, compensatory, and exemplary damages in addition to the interpleaded funds. Finally, he sought recovery of attorney’s fees for trial and appeal. In his Answer to Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amended Petition, Shaw pled a general denial. He raised the following “affirmative defenses”: (1) the Hollmanns’ failure to prosecute their claim with reasonable diligence requires dismissal for want of prosecution; (2) the Hollmanns’ claims are barred by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 34.001; (3) the Hollmanns’ claims are barred by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 31.006, as any judgment upon which they claim has been extinguished or waived, is dormant, and was not timely revived; and (4) the Hollmanns’ claims are barred by limitations, waiver, estoppel, laches, unclean hands, contributory negligence, release, failure of conditions precedent, and fraud. Shaw also sought relief under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 10.001, et seq. for the Hollmanns’ litigating for the last ten years for an improper purpose, including to harass or cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly increase the costs of litigation, seeking a take-nothing judgment against the Hollmanns, court costs, and attorney’s fees. 9 3. Factual Sufficiency of the Proof of Shaw’s Attorney’s Fees Due to Segregation Problems Shaw’s lawyer provided the only evidence of his attorneys’ fees. While his qualifications were not disputed, the Hollmanns contend that the court’s award of attorneys’ fees was not just or equitable because, in part, the fees were not segregated between causes of action for which recovery is authorized and those for which such recovery is not authorized. 4. Interest Rate The Final Judgment provided for postjudgment interest at 8.5 percent. The Hollmanns contend that the proper rate should be 7.5 percent. 5. Judgment Denying Hollman Claims 3 a. Denial of Claim to Interpleaded Funds Whether enforcement of a judgment is barred as dormant by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 34.001 is a question of law that we review de novo. Abrams v. Salinas, 467 S.W.3d 606, 609, 611 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). Likewise, whether a party’s effort to collect on a judgment constitutes a “writ of execution” under Section 34.001 is a question of law that we review de novo. Keith M. Jensen, P.C. v. Briggs, We need not address Hollmanns’ issues regarding the trial court’s alternative 3 ground of dismissal for want of prosecution because of our affirmance of the trial court’s take-nothing judgment based on dormancy of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 10 No. 02-14-00096-CV, 2015 WL 1407357, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). b. Denial of Recovery of Attorney’s Fees under TDJA Under the TDJA a trial court has the discretion to award a nonprevailing party its costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just. Severs v. Mira Vista Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 559 S.W.3d 684, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied). We review a trial court’s ruling under the TDJA regarding attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Id. Reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees are questions of fact, whereas the question of whether to award attorney’s fees as equitable and just is a question of law. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Comm’rs Ct. of Wise Cnty. v. Mastropiero, No. 02-22-00383-CV, 2023 WL 3017941, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 493–94 (Tex. 2019) (discussing factors to consider in determining reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees). Whether it is just and equitable to award attorney’s fees depends not on direct proof but on the concept of fairness in light of all the circumstances of the case. Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162 (Tex. 2004). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we consider (1) if the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, to which we apply the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review, and (2) if the trial court erred in its application of that discretion, 11 i.e., whether, based on the evidence before it, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Mastropiero, 2023 WL 3017941, at *4. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to rule arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its ruling is based on conflicting evidence and some evidence of substantive and probative character supports its decision. Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009); Mastropiero, 2023 WL 3017941, at *4. 6. Judgment Granting Recovery of Shaw’s Attorney’s Fees Since Shaw’s award of attorney’s fees was also based on the TDJA, the same standards of review apply to his award, so we will not repeat them. We will, however, address the concept of segregation. Where a claimant seeks recovery on multiple causes of action, some of which allow for recovery of attorney’s fees and some of which do not, the claimant has the burden to segregate those fees for which recovery is allowed from those for which no recovery is allowed. Jackson Walker, LLP v. Kinsel, 518 S.W.3d 1, 27 (Tex. 2015); Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006). This duty “is not satisfied by simply suggesting that the causes of action for which fees are and are not recoverable required proof of the same set of facts and circumstances.” Jackson Walker, LLP, 518 S.W.3d at 27. “[I]ntertwined facts alone do not make unrecoverable fees recoverable.” Id. “[I]t is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P., 212 S.W.3d at 313–14. 12 “Contemporaneous billing records are not required to prove that the requested fees are reasonable and necessary. Nevertheless, billing records are strongly encouraged to prove the reasonableness and necessity of requested fees when those elements are contested.” Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 502 (internal citations omitted). The standard for proving reasonable attorney’s fees is by using the lodestar method, calculating the reasonable hours expended and multiplying that number by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 498. “Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services.” Id. “This base lodestar figure should approximate the reasonable value of legal services provided in prosecuting or defending the prevailing party’s claim through the litigation process.” Id. This presumptive calculation may be adjusted up or down based on certain factors not relevant to this case. See id. at 499–501. “General, conclusory testimony devoid of any real substance will not support a fee award.” Id. at 501. Generalities about tasks performed provide insufficient information for the factfinder to meaningfully review whether the tasks and hours were reasonable and necessary. City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013); El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 763 (Tex. 2012); Jurgens v. Martin, 631 S.W.3d 385, 418 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.). Failure to provide evidence of what fees are reasonable and necessary combined with failing to segregate fees or offer evidence 13 of the “inextricably intertwined” nature of the fees results in failure to segregate requiring reversal. NP Anderson Cotton Exch., L.P. v. Potter, 230 S.W.3d 457, 467 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). B. Analysis 1. Summary of Issues and Holdings The Hollmanns present ten issues on appeal: 4 a. Does Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 34.001 No Execution on Dormant Judgment . . . apply to the Hollmanns’ request for distribution of funds from the Registry when such funds were previously deposited there by virtue of actions the Hollmanns took earlier in the trial court to collect on their [underlying] judgment? [Issue 1] b. Even if [Section] 34.001 [is] applicable, was the Hollmanns’ [underlying] judgment “dormant,” which prevented the funds in the Registry from being distributed to the Hollmanns, when the Hollmanns’ earlier collection actions in the trial court caused funds owed to the judgment- debtor to be deposited in the Registry long before the [underlying] judgment became “dormant”? [Issue 2] c. Even if [Section] 34.001 applied and the Judgment was “dormant,” did the actions of debt filed by the Hollmanns in the trial court revive their [underlying] judgment under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.006 “Revival of Judgment” . . . ? [Issue 3] d. Did Shaw have standing to claim the Hollmanns’ [underlying] judgment was dormant when he was not the judgment-debtor and was his claim to the funds otherwise without merit as a matter of undisputed facts? [Issue 4] Holdings on Issues 1–4: Overruled. 4 We have altered the formatting and capitalization of the issues. 14 e. Was the Trial Court’s award of $180,000 in attorney’s fees to Shaw not equitable or just under the circumstances related to the actions the Hollmanns took in the trial court? [Issue 5] Holding on Issue 5: Sustained as to the lack of segregation of fees. f. Was the trial court’s dismissal of the Hollmanns’ request for distribution of the funds in the registry for want of prosecution under Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(2) or pursuant to the trial court’s inherent power an abuse of discretion? [Issue 6] g. Was the trial court’s implicit denial of the Hollmanns’ explicit request that the case be reinstated an abuse of discretion? [Issue 7] Holding on Issues 6 & 7: We do not reach these issues. See Tex. R. App. 47.1. h. Was the trial court’s refusal to modify and correct the Final Judgment error given the meaningful and substantive errors it made in the Final Judgment and the Findings and Conclusions? [Issue 8] Holding on Issue 8: Overruled. i. Was the trial court’s refusal to make additional and amended findings of fact a meaningful error based on the legitimacy and importance of such findings to an appropriate resolution of the case? [Issue 9] Holding on Issue 9: Overruled j. Subject to and without waiving the Hollmanns’ argument herein that the trial court erred in awarding a Final Judgment to Shaw, did the trial court err by awarding post-judgment interest at 8.5% in violation of Finance Code [Section] 304.003 which limits such rate to 7.5% and in ignoring the Hollmanns’ request to properly calculate the post-judgment rate? [Issue 10] Holding on Issue 10: Sustained as to the correct rate of interest. 2. Issues 1–4 Discussed The first preliminary matter to be addressed is Shaw’s contention that the Hollmanns have not appealed from the trial court’s summary judgment for Shaw against 15 Kramer and the subsequent Final Judgment that incorporated that summary judgment and awarded Shaw the interpleaded funds. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020). While we disagree that the Hollmanns did not attempt to challenge the Final Judgment in this regard, our discussion below reflects that their challenge was waived due to inadequate briefing. As a result, that portion of the Final Judgment will be affirmed. As another preliminary matter, Shaw argues that there is no evidence of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment in the record. Shaw contends that the Hollmanns’ judgment was never admitted into evidence by the court and that the trial court’s taking judicial notice of the pleadings was ineffective because the underlying judgment was from another court and was not properly authenticated. See WorldPeace v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Elwell v. State, 872 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.); Penix v. State, 748 S.W.2d 629, 630–31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ). We disagree that there was no evidence of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment to support the trial court’s finding of fact. First, in its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that “On April 25, 2011, [the Hollmanns] obtained a judgment against [Kramer] in the 352nd Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. The judgment was in the amount of $863,781.13.” This court will defer to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014). Shaw does 16 not contest this finding’s factual correctness, only that it is not supported by the evidence. Judicial notice is mandatory if a party requests it and supplies the court with the necessary information. Off. of Pub. Util. Couns. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1994); Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 222–23 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. denied). Courts may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts at any stage of the proceedings and may take judicial notice of other courts’ records if given proper proof. Krishnan, 42 S.W.3d at 222–23. In Krishnan, a wrongful death suit in district court, at the plaintiffs’ request the trial court took judicial notice of a probate court order holding that there was no necessity of administration of the decedent’s estate and no requirement for the appointment of a personal representative. Id. The court of appeals held that judicial notice of that order was proper since the plaintiffs had filed and served certified copies of the motion and order from the probate court and the defense did not object. Id. In this case, the Hollmanns provided the trial court and opposing counsel with a certified copy of the Amended Final Judgment in their underlying case. It is a duplicate of the Amended Final Judgment attached to the Hollmanns’ Eighth Amended Petition except it is certified. Although the trial court did not admit the certified copy into evidence, it did take judicial notice of the pleadings on file. Shaw did not object to the tender of the certified copy. We may therefore infer that sometime prior to the rendition of judgment, the court properly took judicial notice of the certified copy of the 17 Amended Final Judgment in view of its Finding of Fact. See Sunbelt Builders v. Payne Concrete, No. 07-00-0387-CV, 2000 WL 1635711, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31, 2000, no pet.); Est. of Kidd, 812 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1991, writ denied). Thus, no further proof of the judgment was necessary. See Vaccaro v. Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., 655 S.W.3d 485, 489 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no pet.). The final preliminary matter to address is Shaw’s contention that the Hollmanns did not appeal the trial court’s judgment granting his plea to the jurisdiction, requiring an affirmance of the take-nothing judgment against the Hollmanns. Shaw’s plea was based on the dormancy of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment. However, Issues 1 through 4 challenge the trial court’s take-nothing judgment based on the dormancy of their judgment. The order granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction was part of the Final Judgment. We will therefore construe Issues 1 through 4 as encompassing the trial court’s ruling on the Plea to the Jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included.”); see also Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, 16 S.W.3d 829, 843–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). We will start our discussion of Issues 1 through 4 with Issue 4. The Hollmanns contend that Shaw has no standing to assert dormancy of their underlying judgment because that defense belongs only to the judgment debtor. The Hollmanns cite no legal authority in support of this contention and offer no legal analysis. It is therefore waived due to inadequate briefing. To assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief “must 18 contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal if he or she does not adequately brief that issue by providing supporting arguments, substantive analysis, and appropriate citations to authorities and the record. Carr v. Claudio, No. 01-22-00815-CV, 2024 WL 3187354, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 27, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Marin Real Est. Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 5 Even if the standing issue was not waived by inadequate briefing, it would be overruled. A person has standing to sue for an injury when the pleaded facts state a concrete and particularized injury, actual or imminent, not a hypothetical injury. Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 593 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex. 2020) (citing Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 155 (Tex. 2012)). When parties are asserting competing claims to an interpleaded fund, one may challenge the other’s right to the fund because its underlying claim is barred by limitations. McBryde v. Curry, 914 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied). A 5 The Hollmanns also argue that Shaw was not entitled to the interpleaded funds because his claim was barred by limitations, was behind their claim in priority, and was based on a “bogus and contrived transaction between Shaw and Kramer.” These arguments are likewise waived for inadequate briefing because they cite no legal authority and offer no substantive analysis. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). 19 party seeking to enforce a judgment is subject to the ten-year limitations period of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 34.001. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 34.001; Abrams v. Salinas, 467 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, no pet.); see also Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. 1983) (referring to Section 34.001’s predecessor statute as the “ten-year statute of limitation for the renewing and enforcement of judgments”). So, Shaw had standing to raise the dormancy of the Hollmann’s underlying judgment to enhance his claim to the interpleaded funds, just as the Hollmanns challenged Shaw’s claim against Kramer. Issue 1 asks whether Section 34.001 applies to the Hollmanns’ request for distribution of the interpleaded funds. The answer is “yes.” The Hollmanns contend that Section 34.001 is not applicable to their request for distribution because they were not seeking to execute on their underlying judgment; they “simply wanted the funds they caused to be deposited in the Registry to be distributed to them.” This simplistic statement misses the mark. In an interpleader action, there are two stages: In the first stage, the court determines whether interpleader is appropriate. Generally, the stakeholder is discharged from liability to the rival claimants in the first stage of the process [to] avoid the cost of additional litigation over the stake it once held, but to which it asserts no claim. In the second stage, after interpleader has been determined to be appropriate, the rival claimants litigate their differences. Clayton v. Mony Life Ins. Co. of Am., 284 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.). When, as here, multiple parties claim interpleaded funds, each claimant must prove its own claim to the funds and its “relative priority as to all other claimants.” 20 CCPA Enter., Inc. v. Bedford Hosp. Inv., LLC, No. 02-17-00382-CV, 2019 WL 5608230, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Branch v. Monumental Life Ins., 422 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); McBryde, 914 S.W.2d at 620. Thus, both the Hollmans and Shaw had a duty to prove their entitlement to the interpleaded funds, and merely asking for distribution was not sufficient.6 Shaw raised the dormancy of the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment, in essence a limitations plea, as a defense to their entitlement to the interpleaded funds. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 34.001(a); McBryde, 914 S.W.2d at 620. Section 34.001 provides, in pertinent part, (a) If a writ of execution is not issued within 10 years after the rendition of a judgment of a court of record or a justice court, the judgment is dormant and execution may not be issued on the judgment unless it is revived. (b) If a writ of execution is issued within 10 years after rendition of a judgment but a second writ is not issued within 10 years after issuance of the first writ, the judgment becomes dormant. A second writ may be issued at any time within 10 years after issuance of the first writ. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 34.001. 6 Although the Hollmanns’ and Shaw’s initial pleadings were applications for writs of garnishment, no writs were actually issued. PA deposited the funds into the court registry as an interpleader. When an alleged garnishee places funds into the court registry as an interpleader, the rules of garnishment no longer apply. Daniels v. Pecan Valley Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 383 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). 21 The underlying judgment on which the Hollmanns were relying to create their right to the interpleaded funds was rendered on April 25, 2011. In the absence of the issuance of a “writ of execution” on or before April 25, 2021, their underlying judgment became dormant. So, what is meant by the phrase “writ of execution?” In holding that a turnover order was not a writ of execution, we stated in Keith M. Jensen, P.C., Under the rules, “[a]n execution is a process of the court from which it is issued,” Tex. R. Civ. P. 622, through which a judgment creditor can enforce a judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 621. A writ of execution is issued by the clerk of the court where the judgment was signed, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 622, 627, and must comply with the following requirements: The style of the execution shall be “The State of Texas.” It shall be directed to any sheriff or any constable within the State of Texas. It shall be signed by the clerk or justice officially, and bear the seal of the court, if issued out of the district or county court, and shall require the officer to execute it according to its terms, and to make the costs which have been adjudged against the defendant in execution and the further costs of executing the writ. It shall describe the judgment, stating the court in which, and the time when, rendered, and the names of the parties in whose favor and against whom the judgment was rendered. A correct copy of the bill of costs taxed against the defendant in execution shall be attached to the writ. It shall require the officer to return it within thirty, sixty, or ninety days, as directed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Tex. R. Civ. P. 629. Once delivered to any sheriff or constable in Texas, the writ empowers the officer to levy on a debtor’s nonexempt real and personal property within the officer’s jurisdiction and sell the property. Tex. R. Civ. P. 622, 637, 646a, 649. 22 2015 WL 1407357, at *3; see also Lavizadeh v. Moghadam, No. 05-18-00955-CV, 2019 WL 6799756, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a turnover order was not an execution that would trigger a duty to indemnify under a trust agreement). It is uncontroverted that no “writ of execution,” as so defined, was issued on the Hollmanns’ underlying judgment. But the Hollmanns contend that their filing of their Petition in Intervention, Application for Writ of Garnishment and Third-Party Petition resulted in PA’s acknowledging their garnishment claim and disclaiming any rights in the interpleaded funds. They also point to their Amended Petition, Second Amended Petition, Fourth Amended Petition, Fifth Amended Petition, and Sixth Amended Petition where they continued to pursue their claims against the interpleaded funds. However, PA’s Original Answer to the Hollmanns’ Application for Writ of Garnishment did not actually acknowledge anything other than the existence of competing applications for writ of garnishment, and it mentioned nothing about writs having been issued and served in accordance with the rules. In fact, the Hollmanns’ Petition did not request service on PA and served the Petition only on PA’s attorney by email and certified mail. We do not find this argument persuasive. We held in Keith M. Jensen, P.C. that “the only method provided under [S]ection 34.001 to prevent a judgment from becoming dormant is the issuance of a writ of execution. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code [ ]§ 34.001.” 2015 WL 1407357, at *6 (emphasis added). 23